Ana, Beatriz and Celia Gonzalez Perez v. Mexico, Case 11.565, Report Nº 129/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 232 (1999).
REPORT
Nº 129/99
CASE
11.565
ANA, BEATRIZ, AND CELIA GONZÁLEZ PÉREZ[1]
MEXICO
November 19, 1999
I.
SUMMARY
1.
On January 16, 1996, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(hereinafter the Commission or the IACHR) received a petition lodged by
the Center for Justice and International Law - CEJIL [Centro por la Justicia
y el Derecho Internacional], (hereinafter the petitioners). The petition
alleges the international responsibility of
the United Mexican States (hereinafter "the State", "the Mexican
State", or "Mexico") for the illegal detention and torture
of the Tzeltal native sisters Ana, Beatriz, and Celia González Pérez, as well
as the subsequent failure to investigate and provide redress for those acts.
The petitioners allege violation of several rights enshrined in the
American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the "American Convention"):
right to humane treatment (Article 5); right to personal liberty (Article
7); right to a fair trial (Article 8); right to privacy (Article 11); rights
of the child (Article 19); and right to judicial protection (Article 25).
2.
According to the petition, on June 4, 1994 a group of military personnel
illegally detained in the State de Chiapas, Mexico, the sisters Ana, Beatriz,
and Celia González Pérez and their mother Delia Pérez de González, in order
to interrogate them; the four women were held for approximately two hours.
The petitioners allege that the three sisters were separated from their
mother, beaten, and raped several times by the military personnel; that on
June 30, 1994 a petition was lodged with the Federal Public Prosecutors Office
based on a gynecological examination; that same examination was corroborated
before the said institution by the testimony of Ana and Beatriz, the two older
sisters; that the record was transferred to the Office of the Public Prosecutor
of Military Justice in September 1994; and that the latter decided finally
to close the record for failure of the sisters to come forward to testify
again and to undergo expert gynecological examination.
The petitioners assert that the State failed in its duty to investigate
the facts denounced, punish those responsible, and provide redress for the
violations.
3.
For its part, the Mexican State contends that the competent authorities
carried out a serious investigation, although domestic remedies were not exhausted;
that the representatives of the González Pérez sisters did not show sufficient
interest in the case; and that the military investigation that was closed
could be reopened, but that it was not possible without the cooperation of
the alleged victims. The State
requests that the IACHR declare the case inadmissible due to non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies and for failure to constitute violations of human rights.
4.
The IACHR concludes in the instant report that the case meets the requirements
set forth in Articles 46 and 47 of the American Convention.
Accordingly, the Commission declares the case admissible, notifies
the parties of its decision, and continues to examine the merits in respect
of the alleged violations of Articles 5, 7, 8, 11, 19, and 25 of the American
Convention. At the same time the Commission
places itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to initiating
a friendly settlement procedure and decides to publish this report.
II.
PROCESSING BY THE COMMISSION
5.
The Commission assigned case number 11.565 to the matter and requested
the Mexican State for information on the pertinent parts of the petition on
January 18, 1996. The IACHR received the observations of the petitioners on
May 13, 1996 and transmitted them to the Mexican State on September 10, 1996.
On October 24, 1996 the State sent its observations to the Commission, which
forwarded them to the petitioners.
6.
The IACHR requested the petitioners for up-to-date information on the
case on November 13, 1998 and, in the absence of a reply, repeated the request
on March 19, 1999. The petitioners
submitted information on the case on May 27, 1999, the Mexican State doing
likewise on July 14, 1999.
7.
On October 4, 1999 a work meeting was held to address the instant case
at the headquarters of the Commission and was attended by the petitioners
and representatives of the State. At the meeting the Commission received updated
information on the positions of the parties in regard of the admissibility
and merits of the petition.
III.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A.
The petitioners
8.
The petition received by the IACHR
mentions that on June 4, 1994, members of the Mexican Federal Army arbitrarily
detained Mrs. Delia Pérez de González and her daughters Ana, Beatriz, and
Celia, and interrogated them in order to make them confess that they belonged
to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de
Liberación Nacional).[2]
The petitioners underscore that the women communicate in the language
of the Tzeltal ethnic group and that their knowledge of Spanish is very limited,
owing to which they had difficulty understanding the questions that were put
to them. The petitioners allege
that the mother was then separated from her daughters and that Ana, Beatriz,
and Celia were taken to a wooden room where they were beaten and raped several
times in the presence of some 30 members of the military, most of whom took
part in those acts. According
to the petition, the four women were released at 4:30 p.m. on the same day,
after they received death threats to prevent them from denouncing the violations.
9.
The petitioners allege that the women remained in hiding for several
weeks for fear of the reprisals with which the members of the military threatened
them if they reported the acts. On June 29, 1994, a female doctor performed
a gynecological examination on each of the three sisters and found that there
were still traces of the rape more than 20 days after the denounced acts occurred.
That piece of medical evidence was attached to the petition lodged
on June 30, with the Office of the Public Prosecutor in San Cristóbal de las
Casas, Chiapas. On August 30,
1994, in Preliminary Investigation 64/94, which had been opened on basis of
the petition, Ana and Beatriz González Pérez corroborated and enlarged on
their petition before that authority, and in the presence of a senior official
of the Office of the Public Prosecutor. The petitioners add that the youngest
sister, Celia, did not come forward because she was unable to overcome the
fear caused by her ordeal; for that reason, the mother stayed at home to keep
her company.
10.
On September 2, 1994, the Federal Public Prosecutors Office decided
to refer Preliminary Investigation 64/94
to the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Military Justice for lack of legal
competency to hear the matter due to lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners maintain that they fulfilled the requirement of seeking
the suitable domestic remedies available in Mexico for resolving the petition;
and that the transfer of competency to the military authorities was a violation
both of the Mexican Constitution and of the duty to investigate the violations.
In relation to this they state the following:
Following
the transfer of competency to the jurisdiction of the military courts in September
1994 there was no substantial progress in the investigations, despite the
court of the civil jurisdiction ordering the Office
of the Military Public Prosecutor to continue said investigation.
The case has been closed since February 1996, which constitutes a violation
of the duty to investigate.
The
fact that Mexican legislation states that the military courts shall take cognizance
of common offences committed by military personnel while on service or in
the performance of acts thereof, combined with the argument made by the government
for the military courts to take up the instant case, lead one to presume that
the detention, torture and rape of the injured parties were acts of service
or acts deriving therefrom.[3]
11.
The petitioners maintain that the investigation opened and later closed
by the Office of the Military Public Prosecutor does not meet the requirements
of suitability and impartiality essential to any investigation of human rights
violations. In relation thereto
they observe that Press Release Nº 38 of the Secretariat of National Defense
(hereinafter the SEDENA) of July 3, 1994, referring to the events that led
to the petition, vigorously rejects the false charges made against military
personnel and reserves the right to take legal action against persons or entities
that defame our institution. They
add that the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Military Justice is an institution
hierarchically subordinate to the head of the SEDENA.
12.
As to a new court appearance and medical examination before the military
authorities which the State deems essential for reopening the investigation--
the petitioners state the following:
It
is unacceptable to claim that these women, who had endured such an experience
of torture by members of that institution, would feel safe testifying (for
the third time) before this entity.
On several occasions the petitioners informed the government attorneys
office of the victims fear and trauma, which made it difficult even for them
to go to the civil court, since they were obliged to cross military roadblocks,
which made it impossible for them to appear before the military authority
to testify.
It
should be noted that, owing to the nature of the case, it is logical that
the victims should have been terrified of appearing before the military entity,
especially since the agencies involved --in this case the Army-- turn out
to be the ones in charge of the investigations.
The
victims, who had already testified before the competent court, had no obligation
to consent to the kind of psychological torture entailed by fresh questioning
and the humiliation of another gynecological examination, particularly before
the entity that represents those responsible for the torture, illegal detention,
and rape of the injured parties.
The
foregoing entails a violation and aggression equal to or worse than that endured
on June 4, 1994, by which token the Armys proposal to reopen the investigation
itself, thereby rejecting the inquiries already made by the Federal Public
Prosecutors Office, cannot be valid.
This is particularly true given that they have testimonies from the
very soldiers who interrogated the injured parties and who accept having
been in the right time and place and having had the opportunity to commit
the aggression. Basically, the
only thing they do not accept in their testimony is having raped them. However,
they do accept having detained them, interrogated them, and [engaged in] other
acts, which, by their very contradiction allow one to assume that the women
witnesses are telling the truth and the soldiers are lying.
However, all of that was rejected and not one of them was ever prosecuted.[4]
13.
As regards the supposed lack of interest of the petitioners, which
the State alleged, CEJIL reiterates that a medical examination was performed
immediately after the events, the results of which were presented to the Office
of the Public Prosecutor and later corroborated by the testimony of the victims.
On the basis of those elements, the petitioners state that there is
evidence of the violations, and that the silence of CEJIL for such a long
time was due to the difficulty in locating the women, since as a consequence
of the events, they were compelled to leave their communities and families
because they were repudiated in accordance with their indigenous culture.
14.
The petitioners say that the abuses denounced in this case are a part
of a general problem in Mexico, and they mention in that light the Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women (Convention of Belém do Pará).[5]
Also, the petitioners allege that the facts tend to establish a violation
of the rights of the child protected in Article 19 of the American Convention:
The
youngest of the victims was 16 when she was tortured and raped by the soldiers
of the Mexican Federal Army. Her
case, as the Committee on the Rights of the Child has rightly stated, is one
of so many that remains unpunished, where the unwillingness of the Government
to protect its juvenile citizens is made plain by the closure of the instant
case, as a result of which, five years after the physical, psychological,
and sexual abuse suffered by this minor, none of the parties responsible has
been tried and convicted of those crimes[6].
15.
Finally, the petitioners claim that facts were duly reported with strong
supporting evidence to the authorities in Mexico but that the transfer of
competency to the Office of the Military Public Prosecutor and its lack of
willingness resulted in the failure to investigate the violations, with the
upshot that, to date, those responsible have got off scot-free.
B.
The State
16.
The Mexican State initially omits any reference to the merits and states
that the petition should be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies:
Under
the jurisdiction of the military courts, the complainants have not lodged
any petition with the SEDENA against the prosecuting attorneys in charge of
the investigation, despite the fact that they have the right to do so and
that, any proven wrongdoing on the part of the Office of the Military Public
Prosecutor would originate proceedings to determine criminal responsibility
in the military courts
In light of the severe punishments in which such
a proceeding could result, this is not a mere formality from which the complainants
are excused; nor have the remedies available under military jurisdiction been
exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international
law.
The
fact that this case corresponds primarily to the jurisdiction of the military
courts does not mean to say, however, that the interested parties lack effective
remedies in the federal civil jurisdiction. Under Article 34 of the
Criminal Code ...any person who considers himself entitled to indemnification
for damage caused, who cannot obtain as much from a criminal judge, due to
failure on the part of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to bring suit,
dismissal of the case, or verdict of acquittal, may resort to the civil process
under the terms of the corresponding legislation.
If
the complainants consider that the process failed to observe human rights
and fundamental freedoms, there is nothing to prevent them from filing a judicial
complaint against the way the criminal suit was prosecuted in this case, which
would also be a matter for the civil and not the military courts to decide.[7]
17.
The State subsequently broadens its arguments and states that the Office of
Complaints and Citizen Attention conducted an investigation based on an article
published in La Jornada newspaper on June 17, 1994, and informed the
SEDENA of the statements of several persons regarding the events. The
State asserts that on June 25, 1994 the military authority ordered an investigation
in order to determine if, as a result of the events in question, there was
a breach of Military Discipline(sic). The State also adds the following:
On
July 2, 1994, the Secretariat of National Defense issued Press Release Number
38 informing the public that, as a result of the investigation carried out
--into the supposed rape of three Tzeltal native women by military personnel--
it had emerged that said charge was completely false and that there was no
breach of military discipline, in accordance with Preliminary Investigation A5FTA/03/94-E (emphasis in the original).[8]
18. The State also says
that Preliminary Investigation Nº 64/94 was opened for the offences of GANG
RAPE, ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, AND OTHERS (capitals in the original), and that
the following procedures were carried out in that investigation:
The
Federal Judicial Police were called on to conduct an investigation of the
above-mentioned events. The complainants [were] summoned in order to corroborate
their complaint and presented themselves on July 1, 1994. The alleged
injured parties [were] summoned in order to testify about the events in question.
Experts in legal medicine were called on to give their opinion on the clinical
age they claimed to have as injured parties, and to perform the respective
gynecological examination.[9]
19.
The State mentions the request from various non-governmental organizations
that a woman be appointed as special prosecuting attorney in the case.
The State also says that the Office of the Military Public Prosecutor appointed
a female military prosecuting attorney and female medical staff to assist
her in clarifying the facts in question; and that the said military official
requested and obtained from the Representative of the Office of the Federal
Public Prosecutor in Chiapas definitive refusal of competency in favor of
the jurisdiction of the military courts due to its being a matter for its
purview. The State describes the proceedings of the Public Prosecutor
of Military Justice in the following terms:
He
obtained further testimony from the civilians who witnessed the events, who
in short said that at no time was there any physical or verbal abuse by the
military personnel against the alleged injured parties, much less sexual assault.
He obtained further testimony from the military personnel involved in the
presence of their respective court-appointed defense counsel, who offered
rebutting for the confrontation between his clients and the alleged injured
parties, it not being possible to compare that evidence due to the nonattendance
of the alleged injured parties. At the request of the Military Prosecuting
Attorney staff from the National Commission on Human Rights were present as
observers of the way the proceedings were put into practice, as were translation
experts from the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs, and experts in
medical law specializing in gynecology, all of whom are civilians and residents
of the area. He summoned Mrs. MARTHA
GUADALUPE FIGUEROA MIER and Mr. ROGER
MALDONADO BAQUEIRO, (emphasis in the original) alleged legal representatives
of the injured parties, of whom only the former appeared in court, she being
noticeably annoyed, haughty, and intimidating, but with extreme nervousness
(sic). By reason of the foregoing the Head of Preliminary Inquiries
of Military Justice concluded that the charge against the military personnel
is totally and manifestly false.[10]
20. The State goes on
to perform a detailed analysis of the military preliminary investigation,
which includes statements from several persons who concur on the good conduct
of the military and deny that events occurred.[11]
The States analysis continues with a section entitled Considerations regarding
the competence of the jurisdiction of the military courts to take cognizance
of the facts. In this section, the State indicates that the jurisdiction
of the military courts owes its existence to the very nature of the armed
force and the way of life peculiar to it, and explains that the prerequisites
under which the intervention of that jurisdiction is in order are the following:
that the perpetrator of the infraction is a member of the armed forces; that
the member of the military is on service or engaging in acts relating thereto;
and that the infraction is in breach of military discipline. The State
then applies those prerequisites to the case under consideration:
There
is considered to be no problem whatever with the first prerequisite since
the complainants themselves expressly accept that participants in the crime
are members of the Armed Forces.
As
to the second of these, regarding the participant in the crime being on service
or engaging in acts relating thereto, service should be understood as any
act executed by members of the military, either in an individually or a collective
manner, in fulfillment of the orders they receive in the course of performing
the duties that befall them, depending on their category and in accordance
with the laws, regulations, and provisions of the Army. (Article 37 of the
Army Corps Service Regulations)
In
relation to the third element, that the infraction or offences be in breach
of military discipline, Article 57 of the Code of Military Justice is very
explicit when it establishes that the following
are offenses in breach of
military discipline (
) II. Common or federal offences when any of the following
circumstances are involved: a) That
were committed by members of the military while on service or in the performance
of acts thereof (emphasis in the original)[12]
21.
The State continues with an analysis of Mexican jurisprudence relating to
the competency of the jurisdiction of the military courts and argues that
the intervention of the armed forces in matters of public security is entirely
compatible with the Constitution of Mexico.[13]
In addition to the Constitution, the State cites Mexican legal provisions
that it considers applicable to the instant case, including the Statute of
the Federal Public Administration, the Organic Law of the Army and the Air
Force, the Federal Statute of Responsibilities of Civil Servants, and the
Law of the National Commission on Human Rights. The State concludes that the
instant case is based on vague assumptions and conjecture and not on any
firm proof, the main evidence held up being a newspaper article and a petition
lodged with an authority that lacks legal competence
22. In a later communication
the State questions the petitioners delay in presenting information on the
case to the IACHR, saying in relation thereto that, in no circumstances can
a delay of this magnitude be justifiable, especially when dealing with facts
such as those alleged.[14]
The State adds that, the National Commission on Human Rights itself
decided
to close the record in question precisely because of the inactivity and lack
of cooperation of the petitioners. In spite of that, however, it reiterates
its willingness to continue the investigations if the petitioners are prepared
to cooperate with the authorities.[15]
23. The State maintains
that the case is not admissible for the following reasons: the remedies under
domestic law were not exhausted; the petitioners did not manage to prove the
existence of acts that violate human rights; the military authorities are
the competent authority to investigate the denounced acts; and the investigation
initiated by the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Military Justice was serious
and impartial, but had to be closed due to lack of cooperation from the alleged
victims. Finally, the State requests that the IACHR close the instant
case.
IV.
ANALYSIS
A.
Competence of the Commission
ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione
loci
24.
The allegations in the instant case describe acts that purportedly violate
several rights recognized and enshrined in the American Convention and took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of Mexico when the duty to respect
and ensure the rights recognized in the Convention was in force for that State.[16]
Accordingly, the IACHR is competent ratione
personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione loci to examine the merits of the petition.
B. Other
admissibility requirements of the petition
a. Exhaustion
of domestic remedies
25. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has established the following with respect to the rule
of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies:
States
Parties have an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to victims
of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated
in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8(1)), all in keeping
with the general obligation of such States to guarantee the free and full
exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all persons subject
to their jurisdiction (Art.1).[17]
26.
The IACHR, after examining the information supplied by the petitioners and
by the State, considers prima facie
that the petition lodged by the representatives of the victims with the Office
of the Public Prosecutor in Chiapas on July, 1994, constitutes a suitable
remedy for redressing the alleged violations. Indeed, the facts described
by the petitioners --if established in the framework of a serious and impartial
investigation, in accordance with due process of law-- would appear to constitute
arbitrary detention, torture, and rape, that is to say, acts provided for
and punished by common criminal law in Mexico.[18] In spite
of that, the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor refused competence in
favor of its military counterpart. Both parties agree that the investigation
of the facts remains unfinished to date, although they disagree on the reason:
for the State it is due to lack of cooperation of the victims, and for the
petitioners, to the intervention of an entity without legal competence that
lacks impartiality and willingness.
27.
In sum, the representatives of the alleged victims had access to a suitable
remedy under the domestic jurisdiction and lodged a petition in good time
and in the correct manner, but the aforementioned transfer of competency resulted
in the paralyzation of the investigation and, finally, its closure.
The petitioners allege that they are excused from appealing to the jurisdiction
of the military courts due to the fact that they lodged the petition with
the competent authority, and that the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Military
Justice lacks the necessary impartiality to investigate the facts.
28.
It is an uncontroverted fact that the complaint to the Office of the Public
Prosecutor in Chiapas was filed with the result of a gynecological exam, according
to which the three sisters had lesions of rape consistent with the date when
they allegedly occurred; the Mexican State did not question the validity of
that document in the proceedings before the IACHR. The IACHR furthermore
notes, by way of a preliminary observation, that five years have elapsed since
the petition was lodged in Mexico with the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor,
without it having been definitively established as of the date of adoption
of the instant report how the events occurred, for which reason it has not
been possible to identify those presumed responsible. However, these
matters will be analyzed at the appointed stage of the proceedings, together
with the other arguments relating to the right to due process of law and to
effective legal protection.[19]
29. The Commission concludes
that, for different reasons, exhaustion of domestic remedies in Mexico was
not possible, even though five years have elapsed since the facts allegedly
occurred. Consequently, the Commission applies to the instant case the
exception provided for in the second part of Article 46(2)(b) of the American
Convention. The causes and effect of the lack of exhaustion of domestic
remedies shall be analyzed in the report that the Commission will adopt on
the merits, in order to determine whether they constitute violations of the
American Convention.
b.
Period for lodging the petition
30. Due to the application
of Article 46)2)(b) of the American Convention to this case, it is not necessary
to analyze the requisite established in Article 46(1)(b) of that international
instrument. The Commission considers that in the instant case, under
the circumstances set forth supra,
the petition was presented in a reasonable time from the date on which the
alleged violations were denounced in Mexico.
c.
Duplication of proceedings and res judicata
31.
The exceptions provided for in Articles 46(1)(d) and 47(d) of the American
Convention have not been contended by the Mexican State, nor do they emerge
from the information contained in the record of the instant case.
d.
Characterization of the alleged facts
32. The Commission considers
that the facts alleged, if shown to be true, would characterize a violation
of the rights guaranteed in Articles 5, 7, 8, 11, 19, and 25 of the American
Convention.
e.
Request for closing the case
33. The Mexican
State requested that the instant case be closed due to the delay in which
the petitioners incurred to respond to the information supplied by it on October
24, 1996. The State said:
Delays
such as the one that took place in this case, tarnish the proceedings before
the Commission and they are contrary to the spirit of the American Convention.
Although
that Convention does not expressly state a period of time in which a case
must be decided, nor does it provide for preclusion of procedural stages,
both the spirit and the general principles of law establish duties of equality,
good faith and transparency. Giving value to cases in which there is
such manifest lack of interest, not only with regard to the internal jurisdiction
but also to the inter-American jurisdiction, would severely question such
duties.[20]
34. In order to analyze
the request of the State, the Commission must refer to the provisions that
apply to closing files. Article 48(1)(b) of the American Convention
establishes:
After
the information has been received, or after the period established has elapsed
and the information has not been received, the Commission shall ascertain
whether the grounds for the petition or communication still exist.
If they do not, the Commission shall order the record to be closed. (emphasis
added)
35. Likewise, the Regulations
of the IACHR establish in Article 35(c) certain preliminary procedural questions:
The
Commission shall proceed to examine the case and decide on the following matters:
a.
whether the remedies under domestic law have been exhausted, and it may determine
any easures it considers necessary to clarify any remaining doubts;
b.
other questions related to the admissibility of the petition or its manifest
inadmissibility based upon the record or submission of the parties;
c.
whether grounds for the petition exist
or subsist, and if not, to order the file closed. (Emphasis added).
36. The Commission considers,
on the basis of the information received from the parties and summarized in
the instant report, that the grounds alleged by the petitioners fully subsist.
Accordingly, there is no reason to suspend or close these proceedings in the
inter-American system. On the contrary, the case must be declared admissible
and move to the following stage provided for in the American Convention and
the Regulations of the IACHR.
V.
CONCLUSIONS
37.
The Commission considers that it is competent to take cognizance of the instant
case and that the petition is admissible in accordance with Articles 46 and
47 of the American Convention.
38. Based on the foregoing
de facto and de jure arguments and without prejudging the merits of the matter,
THE
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
DECIDES:
1.
To declare the instant case admissible in respect of the alleged violations
of the rights protected in Articles 5, 7, 8, 11, 19, and 25 of the American
Convention.
2. To notify the parties
of this decision.
3. To continue to examine
the merits of the case.
4.
To place itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to reaching a friendly
settlement on the basis of respect for the human rights enshrined in the American
Convention and to invite the parties to give their opinion on that possibility,
and
5.
To publish this report and include it in the Annual Report to the OAS General
Assembly.
Done and signed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the city
of San José, Costa Rica, on this the 19th of November of 1999.
(Signed): Robert K. Goldman, Chairman; Hélio Bicudo, First Vice-Chairman;
Claudio Grossman, Second Vice- Chairman; Commission Members: Alvaro Tirado
Mejía, Carlos Ayala Corao and Jean Joseph Exumé.
1 Fictitious names.
The real identities of the sisters and their relatives are withheld at
the express request of the petitioners and in keeping with the practice
of the Commission when dealing with denounced acts such as are characterized
in the instant case which, when published, could affect a persons dignity
and honor. Moreover, one of the alleged victims was a minor at the
time the violation allegedly occurred. In their note of May 2, 1999,
the petitioners stated the following:
After
lodging the petitions the victims suffered reprisals from the community
where they lived, as a result of which they had to move away from their
village of origin and two of them to changed their names. For those
reasons, we, the petitioners, have left out the names of the injured parties
and respectfully request the honorable Commission in future to keep the
names of the victims secret.
[2] An armed dissident
group that launched a rebellion in Chiapas in 1994. The Law for
Dialogue, Conciliation and Fitting Peace in Chiapas, which entered into
force on March 11, 1995, defines the EZLN as a group of people who identify
themselves as an organization of mostly indigenous Mexican citizens, who
for various reasons chose to rebel and became involved in an armed conflict
that started on January 1, 1994. As of the date of approval
of this report the conflict continues and the negotiations for reaching
peace in Chiapas remain unconcluded.
[3] CEJIL communication
of May 27, 1999, p.4.
[4] CEJIL communication
of May 27, 1999, pp.5 and 6.
[5] The Mexican State
ratified the Convention of Belém de Pará on November 12, 1998.
[6] CEJIL communication
of May 27, 1999, p.13.
[7] Communication
of the Mexican State of May 13, 1996, pp.1 and 2.
[8] Communication
of the Mexican State of October 24, 1996, p.2.
[9] Idem, pp. 2-3.
[10] Idem,
p. 3.
[11] For
example, Pedro Santiz Espinoza declared,
That
since the moment the military arrived at my home they have behaved well
toward the people; that I have never noticed people passing through there
having any problem with the military; that the military only ask the people
passing through there for their identification and search their bags;
that I have never heard any rumors of the military personnel at the post
next door to my house taking advantage of women
That
he did not observe the soldiers strike the girls because otherwise he
would have told the authority; that he has received advice from no-one
on what he is saying, that neither has he been threatened, nor has he
been given money to declare as he is doing, that on that day he was not
drunk
. Communication of October 29, 1996, p.4.
[12] Idem,
pp. 10 and 11.
[13] In
this regard the State adds the following:
It
is incomprehensible that they should cultivate accusations against vertical
institutions with a clean historical record like the Mexican Army with
proof no greater than rumors that only generate legal insecurity and the
most disgraceful of attacks on the entities responsible for national security,
which were brought to the area of conflict with the sole purpose of fulfilling
their duty, their constitutional mandate, which is to safeguard the nations
domestic security under the system of government ruled by law and respect
for human rights that prevails in the Mexican State.
Idem, pp. 26 and 27.
[14] Communication
of the State of July 14, 1999, p.1.
[15] Idem.
[16]
The Mexican State deposited its instrument of ratification of the American
Convention on April 3, 1982.
[17] Velásquez Rodríguez
Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgement of June 26, 1987, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.
(Ser. C), para. 91.
[18] In
this regard, the petitioners consider that rape, in this case committed
by a gang and against three females, including a child, is originally
and by definition a common crime and not a breach of military discipline
(communication of August 29, 1996, p. 4). The State, for its part,
holds that the military personnel was on duty on the date of the events,
because in time of peace the interior security of the country may also
be threatened (communication of October 24, 1996, p. 14); that
it is logic that the competency be assigned to the military organs;
and that the competent military organs
after a profound and exhaustive
investigation, concluded that the alleged facts were nonexistent (idem,
p.22).
[19] The
Inter-American Court has stated:
When
certain exceptions to the rule of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
are invoked, such as the ineffectiveness of such remedies or the lack
of due process of law, not only is it contended that the victim is under
no obligation to pursue such remedies, but, indirectly, the State in question
is also charged with a new violation of the obligations assumed under
the Convention. Thus, the question of domestic remedies is closely tied
to the merits of the case. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra,
para. 91.
[20] Communication
of the State of July 14, 1999, p. 3.