2. THE APPLICABLE LAW
2.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility
2.2 Genocide (Article 2 of the Statute)
2.3. Crimes against Humanity (Article 3 of the Statute)
2.4. Serious Violations of Common Article 3 (murder)
2.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility
"A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime".
2.2 Genocide (Article 2 of the Statute)
"Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
The Acts Enumerated under Article 2(2)(a) to (e) of the Statute
Potential Groups of Victims of the Crime of Genocide
The Special Intent of the Crime of Genocide.
"[...] The Chamber finds that the intent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be determined by a pattern of purposeful action. In particular, the Chamber considers evidence such as [...] the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of killing. [...]"(9)
2.3 Crimes against Humanity (Article 3 of the Statute)
Crimes against Humanity pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal
(a) the actus reus must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
(b) the actus reus must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
(c) the actus reus must be committed against members of the civilian population
(d) the actus reus must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds, namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.(12)
The Actus Reus Must be Committed as Part of a Widespread or Systematic Attack
The Actus Reus Must be Directed against the Civilian Population
The Actus Reus Must be Committed on Discriminatory Grounds
The Enumerated Acts
Murder
(a) The victim is dead;
(b) The death resulted from an unlawful act or omission of the accused or a subordinate;
(c) At the time of the killing the accused or a subordinate had the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim's death, and is reckless as to whether or not death ensures;
(d) The victim was discriminated against on any one of the enumerated discriminatory grounds;
(e) The victim was a member of the civilian population; and
(f) The act or omission was part of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population.(22)
Extermination
(a) the accused or his subordinate participated in the killing of certain named or described persons;
(b) the act or omission was unlawful and intentional;
(c) the unlawful act or omission must be part of a widespread or systematic attack;
(d) the attack must be against the civilian population; and
(e) the attack must be on discriminatory grounds, namely: national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.
2.4 Serious Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II
Article 4 of the Statute
(a) violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(f) pillage;
(g) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Applicability of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II
The Nature of the Conflict
(i) an armed conflict takes place in the territory of a High Contracting Party, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups;
(ii) the dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups are under responsible command;
(iii) the dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups are able to exercise such control over a part of their territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations; and
(iv) the dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups are able to implement Additional Protocol II.
Ratione Personae
The Class of Perpetrator
"It is, in fact, well-established, at least since the Tokyo trials, that civilians may be held responsible for violations of international humanitarian law. Hirota, the former Foreign Minister of Japan, was convicted at Tokyo for crimes committed during the rape of Nanking. Other post-World War II trials unequivocally support the imposition of individual criminal liability for war crimes on civilians where they have a link or connection with a Party to the conflict. The principle of holding civilians liable for breaches of the laws of war is, moreover, favored by a consideration of the humanitarian object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, which is to protect war victims from atrocities."(31)
The Class of Victims
Ratione Loci
The Nexus between the Crime and the Armed Conflict
The Specific Violation
"[...]it is acceptable to convict the accused of two offences in relation to the same set of facts in the following circumstances: (1) where the offences have different elements; or (2) where the previous creating the offences protect different interests; or (3) where it is necessary to record a conviction for both offences in order fully to describe what the accused did. However, the Chamber finds that it is not justifiable to convict an accused of two offences in relation to the same set of facts where (a) one offence is a lesser included offence of the other, [...]or (b) where one offence charges accomplice liability and the other offence charges liability as [...]"(40).
"(1) where offences have differing elements, or (2) where the laws in question protect differing social interests."(41)
"What must be punished is culpable conduct; this principle applies to situations where the conduct offends two or more crimes, whether or not the factual situation also satisfies the distinct elements of the two or more crimes, as proven."(43)
"[...]where the culpable conduct was part of a widespread and systematic attack specifically against civilians, to record a conviction for genocide alone does not reflect the totality of the accused's culpable conduct. Similarly, if the Majority had chosen to convict for extermination alone instead of genocide, the verdict would still fail to adequately capture the totality of the accused's conduct."(44)
"The Prosecutor may be justified in bringing cumulative charges when the articles of the Statute referred to are designed to protect different values and when each article requires proof of a legal element not required by the others."(45)
"Penal Code of Rwanda: Chapter VI - Concurrent offences:
Article 92: Where a person has committed several offences prior to a conviction on any such charges, such offences shall be concurrent.
Article 93: Notional plurality of offences occurs:
1. Where a single conduct may be characterized as constituting several offences;
2. Where a conduct includes acts which, though constituting separate offences, are interrelated as deriving from the same criminal intent or as constituting lesser included offences of one another.
In the former case, only the sentence prescribed for the most serious offence shall be passed while, in the latter case, only the sentence provided for the most severely punished offence shall be passed, the maximum of which may be exceeded by half".(46)
1. Judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, (Case No. ICTR 95-1-T) 21 May 1999.
2. Judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (Case No. IT-96-21-T) The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo, "The Celebici Case", 16 November 1998.
3. Akayesu Judgement, para. 562
4. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.
5. Secretary-General's Report pursuant to para. 2 of Resolution 808 (1993) of the Security Council, 3 May 1993, S/25704.
6. Legislative Decree of 12 February 1975, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 1975, p.230. Rwanda acceded to the Genocide Convention but stated that it shall not be bound by Article 9 of this Convention.
7. Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21 September - 10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly.
8. Akayesu Judgement, para. 523
9. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 93.
10. Akayesu Judgement para. 563 to 576
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Court on 17 July 1998.
12. Akayesu Judgement, para. 578.
13. Akayesu Judgement, p. 235, fn 144; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, p. 51, fn 63.
14. Akayesu Judgement para. 580.
15. Report on the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 10 ) at 94 U.N.Doc. A/51/10 (1996)
16. Akayesu Judgement para. 581.
17. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement para. 134
18. Akayesu Judgement, para. 582. Note that this definition assimilates the definition of "civilian" to the categories of person protected by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
19. Ibid para. 582, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict; Article 50.
20. Akayesu Judgement, para. 584.
21. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic; Appeals Judgment of 15 July 1999; para. 305; p. 55.
22. Akayesu Judgement, para. 589 and 590.
23. See Akayesu Judgement, para. 603 to 605.
24. See Tadic Judgement and Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995.
25. See Akayesu Judgement, para. 616 and 617.
26. See Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 156 and 157.
27. See generally ICRC Commentary IV Geneva Convention, para. 1 - Applicable Provisions.
28. Ibid. 34
29. Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 24 May to 12 June 1971, and 3 May to 3 June 1972; Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 20 February to 29 March 1974, 3 February to 18 April 1975, 21 April to 11 June 1976 and 17 March to 10 June 1977.
30. See Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II
31. Akayesu Judgement, para. 633
32. It should be noted that the civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. (Article 50 (2) of Additional Protocol II)
33. See ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, commentary on Protocol I, Article 50.
34. Ibid., Commentary on Additional Protocol II, Article 13.
35. See Akayesu Judgement para. 635-636.
36. See ICTY Tadic decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, para. 69.
37. See Akayesu Judgement para. 643 and ibid, para. 70.
38. See Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement para. 188.
39. The indictment against the major German War Criminals presented to the International Military Tribunal stated that "the prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three (violations of the laws and customs of war) as also constituting crimes against humanity (Count Four)". Several accused persons were convicted of both war crimes and crimes against humanity. The judgement of the International Military Tribunal delivered at Nuremberg on 30 September and 1 October 1946 ruled that "[...] from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also crimes against humanity." The commentary on Justice case held the same view: "It is clear that war crimes may also constitute crimes against humanity; the same offences may amount to both types of crimes." The trials on the basis of Control Council Law No. 10 followed the same approach. Pohl, Heinz Karl Franslau, Hans Loerner, and Erwin Tschentscher were all found to have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. National cases, such as Quinn v. Robinson, the Eichmann case and the Barbie case also support this finding. In the Tadic case, the Trial Chamber II of ICTY, based on the above reasoning, ruled that "acts which are enumerated elsewhere in the statute may also entail additional culpability if they meet the requirements of persecution." Thus, the same acts, which meet the requirements of other crimes -- grave breaches of Geneva Conventions, violation of the laws or customs of war and genocide, may also constitute the crimes against humanity for persecution.
40. Akayesu Judgement, para.468.
41. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 627.
42. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 645, 646 and 650.
43. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tafazzal Hossain Khan Regarding the Verdicts Under the Charges of Crimes Against Humanity/Murder and Crimes Against Humanity/Extermination, para. 13.
44. Ibid. para.33.
45. The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and others, Decision on Defence Challenges to Form of the Indictment, IT-95-16-PT, 15 May 1998.
46. The English text quoted is an unofficial translation of the following "Code pénal du Rwanda : Chapitre VI - Du concours d'infractions" :
Article 92 - Il y a concours d'infractions lorsque plusieurs infractions ont été commises par le même auteur sans qu'une condamnation soit intervenue entre ces infractions.
Article 93 - Il y a concours idéal :
- Lorsque le fait unique au point de vue matériel est susceptible de plusieurs qualifications ;
- Lorsque l'action comprend des faits qui, constituant des infractions distinctes, sont unis entre eux comme procédant d'une intention délictueuse unique ou comme étant les uns des circonstances aggravantes des autres.
Seront seules pronocées dans le premier cas les peines déterminées par la qualification la plus sévère, dans le second cas les peines prévues pour la répression de l'infraction la plus grave, mais dont le maximum pourra être alors élevé de moitié".
1. Introduction | 2. The Applicable Law | 3. The Defence Case | 4. Factual Findings | 5. Legal Findings | 6. Verdict | 7. Sentencing