BASIC
COUNTRY INFORMATION
(Sources: The World Factbook 2000 [i] , Lonely Planet [ii] ):
Population,
July 2000 estimate: 24.7 million
Rural
population: 62.2 %
Urban
population: 37.8 %
Birth
Rate, 2000 estimate: 26.18 births/1000 population
Fertility
Rate, 2000 estimate: 3.09 children born/woman
Infant
Mortality Rate, 2000 estimate: 72.13 deaths/1000 live
births
Ethnicities:
80% Uzbeks, 5.5% Russians, 5% Tajik,
3%
Kazakh.
Languages:
Uzbek, Tajik, Farsi
Religion:
88% Sunni Muslim, 10% Christian,
2% Other
GDP,
1999 estimate: US$ 59.3 billion
GDP
per capita, 1999 estimate: US$ 2,500
Major
industries: cotton, fruit & vegetables, rice, gold
Unemployment
Rate, December 1996 estimate: 5% plus 10% underemployed
Literacy,
1996: Male and Female - 99%
Life
Expectancy at Birth, 2000 estimate: Male - 60.09 years
Female
- 67.52 years
Recent Political
History
The
Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan gained independence
from the Soviet Union in 1991. In December 1999, Uzbekistan
held a parliamentary election, followed by a presidential
election in January 2000. Despite official Uzbek claims
of progress towards electoral democracy, a group from
the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODI HR) of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) concluded the parliamentary election
fell far short of OSCE standards and the Office refused
to observe the presidential election in protest. [iii] The legislature is said to function as
President Islam Karimov’s rubber stamp. [iv]
The
collapse of the Soviet Union created conditions for the
revival of national identity and culture of Uzbek people.
Particularly, a wave of national self-awareness gave impulse
to traditional and religious views on the role of women
and gender relations, which had been suppressed before.
Different views on societal roles of women have become
a battleground between various political forces, including
religious fundamentalism, which seek to fill the ideological
vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet power. [v] In September 2000, Uzbekistan signed a
military cooperation agreement with Kyrgyzstan aimed at
countering the threat of Islamic militants. [vi]
Human
Rights and Freedom of Expression
Like
its Soviet predecessor, the Constitution of Uzbekistan
nominally guarantees a number of civil rights that its
citizens are in effect unable to exercise, such as freedom
of speech, association and assembly. Additionally, Uzbekistan
has acceded to more than a dozen international human rights
agreements, which theoretically take precedence over state
law. Despite standard rhetoric by President Karimov and
other Uzbek officials about the commitment to human rights
and gradual democratization, there has been no liberalization
of society nor evidence of serious intentions in that
direction. No political opposition is permitted, and
censorship remains as strict as ever: those who dare to
distribute opposition publications risk imprisonment.
Some experts state that official suppression of religious
groups appears to be encouraged by the heads of the religious
establishment, the official Muslim Muftiate and the Russian
Orthodox Church, which wish to maintain their privileged
and influential status. According to observers, however,
the systematic removal of moderate opposition forces could
open the way for more militant groups to take their place. [vii]
In
mid-1996, aware that Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record
was hampering its efforts to expand ties with Western
nations, gain greater access to development aid, and increase
foreign investment, the Uzbekistani leadership launched
a full-fledged public relations campaign to improve its
tarnished image. Steps were taken to cooperate with ousted
human rights monitors, and amnesties were granted to prisoners,
including political prisoners. (The amnesties were timed
to coincide roughly with President Karimov’s visit to
the United States in June 1996 and with the fifth anniversary
of Uzbekistan’s independence).
Media
Despite
calls for a more open press, blatant censorship — both
official and self-imposed—persists, and existing legislation
concerning media rights is not enforced. Uzbekistani
papers remain devoid of criticism of state policy, printing
instead approved reports from the government information
agency, information on President Karimov’s activities
and other politically acceptable items. There are no private
publishing houses, and government approval is required
for all publications. All newspapers are printed from
state-owned printing houses. These facilities can refuse
to print any newspaper if its editor does not confirm
that the committee overseeing media publications has cleared
the contents. Journalists who want to ensure that their
work is published practice self-censorship. The existing
independent television stations operate under tight official
control, including frequent demands from the government
officials to view programs before they air. [viii] The government has been known to shut
down media outlets critical of the government under the
pretext that they lack proper licensing. [ix] The Committee to Protect Journalists reported
in 1999 that two journalists of the opposition newspaper
Erk were imprisoned and tortured. [x]
Non-governmental
Organizations
In
1999, the government refused to register two major independent
human rights organizations. The Human Rights Society
of Uzbekistan (HRSU), a group with close ties to exiled
opposition figures, has sought registration unsuccessfully
since 1992. The independent Human Rights Organization
of Uzbekistan (IHROU), headed by the long time human rights
activist Mikhail Ardzinob, held its founding convention
and filed registration papers in 1997, but the government
has not yet formally approved or denied the application.
Women
and Culture
Societal
attitudes toward women in Uzbekistan are, to a large degree,
linked to dominant culture, low legal awareness, and the
lack of understanding that the protection of human rights
is an integral part of the democratization process. [xi]
According
to women’s activists in Uzbekistan, the sources of violence
against women are rooted primarily in cultural stereotypes.
The historic attitude in this region of male superiority
“over the weak reasoning of women” reinforce men’s despotic
treatment of women. Such attitudes are especially strong
with respect to family life.
The
pre-Soviet social status and lifestyle of Muslim women
in Central Asia was guided by Islamic Shari’a, based on
the segregation of sexes and the isolation of women from
social life. Secular behavior is disapproved as being
“non-Muslim.” For Uzbek women in Soviet times, equal
rights and employment outside the home existed alongside
traditional obedience in the family. Women’s desire for
independence was supported by the state but suppressed
in the family and community for the sake of preservation
of national and cultural identity. As a result of Soviet
government policy, the level of women’s representation
in administrative bodies and their professional qualifications
and education, including in rural areas, increased considerably.
At the same time, however, the deep influence of traditions
sanctioned by religion also was preserved.
Under
the banner of Islam’s revival, the propaganda of early
marriages, polygamy and submissive position of women reappeared
in numerous publications, culminating in 1991-1992. The
idea of independence grew in parallel with the revival
of Islam, national values and traditions. Therefore,
to a large part of society, the notion of “Uzbek woman”
has become identical to “Muslim woman.” The principles
of family and of local self-governing community (mahalla
[xii] ) have had a tremendous impact on the social
status of women in Uzbekistan, their participation in
economic and social life, and on how they view themselves.
According
to a survey carried out by the Women’s Resource Center
in 1995, in mahallas of Tashkent, 70 percent of
women with four children still wished to have more in
order to have one or more sons, in order to improve their
family standing.
These
post-independence developments have led to the decline
of the social status of Uzbek women since the beginning
of the 1990s. However, a return to the affirmative action
policy towards women in 1995 has created conditions to
strengthen their rights.
STATUS
OF WOMEN IN UZBEKISTAN UNDER SPECIFIC CEDAW ARTICLES:
CONVENTION
ARTICLES 1- 3: DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION;
POLICY
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION;
and
BASIC RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
According
to the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan,
all citizens of the country have the same legal status,
and they enjoy equal rights and freedoms irrespective
of sex, race, ethnic origin, language, religion, social
background, convictions, personal or social status (Article
18). One of the fundamental constitutional principles
is equality of rights for men and women (Article 46).
Although the Uzbek Constitution has no provisions that
would discriminate or injure the rights or freedoms of
women, it does not explicitly include a clause on non-discrimination
against women. [xiii] Article 2 of the newly adopted Family
Law, Article 45 of the Criminal Code, Article 6 of the
Labor Law all embody the principle of equality between
women and men.
[xiv]
By
a presidential Decree of 2 March 1995, the government
of Uzbekistan established a program of “Measures to Increase
the Role of Women in State and Public Construction in
the Republic of Uzbekistan” charged with monitoring the
implementation of the internationally adopted norms on
protection of interests of women, maternity and childhood.
According to Marfua Tokhtakhodjaeva, chair of the Women’s
Resource Center, the decree gave impetus to the creation
of branches of the Women’s Committee in every region of
Uzbekistan.
[xv] Also by the order of the President,
in hokimiats (local administrations) at all levels,
women are appointed as deputies to the administrative
heads (hokims).
Women’s
activists emphasize that despite its purpose of advancing
women on many different levels, the program’s impact has
been limited by its formal, bureaucratic and inflexible
approach and an unclear position on the issue of modernization
versus traditionalism, which has been gaining force in
the country. [xvi] For example, a monitoring action under
this program was carried out for the first time in 1999.
As a result, provincial hokimiats submitted information
which, according to activist Sayora Sharafovna Rashidova,
revealed that the objectives of the program were misunderstood.
The regional reports contained simple facts on violations
of women’s rights instead of information on efforts to
monitor compliance with human rights obligations. The
methodology was subsequently clarified by the Uzbekistan
Office of Ombudsman and sent to local governments. [xvii] The public awareness of these government
actions is very low, as little is information available
(either publicly or through the education system) about
the institutions designed to deal with discrimination
against women. [xviii] Despite the legal provisions allowing
individuals to sue for discriminatory practices, no recorded
cases have been filed. [xix] There are no legal courses or special
training courses on discrimination for law students, lawyers
or judges to raise their awareness. NGOs are the only
ones to have organized workshops and on these issues.. [xx]
Women
in Prisons
Although
there have been instances of both male and female prisoners
being threatened with rape, police tend to threaten women
frequently. In particular, according to Human Rights
Watch (HRW), “police made threats of rape against female
detainees in the presence of males relatives to force
the men to sign self-incriminating statements.” [xxi]
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 5: SEX ROLES AND STEREOTYPING
Stereotypes
in the Media
According
to Tokhtakhodjaeva, the fundamental problem facing women
and the women’s movement in Uzbekistan is the predominant
“mentality dominated by patriarchal values attaching a
secondary role to women.” [xxii] In the media, “alongside stereotypical
Soviet-style images of women standing by a machine at
a plant, or women on a plantation, there is a new image,
typical of patriarchal discourse - a blushing bride, a
mother sitting by the cradle, an elderly woman surrounded
by numerous relatives, and a woman running her home.”
[xxiii] :
Written and
oral declarations addressed to women display the perception
of a woman as a bearer of some decorative function: the
mode of all beautiful words addressed to her include some
share of indulgence like the praise of the patron addressed
to his subordinate. It is the cult of mother ruling by
the word of mouth that predetermines motherhood as major
function of a woman and, hence, determined perception
of the unmarried woman as an inferior creature, and of
childless woman as a monster. [xxiv]
Major
media outlets, such as the daily “Uzbekiston Adabiyet
va Sanati,” “Hurriyat,” “Oila va Jamiyat,” “Turkiston,”
“Vatan,” “Uzbekiston Ovozi,” “Khalk Suzi,” and others
publish materials calling for women to return to “the
bosom of the family and to refuse the prospect of a public
career.” [xxv] According to Tokhtakhodjaeva, “work with
small groups shows that domination of family values and
patriarchal relations does not only influence upon public
consciousness but upon women themselves. They accept
the subordinated position of women as a norm, where we
see the case of self-underestimation both regarding evaluation
of facts of violence against women when part of the guilt
is laid on the women herself.” As a result of the prevailing
values and norms and the ideal of a passive, submissive,
home object creates generations of women who are not ready
and eager, or even aware of participation in public life.
Marriage and family becomes the main life goal.
Different
Upbringing for Boys and Girls and Early Education
According
to activists, the different treatment of women starts
in the family where boys and girls are socialized in different
ways. As boys are typically allowed do many things and
activities that girls cannot do, girls are brought up
to see themselves as less than the boys. [xxvi]
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 6: PROSTITUTION AND TRAFFICKING
The
Criminal Code does not address prostitution directly.
Section V, Article 131 (Crimes Against the Family, Youth
and Morality) provides for fines of 25 to 50 percent of
the minimum monthly salary, correctional labor for up
to three years, or imprisonment for up to three years
with the confiscation of property for the maintenance
of brothels and procurement. [xxvii] Pimping is punishable under Article 131
of the Criminal Code. However, there is no public discussion
of the problem of prostitution, venereal diseases or AIDS,
as neither the government, media, or NGOs have addressed
the issue. Nevertheless, according to the IHFHR report,
levels of prostitution and pimping are on the rise in
Uzbekistan with the increase in poverty. This sometimes
happens with the cooperation of law enforcement. [xxviii] Prostitution rings typically operate from
hotel complexes and trading and leisure complexes. According
to International Helsinki Federation of Human Rights (IHFHR),
of special concern is a marked increase in underage prostitution
in the last few years. Prostitutes offer sexual services
for payments ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 (US$3 to 15). [xxix]
Several
international NGOs report that hundreds of girls and
young women are trafficked for work in the sex industry
abroad. For example, in one case, girls as young as 13
and 14 years old were provided with false passports and
sent to various countries, including the United Arab Emirates.
HRW reports that the “traffickers typically paid large
bribes to Uzbek law enforcement officials who agreed to
look the other way.”
[xxx] This practice often occurs as an extension
of the “shuttle” trade. The women are sent as tourists
with promises of employment as nannies, tutors or baby-sitters,
but they often end up working in the sex industry.
[xxxi]
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 7: POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LIFE
According
to women’s activists in Uzbekistan, an increase of women’s
participation in the State decision-making structures
is critical to their ability to participate in policy
making, particularly with respect to issues such as women’s
health. [xxxii] Women also have practically no role
in decision and policy-making in important new areas concerning
the economy, such as the issue of privatization. The
abolition of the Soviet era quota system for women brought
a sharp decline in their representation in national politics.
In the 1980s, there were 178 female members among the
deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbek SSR (34.9 percent).
In the Uzbek Parliament (Oliy Majlis) in 1994, there
were only 15 women (6 percent) out of a total of 240 seats.
[xxxiii] Currently, only 17 of the 250 members
of the Parliament, elected in November 1999, are women.
Women head two committees in the Parliament. The Deputy
Prime Minister is a woman, and she is also the head of
the Committee of Women of Uzbekistan.
[xxxiv] The only example of a woman being appointed
to a government position in an effort to increase their
representation was the appointment of Vice-Premier Gulyamova
by presidential decree. [xxxv] The share of women in highest administrative
and management positions, such as deputy ministers and
deputy directors of enterprises, now stands at 17.5 percent.
There are 13 women at the ministerial level. [xxxvi]
A similar trend has emerged at the local
level although women’s involvement is higher in local
and grassroots politics.
A
March 1995 decree issued by President Karimov on measures
to increase the women’s role in state and society, promised
women’s participation in decision-making at all levels.
According to the decree, the chairpersons of the women’s
committees are at the same time appointed as deputy of
hokims responsible for the social sector in administrative
bodies at regional, district and city levels. The president
decreed that the second in command of every mahalla
committee was to be woman, who would simultaneously act
as the ex-officio head of the mahalla’s Women’s
Committee. This Decree returns to the quota system and
develops affirmative action policy towards women. However,
despite government policies aimed at increasing women’s
political participation, much remains to be done to stimulate
women’s representation in the State structures and create
conditions conducive to such participation..
[xxxvii] In particular, women’s activists have
pointed out that the media could be used to promote modernization
and non-traditional roles for women. So far, conservative
forces have used the mass media to promote traditional
attitudes. [xxxviii]
Another
problem highlighted by women’s activists relates to the
prevailing cultural emphasis on the role of women as mothers
and wives, is a low interest of women in political and
public activities. According to Uzbekistani NGO reports,
only young and unmarried women display any interest or
activity. [xxxix]
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 10: EDUCATION
Currently,
Uzbekistan has a system of free and fee-paying educational
institutions. Primary education is compulsory—all children
must attend the first eight years of school. Nevertheless,
in families with many children, especially in villages,
eight years is usually the maximum. Children’s education
is accompanied by work in the field or at home; girls
are involved particularly in household tasks. According
to a report by the IHFHR, the majority of girls (about
1.7 million) have no access to secondary or higher education
or have to drop out of the educational system because
of poverty or early marriage. Especially in rural areas
it is common for girls to marry as early as 16. [xl] Although the number of children attending
school decreased in 1998 compared with 1997, there has
been no impact in higher education and specialized secondary
education upon women. Most female students are concentrated
in fields such as medical school and teaching careers.
According
to Sayora Sharafovna Rashidova, conditions have not been
created to enable and encourage women to continue education
at higher levels. Currently, as a result of negative
family attitudes and the burden of family responsibilities,
women are often forced to discontinue their education
once they start a family, which usually [xli] happens in their early 20s. [xlii] Sharafovna recommended some measures that
would enable young wives and others to continue education,
such as the development of special educational schedules
for breast-feeding mothers, the establishment of free
day-care centers attached to higher educational institutions,
the allocation of educational loans, and the creation
of televised courses. [xliii] Uzbekistan has been one of the few countries
where there is no connection between the level of education
and birth rate, and women still show high educational
achievement, but this trend may be changing.. [xliv]
Islamic
Schools for Girls
With
the religious revival in Uzbekistan following independence
from the SU, religious schools for girls opened. Educational
programs in these schools have emphasized the study of
religion and the promotion of traditional gender roles.
According to IHFHR, the government began an effort to
crack down on these institutions and on overt expressions
of religious beliefs in February 1999. [xlv]
It is unknown how many religious schools
for girls still exist in Uzbekistan and what the status
of these schools is in the country’s educational system.
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 11: EMPLOYMENT
Discrimination
in Employment
Tokhtakhodjaeva
reports that women who complete higher education do not
enjoy equal access with men to administrative and professional
positions carrying responsibility. Because statistics
in Uzbekistan are inadequate, she uses statistical data
for neighboring Kazakhstan, where she claims that the
situation is very similar, to show that one out of five
men with higher education holds an administrative position
compared with one out of seventeen women. According to
her, the situation in Uzbekistan may be worse. [xlvi] Moreover, women are discriminated against
based on age and family status. For instance, preference
is given to younger women with less experience and fewer
qualifications, and to women without children over women
with small children. Pregnant women are rarely hired
at all. [xlvii] Male workers also tend to be promoted
faster and their overall salaries and status are higher
than those of women who have the same education and experience.
Men and women who occupy equal positions do receive equal
pay. [xlviii]
There
are no reliable statistical data on employment and unemployment.
Women comprised 43 percent of the total number of employed
in 1986 and this trend continued until independence. [xlix] Tadjihon Djalalovna Aidikramova reports
that in 1997, 71.1 percent of women compared to 77.7 percent
of men were employed. [l]
According to IHFHR, in recent years the
number of women working outside the home, especially in
the informal sectors, has increased as many elderly women
have become involved in “chelnok” work (delivery of goods
from another country for resale in Uzbekistan). In fact,
both rural and urban women are more likely to work in
the informal sector. [li]
In general, a woman meets with resistance
to her work outside the home and a “negative attitude
of husbands and other relatives to her work.” [lii] On the other hand, the State has not created
conditions for women to be able to combine their family
duties and active labor activity, such as the establishment
of network of child-care institutions, which creates double
burdens for women who have to juggle outside employment
with household chores. [liii]
“Shuttle
Business”
Much
public criticism has been directed at women engaged in
so-called “shuttle business,” which means selling items
such as clothes and household items out of a sack. These
women are often criticized in the media for not adhering
to traditional roles, but Tokhtakhodjaeva points out that
their involvement in this kind of business activity it
is dictated by women’s struggle to provide for their families
in difficult times. Moreover, the kind of work is risky
and physically and psychologically demanding as these
businesses exists in a vacuum outside the economic reach
of the government. The women often have higher education,
and their business activity gives them real-life experience
in dealing with banks and other State institutions. [liv]
Distribution
of Women in the Labor Force
According
to 1988 data (newer data were unavailable at the time
of writing), the careers with the highest proportion of
women were health care and social work (72.7 percent).
In education, 60.5 percent of employees were women. In
cultural fields, 57.1 percent were women and in trade
and catering, 55.8 percent were women. Despite women’s
dominance of the health care and teaching professions,
they had a slim chance of becoming a university rector
or a director of a health care institution. In the same
year, women comprised 36 percent of research staff and
10.7 percent of all academics. [lv] This trend has continued, and there is
evidence that women’s official employment has decreased
during the transition to the market economy. [lvi]
Women
Employed in the Media
Even
though women comprise 50 percent of media employees, they
typically occupy low-level positions and work on issues
related to women’s traditional social roles: a majority
of female journalists report on issues related to motherhood
and family. [lvii] Male journalists are given assignments
carrying more weight, such as participation in high level
conferences; they typically report on political issues. [lviii]
Protective
Legislation
The
Labor Code places limits on certain types of employment
for women. Article 225 prohibits women’s employment in
unfavorable conditions, and Article 228 prohibits the
employment of pregnant women or mothers of children under
14 years for night shifts, overtime and weekends and from
taking business trips without their husband’s consent. [lix] These restrictions are inconsistent with
CEDAW, as they create protective measures which may prevent
women from obtaining certain types of employment and limiting
their opportunities in the labor market.
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 12: HEALTH CARE AND FAMILY PLANNING
Family
Planning and Reproductive Rights
The
difficulties of the transition period negatively affected
the system of health protection. In addition, programs
dealing with family planning and reproductive health are
sometimes difficult to implement due to the emphasis on
traditional gender roles and “moral purity” for women.
NGOs that run family planning programs sometimes meet
with resistance and refusal by target groups to discuss
certain topics as “forbidden for maidens.” Nevertheless,
the Ministry of Health trains physicians to provide family
planning services, and an International Research &
Exchanges Board (IREX) report states that these efforts
are starting to pay off: the proportion of the population
using contraceptives has risen from 3 to 14 percent in
the past few years. [lx]
On
the other hand, many women decide to give birth, even
if they are aware of potential damage to their health,
for fear of being considered childless or infertile.
The perceived need to bear a male heir also drives women
to bear “as many as God gives” without considering their
own health, desires, or the family’s economic situation. [lxi] According to an IREX report, as many
as 60 percent of women of childbearing age have serious
health problems that can affect their well-being during
pregnancy.
[lxii] It is estimated that 99 percent of pregnant
women, 92 percent of non-pregnant women and 87 percent
of teenage girls are anemic. [lxiii] Thus, despite the government’s efforts
to improve maternal and child health, morbidity and mortality
rates remain high and more needs to be done to reverse
this trend. In particular, information about and access
to family planning and prenatal care must be made readily
available. [lxiv]
Forced
Sterilization
Although
compelling a person to undergo sterilization is illegal,
IHFHR reports that women are sometimes sterilized without
consent (particularly in rural areas) following the birth
of their fourth or fifth child. Doctors have been known
to admit privately that they merely follow indirect instructions
of the authorities who are making an effort to reduce
the birth rate. [lxv]
Abortion
Abortion
is legal without restrictions. Although it is supposed
to be provided free of charge, women are pressured to
pay for abortion in the amount of 3,000 sums (US$ 450).
If the doctor does not receive a payment, the abortion
may be performed without anesthetic or precautions that
ensure the woman’s safety and health. [lxvi]
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 14: RURAL WOMEN
More
than 60 percent of the population lives in rural areas,
where attitudes toward women are most traditional and
women’s economic and social status are the lowest. Young
girls are expected and pressured to marry early, so they
frequently are denied access to education.
The
economic crisis has had its most severe impact in rural
areas, where the quality of health care is very poor,
and hospitals and clinics lack equipment and medication.
[lxvii] The situation is especially critical
given the environmental degradation in rural areas: the
Soviet-era use of pesticides and toxic defoliants in Uzbekistan’s
cotton plantations harmed the environment and resulted
in severe water shortages as irrigation projects diverted
massive amounts of water to the field. Especially the
Aral Sea region was affected, where about 30 percent of
water is unsanitary. [lxviii]
Women
in villages do not have access to services such as childcare.
This prevents women with many children from taking up
paid work outside the home. While education services
only cover the needs of about 35 percent of all children
nationally, some rural zones are affected more deeply.
For instance, in the Kashkadarya region, only 18 percent
of children are enrolled. [lxix]
Additionally,
rural women are overburdened as they are responsible for
much of the hard work in the village, including fetching
scarce water and making kizyak, a fuel of dried
cow dung mixed with straw and wheat chaff. [lxx]
CONVENTION
ARTICLE 16: MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW
Despite
a legal prohibition of early marriages and polygamy, these
practices are becoming more common. Currently, more
than 45 percent of women, but only 8 percent of men marry
before the age of 20. [lxxi] According to Uzbek tradition, many marriages
are arranged by parents who execute an agreement between
the families. In most of these cases, the spouses meet
for the first time at the wedding ceremony. Prospective
husbands have a chance to express their wishes concerning
an arranged marriage, but prospective wives do not have
the same right. Parental decisions are final, as those
who marry are mostly very young (girls 17-18; boys 19-20).
[lxxii]
Polygamy
The
law is vague on the issue of polygamy, and there is no
judicial definition of polygamy. Chapter V, Article 126
of the Criminal Code provides for a fine of 50-150 times
the minimum monthly wage or correctional labor of up
to three years or imprisonment of up to three years as
punishment for cohabitation of a man with two or more
women as a common household. [lxxiii] De facto, polygamy continues and
remains socially acceptable; there are no known cases
which have resulted in punishment. According to Minnesota
Advocates for Human Rights (MAHR), economic factors and
men’s ability to support more than one spouse result
in polygamous unions being more common among men with
high salaries, such as businessmen and government officials.
MAHR reports that as many as 80 percent of policemen have
two wives. [lxxiv]
GENERAL
RECOMMENDATION NO. 19: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Domestic
Violence
There
is practically no public discussion, in the media or otherwise,
of violence against women, including domestic abuse of
women by parents, husbands, and in-laws. [lxxv] When the topic is raised in the mass
media, it is treated as “misconduct” of individual men.
In many cases, women are blamed for abuse against them. [lxxvi] Typically, abuse is attributed to women’s
failure to act in accordance with their perceived roles
in the family. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that
authorities create obstacles for women who try to obtain
justice for domestic abuse. Research conducted by HRW
in 2000 revealed that police discourage women who were
abused by their husbands or relatives from filing reports.
Furthermore, authorities fail to investigate and punish
abusers when such reports are made. There have been instances
of local authorities pressuring women to remain in abusive
homes and attempts to dissuade women from pursuing divorce. [lxxvii] MAHR reports that there is also a tendency
to classify injuries resulting from domestic violence
as “light,” which carry lesser penalties. [lxxviii]
Abuse
of Young Brides
Uzbek
activists underline the influence of family — and, especially,
of the in-laws and husband — on the woman following marriage.
A bride typically moves in with her husband’s family.
Neft and Levine report that young brides become handmaidens
to their in-laws and their husbands. In some cases, the
maltreatment leads married women to commit suicide. They
cite a 1990 study in Uzbekistan, which showed that as
many as 300 women attempted suicide as a result of abuse
and harassment from their husbands’ families. [lxxix] Some reports indicate that the practice
is on the rise. [lxxx] Newer studies indicate that approximately
500 women per year kill themselves, mostly because of
family problems and as a response to the inability to
find relief from the abusive situations. [lxxxi] It is unknown whether authorities have
launched any programs or campaigns to combat domestic
violence and to help create new institutional norms which
would allow women to seek a more effective legal redress.
ACTIONS
BY OTHER UN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS
PERTAINING
TO WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS:
Conclusions
and recommendations of the Committee against Torture:
Uzbekistan. 19 November 1999.. CAT/C/23/7.
No recommendations concerning women were
issued by this Committee.
