171. The Commission finds that Mr. Andrews did not receive an impartial trial because there was evidence of "racial bias" present during his trial, and because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing of the jury in order to ascertain whether members of the jury found the napkin as the juror claimed or whether the jurors themselves wrote and drew the racial words on the napkin. If the note did not originate from the jurors and was "found" by the juror then the trial court could have inquired of the jurors by conducting an evidentiary hearing as to whether they would be influenced or their judgment impaired by the napkin depicting the racial words and drawing so that they would be unable to try the case impartially. Had the Court conducted the hearing it would have had the possibility of remedying, if it had proved necessary so to do, a situation contrary to the requirements of the American Declaration.
172. Therefore, the Commission finds the United States in violation of Article XXVI, paragraph 2, of the American Declaration, because Mr. Andrews had the right to receive an impartial hearing as provided by the Article, and he did not receive an impartial trial in United States Courts. In capital punishment cases, the States Parties have an obligation to observe rigorously all the guarantees for an impartial trial. 107
B. Did Mr. Andrews Receive Equal Treatment Without Distinction as to Race?
173. Article II provides: "All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor." This Article has been defined as "the right of everyone to equal protection of the law without discrimination."108 This right to equality before the law means not that the substantive provisions of the law will be the same for everyone, but that the application of the law should be equal for all without discrimination.109 The provision was intended to ensure equality, not identity of treatment, and would not preclude reasonable differentiations between individuals or groups of individuals." 110
174. The Commission finds that on the basis of the above definitions and interpretations, Mr. Andrews had a right to an impartial hearing as required by Article XXVI of the American Declaration. He also had a right to be treated equally at law without discrimination. The facts reveal that he was not treated equally at law without discrimination, and he did not receive an impartial hearing at trial because of evidence of "racial bias" during his trial. Therefore, the Commission finds that the United States violated Mr. Andrews' right to equality at law pursuant to Article II of the American Declaration.
C. Was Mr. Andrews' Right to Life Violated?
175. With regard to the petitioner's claim that the United States violated Article I of the American Declaration, Article I provides: "Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person." Article I is silent on the issue of the death penalty. However, when the definitive draft of the "Project of Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man, formulated by the Inter-American Juridical Committee," was presented for consideration by the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948, the original Article I, provided:
Every person has the right to life. This right extends to the right to life from the moment of conception; to the right to life of incurables, imbeciles and the insane. Capital punishment may only be applied in cases in which it has been prescribed by pre-existing law for crimes of exceptional gravity.111
176. The explanation given for the amendment of the last part of Article I was stated by the Committee as follows:
The Committee is not taking sides in favor of the death penalty but rather admitting the fact that there is a diversity of legislation in this respect, recognizes the authority of each State to regulate this question.
The Committee must note that several constitutions of America based on generous humanitarian conceptions, forbid the legislator to impose the said penalty.112
177. Thus, the construction of Article I of the Right to Life of the American Declaration does not define nor sanction capital punishment by a member State of the OAS. However, it provides that a member State can impose capital punishment if it is prescribed by pre-existing law for crimes of exceptional gravity. Therefore, inherent in the construction of Article I, is a requirement that before the death penalty can be imposed and before the death sentence can be executed, the accused person must be given all the guarantees established by pre-existing laws, which includes guarantees contained in its Constitution, and its international obligations, including those rights and freedoms enshrined in the American Declaration. These guarantees include, the right to life, and not to be arbitrarily deprived of one's life, the right to due process of law, the right to an impartial and public hearing, the right not to receive cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment, and the right to equality at law. Evidence produced to the Commission was sufficient to prove that Mr. Andrews did not receive an impartial trial because the trial court failed to grant Mr. Andrews an evidentiary hearing for the reasons discussed above. The Commission therefore finds, that Mr. Andrews' right to life was violated because he was tried by an impartial and incompetent court which did not provide him with equal treatment at law. Therefore, the Commission finds for the reasons discussed above that Mr. Andrews' right to life was violated by the United States pursuant to Article I of the American Declaration.
D. Did Mr. Andrews Receive Cruel, Infamous or Unusual Punishment?
178. With regard to the question whether Mr. Andrews received cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment, the Commission finds that in this case the death penalty was not rendered by an impartial and competent court for the reasons discussed above. It was rendered by the same jury who found Mr. Andrews guilty. Mr. Andrews did not receive equal treatment at law, and his right to life was violated. He spent eighteen years on death row, and was not allowed to leave his cell for more than a few hours a week. During that time he received notice of at least eight execution dates and was executed by the State of Utah in July of 1992 on the basis of the jury's decision which was tainted because of evidence of "racial biasness" on their part. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Commission finds that the United States violated Mr. Andrews' right not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment pursuant to Article XXVI of the American Declaration.
179. The argument of the United States Government with regard to William Andrews' duty under Articles XXIX, and XXXIII of the American Declaration is noted. The Commission cannot however, examine William Andrews' actions because he is not a member State of the Organization of American States. The Commission can only examine and make findings under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention and other Treaties in the inter-American system against States who are members of the Organization of American States and who are States Parties to the Declaration and Treaties.
180. Reference has been made to the Celestine and the Roach and Pinkerton cases by the parties in their argument. The Celestine case dealt with the issue of generalized racism in Louisiana and the exclusion of jurors who indicated that they would automatically vote against imposition of the death penalty at the sentencing stage of the trial without regard to the evidence presented. This resulted in Celestine being sentenced by a death-qualified jury. Celestine relied on statistical studies to substantiate his case. The Commission found that Celestine had not provided sufficient evidence that the statistical studies presented made out a prima facie case to prove the allegations of racial discrimination and partiality, in the imposition of the death penalty such as to shift the burden of proof to the United States.
181. The Roach and Pinkerton cases dealt with the issue of the disparity in the application of the death penalty to juveniles in the United States, vis a vis among states. The punishment was not based on the nature of the crime committed but on the location where it was committed and the Commission found violations of the Articles I the right to life, and II, the right to equality before the law of the American Declaration.
182. In this case, reference is made to a specific issue of "racial bias" during the trial of William Andrews and evidence, which substantiated the petitioners' case, was provided to the Commission. The Commission limits its findings of violations to this case, based on the evidence it received.
183. Conclusion: Based on the reasons and findings discussed above, the Commission finds that the United States has violated Mr. William Andrews' rights pursuant to Articles I, (the right to life) II, (the right to equality before the law) XXVI (the right to an impartial hearing, and the right not to receive cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment) of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
THEREFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FINDS THAT:
184. The United States violated William Andrews right life pursuant to Article I of the American Declaration.
185. The United States violated William Andrews right to equality at law pursuant to Article II of the American Declaration.
186. The United States violated William Andrews right to an impartial hearing pursuant to Article XXVI of the American Declaration.
187. The United States violated William Andrews right not to receive cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment pursuant to Article XXVI of the American Declaration.
THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT:
188. The United States must provide adequate compensation to Mr. William Andrews' next of kin for the violations referred to in paragraphs 184 to 187 above.
VII. PUBLICATION:
189. On January 22, 1997, the Commission wrote to the Government of the United States of America and enclosed a copy of this Report, and requested that it "inform the Commission as to the measures that have been adopted to comply with the recommendations made to resolve the situation denounced within two months."
190. On March 14, 1997, the United States of America replied by letter to the Commission's request, and informed it inter alia that Mr. Andrews received an impartial trial free of racial bias, and stated that for the reasons stated in its letter and its prior detailed submissions, that it "cannot agree with the Commission's findings, or carry out its recommendations."
191. The Commission, considering that the United States of America has not complied with its recommendations, decides to ratify its conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report; and also decides that this Report be published in accordance with Article 54(5) of its Regulations in its Annual Report to the General Assembly.
* Commission Members Profs. Claudio Grossman, Chairman, and Robert Goldman took no part in the proceedings, pursuant to Article 19.2 of the Commission's Regulations.
1 Argument under part IV, submissions of the parties, of this Report.
2 Argument under part IV submissions of the parties, of this Report.
3 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
4 Organization of American States.
5 Cases are collected in Anne F. Bayefsky, "The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law," 11 Hum. Rts. L.J. 1, 6 (1990).
6 See, § 702 (f), Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol. 2 (1987).
7 Celestine Case, Res. No. 23/89, Case 10.031 (Sept. 28, 1989).
8 Petitioners submitted the note appendix A as an exhibit.
9 The U.S. did adopt an understanding with regard to the application of Articles 2 and 26, stating that discrimination based on race is understood in the United States "to be permitted when such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." See, United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992). This understanding applies only when the treaty is sought to be applied domestically and does not affect the obligations of the United States under the international law of human rights.
10 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, 30 I.L.M. 1692, 1696 (1991).
11 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1318 (1990).
12 Robin Abravian, "A Web of Terror: Survivors of Siege at Utah Maternity Ward Try to Understand What Made Richard Worthington Do What He Did," L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1991, at E1; "Jailed Hostage Taker Attempts Suicide," Wash. Times, May 13, 1992, at A6.
13 "Utah," U.S.A. Today, March 12, 1990, at 5A.
14 "Parolees Charged in Killings During Botched Utah Burglary," Chicago Tribune, Dec. 25, 1990, at M4.
15 "Tried to Kill Self, Mormon Artifacts Dealer Says," L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 1987, at A1.
16 State v. Franklin, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 735 P.2d 34 (1987).
17 All references to individual cases, and to statistical data, are from Proportionality Study conducted by the Salt Lake City Public Defender's Office, submitted with Petitioner's application to the Utah Board of Pardons for commutation of the sentence of death (1992), and available on request to the Petitioner.
18 Case 9647, supra, note 2.
19 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Ten Years of Activities, 1971-1981, 329 (1982).
20 While the United States has ratified the International Covenant, Senate advise and consent was subject to a reservation to Article VII which states that "the United States considers itself bound by Article VII to the extent that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eight and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." See, "United States: Senate committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992).
The fact that the issue of cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the U.S. Constitution was twice raised and rejected in this litigation should be taken not as a conclusion of compliance with international human rights law, but as evidence that the issue has been raised and preserved for review, though rejected by the U.S. courts under domestic law. See, Andrews v. Morris, 600 F. Supp., 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984); State v. Andrews, 1992 Westlaw 171582 (Utah 1992).
21 The reference to various CSCE documents (pet. at 7, 13-14) is doubly misplaced: the U.S. is not a "signatory" to them (nor are they legally binding), and whether a participating State is living up to its CSCE commitments is a matter for the CSCE.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Here the United States Government's response referred to and recited the names of cases and prior proceedings previously cited in relation to Mr. William Andrews and his co-defendant Pierre. (These citations have been omitted.)
27 Id. at 1176-80.
28 See Andrews v. Shulsen, at 1274.
29 Here reference was made to all previously cited cases and proceedings concerning William Andrews and his co-defendant Pierre.
30 Id. at 1265-70.
31 It is the understanding of the United States, for example, that while Lance Wood, a Caucasian, did not receive a death sentence, his partner in the murder, Michael Archuleta, a Hispanic, was sentenced to death. The disparity was not race-related: Archuleta was older (26 compared to 20), had a more serious record, and was the instigator. Afterwards Archuleta made two damning statements that: Once he started beating their victim, a white homosexual, "the evil completely took over," and that the act of killing him was "the ultimate rush." Steven Deli, a Caucasian, did not receive a death sentence, but his partner in the murder, Von Lester Taylor also white, did. Their victims were a Caucasian woman and her daughter.
32 Mr. Andrews also challenged the mode of execution then mandated by Utah law (shooting or hanging) as cruel or unusual; that claim, not made in the present petition, was also considered and rejected. See Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 824 (Utah 1980).
33 Id. Andrews v. Shulsen, at 431 (D.Utah, 1984); n.16 (10th Cir. 1986); at 919 and 1015 (1988).
34 798 F.Supp. 659 (D.Utah 1992) at 664.
35 Cf. State v. Andrews 843 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 and 1040 (Utah 1992).
36 161 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Ser. A (1989), 11 Eur. Hum. Rts Rep. 439 (1989), reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 1063.
37 It has been established that the Commission has no authority to impose upon a State, by means of "interpretation," an international obligation based upon a treaty that such State has not duly accepted or ratified. See Baby Boy, Case No. 2141 (United States), Res. 23/81, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, Oct. 16, 1981. The same reasoning applies to the Declaration.
38 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
39 Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790 (Utah 1992).
40 Full argument omitted, and will be referred to in the decision on the merits of the petition.
41 Full argument will be referred to in the decision on the merits of the petition.
42 Full argument will be referred to in the decision on the merits of the petition.
43 The petition was filed by the students and professors at the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University's Washington College of Law.
44 Professor Wilson writes that "[w]ithin six months after the execution, a petition was sent to the Commission alleging that the execution violated Mr. Andrews' rights . . . ." R. Wilson, "Action on U.S. Death Penalty Litigation in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights," 11 Amnesty-International-USA Legal Support Network Newsletter 18, 20 (Spring 1994) (discussing his students' death penalty cases before the Commission) (attached).
45 Other arguments addressing the merits of the petition will be referred to in the decision on the merits.
46 Other arguments in this submission will be referred to in the decision on the merits of the petition.
47 See Claudio Grossman, Proposals to Strengthen the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights, 32 German Yearbook of INT'L.L. 264, 271 (1990); See also Robert E. Norris, Bringing Human Rights petitions Before the Inter-American Commission, 20 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 733, 738 (1980) ("Any person or group of persons may bring a complaint before the Commission . . . The person filing the complaint need not be the person whose rights have been violated. He may be a spouse, relative, friend, or even a person unknown to the aggrieved party)."
48 Article 39(1) of the Regulations of the Commission.
49 Article 39(1)(a) of the Commission's Regulations.
50 On May 23, 1995, the petitioners submitted a 15 page brief arguing the merits of their petition, only a summary is reproduced here.
51 1 EUR.HUM RTS. REP. 439 (1989) 161 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at paras. 82, 122-23, January 19, 1989, reprinted in 161 Eur. Ct.Hr. (Ser. A) (1989) Annex, and in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
52 2 S.C.R. 348, 353.
53 No. S.C. 73/93 (Zimb.June 24, 1993) (reported in 14 Hum.Rts L.J. 323(1993.)
54 On December 21, 1995, the Government submitted a 35 page brief on the merits of the petition. However, only a summary is reproduced here.
55 On February 1, 1996, petitioners submitted a 25 page brief, only a summary is reproduced here.
56 United States v. Harris, 908 F 2.d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 1990).
57 Race Convention, Article 1.
58 Id. Piersack v. Belgium
59 16 H.R.L.J. 238 (1995).
60 Id. at 238.
61 Id. at 240.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 239. The real danger test originated in the English common law in the case of R v. Gough, 4 A.E.R. 481 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division 1992). In Gough, two brothers were charged with robbery. One of the brothers was discharged and the other was indicted on the charge of conspiracy. The bias discussed in Gough was the fact that one of the jurors was a neighbor of the defendant's brother who had been involved in the crime but was not indicted. The Court of Appeal, criminal Division stated the test as follows:
[t]he proper test for determining whether a conviction obtained on a trial...should be quashed on the grounds of possible bias on the part of the juror was whether there was a real danger that the accused might not have had a fair trial. (emphasis added)
65 Id. at 239.
66 (United States), Case No. 10.031 Resolution No. 23/89, (Sept. 28, 1989), reprinted in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1989-1990, 62, para 45. at 72.
67 On April 30, 1996, the United States Government submitted an 11 page response. Only a summary is reproduced here.
68 16 H.R.L.J. 238 (1995).
69 Received on March 6, 1996.
70 1996 NRCD Vol. VII No.7, 608-631.
71 Mr. Bryan Sells, Law student intern (Columbia Law School), Ms. Marguerite Marty, Law student intern (Columbia Law School), Mr. Joel Diegleman, Law student intern. Univ. of Wisconsin Law School), contributed to the brief. However, only a summary is reproduced here.
72 Argument at 1-18.
73 Id. at 19-31. In addition the Center for International Human Rights Law, Inc. submitted a Report of a Mission by the International Commission of Jurists on the Administration of the Death Penalty in the United States.
74 Professor Karen Musalo, Acting Director, International Human Rights Law Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University; Ms. LeeAnne Difilippo, student attorney. Professor Bright provided the Commission with a copy of Santa Clara Law Review, Death Penalty Symposium of addresses made by various legal writers and experts, including himself on this issue. Volume 35 1995, Number 2, at 433-483.
75 Mr. Edgar L. Embrey, Alternate Representative to the Permanent Mission of the U.S.A. to the OAS and Mr. Nigel Purvis, Legal Adviser.
76 Assistant Attorney General form the Attorney General's office in the State of Utah, U.S.A.
77 Mr. David Yocum.
78 Transcript submitted by petitioner. The napkin was referred to as Pierre's exhibit No.4. Pierre was one of Mr. Andrews' co-defendants. Pags. 2445-2456.
79 Id. at 2445-2456.
80 Id. at 2450.
81 Id at 2453-2454.
82 Id. at 2451.
83 Id. at 2454.
84 Id. at 2455-2456.
85 State v. Andrews, 376 P.2d 857, Wilkins Justice at 859.
86 Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 920 (1988).
87 Id. Andrews v. Shulsen
88 Id.
89 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
90 United States Harris 908 F.2d 728, 733 11th Cir. 1990). United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1439 (11th cir.1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1006. 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 1.Ed.2d.383 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied.
91 United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 979 (5th. Cir. 1978), cert. denied
92 77-31-28 Utah Code Annotated 1953, Amendments to Utah Criminal Code during its 1975 Session.
93 Id. Utah Code 77-30-1-28.
94 Narrainen v. Norway, UN Ctte. Elim. Racial Discrim., Communication No. 3/1991, views adopted 15 March 1994. In that case a Norwegian citizen of Tamil origin, who was charged with a drug-related offense, complained that he had not obtained a fair and impartial trial. He alleged that racial views had played a large part in the decision against him, pointing to a statement of one of the jurors that people such as him, living on taxpayers' money, should be sent back from where they had come, and alleged that slurs were made about the color of his skin.
95 5 HRR 169 (1982). The European Court of Human Rights held that there was a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention which guarantees the right to a fair and impartial trial. The European Commission stated that: "Whilst impartiality normally denotes absence of prejudice or bias, its existence or otherwise can.. be tested in various ways. A distinction can be drawn in this context between a subjective approach, that is endeavoring to ascertain the personal conviction of a given judge in a given case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect."
96 16 H.R.L.J. 238 (1995). In this case an Afro-Caribbean male, had been convicted of armed robbery. During jury deliberations, the trial judge received a handwritten note for a juror stating: "Jury showing racial overtones 1 member to be excused." The trial judge redirected the jury, and did not hold an evidentiary hearing. The European Commission found the case admissible and found that the defendant essentially makes the case that it was clear from the jury note that there was, at the very least, a strong objective indication of racial bias within the jury. It looked at the international standard and stated:
[i]f the possibility of bias on the part of the juror comes to the attention of the trial judge in the course of a trial, the trial judge should consider whether there is actual bias or not (a subjective test). If this has not been established, that trial judge or appeal court must then consider whether there is "a real danger of bias affecting the mind of the relevant juror or jurors"(objective test). Note, the real danger test originated in the English common law in the case of R. v. Gough, 4 A.E.R.481 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division 1992).
However, the European Commission concluded that the judge's detailed and careful redirection of the jury was sufficient. The Gregory's case is now before the European Court of Human Rights.
97 [1996] HRCD Vol. VII No. 7, European Court of Human Rights: Judgments, at 608-613. Judgment was delivered on April 23, 1996. The case involves the trial of an Algerian national in France for escape, during which a prison guard was struck and killed. The applicant and another person (both of them were of North African origin) were tried and convicted for intentional homicide and attempted escape in the Rhone Assize Court. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment on April 14, 1989. He submitted evidence that during his trial, a person overheard one of the jurors say, "What's more, I'm a racist." That person so certified in writing, and defense counsel asked that the court take formal note of the racist remark, and that the court append the written statement to the record. The trial court refused the first request but granted the second. As to the first request, the Assize Judge stated that it was "not able to take formal note of events alleged to have occurred out of its presence."
98 November 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S 5 as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118.
99 In Remli's case the Rhone Assize Court dismissed their application without even examining the evidence submitted to it, on the ground that it was "not able to take formal note of events alleged to have occurred out of its presence." Nor had it ordered that evidence should be taken to verify what had been reported and, if had been established, take formal note of it as requested by the defence, although it could have done so. The applicant had been unable either to have the juror in question replaced by one of the additional jurors or to rely on the fact in issue in support of his appeal on points of law. Nor had he been able to challenge the juror, since the jury had been finally empaneled and no appeal lay against the Assize Court's judgment other than on points of law. Id. at 612.
100 In Davis County, Utah, 73.9% of the people who resided there were Mormons.
101 Id. at 2448.
102 Id. at 2450.
103 Id. at 2450.
104 Id. at 2452.
105 See Case No. 9260. Decision rendered on 14 September 1988, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74, Doc. 10. rev.1, 16 September 1988.
106 Articles 1, 2, 18, 20; Articles 1,2, 26 and its other Articles.
107 See Communication No. 333/1988, Lenford Hamilton v. Jamaica (views adopted on 23 March 1994, fiftieth session) United Nations Report of the Human Rights Committee Volume II, Official Records, Forty-ninth Session Supplement No. 40 (A/49/40) 37-41. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 6, the right to life, and 14 the right to equality of the law, and the right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal considered.
108 Bjorn Stormorken and Leo Zwaak, Human Rights Terminology in International Law: A Thesaurus, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).
109 Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." See Travaux preparatoires of the ICPR, Annotation on the Text of the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, 10. U.N. GOAR, Annexes (Agenda item 28, pt.II) 1, 61, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955).
110 Id. See also Case Relating to Aspects of Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, 1EHRR 252.
111 CB-7-E, Pan American Union Washington, 1948, at 2.
112 Article 29 of the Constitution of Colombia, Article 30 of the Constitution of Panama 1946, Article 25 of the Constitution of Uruguay 1946, Articles 141, number 31, of the Constitution of Brazil 1946, and Article 29, of the Constitution of Venezuela of 1947. Report to Accompany the Definitive Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man, Background, at 5-6.