I. SUMMARY

1. Through two different petitions submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter "the Commission") by the non-governmental organizations Centro de Estudios y Acción para la Paz (CEAPAZ) and the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) (referred to jointly hereinafter as "the petitioner"), on March 27, 1991 and April 10, 1991, respectively, it was alleged that the Republic of Peru (hereinafter "Peru," "the State," or "the Peruvian State") violated the human rights of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca, when they were detained on March 14, 1991, by police personnel, and then disappeared. The State alleges that Messrs. Pacotaype Chaupín, Cayllahua Galindo, Cabana Tucno, and Huamán Vilca were not detained by police forces. The Commission concludes that Peru violated, to the detriment of the persons mentioned, the rights set forth at Articles 7, 5, 4, 3, and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter "the Convention" or "the American Convention"), in conjunction with Article 1(1), and makes pertinent recommendations to the Peruvian State.

II. PROCESSING BEFORE THE COMMISSION

2. On June 24, 1991, the Commission opened the case, transmitted the pertinent parts of the complaint to the Peruvian State, and asked that it provide information within 90 days. The State answered on July 22, 1991. Petitioner CEAPAZ, who followed the processing of the case before the Commission, submitted observations on the State's answer on September 3, 1991. Both parties submitted additional information on several occasions. On May 26, 1999, both parties were asked to provide updated information on the case to the Commission, and they were told that the Commission was placing itself at their disposal to try to reach a friendly settlement. The State, on July 30, 1999, declared that it did not consider it advisable to pursue a friendly settlement. Accordingly, the Commission considered the possibility of reaching a friendly settlement exhausted.

III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. The petitioner

3. Petitioner indicates that as of December 1990, the General Police of the locality of Chuschi, in the district of Chuschi, province of Cangallo, department of Ayacucho, had been demanding that a Ronda de Defensa Civil, or civilian defense patrol, be formed. The local authorities had refused to do so, to avoid becoming victims of a direct confrontation with the insurgent armed groups and because there
was a Comité de Vigilancia contra el Terrorismo (Anti-terrorism Vigilance Committee), which was supporting the General Police station. Petitioner further alleges that the police in that place were irritated at the civilian and community authorities, since they opposed police detentions of the local people, perpetrated for the purpose of demanding food from family members in exchange for the release of the detainees.

4. Petitioner notes that on March 14, 1991, at 5:00 p.m., an Army patrol from the Military Base at Pampacangallo, made up of approximately 25 soldiers, entered the locality of Chuschi, district of Chuschi, province of Cangallo, department of Ayacucho, and stationed themselves at the local General Police station.

5. Petitioner indicates that at 11:30 p.m., Second Lieutenant PNP-PG Luis Bobadilla Cuba, also known as "Largo" ("the long one"), Sergeant PNP-PG Morales Ampia, also known as "Brujo" ("warlock") and two other members of the General Police Station for the district of Chuschi, searched several domiciles there, looking for the civilian and community authorities, and detained the mayor, Mr. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, the secretary of the local council, Mr. Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Lieutenant-Governor Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Mr. Isaías Huamán Vilca. The petitioner has produced the testimony of witnesses to the detentions and later transfer of the detainees to the Military Base at Pampacangallo, including of Mrs. Yrena Huamaní, the wife of Martín Cayllahua Galindo; Mrs. Francisca Tucno de Pacotaype, the wife of Mr. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín; María Julia Cayllahua de Huaycha, sister of Mr. Martín Cayllahua Galindo; Mrs. Teófila Rocha, the wife of Mr. Marcelo Cabana Tucno; and Messrs. Julio Mejía Rojas, Julio Núñes Galindo, Rufino Galindo Micuylla, Serapio Vilca Galindo, Demetrio Galindo Quispe, Daniel Núñes Huamani, Faustino Mejía Galindo, and Aquilino Mendoza Cayllahua, who on the night of the facts in question were serving as watchmen at the square in Chusqui, by order of the police, and in that capacity noted that there was no attack by armed groups, but that instead the members of the police and military faked that attack.

6. Petitioner states that the mayor, Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, was married to Mrs. Francisca Tucno Chipana, and was the father of five children, Adolfo, Adela, Rómulo, Rafael, and Ronal Pacotaype Tucno. Council Secretary Martín Cayllahua Galindo was married to Mrs. Yrena Huamaní Conde, and had four children: Víctor Alex, Roger Santos, Nieves, and Inés Cayllahua Huamaní. Lieutenant-Governor Marcelo Cabana Tucno was married to Mrs. Teófila Rocha Pacotaype.

7. Petitioner notes that while the police carried out the searches and detentions, the members of the military supported them by shooting firearms and setting off three explosive artifacts in different parts of the locality, trying to make it seem that there was an incursion by armed groups.

8. Petitioner adduces that the detainees' wives, and the people in general, met in an assembly immediately when these events took place, and went to the police station, at 3:00 a.m. on March 15, 1991, to protest the detentions. Nonetheless, the police denied having detained the victims.

9. Petitioner argues that Messrs. Pacotaype Chaupín, Cayllahua Galindo, Cabana Tucno, and Huamán Vilca were taken, bound and hooded, to the local police station, where they remained until 5:00 a.m. of that early morning of March 15,
1991, on which occasion military troops, accompanied by members of the General Police, took them to the Military Base at Pampacangallo. The group of detainees, military, and police was followed by the detainees' wives, and by other women from the locality, first on foot and then in a bus. The group went through Uchuiri and through Ccatarara. Along the way, the military seized the vehicle of Mr. Zenobio Quispe and forced Mr. Orlando Quicaña to drive them to Huaccanca-Ccasa, after which they walked two kilometers with the detainees, to the Military Base at Pampacangallo. Even though the transfer of the detainees and their entry into that base was observed by the wives and several witnesses, the military officers at the Pampacangallo Base denied they were detained there.

10. Petitioner says that the relatives of the victims, several local residents, and non-governmental organizations took many actions to try to win the victims' release. These actions were carried out before the local and national authorities, in the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of government. In this context, on March 14, 1991, Yrena Huamaní, Francisca Tucno de Pacotaype, and Teófila Rocha directed a written communication on the events to the Superior Prosecutor for Human Rights in Huamanga, and later lodged complaints with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Criminal Matters of Ayacucho, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cangallo, before the Office of the Principal Prosecutor of Ayacucho, and before the Attorney-General of the Nation. An acción de garantías was also pursued. In addition, steps were taken before the Human Rights and Justice Committee of the Senate, and before the Prefect for the Libertadores-Wari region. On March 19, 1991, a habeas corpus was filed before the investigative judge of Cangallo, Ayacucho. The press also reported in detail on the facts. Notwithstanding all these steps that were taken, the victims never appeared.

11. Petitioner notes that the Senate of the Republic designated an Investigative Commission, which, after a detailed study, concluded that there were serious indicia that the perpetrators of the detention-disappearance of the victims were members of the Peruvian National Police and the Peruvian Army, among them Second Lieutenant of the Peruvian National Police General Police Luis Juárez Aspiro, Communications Lieutenant of the Peruvian Army Collins Collantes Guerra, and Lieutenant-Colonel of the Peruvian Army Carlos Ruiz Camargo. The petitioner attached a copy of the report issued by that Investigative Commission.

B. The State

12. The State answered on July 22, 1991, and alleged that based on information in the hands of the Ministry of Defense of Peru, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces determined as follows:

1. That on March 14, 1991, a patrol from the Peruvian Army alerted the Second Lieutenant and Chief of the "Chusqui" Territorial Control Post of the entry to Pomabamba of 40 subversive criminals, who, based on the information from the residents, had retreated to Chusqui, and so that Chief of Post took the appropriate measures in the face of a possible subversive attack, withdrawing the Army patrol on March 14, 1991, at approximately 21:00 hours, to the Pampa Cangallo base, and arriving on March 15, 1991.
2. Based on information from the Chief of the "Chusqui" Territorial Control Post, this police locale was the target of harassment by firearms, explosives, and harangues calling for armed struggle from the side of a hill, on March 15, 1991, and the attack was repelled.

3. That on March 15, 1991, a group of community members went to the Territorial Control Post of Chusqui, informing them that the previous evening unknown persons removed from their homes citizens Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín (district mayor), Martín Cayllagua Galindo (council secretary), Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca, and took them to an unknown destination.

4. That in the face of the order by the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman at Ayacucho, effectuated through official communication Nº 100-91-MP-FED of March 19, 1991, in official communication Nº 229-K3/2DA D1/21.01, the Command of the Huamanga Front responded that those citizens were had not been detained, in any circumstances whatsoever, by military personnel of that Front.

13. On October 6, 1992, the State submitted an additional communication in which it reiterated the terms of its prior communication, noted above, and indicated that it was compiling additional information through the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation.

14. On October 20, 1992, Peru reported that according to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cangallo, on May 12, 1992, criminal indictments were handed down against police agents Luis Juárez Aspero, Domingo Morales Ampudia, Luis Bobadilla Cuba, Stalin Ribera Herrera, and José Leiva Casaverde, for committing the crimes of violation of personal liberty and abuse of authority to the detriment of mayor Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín and others, and that an investigation had been opened on May 18, 1992, and arrest warrants had been issued.

15. On December 18, 1992, Peru reported that once the investigations had concluded, it was determined that the members of the National Police stationed in the district of Chuschi did not participate in the alleged detention/disappearance that is the subject of this case.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Considerations on admissibility

The Commission now analyzes the admissibility requirements of a petition established in the American Convention.

a. Subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction based on time and place of the events

16. The allegations in this case describe facts that would be violative of several rights recognized and enshrined in the American Convention that took place within the territorial jurisdiction of Peru when the obligation to respect and guarantee the rights established therein were in force for the State.[1] Therefore, the IACHR
has subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction based on when and where the alleged violations took place, so as to be able to take cognizance of the merits in the case.

b. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

17. The fact that the first stages of the process, i.e., within the first 90 days that it was given to provide information about the facts alleged, the State did not present any objection on grounds of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, will be sufficient for the Commission to consider the requirement established at Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention to have been met.

18. The Commission recently decided, together, a group of 35 cases that involved 67 persons disappeared in various departments of Peru during the period from 1989 to 1993, and analyzed in detail the general phenomenon of disappearances in Peru. In those reports the Commission notes that habeas corpus was the adequate remedy in cases of disappearance for trying to find a person presumably detained by the authorities, to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if possible, to secure his or her release. The IACHR also concluded that for the purposes of admissibility of complaints before this body, it was not necessary to file a habeas corpus remedy—or any other—for the purpose of exhausting domestic remedies, since from 1989 to 1993 there was a practice or policy of disappearances ordered or tolerated by various public authorities that rendered the habeas corpus remedy totally ineffective in cases of disappearance. In those reports the Commission found as follows:

As stated earlier, the relatives of the victims applied on numerous occasions to various judicial, executive (military), and legislative authorities to locate the victims and secure their release. These efforts usually included writs of habeas corpus; complaints to the Attorney General, the Chief Prosecutor in San Martín, the Special Attorney for Human Rights in San Martín, the Office of the Special Ombudsman, and the Offices of the Provincial Prosecutors; and appeals to the Ministry of Defense, the Army High Command, the Office of the Inspector General of the Army, the Political-Military Commander in Chief, and the commanding officers at the military bases concerned. Despite all these efforts, the victims were never located and never reappeared.

All these procedures and appeals by the relatives of the victims proved fruitless, because the same people who had allegedly brought about the disappearances and who hid the evidence played a key part in the results of the investigations. None of the writs of habeas corpus was successful in any of the cases. Likewise, the complaints filed with the offices of the government prosecutors led to little more than a request for information from the military, who would deny the detention. The cases were then shelved without ever being brought before the competent court of the first instance. It should be added that generally the Peruvian Government’s replies to the Commission denying responsibility for the disappearances are based precisely on photocopies, sent to the Commission, of official communications in which the military itself denies having carried out the arrests.
The Commission considers it important to provide certain clarifications regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies in connection with the forced disappearances in Peru. In this regard, it should be noted that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held, in connection with the exhaustion of domestic remedies, that, "in keeping with the object and purpose of the Convention and in accordance with an interpretation of Article 46 (1)(a) of the Convention, the proper remedy in the case of the forced disappearance of persons would ordinarily be *habeas corpus*, since those cases require urgent action by the authorities" (and it is) "the normal means of finding a person presumably detained by the authorities, of ascertaining whether he is legally detained and, given the case, of obtaining his liberty." Thus, when a writ of *habeas corpus* is presented in the case of persons who were detained and then disappeared, and nothing comes of it because the victims are not located, those are sufficient grounds for finding that domestic remedies have been exhausted.

However, the Court has also ruled that domestic remedies must be effective, that is, they must be capable of producing the results for which they were intended, and that if there is proof of a practice or policy, ordered or tolerated by the government, the effect of which is to prevent certain persons from availing themselves of internal remedies that would normally be available to all others, resorting to those remedies becomes a senseless formality, so that the exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies provided for in Article 46(2) of the Convention would be fully applicable.

In its analysis of the substance of the case, set forth in section VI below, the Commission finds that, during the period in which the alleged events took place, there existed in Peru a practice or policy of disappearances, ordered or tolerated by various government authorities. For that reason, and given that that practice rendered writs of *habeas corpus* completely ineffective in cases of disappearances, the Commission finds that, for purposes of admissibility of complaints before this Commission, it was not necessary to attempt the *habeas corpus* remedy--or any other--in order to exhaust domestic remedies. Consequently, the Commission considers that the rule regarding exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(2) of the Convention is fully applicable.[2]

19. The Commission considers the foregoing considerations fully applicable to this case, as it involved an alleged forced disappearance in 1991 imputed to the Peruvian Army. The disappearance alleged in this case occurred during the time (1989-1993) when, the Commission determined, as set forth in the reference cited above, that there was a practice or policy of disappearances ordered or tolerated by several public authorities that rendered the habeas corpus remedy completely ineffective in cases of disappearance, thus the Commission established that for the purpose of the admissibility of complaints before the Commission, it was not necessary to bring a *habeas corpus* action--or any other--for the purpose of exhausting domestic remedies. Therefore, the Commission concludes that this case
fits within the exception at Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention, according to which the exhaustation requirement laid down at Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention is not applicable when "the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated."

c. **Time period for submission**

20. With respect to the requirement set forth at Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention, according to which the petition must be submitted within six months from the date on which the victim is notified of the final judgment that exhausted domestic remedies, the Commission observes that this requirement does not apply in this case. This is because the exception to the exhaustation requirement at Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention, as set forth in the previous paragraph, also holds--by mandate of Article 46(2) of the Convention--for the requirement concerning the time for submission of the petitions provided for at the Convention.

21. The Commission, without prejudging on the merits, should add that the forced disappearance of a person by state agents constitutes a continuing violation by the State that persists, as a permanent infraction of several articles of the American Convention, until the person or corpse appears. Therefore, the requirement concerning the time period for submission of petitions, set forth at Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention, does not apply to such cases.

d. **Duplicity of procedures and res judicata**

22. The Commission understands that the subject matter of the petition is not pending before any other procedure for international settlement, nor does it reproduce a petition already examined by this or any other international organization. Therefore, the requirements established at Articles 46(1)(c) and 47(d) are also satisfied.

e. **Characterization of the facts**

23. The Commission considers that the petitioner's presentation refers to facts which, if true, could characterize a violation of rights guaranteed in the Convention, for, as established *supra*, the issue submitted to the Commission is the forced disappearance of several persons.

24. For all the reasons set forth above, the Commission considers that it has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case, and that pursuant to Articles 46 and 47 of the American Convention the petition is admissible, in the terms set forth above.

B. **Considerations on the merits**

25. Having determined its jurisdiction to hear this case, and that in keeping with Articles 46 and 47 of the American Convention the petition is admissible, the Commission now moves on to set forth its decision on the merits, bearing in mind that the parties did not agree to initiate a friendly settlement
procedure, and that the Commission already has sufficient grounds to make a decision on the merits.

a. **State practice of disappearances**

26. In relation to the analysis of the merits of the present case, the Commission regards as pertinent to reiterate the following considerations concerning the practice of forced disappearances in Perú that the Commission set forth recently, when it decided an accumulated group of 35 cases involving 67 "disappeared" persons in different provinces of Perú during 1989-1993. To this respect, the Commission ruled in the following terms, which completely ratifies in the present case:

… the Commission decided to combine the cases under review because it considers that the alleged events suggest a pattern of disappearances brought about by Peruvian State agents around the same time period (1989-1993), within the context of what are called anti-subversive activities, and employing the same *modus operandi*.

The Commission therefore decided to look into the possible existence of a practice of forced disappearances brought about by the Peruvian State, or at least tolerated by it, during the period in question (1989-1993). The Commission cannot ignore, to use the words of the Inter-American Court, "the special seriousness of finding that a State Party to the Convention has carried out or has tolerated a practice of disappearances in its territory." Nonetheless, it is crucial that the Commission, in accordance with the functions assigned to it, carry out that analysis, not only for the purposes of this report, but also to arrive at the truth regarding a policy of human rights violations, with all its possible repercussions for the clarification of other cases that have come to the attention of this Commission.

In this regard, it should be pointed out that the criteria used to evaluate evidence in an international court of human rights have special standards, which empower the Commission to weigh the evidence freely and to determine the amount of proof necessary to support the judgment.

The *modus operandi* used, according to the petitions received by the Commission, in the arrests and disappearances in the cases in question, involving Messrs. (...), shows an overall pattern of behavior that can be considered admissible evidence of a systematic practice of disappearances.

The Commission has received a very large number of complaints of disappearances in Peru, many of which pertain to multiple disappeared persons. In its 1993 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, the Commission discussed the problem of the forced disappearance of persons in that country and indicated that it had already passed 43 resolutions regarding individual cases involving 106 victims. Subsequently, the Commission has continued to write reports on the matter. Moreover, the Peruvian State itself has officially recognized the
existence of forced disappearances and has reported on 5,000 complaints of disappearances between 1983 and 1991. The large number of complaints of this type is a clear indication, in the Commission’s view, that disappearances in Peru followed an official pattern devised and carried out in a systematic manner.

This indication is supported by the fact that, at the United Nations (UN), the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1980, had received 3,004 cases of forced disappearances in Peru. That Group points out that:

The vast majority of the 3,004 cases of reported disappearances in Peru occurred between 1983 and 1992, in the context of the Government's fight against terrorist organizations, especially the "Shining Path" (Sendero Luminoso). In late 1982, the armed forces and police undertook a counter-insurgency campaign and the armed forces were granted a great deal of latitude in fighting Shining Path and in restoring public order. While the majority of reported disappearances took place in areas of the country which had been under a state of emergency and were under military control, in particular in the regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, San Martín, and Apurímac, disappearances also took place in other parts of Peru. Detentions were reportedly frequently carried out openly by uniformed members of the armed forces, sometimes together with Civil Defense Groups. Some 20 other cases reportedly occurred in 1993 in the Department of Ucayali and concerned largely the disappearance of peasants.

Dr. Imelda Tumialán, the ad hoc Provincial Prosecutor for the Department of Junín, has placed on record that in 1991 there were more than 100 disappearances in that Department. Likewise, in a note dated January 9, 1992, Peru's Assistant Attorney General pointed out that in the first 11 months of 1991 there had been 268 complaints of disappearances, and that only a few cases had been solved. For its part, the National Coordinating Body for Human Rights in Peru, a recognized nongovernmental umbrella group of various Peruvian human rights organizations, estimates that 725 persons disappeared in Peru between 1990 and 1992. The Commission has been told that reports circulating freely in Peru indicated that military personnel, and in some cases police officers, were carrying out disappearances. The Commission has received numerous articles and news reports on such disappearances, published by the print media and others.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Commission concludes that in the 1989-1993 period there existed in Peru a systematic and selective practice of forced disappearances, carried out by agents of, or at least tolerated by, the Peruvian State. That official practice of forced disappearances was part of the "fight against subversion",...
although in many cases it harmed people who had nothing to do with the activities related to dissident groups.

**Perpetration of the disappearances**

On the basis of the various items of evidence mentioned above, the Commission sees fit to map out the steps usually involved in the above-mentioned official policy of disappearances:

**Detention of the victims**

The Commission has been told that, in general, perpetration of the disappearances was delegated to the political military commanders and the commanding officers at military bases. The latter imparted orders directly to the personnel who carried out the detentions, normally the first stage of the disappearance process. Peru's national police force was also in charge of perpetrating disappearances, usually through DINCOTE.

Most often the abduction and disappearance of a person began with information obtained by members of the intelligence service, according to which that person was in some way linked to subversive groups, chiefly the Shining Path or the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). It should be pointed out that in many instances the persons concerned were in no way involved with those subversive groups, but were unfortunate enough to have been included, fraudulently or by mistake, on the lists that would later lead to their disappearance.

Another factor that, in certain Departments and under particular circumstances, could lead to the detention and later disappearance of many people was the fact that they were not carrying their voter registration documents, which were used for identification purposes. In certain cases, during checkpoint operations on public thoroughfares, a person unable to produce an identification document upon request was almost automatically considered a terrorist.

Once a person was considered "suspect", he or she was arrested; on numerous occasions, this was the first step toward disappearance. Some arrests were carried out openly in public, others at the victim's home, usually in the early hours of the morning and in the presence of witnesses. Those charged with carrying out the detentions were heavily armed soldiers or police, sometimes dressed in civilian clothing, but most often in uniform.

Generally, the soldiers or police paid little attention to the witnesses and proceeded to do what they came to do anyway. Arrests in people's homes were usually carried out in front of whoever happened to be there: wives, children, fathers, mothers, etc. Thus the normal pattern was for the personnel to arrest the victim regardless of who might be present, with no attempt to hide the official nature of what they were doing.
Official denial of the detentions

The same day of the arrest, or in the days immediately following, relatives would go to the place where the victim was detained and be told that he or she was not being held. It should be stressed that since the arrests were usually carried out publicly, the relatives knew where the victim had first been detained. Nevertheless, the authorities denied the detention. As the Commission has established previously:

The fact that the military authorities deny having carried out the detention thus merely confirms the clandestine nature of the military operations. Detention is neither registered nor officially admitted, in order to make it possible to employ torture during interrogation and if need be to apply extrajudicial punishment to persons considered to be sympathizers, collaborators, or members of the rebel groups.

A variation on this practice consisted of the authorities alleging that the victim had been released and even producing documents to show this, sometimes with a forgery of the victim’s signature, others with his or her real signature obtained under torture, when in fact the release had never taken place.

Torture and extrajudicial execution of detainees

When the victim did not die as a result of the torture inflicted, he or she was generally executed in summary, extrajudicial fashion. The bodies were then hidden by burial in secret places chosen to make their discovery practically impossible.

Amnesty for those responsible for the disappearances

In general, cases of disappearance in Peru were not seriously investigated. In practice, those responsible enjoyed almost total impunity, since they were carrying out an official State plan. Despite that, the authorities decided to go even further by passing Act Nº 26.479 (the "Amnesty Act") in 1995. Article 1 of that Law grants a blanket amnesty to all members of the security forces and civilian personnel accused, investigated, indicted, prosecuted, or convicted for human rights violations committed between May 1980 and June 1995. That law was later strengthened by Act Nº 26.492, which prohibited the judiciary from ruling on the legality or applicability of the Amnesty Law. In its annual reports for 1996 and 1997, the Commission has addressed the issue of those amnesty laws in the overall analysis of the human rights situation in Peru.

Although the Commission has been told that both laws can be rendered inapplicable by Peruvian judges, through what is known as their "broad powers" to rule on the constitutionality of laws—provided
for in Article 138 of the Peruvian Constitution--the Commission considers the aforesaid laws an invalid attempt to legalize the impunity that existed in practice with regard to forced disappearances and other serious offenses committed by agents of the State. For example, the Commission has learned that the judges of the Constitutional Court, who were removed by the Congress, invoked that same Article 138 of the Constitution in their December 27, 1996, finding that Act Nº 26.657 did not apply to President Alberto Fujimori.

The burden of proof regarding disappearances

The general principle is that, in cases of disappearance in which, in the Commission’s view, there is sufficient evidence that the arrest was carried out by State agents acting within the general framework of an official policy of disappearances, it shall be presumed that the victim’s disappearance was brought about by acts by Peruvian State agents, unless that State gives proof to the contrary.

Thus it is not incumbent upon the petitioners to prove that the victims have disappeared, because it may be assumed, for lack of proof to the contrary, that the Peruvian State is responsible for the disappearance of any person it has detained. This is even more important in view of the aforementioned government practice of causing disappearances. It is up to the State to prove that it was not its agents who brought about the disappearance of the victims.

Indeed, the "policy of disappearances, sponsored or tolerated by the Government, is designed to conceal and destroy evidence of disappearances". Then, as a result of action by the State, the petitioner is deprived of evidence of the disappearance, since "this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim." The fact is, as established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:

.... in contrast to domestic criminal law, in proceedings to determine human rights violations the State cannot rely on the defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained without the State’s cooperation.

The Commission has explained in this regard that when there is proof of the existence of a policy of disappearances sponsored or tolerated by the Government, it is possible, using circumstantial or indirect evidence, or through relevant logical inference, to prove the disappearance of a specific individual when that would otherwise be impossible given the link between that disappearance and the overall policy.

More recently, the Commission has also determined that:

The burden of proof lies with the State, because when the State holds a person in detention and under its
exclusive control, it becomes the guarantor of that person’s safety and rights. In addition, the State has exclusive control over information or evidence regarding the fate of the detained person. This is particularly true in a disappearance case where, by definition, the family members of the victim or other interested persons are unable to learn about the fate of the victim.

This establishes the inversion of the burden of proof for cases of disappearance in Peru and the effects of that inversion on cases being heard by the Commission.

Considerations relating to forced disappearances

The General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) has called the practice of the forced or involuntary disappearance of persons a crime against humanity that strikes against the fundamental rights of the human individual, such as personal liberty and well-being, the right to proper judicial protection and due process, and even the right to life. In that context, the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted, in 1994, an Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons as a means of preventing and punishing the forced disappearance of persons in our Hemisphere.

The Commission has affirmed, in relation to the forced disappearance of persons, that:

This procedure is cruel and inhuman. ... [It] not only constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of freedom but also a serious danger to the personal integrity and safety and to even the very life of the victim. It leaves the victim totally defenseless, violating the rights to a fair trial, to protection against arbitrary arrest, and to due process.

The UN Working Group on Enforced or InvoluntaryDisappearances has affirmed that the forced or involuntary disappearance of a person is a particularly odious violation of human rights, and is a doubly paralyzing form of suffering: for the victims, frequently tortured and in constant fear for their lives, and for their family members, ignorant of the fate of their loved ones, their emotions alternating between hope and despair, wondering and waiting, sometimes for years, for news that may never come. The victims are well aware that their families do not know what has become of them and that the chances are slim that anyone will come to their aid. Having been removed from the protective precinct of the law and “disappeared” from society, they are in fact deprived of all their rights and are at the mercy of their captors. If death is not the final outcome and they are eventually released from the nightmare, the victims may suffer for
a long time from the physical and psychological consequences of this form of dehumanization and from the brutality and torture which often accompany it.

The family and friends of disappeared persons experience slow mental torture, not knowing whether the victim is still alive and, if so, where he or she is being held, under what conditions, and in what state of health. Aware, furthermore, that they too are threatened; that they may suffer the same fate themselves, and that to search for the truth may expose them to even greater danger.

The family's distress is frequently compounded by the material consequences resulting from the disappearance. The missing person is often the mainstay of the family's finances. He or she may be the only member of the family able to cultivate the crops or run the family business. The emotional upheaval is thus exacerbated by material deprivation, made more acute by the costs incurred should they decide to undertake a search. Furthermore, they do not know when--if ever--their loved one is going to return, which makes it difficult for them to adapt to the new situation. In some cases, national legislation may make it impossible to receive pensions or other means of support in the absence of a certificate of death. Economic and social marginalization is frequently the result.[3]

b. Facts established

27. In keeping with the doctrine of the Commission outlined above, the general principle is that in cases of disappearance in which there are sufficient indicia of evidence, in the view of the Commission, that the detention was presumably effectuated by State agents in the general context of an official policy of disappearances, the Commission will presume that the victim was disappeared by agents of the Peruvian State, unless that State has proven otherwise.

28. In applying the aforementioned considerations to this case, the Commission, in relation to the detention of the victims, observes that the petitioner alleges that Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaias Huamán Vilca were detained in the locality of Chuschi, district of Chuschi, province of Cangallo, department of Ayacucho, by members of the police posted locally, who acted with the support of members of the military from the Military Base at Pampacangallo. The Commission finds that the detention occurred at the victims' respective domiciles, while the police and military forces were simulating a confrontation with armed groups, and adds that the detainees were taken on March 15, 1991, to the Military Base at Pampacangallo, as observed by their wives and several witnesses, and that they later disappeared.

29. In this regard--and based on the facts narrated by the petitioner and the testimony it has pulled together by Mrs. Yrena Huamaní, the wife of Martín
Cayllahua Galindo; Mrs. Francisca Tucno de Pacotaype, the wife of Mr. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín; Mrs. María Julia Cayllahua de Huaycha, sister of Mr. Martín Cayllahua Galindo; Mrs. Teófila Rocha, the wife of Mr. Marcelo Cabana Tucno; and Messrs. Julio Mejía Rojas, Julio Núñes Galindo, Rufino Galindo Micuylla, Serapio Vilca Galindo, Demetrio Galindo Quispe, Daniel Núñes Huamani, Faustino Mejía Galindo, and Aquilino Mendoza Cayllahua, who on the night of the facts served as watchmen posted in the square in Chusqui; the modus operandi of the detention; and all the other evidentiary indicia, including the detailed report prepared by the Investigative Commission designated by the Senate of the Republic, the steps and remedies pursued internally aimed at locating and winning the release of the victims, the reports prepared by the police and military denying that the detentions were carried out by members of the police or military, without the Peruvian State having carried out a serious judicial investigation into the grave events, in addition to which is the circumstance that those detentions occurred in 1991, during a time when, as established by the Commission, there was a systematic and selective practice of forced disappearances carried out by Peruvian State agents, or at least tolerated by the State--the Commission concludes that it has sufficient grounds for establishing the veracity of the facts alleged, with respect to the victims' detention. [4]

30. Based on the foregoing, the Commission accepts as true that the victims were detained in their respective domiciles on March 14, 1991, in the locality of Chuschi, district of the same name, province of Cangallo, department of Ayacucho, by locally-stationed police, who acted with support from members of the military from the Military Base at Pampacangallo. That detention occurred while the police and military forces simulated a confrontation with armed groups; the next day, on March 15, 1991, the victims were taken to the Military Base at Pampacangallo, as was observed by their wives and several other witnesses.

31. Therefore, and consistent with the above-mentioned doctrine of the Commission, the Peruvian State had the burden of proving that it did not disappear Messrs. Pacotaype Chaupín, Cayllahua Galindo, Cabana Tucno, and Huamán Vilca. In this connection, the Commission observes that the State did not provide any evidence tending to show that it did not disappear Messrs. Pacotaype Chaupín, Cayllahua Galindo, Cabana Tucno, and Huamán Vilca; rather, it denied that it had detained them.

32. Based on the reasons set forth above, the Commission concludes that the Peruvian State, through members of the police stationed locally, acting with the support of members of the military from the Military Base of Pampacangallo, detained Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaias Huamán Vilca on March 14, 1991, in the locality of Chuschi, district of Chuschi, province of Cangallo, department of Ayacucho, and that it later proceeded to disappear them.

33. That detention and subsequent disappearance followed the characteristic pattern: the detention of the victims by military agents; an official denial of responsibility for the disappearance; the failure of the public authorities to carry out an investigation into the situation of the victims; the ineffectiveness of domestic remedies; the torture and possible extrajudicial execution of the victims; and absolute impunity, reinforced by the subsequent amnesty.

c. Violation of the victims' human rights
34. The Commission now proceeds to analyze the specific violations by the Peruvian State of the rights set forth in the Convention implicit in the disappearance of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca.

**Right to Personal Liberty (Article 7 of the Convention)**

35. The American Convention establishes:

   Article 7. Right to Personal Liberty

   1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security.

   2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.

   3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.

   4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him.

   5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.

   6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws provide that anyone who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these remedies.

   7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of duties of support.

36. A detention is arbitrary and illegal when not carried out for the reasons, and according to the formalities, established by law; when carried out without adherence to the standards established by law; and when it involves misuse of the authority to arrest—in other words, when carried out for purposes other than those envisaged and stipulated by law. The Commission has also pointed out that detention for improper ends is, in itself, a form of penalty without due process, or extralegal punishment, which violates the guarantee of a fair trial.
In this case, Peruvian citizens Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca were illegally and arbitrarily detained by members of the Peruvian Army.

It is necessary to recall the circumstances in Peru at that time, which generally affected most of the Departments where detentions and disappearances occurred. Continuous raids by armed groups had generated permanent unrest in the local population. For that reason, a "state of exception" had been declared in various Departments, which was, prima facie, justified by the crisis faced by the Peruvian State in fighting terrorism. By virtue of that state of emergency, in numerous Departments Article 2(20)(g) of the 1979 Constitution had been suspended, which meant that the military was legally empowered to detain a person without a warrant from a competent judge, even if an individual was not being caught in flagranti.

Despite the prima facie legality of this measure, the security forces are not thereby entitled, without restrictions, to detain citizens arbitrarily. The suspension of the judicial warrant requirement for detention does not mean that public officials are exempted from observing the legal requirements for such detentions, nor does it annul jurisdictional controls over the manner in which detentions are carried out.

The suspension of the right to personal liberty authorized in Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights can never be absolute. There are basic principles at the heart of any democratic society that the security forces must respect in order to carry out a detention, even in a state of emergency. The legal prerequisites for detention are obligations that State authorities must respect, in keeping with their international commitment under the Convention to protect and respect human rights.

Secondly, in accordance with those principles, preventive detention by the military or police must be designed solely to prevent the escape of a person suspected of having committed a crime and thereby ensure his appearance before a competent court, either for trial within a reasonable period of time or for his release. No State may impose a sentence without a trial. In a constitutional, democratic State in which the rule of law and the separation of powers are respected, all penalties established by law should be imposed by the judiciary after guilt has been established in a fair trial with all the procedural guarantees. The existence of a state of emergency does not authorize the State to disregard the presumption of innocence, nor does it confer upon the security forces the right to exercise an arbitrary and unlimited ius puniendi.

On this subject, Article 7(5) of the American Convention establishes that "Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released...." Paragraph 6 of that article adds: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention (...)". The Commission has also stated that anyone deprived of his liberty must be kept in an officially recognized detention center and brought, without delay, in accordance with domestic legislation, before a competent judicial authority. Should the authority fail to comply with this legal obligation, the State is
duty-bound to guarantee the detainee’s right to apply for an effective judicial remedy to allow judicial verification of the lawfulness of his detention.

43. The Commission concludes that the Peruvian State is responsible for violating the right to personal liberty and security by arbitrarily imprisoning Peruvian citizens Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca; for violating their right of recourse to a competent judge or court that would rule on the lawfulness of their arrest; and, thereby, for violating Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

Right to Humane Treatment (Article 5 of the Convention)

44. The American Convention establishes:

Article 5. Right to Humane Treatment

1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.

2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.

4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.

5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors.

6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.

45. Since forced disappearance involves violation of multiple rights, violation of the right to humane treatment is implicit in the cases of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca.

46. In this regard, the Court has stated that "prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication are in themselves cruel and inhuman treatment, harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the person and a violation of the right of any detainee to respect for his inherent dignity as a human being. Such treatment, therefore, violates Article 5 of the Convention, which recognizes the right to the integrity of the person....".[7]
Accordingly, the Commission, on the basis of the facts presented, is convinced, by way of presumptive evidence, that Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca were tortured. The circumstances in which the victims were detained, kept hidden, isolated, and in solitary confinement, and their defenselessness as a result of being denied and prevented from exercising any form of protection or safeguards of their rights make it perfectly feasible for the armed forces to have tortured the victims with a view to extracting information about subversive groups or units. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the Peruvian State violated the rights guaranteed to the victims under Article 5 of the Convention.

**Right to Life (Article 4 of the Convention)**

48. The American Convention establishes:

Article 4. Right to Life

1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The application of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply.

3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it.

4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related common crimes.

5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women.

6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the competent authority.

49. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that the forced disappearance of persons "often involves secret execution without trial, followed by concealment of the body to eliminate any material evidence of the crime and to ensure the impunity of those responsible. This is a flagrant violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4 of the Convention...". The Court also ruled that the fact that a person has disappeared for seven years creates a reasonable presumption that he or she was killed.⁸
50. In the cases of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca, it has been established their “disappearance” by State agents, and there is sufficient evidence to support the presumption that they are dead—given that more than nine years have elapsed since their detention and disappearance—and the presumption that those responsible are agents of the State.

51. Therefore, the Commission finds that the Peruvian State violated the victims’ right to life, a fundamental right protected under Article 4 of the Convention, which states that "Every person has the right to have his life respected... No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."

**Right to Juridical Personality (Article 3 of the Convention)**

52. The American Convention establishes:

Article 3. Right to Juridical Personality

Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.

53. Article 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes that every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law. When Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca were detained and then "disappeared" by State agents, they were excluded from the legal and institutional framework of the Peruvian State. In that sense, the forced disappearance of persons constitutes the negation of their very existence as human beings recognized as persons before the law.[9]

54. Thus, the Commission finds that Peru violated the victims’ right to recognition as persons before the law, enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention.

**Right to Judicial Protection (Article 25 of the Convention)**

55. The American Convention establishes:

Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection

1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.

2. The States Parties undertake:

   a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state;
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and

c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

56. From the information provided by the parties, it is clear that the Peruvian State has not complied with its obligation to investigate the facts of this case and initiate judicial proceedings.

57. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that the principles of international law "refer not only to the formal existence of such remedies, but also to their adequacy and effectiveness, as shown by the exceptions set out in Article 46(2)."[10] It has also made it clear that the failure to provide effective, not merely formal, judicial remedies not only entails an exception to the rule that domestic remedies must be exhausted, but also constitutes a violation of Article 25 of the Convention.[11]

58. Peruvian law establishes that in all cases of offenses against the public order, the Office of the Attorney General represents both the State and the victim. The Office of the Attorney General is obligated to participate in investigating and prosecuting the crime. Consequently, it should promote and undertake whatever action may be required (provision of evidence, inspections, or any other) to establish the veracity of the complaint, to identify those responsible, if applicable, and to bring criminal charges against them.

59. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights confirms the provisions of domestic law when it refers to the obligation of States and says, with regard to the previous point, that "The State has a legal duty (...) to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation."[12]

60. The State must not evade, under any pretext, its duty to investigate a case involving violation of fundamental human rights. The Court says as much when it states that "the investigation... must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the... family... without an effective search for the truth by the government."[13]

61. The right to be brought before a competent judge is a fundamental safeguard for the rights of any detainee. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, judicial supervision of detention, through habeas corpus, "performs a vital role in ensuring that a person's life and physical integrity are respected, in preventing his disappearance or the keeping of his whereabouts secret and in protecting him against torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or treatment."[14]

62. Precisely for that reason, Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights has established that essential judicial guarantees safeguarding certain fundamental rights cannot be suspended. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled, "from Article 27(1), moreover, comes the general requirement that
in any state of emergency there be appropriate means to control the measures taken, so that they are proportionate to the needs and do not exceed the strict limits imposed by the Convention or derived from it."[15]

63. The Court has also stated that the judicial nature of those means presupposes "the active involvement of an independent and impartial judicial body having the power to pass on the lawfulness of measures adopted in a state of emergency[16] and that "it must also be understood that the declaration of a state of emergency" whatever its breadth or denomination in internal law "cannot entail the suppression or ineffectiveness of the judicial guarantees that the Convention requires States Parties to establish for the protection of the rights not subject to derogation or suspension by the state of emergency."[17]

64. According to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, this also includes the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 8, which "includes the prerequisites necessary to ensure the adequate protection of those persons whose rights or obligations are pending judicial determination."[18] The Court concluded that "the principles of due process of law cannot be suspended in states of exception insofar as they are necessary conditions for the procedural institutions regulated by the Convention to be considered judicial guarantees."[19]

65. Such a lack of access to effective domestic remedies against acts that violate fundamental rights constitute a violation by the Peruvian State of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.

**Obligation to respect and guarantee rights**

66. In this case, it has been shown that the Peruvian State failed to comply with the obligation, set forth in Article 1(1) of the Convention, "to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms," because it violated rights established in Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 25 of the Convention.

67. The first obligation of States, under Article 1(1) of the Convention, is to respect the rights and freedoms of all persons subject to their jurisdiction. With regard to this obligation, the Court ruled that "under international law a State is responsible for the acts of its agents... and for their omissions, even when those agents act outside the sphere of their authority or violate internal law". It ruled also that "any violation of rights recognized by the Convention carried out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their position of authority is imputable to the State."[20]

68. The Commission concludes that the forced disappearance of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupin, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaisa Huamán Vilca were acts perpetrated by agents of public authority, and that, therefore, the Peruvian State violated the rights of those victims, enshrined in Article 1(1) of the Convention, in relation to violations of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 25 of the Convention.

69. The second obligation set forth in Article 1(1) is to ensure free and full exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention. On this the Court’s jurisprudence establishes that: "This obligation implies the duty of the States
Parties to organize the governmental apparatus, and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, States must prevent, investigate, and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention ..."[21]

70. In the event of a "forced disappearance", the State is obligated to ascertain the whereabouts and situation of the victim, punish those responsible, and make reparation to the family members. In the case at hand, these obligations have not been met. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Peruvian State has violated Article 1(1) of the Convention by failing to ensure the exercise of the rights and guarantees of the individuals involved.

V. PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO REPORT Nº 98/99

71. The Commission adopted Report Nº 98/99 (Article 50) in this case on September 28, 1999, during its 104th session. That Report, with the Commission's recommendations, was transmitted to the Peruvian State on October 18, 1999; the State was given two months to carry out the recommendations, counted from the date of transmittal of the Report.

72. By Note Nº 7-5-M/556, of December 17, 1999, the State transmitted to the Commission its considerations on Report Nº 98/99, and stated its disagreement with aspects of fact and of law reflected in that report, and with the conclusion the Commission reached. The State alleged that the case should not be admitted, on grounds that the petitioner failed to exhaust domestic remedies, and added that "the exception to exhaustion of domestic remedies provided for at Article 46(2)(a) of the American Convention on Human Rights does not apply to this case, as it is not true that there has been a practice or policy of disappearance ordered or tolerated by the public authorities in Peru."

73. The Peruvian State indicated its specific discrepancy with the conclusion of the IACHR at paragraph 77 infra, insisting in this respect that Messrs. Pacotaype Chaupín, Cayllahua Galindo, Cabana Tucno, and Huamán Vilca were not detained by members of the police. It added that "consequently, the recommendations of the IACHR are not admissible, especially when the investigation carried out in due course regarding the alleged detention and later disappearance of Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaias Huamán Vilca, considering the circumstances of terrorist violence, was serious and impartial, and did not determine that any agents of the Peruvian State were responsible."

74. Finally, the State indicated, with respect to amnesty laws 26.479 and 26.492, that "both provisions were approved by the Congress of the Republic in the exercise of the functions that the Constitution confers on it, and are part of the policy of pacification initiated by the Peruvian State."

75. The Commission refrains from analyzing the reiterations of the Peruvian State in response to arguments made prior to the adoption of Report Nº 98/99, and its expressions of disagreement with that Report, for pursuant to Article 51(1) of the Convention, what the Commission must determine at this stage of the procedure is whether the State did or did not resolve the matter. In this respect, the
IACHR observes that the Peruvian State has not carried out any of the recommendations made to it by the Commission in its Report No. 98/99.

76. With respect to Peru's allegation that the amnesty laws are consistent with the Peruvian Constitution, the Commission recalls that the Peruvian State, on ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights, on July 28, 1978, contracted the obligation to respect and ensure the rights set forth in it. In this regard, and in keeping with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Peruvian State cannot invoke its internal laws as justification for failure to comply with the obligations it assumed on ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights. Over the years, this Commission has adopted reports in several key cases in which it has had the opportunity to express its point of view and crystallize its doctrine with respect to the application of amnesty laws, establishing that such laws violate several provisions of both the American Declaration and the American Convention. These decisions, which are in agreement with the criterion adopted by other international human rights bodies regarding amnesties, have declared uniformly that both the amnesty laws and comparable legislative measures that impede or that determine the conclusion of the investigation and trial of State agents who may be responsible for serious violations of the American Convention or the American Declaration violate several provisions of those instruments. This doctrine has been confirmed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has established that the States Parties have the duty "to investigate human rights violations, prosecute the persons responsible, and prevent impunity." The Court has defined impunity as the failure to investigate, pursue, arrest, try, and sentence persons responsible for human rights violations, and has affirmed that the States have the duty to combat this situation by all legal means available, since impunity fosters the chronic repetition of such human rights violations, and the total defenselessness of the victims and their families. The States Parties to the American Convention cannot invoke provisions of domestic law, such as amnesty laws, to fail to carry out their obligation to guarantee the complete and correct functioning of the justice system.

VI. CONCLUSION

77. The Commission reiterates its conclusion that the Peruvian State, through members of the police from the local police station, who acted with support from members of the military from the Military Base of Pampacangallo, detained Messrs. Manuel Pacataype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca on March 14, 1991, in the locality of Chuschi, district of Chuschi, province of Cangallo, department of Ayacucho, and that it later proceeded to disappear them; consequently, the Peruvian State is responsible for violations of the right to liberty (Article 7), the right to humane treatment (Article 5), the right to life (Article 4), the right to juridical personality (Article 3), and the right to an effective judicial remedy (Article 25), set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights. In addition, it has breached its general obligation to respect and ensure the exercise of these rights set forth in the Convention, in the terms of Article 1(1).

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing analysis and conclusion,
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS REITERATES THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PERUVIAN STATE:

1. That it carry out an exhaustive, impartial, and effective investigation to determine the circumstances of the forced disappearance of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca, and that it punish the persons responsible, in keeping with Peruvian legislation.

2. That it void any domestic measure, legislative or otherwise, that tends to impede the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the persons responsible for the detention and forced disappearance of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca. Accordingly, the State should nullify Laws 26.479 and 26.492.

3. That it adopt the measures required for the family members of Messrs. Manuel Pacotaype Chaupín, Martín Cayllahua Galindo, Marcelo Cabana Tucno, and Isaías Huamán Vilca to receive adequate and timely reparation for the violations established herein.

VIII. PUBLICATION

78. On March 2, 2000, the Commission transmitted Report 16/00--the text of which precedes--to the Peruvian State and to petitioners, in accordance to Article 51(2) of the Convention, and granted Peru an additional period to comply with the recommendations set out above. On March 31, 2000, the State forwarded the Commission a note which reiterated its considerations pertaining to the conclusions of fact and of law of the Commission, and did not state that it had taken any action towards compliance with the recommendations made by the Commission.

79. According to the above considerations, and Articles 51(3) of the American Convention and 48 of the Commission’s Regulations, the Commission decides to reiterate the conclusion and recommendations set forth in chapters VI and VII above; to make public the present report and include it in its Annual Report to the OAS General Assembly. The Commission, according to the norms contained in the instruments which govern its mandate, will continue evaluating the measures adopted by the Peruvian State with respect to the above recommendations until they have been complied with by the Peruvian State.

Done and signed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the 13th of April 2000. (Signed): Hélio Bicudo, Chairman; Claudio Grossman, First Vice-Chairman; Juan Méndez, Second Vice-Chairman; Commissioners Marta Altoloaguirre, Robert K. Goldman, Peter Laurie and Julio Prado Vallejo.

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As mentioned in paragraph 28 supra, the Commission has noted, citing doctrine of the Inter-American Court, that when the existence of a policy of disappearances sponsored or tolerated by the Government has been proven, it is possible, through circumstantial or indirect evidence, or by pertinent logical inferences, to show the disappearance of a specific individual, which otherwise would be impossible, by a link between the specific disappearance in question and the general practice. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of July 29, 1988, para. 124.

According to which every person has the right: ... Article 20: ... to personal liberty and security. Consequently, (g) No one shall be detained except with a justified, written order or by police officers in flagrante delito.

The Commission has established that: The rationale behind this guarantee is that no person should be punished without a prior trial which includes a charge, the opportunity to defend oneself, and a sentence. All these stages must be completed within a reasonable time. The time limit is intended to protect the accused with respect to his or her fundamental right to personal liberty, as well as the accused personal security against being the object of an unjustified procedural risk. (IACHR, Report Nº 12-96, para. 76 (Case 11.245, Argentina), published in the 1995 Annual Report.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez case, op.cit., paragraph 156.

Idem paragraphs 157 and 188.

Article 1(2) of the declaration regarding protection of persons from forced disappearances defines disappearance as a violation of the norms of international law guaranteeing every human being the right to recognition as a person before the law. UN General Assembly resolution 47/133, december 18, 1992.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez case, op.cit., paragraph 63.


Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez case, op.cit., paragraph 174.

Idem, paragraph 177.


Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, op.cit., paragraph 30.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judicial Guarantees in State of Emergency, op.cit., paragraph 25.

Idem, paragraph 28.

Ibidem, paragraph 30.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez case, op.cit., paragraphs 170 and 172.

Idem, paragraph 166.


[27] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Loayza Tamayo, Judgment of Reparations of November 27, 1998, paragraph 168.