MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-7, Iraq

SUBJECT: Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq


2. This report documents the detention and corrections operations assessment and assistance completed during the period of 13 October – 6 November 2003.

3. The report includes the background and methodology employed by the assistance team. It also addresses each of the areas specified in the request with recommended solutions in the near term (from now until the next unit rotations occur o/a Feb 04), mid term (OIF 2 rotation from o/a Feb 04-Feb 05), and long term (Feb 05 and after).

4. Planners from CJTF-7 PMO, CFLCC PMO, 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units, have established the groundwork for a successful transition from a Coalition Forces dependant correctional system to one managed and operated by the Iraqi Prison Department under the supervision and support of the Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice Prison Department (CPA MOJ), with assistance of OIF-2 forces.

5. The team appreciated the courtesies and cooperation provided throughout the visit by all headquarters and staff elements. In particular, we received excellent support from CPT Rick Stuhrke, CJTF-7 PMO Detainee Ops Officer, MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, 800th MP Bde S3, Mr. Terry Bartlett, CPA MOJ, COL Teddy Spain and CSM Charles Guyette, 18th MP Bde, and 1LT Tom Colonna and the Joint Visitor’s Bureau team.

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Provost Marshal General
REPORT ON
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS OPERATIONS
IN IRAQ

OFFICE OF THE
PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
OF THE ARMY

November 5, 2003

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Executive Summary

Coalition Forces are detaining EPW’s and Civilian Internees (both security internees and criminal detainees) in accordance with DoD Directives and accepted U.S. and international practices. To date, Coalition Forces have processed over 30,000 detainees. The transition to an Iraqi-run corrections operation is progressing, though there is disparate progress in different regions/unit areas of responsibility throughout the country. Iraqi Police or Correctional Officers, requiring only periodic monitoring and mentorship by U.S. personnel already operate many facilities outside Baghdad. However, in and around Baghdad, US Military Police units and Iraqi Correctional Officers jointly operate facilities, while in al-Anbar province (e.g., ar-Ramadi and Falluja), U.S. Forces have allowed Iraqi officials greater autonomy with their police and prison operations. As reconstruction of larger regional prisons, detention centers and additional city jails approach completion (or are approved for funding), there will be a future challenge to train sufficient Iraqi Corrections Officers in basic tasks, intermediate level supervision, and senior level management. There will also be an increased requirement to provide oversight and mentoring by the CPA MOJ Prisons Department of the more complex long-term correctional facilities; vice the current smaller jail operations. Finally, as several detention facilities currently under MOI (Iraqi Police) control likely transfer to MOJ control, the hiring of all authorized personnel within that CPA MOJ Prisons Department and the development of an Iraqi National Prison leadership takes on greater importance.

Generally, conditions in existing prisons, detention facilities and jails meet minimal standards of health, sanitation, security, and human rights established by the Geneva Conventions and encouraged in the Practical Guidelines for the Establishment of Correctional Services within United Nations Peace Operations. There is room for continued improvement in all areas. New prison facilities must be constructed during the next one to three years to achieve projected prison bed capacity requirements (approx 23,000 within five years). This will require a major capital investment to ensure appropriate security, health care, adequate living space, food service, and staff training (custody and control, security and safety, and basic human rights). In the near term, CPA should continue to prioritize training of Iraqi Correctional Officers in basic tasks and aggressively hire sufficient corrections subject matter experts to mentor Iraqi prison officials on the application of effective correctional practices and ensure humane treatment of detainees and prisoners. Additionally, the CPA must work with the Iraqi Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Interior to develop the processes and procedures necessary to ensure adequate staff recruitment, training, and appropriate pay (wages equivalent to Iraqi police and paid in a timely manner). With the limited resources available, recommend that the CPA MOJ and Iraqi Prison leaders concentrate on capacity building (renovating existing facilities and initiating new prison/detention construction projects), recruitment and training of Iraqi corrections staff and leaders, and streamlining the legal/court processing system to reduce the inmate population. All are critical programs that will ensure that the fledgling Iraqi prison system will have adequate capacity, while preserving basic human rights of prisoners and detainees.
While this report addresses each of the requested topic areas in the CJTF-7 memorandum, the major themes of this assessment include:

1. Consolidation. The Coalition Detention and Iraqi Prison systems will achieve greater efficiencies in detainee and corrections operations with a small number of large facilities. Recommend the following actions in the near term: close Camp Bucca theater internment facility (projected to close in early Dec 03)—along with the Theater Trans-shipment Point (TSP Whitford)—and consolidate all security internees at Camp Ganci in the Abu Ghurayb complex (except High Value Detainees); assess the tactical feasibility to decrease the number of Brigade Collection Points; promptly renovate facilities and train Iraqi guards for the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (Abu Ghurayb), Russafa Detention Center (Baghdad), and the four Regional Correctional Facilities in Mosul, Rahul, al-Hilla and Basrah, to most efficiently maximize Iraqi prison capacity; continue to assess the feasibility of establishing regional correctional facilities at Kanbani Saad (near Baqubah), ar-Ramadi and any other province with sufficient population to justify a 1,000 bed post-trial facility (the team cautions against the use of the facility at Basrah near the Saudi border, due to location, logistical issues, and previous reported atrocities); and move the Iraqi National Prison Headquarters from its Northwest Baghdad neighborhood to the Russafa Detention Center complex, joined by select members of the CPA MOJ (current location hinders communication/mentorship).

2. Separation. Currently, due to the lack of Iraqi prison facilities and the ongoing consolidation efforts at the Abu Ghurayb complex, Iraqi criminals are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs; though segregated in different cells/compounds. Camp Vigilant is within the same compound as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (an Iraqi-manned facility). At the High Value Detainee location, 30 EPWs are intermingled with the other security internees. These categories of offenders need to be separated as soon as facility construction and renovation projects permit, especially separating those facilities run by US personnel (for security internees) and those run by Iraqi personnel (for Iraqi criminals). The management of multiple disparate groups of detained persons in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. Absent specific mission constraints, intermingling these categories of detainees should be avoided.

3. Standardization. There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g., weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.). However, it should also be noted that the assessment team members did not identify any military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. Conversely, Military Police units of the 800th MP Brigade operating in the 101st ABN (AA) Division area of operation have established superb operations at the Mosul Regional Correctional Facility in Badush, as have 800th and British (3 RMP) units at the al-Hilla Regional Correctional Facility and al-Maqual
Jail. The 4th ID collection point was equally impressive. Consistently, those units that had soldiers with previous military or civilian corrections experience employed more effective and appropriate procedures, knowing what “right” looked like. Though Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum #2 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities) provides general guidelines, it does not provide sufficient detail to serve as Standing Operating Procedures. On a larger scale, there is not clear boundary between which facilities will remain under the control of the Ministry of Interior (police) and those that will transfer to the control of the Ministry of Justice. Standardization is not intended to result in centralized control of detainee and corrections operations or inhibit initiative, but merely to set and attain reasonable standards throughout the theater.

4. Enable CPA MOJ. The Corrections experts in CPA Ministry of Justice Prisons Department have experienced a high turnover rate and slow recruitment. The current administrators are proven experts in corrections, and appear very committed to the establishment of a viable Iraqi corrections system. Unfortunately, they are understaffed and are still assessing the current situation and immediate requirements. Until CPA hires its prison staff, CJTF-7 should continue to provide staff augmentation, escort, and force protection support. CPA MOJ would also benefit from aggressively seeking a contractor (e.g., MPRI, Dynacorps, etc.) to develop and conduct Iraqi corrections officer training for initial entry, intermediate and manager level personnel. The training burden will increase when construction of the larger regional correctional facilities is complete.

5. Enable decentralized execution/initiative. The units in the 101st ABN (AA) Div have achieved great success, due in great part to the supportive command climate established by the Division Commander and his emphasis on the use of Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funds for prison projects to augment CPA spending. The current level of reconstruction of prisons (both completed and funded for future construction) and the training of Iraqi personnel is solid, and will continue to excel with sustained adequate funding. The SOPs and standardized training programs developed by the 310th MP Bn in al-Hilla are very thorough and should be considered for use at other locations. Both the North and South are quickly approaching a monitoring stage, in which only a small corrections cell (one MP MAJ/CPT, one Engineer CPT/1LT and two Corrections NCOs; E7/E6) will be necessary to work with CPA MOJ and the Iraqi Prisons personnel, at least until the larger regional facilities are established. CPA MOJ should take advantage of the initiative and energy of the military police units in theater by pushing funds to the commanders as quickly as possible, trusting the commanders to appropriately obligate both reconstruction and operational funds.

Lessons learned regarding necessary changes in doctrine and organizational structure related to detention and corrections operations will not be addressed in any detail in this report. The team did identify a significant paradigm shift in standard EPW/Detainee operations doctrine, as applied to post-hostilities detention of security internees, let alone the reconstruction of the Iraqi prison system. Similar doctrinal lessons learned had been identified in Operation Enduring Freedom, leading to work on an MP Bottom-up Review and Force Design Update. The team will forward suggested doctrinal and organizational changes to the appropriate proponent schools for review and action.
Background

Prior to October 2002, Iraq housed over 100,000 inmates in prison facilities under the supervision of a number of government ministries; most notably the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labor and Social Services, Internal Security Agency, and the Military. Most prisons were operated in secrecy and did not conform to international standards for humane treatment or appropriate living conditions and correctional practices. Prior to the conflict with Coalition Forces, Saddam Hussein issued Decree 225 (Oct 02), releasing all prisoners. Only the prison officials in the Kurdish-controlled North defied that order. Following the decree, the already antiquated prison facilities fell into greater disrepair, which was only compounded during and after the war as Iraqi citizens looted and destroyed most of the existing prisons and jails. Further, there appears to have been a systematic program to destroy all prison administrative documents, to include policies and procedures, records of inmates and employee files. Consequently, the reconstruction of the Iraqi prison system—to include facilities, personnel, and practices—was practically initiated from scratch.

In May 2003, five prison experts and an accountant from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), conducted an assessment of the Iraqi Prison system. The team produced a report titled, “Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for Prisons in a Free Society”, dated 15 June 2003. The report included a basic assessment of 21 prisons and detention centers in Iraq and provided a series of recommendations for establishing a humane, functioning corrections system. Concurrently, the team initiated planning for a future Iraqi-run prison system. They drafted Coalition Provisional Authority Order # 10, “Management of Detention and Prison Facilities,” and the more expansive CPA Memorandum #2 (of the same Title), both published on 8 June 2002. The policy order places “full authority and control over all detention and prison facilities...[under] the Ministry of Justice.” Regrettably, the policy does not clearly define the difference between MOJ-run Detention Facilities and Ministry of Interior/Police-run City Jails. The memorandum does provide general program guidance and standards, tracking closely with the Practical Guidelines for the Establishment of Correctional Services within United Nations Peace Operations, and even provides more detailed instruction in such areas as discipline, instruments of restraint, and treatment of prisoners awaiting trial. The memorandum provides sufficient guidance to develop standing operating procedures (SOP) for Iraqi facilities, but cannot serve as a substitute for a detailed SOP.

Currently only the British financial specialist remains from the original team that conducted the initial assessment and support to CPA MOJ, while the six new staff members from the United States, Korea and Spain have less than 45-days experience in Iraq. The personnel turnover and slow rate of hiring has inhibited progress on the recommendations in the report, though the initiative of Coalition Forces has mitigated some of the impact. CPA MOJ continues to pursue hiring actions to eventually field an organization of 110 international staff (primarily US prison experts) and 102 Iraqi staff.
Until CPA MOJ brings on its additional personnel and is capable of functioning on its own, Coalition Military Police personnel and units will need to continue to support jail, detention center and prison operations, and the Iraqi Correctional Officer training program. Unfortunately, military police generally lack the requisite institutional knowledge to effectively work issues related to National prison system policy and the operation of more complex long-term regional correctional facilities. Only a small number of officers in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment hold advanced degrees and measurable experience in corrections, and there are currently less than 1,000 95C/31E military police corrections specialists authorized to operate the six Army correctional and confinement facilities. The units supporting these six facilities are not currently organized for rotational deployment in support of contingency operations. On the other hand, according to the American Correctional Association, as many as 9,000 civilian correctional officers serve in the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard. The presence of civilian correctional officers in Reserve Military Police Units that deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was purely a matter of chance and coincidence (e.g., the 310th MP Bn has twelve civilian correctional officers).

Since the transfer of authority (TOA) on 15 June 2003 between CFLCC and CJTF-7, the 800th MP Brigade, a theater asset, was tasked to expand from its previous standard EPW operations, to add detention of Security Internees, High Value Detainees, Criminal Detainees and support the establishment of Iraqi jails and prisons throughout Iraq. Additionally, the Brigade's mission includes securing the MEK, providing assistance to the CPA Prisons Department, and coordinating detainee movements (including court appearances by Iraqi criminals). An implied task has been training Iraqi Correctional Officers (over 1,400 correctional officers to date). Currently the 800th operates two internment facilities (IF); one at Umm Qasr (Camp Bucca) with a capacity of approximately 4,000 detainees and one in Baghdad (Camp Ganci) with a capacity of approximately 3,000 (will expand to 4,000 once the winterization project is complete), focused primarily on detaining security internees, but also holding criminal detainees till Iraqi prisons and detention centers expand capacity.

The 800th MP Brigade reports that Military Police support 15 Iraqi Jails, Detention Centers and Prisons. This number varies depending on definitions of police jails, vice police detention cells, and police jails, vice detention centers and prisons. The 800th reports that ten facilities only require monitoring on at least a weekly basis, while five facilities have a full-time MP presence until the Iraqis can operate the facilities on their own. Current capacity in these facilities is approximately 4,500 and 5,500, though again, may be less when applying an International Standard of twenty-five square feet per prisoner (as established by the CPA MOJ Prisons Department). Of those fifteen facilities, three are currently undergoing renovations to increase capacity, while eight other facilities in Iraq are undergoing various phases of refurbishment and construction. When current funded projects are complete, these facilities may increase capacity to as many as 10,500 criminal detainees. The current detainee population in Coalition facilities is approximately 10,600, consisting of: 3,860 MEK members; 3,860 security internees; 2,700 criminals; 162 juveniles; 117 EPWs and 101 high value detainees.
Methodology

The Commanding General, CJTF-7, LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations in Iraq. (Encl 1) US Central Command coordinated for technical assistance with the Department of the Army; the Executive Agent for the DoD EPW/Detainee Program. The Office of the Provost Marshal General of the Army assumed responsibility for forming the team. The team members were selected based on experience and education in the field of corrections and in those additional areas indicated as requiring assistance (i.e., legal, medical, automation). From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Donald J. Ryder, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, led the assessment/assistance team of subject matter experts, which included:

- COL Steve Andraschko, MP, Director, Command & General Staff School; former Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Commander, 704th MP Bn & Ft Lewis Regional Correctional Facility, and Staff Officer at the USDB; MA degree in Criminal Justice (Corrections)
- COL Steve David, JA, Military Judge (OTJAG Rep); Mobilized Reservist, Indiana State Circuit Court Judge; Juris Doctor degree
- LTC Pete Grande, MP, Deputy Commandant, USDB; former Commander of Ft Knox Regional Correctional Facility and Mannheim Confinement Facility; MA degree in Criminal Justice (Corrections); American Correctional Association (ACA) Certified Correctional Executive and Auditor
- LTC Mark Inch, MP, Chief, Corrections & Internment Branch (OPMG); former Battalion Commander, 705th MP Bn (USDB) and Commander, Ft Ord Area Confinement Facility; OIC for Somali Police and Prison program (UNOSOM II); MA degree in Geography (Middle East)
- LTC Tom Schmitt, MS (Social Worker), Health Care Administrator, USDB (10 Years experience at USDB); Masters of Social Work degree, National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) Certified Correctional Health Care Professional, ACA Certified Correctional Manager and Auditor
- Mr Mike Shannon, EPW/Detainee Program Manager (OPMG), former ACA Deputy Director of Standards and Accreditation and Executive Director of the California Correctional Association; US Air Force Reserves Counter-Intelligence Officer; MA degree in Public Administration (Corrections)
- MAJ Anne Albert, SP (Physician Assistant, OTSG Rep), Special Projects Officer (Department Health Education & Training, AMEDDCS); specializes in Preventive Medicine and Occupational Health; 17 years as a PA to include health care at USDB, Ft Lewis RCF and Ft Hood Installation Detention Facility; Masters in Public Health degree
- MAJ Jeffrey Creed, MP, XO 327th MP Bn (currently conducting detention operations at Bagram, Afghanistan); 15 years experience in Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations, to include 6 years in a Training Support Battalion and command of an MP Escort Guard Company during Desert Storm
MAJ Jennifer Curry, MP, Concepts Developer (USAMPS); 12 years experience in I/R operations, to include recent work on MP I/R force design update; MA degree in Management

MAJ Anthony Farris, SG, Action Officer, Strategic Architecture Branch (USCENTCOM, J6); formerly advised Kuwaiti MOD on communications and computer systems; Undergraduate degree in Police Management and MA in Business Management; will remain in country as USCENTCOM J6 LNO

CPT Roger Harbison, MP, I/R Operations Officer, CFLCC PMO since Dec '02; former LNO to CPA and ICRC before TOA; MA in Criminal Justice (Corrections) with follow-on assignment to the USDB

MSG Michael Jones, 95C/31E (Correctional Specialist), Guard Commander, USDB; 24 years of Corrections experience to include NCOIC of the Special Housing Unit and eight years at the USDB

SFC Edward Baldwin, 95C/31E, Senior Corrections Technical Advisor (USAMPS); 22 years corrections experience, to include 7 years at the USDB and two tours to GTMO; MA degree in Public Administration and Security Management

A key objective of the assessment included developing recommendations on how to bridge from current operations to an Iraqi-run prison system, synchronized with the plans of the CPA MOJ Prison Department, setting realistic expectations for the reestablishment of a long-neglected prison system in a developing Nation. The team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system and provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas requested by the Commanding General, CJTF-7:

1. Detention and corrections system management.
2. Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and accountability.
3. Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system.
4. Integration of military detention and corrections operations with CPA, and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run system.
5. Detainee medical care and health management.
6. Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation standards.
7. Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees.
8. Detainee legal processing.
9. Detainee databases and records, including integration with law enforcement and court databases.

Team members interviewed leadership, staff representatives and soldiers from CFLCC, CJTF-7 (PMO/C3, C6, C7, SJA, IG, Surgeon), CPA (Ministries of Justice, Health, Interior [Police], and Labor & Social Services), UN (Office of Peace Keeping Operations, Corrections Liaison, New York), 1st AD, 4th ID, 82nd ABN Div, 101st ABN (AA) Div, Multi-National Division (MND), 3 RMP (UK), and the leadership of all three Military Police Brigades supporting operations in Theater (18th, 220th, and 800th) and MP units subordinate to the MP Brigades or attached to maneuver units, as well as the interim Director of the Iraqi National Prison Department.
Team members visited the majority of operational Coalition Security Internee Camps and Iraqi jails and correctional facilities. A summary of trends and observations concerning each facility visited are listed at Annex A. Audit instruments used by team members conducting security, medical treatment, training, and legal assessments are at Annex B. The assessment team visited the following camps, jails, detention centers, and regional corrections facilities in Iraq:

**US Security Internee Camps and Collections Points:**

- 800th MP Bde, 4 of 5 facilities; Cp Ganci and Cp Vigilant at Abu Ghurayb complex, Cp Bucca at Umm Qarsr, HVD facility, but not the Trans-Shipment Point (TSP Whitford) at Tallil AirBase

- Three Division Collection Points (4th ID, 101st ABN (AA) Div, and 1st AD DIF), two Brigade Collection Points, and the MEK compound

**Iraqi Prisons, Detention Centers, and Jails:**

- Existing or Proposed Iraqi Regional Correctional Facilities: 3 of 3 partially operational prisons (Baghdad Central (Abu Ghurayb), Mosul (near Badush), and al-Hillah), and 2 of 5 proposed prison sites at Dahuk and Basrah, but not Kanbani Saad near Baqubah (only foundations remain), ar-Ramadi (proposed new construction), and Salmon prison near the Saudi border.

- Existing or Proposed Detention Centers (MOJ responsibility) and Major City Jails (currently MOI responsibility): Baghdad (Russafa Detention Center, Salhiya, Karhk Juvenile, Isenbaret, Kadamiyah Women’s, and the training academy), Dahuk (Prison “A” and “B”), Irbil, Mosul (Detention Center “Transportation Jail” and police jail), Tikrit Regional Police Headquarters), an-Najaf, ad-Diwaniyah, Basrah (Al Maqual and Special Police Training Academy), but not Suleimaniyah, Kirkuk, as-Samarah, Baqubah, ar-Ramadi, Karbala, al-Kut, as-Samawah, the Dahuk and Arbil Women and Youth jails (both built 1986 by NGOs and reported in good shape), the proposed jail sites at Al-Amarah and An-Nasariyah, or police jails/Detention Cells in smaller cities and villages.
Detention and Corrections System Management

General.

Since the cessation of major hostilities, most Iraqi and third country nationals detained by Coalition Forces are Civilian Internees, protected according to Geneva Convention IV (Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Very few Enemy Prisoners of War remain in U.S. custody. The division of Civilian Internees (CI) into Security Internees (SI) and Criminal Detainees (CD), gives rise to two distinct and ideally separate detention systems, one run by Coalition Forces, the other by the Iraqi Prison Department and Iraqi correctional officers under the supervision of CPA MOJ Prisons Department. Currently, Coalition military police are involved in both systems.

The population of the Coalition forces and the emerging Iraqi Prison System is made up of various designations including Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)/Civilian Internee (CI) including the High Value Detainee, Security Internee (SI), Criminal Detainee (CD). Each population must be managed appropriate to their specific designation in accordance with Iraqi Law, US Policy and where applicable the Geneva Conventions and the Laws of War.

Security Internees are civilians interned during conflict or occupation for their own protection or because they pose a threat to the security of coalition forces, its mission, or are of intelligence value. This includes persons detained for committing offenses (including attempts) against coalition forces (or previous coalition forces) members of the Provisional Government, NGO's, State infrastructure or any person accused or committing war crimes or crimes against humanity. Certain Security Internees may also be classified as a High Value Detainee (HVD), which are Security Internees of significant intelligence or political value.

When Coalition forces detain a Security Internee, the detaining unit will generally take the SI to a Brigade Collection Point, where Brigade-level personnel determine whether to continue detention, reclassify the detainee as a Criminal Detainee and transfer the individual to the Iraqi police, or release the individual. For those who remain in Coalition custody, the same vetting process occurs at the Division Holding Area. Again, if the Division-level personnel verify that the detainee is a Security Internee, then they transfer the SI to the 800th Military Police Brigade, either at Camp Bucca near Basrah, or Camp Ganci, in the Abu Ghurayb complex. High Value Detainees are kept at a separate location. Currently, the MND South-Central and the 82nd ABN Div take Security Internees directly from Brigade Collection Points or the detaining unit to Camp Ganci, and the British 3 RMP to Camp Bucca. With the anticipated closure of Camp Bucca in Dec '03, the British will build a Security Internee Holding Facility; though the length they intend to hold SI's and procedures to transfer SI's to Camp Ganci is unclear.
Criminal Detainees are persons who are detained because they are reasonably suspected of having committed a crime against Iraqi Nationals or Iraqi properties, a crime not related to the Coalition Force Mission. Whether detained by Coalition Forces or Iraqi Police, the CD will most appropriately be held in a Police Detention Cell or in larger cities, a Police Jail (some Jails maintain over 300 detainees). Within 48-72 hours, the suspect should be brought before a magistrate, and if sufficient evidence exists to continue detention, be placed in an MOJ-run Detention Center. Currently, only Baghdad and Mosul have dedicated Detention Centers, while in the rest of the country, MOI-run police jails hold all Pre-trial CD’s. Until sufficient capacity is built in the Iraqi prison system, criminal detainees are also held at Camp Ganci, and to a lesser extent, Camp Bucca.

If a Criminal Detainee is convicted in an Iraqi Court, and sentenced to confinement, the CD should be moved to a MOJ-run prison (i.e., regional correctional facility). Currently, only Baghdad, Mosul, and al-Hillal have dedicated post-trial prisons, while most MOI-run police jails have dedicated separate cells for convicted criminals. Some have suggested that each Province should have a Regional Correctional Facility, but anticipated prisoner population may allow consolidation of smaller provinces’ prisoners at a neighboring larger provincial facility (e.g., the three Northern Provinces can be amply served by one facility in Mosul and another in Dahuk [which also addresses the concerns of the Kurdish population], the proposed facility at Kanbani Saad would serve both Salah ad-din [Tikrit] and Diyala Provinces, and Basrah could likely handle the three or four of the Southeastern Provinces), at least in the mid-term. Also, each major population center should have a separate MOJ-run Women and Juvenile Facility. Currently, Baghdad, Dahuk and Arbil have separate Women and Juvenile Facilities, while MOI-run police jails generally have designated separate cells for women and juveniles.

Current planning for the Iraq Prison System is being modified from the 15 Jun 03 ICITAP report, that proposes new construction, reconstruction and modernization of twenty-six prisons and detention centers for juveniles and adults at a cost of US$99 Million and is anticipated to increase the system wide capacity by approximately 10,000. Occupancy trends in the surrounding region are declining (UN samples from 97-02). Although at present Iraq appears to be experiencing a higher degree of criminal activity, one can reasonably expect over time given similarities in culture, religion and societal development that the country will be on par with its contemporaries in the region in relation to prison population trends. Presently, the region sustains a prisoner to population ratio of approximately 106 prisoners for every 100,000 persons. This ratio suggests that once Iraq achieves a normalized state (i.e., efficient police and court systems) the requirement for prisoner cells in Iraq will be 23,970 (adjusted down for over 65 population of 3.08%). Given a population growth rate of 2.84 (2001 est.) the 15-year requirement is upwards of 30,000 prisoner beds.
Observations.

NOTE: Observations related to the detention of Security Internees will be addressed under “Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections System.”

1. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order #10, Management of Detention and Prison Facilities promulgates full authority and control over all detention and prison facilities currently exercised by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Additionally, all employees of the Directorate of Adult Prisons and the Directorate of Juvenile Prisons in the Ministry of Labor and Social Services are transferred to the MOJ. In reality, the transfer of facilities and employees is fragmented, with most facilities still under MOI (police) control.

2. The International Staff of CPA MOJ is under-manned, and has experienced a high turn-over rate. The Department Director has been on emergency leave for several months, while the interim Director, though a proven expert in corrections and well known to several team members has less than 45-days in country. The 800th MP Bde has augmented the eight staff members at CPA MOJ with three Captains and several NCO’s with Corrections experience, as well as a Major LNO. The performance and tangible results generated by the military augmentees have been absolutely superb, and worthy of special recognition.

3. The Iraqi National Prison Department currently has a staff of almost seventy personnel. The Iraqi interim Director has not expressed a desire to continue in his position and recognizes that he lacks the experience to run a National prison system (though he is willing to stay on as a senior supervisor). The laborious process for designating a national director is nearing completion, with the formal installation of a Director General for the Iraq Corrections Service expected by mid-November of 2003. The Iraqi Prison Department is currently located in Northwest Baghdad, and has little day-to-day contact with CPA MOJ Prisons Department. Prison wardens in the outer regions expressed concern over the lack of communication and guidance from the Iraqi Prison Department.

4. The 800th MP Bde has missioned eight MP (I/R) Battalions and its specialized detachments to support the reestablishment of the Iraqi Prison system and to operate its security internee facilities. They have also tasked one Battalion to operate the HVD facility, and another to secure the MEK Ashraf compound. Due to the array of missions and extent of the Area of Operations, and earlier responsibility to operate the 3rd ID/1st AD Division Collection Point (Camp Cropper) the 800th MP (I/R) Bde has not supported the reestablishment of Iraqi prisons in the 4th ID and 82nd ABN Div AOs. The lack of support to those two AOs has resulted in the loss of some synergy and consistent progress of jail reconstruction, as well as unclear reporting of criminal detainee information.
5. The 800th MP (I/R) Brigade has used elements of several assigned MP I/R Battalions and two Brigade Liaison Detachments to assist CPA MOJ and Maneuver Units to train Iraqi Correctional officers in the 101st ABN (AA) Div, 1st AD, and MND South Central AO’s. Organic or attached Military Police or Civil Affairs units have worked with Police Jails in the British, 4th ID, and 82nd ABN Div AO’s, and their respective training programs. Two Captains in the 800th MP Bde, CPT Eric Cortes supporting the 101st ABN (AA) Div and CPT John Kaires of the 310th MP Bn deserve special recognition for their personal efforts and initiative; two men that have made a difference.

6. There is not a clear long-term vision or projected end-state for facilities, staff levels, or anticipated prison population. The new staff at CPA MOJ is still conducting its initial survey of existing facilities and has not decided on what facilities will remain open, closed or be consolidated, creating challenges with establishing goals and setting priorities for funding.

7. The ICITAP report states that there are 151 prisons in Iraq, with a total potential capacity of 11,078 beds. But not only are total number of facilities and projected capacity suspect, most facilities have insufficient beds/space per inmate ratios (i.e., 25 sq feet per inmate), latrines, dining areas, recreation, visitation areas, segregation cells or secure areas to confine problem prisoners, offices for staff, towers, and guard facilities. Though some allowances can be made for short-term jails and detention centers, long-term prison facilities must achieve a higher standard, more in line with International Standards.

8. There is confusion on which facilities will transfer to the CPA MOJ Prisons Department oversight and funding, and which will remain under MOI (Police) control. A review of the CJTF-7 IPS Report does not delineate Police stations with mere detention cells, from police stations with actual jails. The report also does not delineate between MOJ-run Detention Centers (pre-trial) and MOJ-run prisons (post-trial correctional facilities). The report would be more useful if it also showed maximum capacity and current population.

9. There is concern among Iraqi Correctional Officers, currently employed as Iraqi Police guards (and appropriately paid equivalent to Iraqi police), that they will loose pay and stature, when transferred to the MOJ Prison Department. Iraqi Correctional Officers also express concern over winter uniforms, personal side arms for protection off-duty, and in some locations, heavier weapons for force protection of prisons from better-armed criminal elements. It is unclear how transfer will take place from mil supported to CPA and ultimately to an independent Iraqi system.
10. The CPA MOJ Prisons Department must obligate US$10 Million by December 31, 2003. Money has been obligated against ongoing construction in Baghdad Central, Basra, Mosul, and al-Hilla. CPA has also endorsed US$5.6 Million for projects at Kanbani Saad, al-Amarah, Nasariyah and Baghdad city. There appears to be some confusion as to whether US$2.9 Million has been allocated to the Mosul facility, and US$2.1 Million to the proposed Dahuk facility.

11. There is a consistent theme of frustration with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and the emerging bureaucracy surrounding budgetary planning and execution, and the difficulty of getting projects funded and pay disbursed in a timely manner. The CPA Iraqi Infrastructure Office now has one POC for prison projects, and reports a consortium of seventeen construction companies prepared to execute projects under an abbreviated “fast-track” process.

12. There are conflicting perceptions of the end state of the Abu Ghurayb Prison complex (i.e., Baghdad Central Correctional Facility). Some believe the complex is programmed for destruction in three years, leaving only the death chamber as a memorial, while others believe it will assume a more GTMO-like character, focused exclusively on U.S. mission priorities. The Abu Ghurayb Complex has four prison compounds and two temporary U.S. Security Internee Camps (Camp Ganci and Camp Vigilant). The Southeast compound currently has one Maximum-security prison under renovation and partially operation under the CPA MOJ (though one tier is used exclusively for U.S. mission priorities), as well as Camp Vigilant, the 320th MP Bn TOC and housing for soldiers in the former warehouse. For force protection reasons, soldiers of the 320th MP Bn and other tenant units have also taken up residence in the remaining three prison compounds. The CJTF-7 C7 has a draft Master Plan to turn the complex into an enduring base, focusing soldier housing and support in and around the Northwest corner compound, but does not address specific renovation of the Southwest and Northeast prison compounds.

Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.

   a. CPA MOJ Prisons Department identify clearly which facilities are or will be a part of the MOJ vice the MOI. Include in this plan staffing instructions specifically identifying levels of authority, duties and pay scales for all confinement personnel. Establish memorandums of agreement between MOI and MOJ delineating each ministry’s ability to utilize the other’s facilities and which clearly identifies each other’s responsibilities.
b. Emphasis should be placed upon hiring the corrections experts who will assist in the development and transition of the Iraqi Correctional System. Allowing the CPA Prisons Department Staff to direct recruit or contracting with a corrections management company rather than relying on DOJ may be a more expeditious answer, at least for the training staff.

c. The Iraqi Correctional System HQ and the CPA Prisons Department need to be co-located or together more than periodically to facilitate training of the Iraqi leadership as much as possible, involving them in the restoration process. Sending the highly recruited Iraqi Correctional System Director to training in management, ethics, accounting and strategic planning will assist in the transition process, increase the perceived importance and make the position more desirable.

d. Policy both operational and budget should be based on a national plan, which is centrally developed and managed, but locally administered to fit the needs of the region where it is being employed.

e. Detainees must be segregated and managed by their designation. Specifically, better control over the environment of the Security Detainees who are in various evaluative stages will increase their intelligence yield. Isolate detainees who continue to be in the evaluative process as much as possible, but at a minimum, visually isolate them from outside eyes.


2. Mid-Term.

a. Once full staffing is achieved at the CPA MOJ Prisons Department, or even when the next thirty-four priority hires are complete, determine if military staff augmentation is necessary. By conducting an actual staffing requirements analysis, force requirements can be anticipated and a time line created for transition from military to civilian control that corresponds with the rotation plans of outgoing and incoming units.

b. Develop a standard issue for safe and secure operations of prison facilities. Take into account that the current threat environment may necessitate a more robust arsenal that may not be required once the county stabilizes. Training on all weapons and tactics to be used must be a substantial block of instruction at the corrections academy. Training records for employees should be developed with copies sent to the facility where a cadre is assigned and one maintained in a central personnel repository.
c. Within the budget cycle, each of the ministries should submit a validated budget to MOF who would then fund the appropriate portions of the individual Ministry budgets. The funding should go to the specific ministry to be managed by that ministry and sent to the regional MOJ areas to achieve the objectives of the ministries national plan. In this way pay issues can be avoided and contracts can be monitored and paid in such a way as to provide contractor accountability to the MOJ.

d. Renovate all the available cells in the Abu Ghurayb complex to facilitate consolidation and separation of the different categories of detainees.

e. Recruit and place civilian correctional administrators at each of the Iraqi Detention Operations to providing mentoring/oversight and hire sufficient personnel or contract to operate Iraqi Correctional Officer Training Academies.

3. Long-Term.

a. Abu Ghurayb Prison complex (i.e., Baghdad Central Correctional Facility) should be the center piece of both the military mission and the eventual transfer of facilities to Iraqi control for their criminal justice system, until the new US $100 Million facility is built to International Standards at a new location (e.g., Kanbani Saad). Abu Ghurayb should continue in operation to help meet anticipated future bed space requirements.

b. Transition operations at all Iraqi detention/prison facilities to the Iraqi Correctional Force with oversight by CPA MOJ Prisons Department.

c. Complete construction of the 4 regional prisons is necessary to provide initial post trial capacity. A strategic plan for additional prison construction is required.
Detainee Management (including movement, segregation and accountability)

General

There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g., weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.). Though there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. Conversely, Military Police units of the 800th MP Brigade operating in the 101st ABN (AA) Division area of operation have established superb operations at the Mosul Regional Correctional Facility in Badush, as have 800th and British (3 RMP) units at the al-Hillah Regional Correctional Facility and Ad-Diwaniyah and al-Maqual Jails. The 4th ID collection point was equally impressive. Consistently, those units that had soldiers with previous military or civilian corrections experience employed more effective and appropriate procedures, knowing what “right” looked like.

Though Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum #2 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities) provides general guidelines, it does not provide sufficient detail to serve as Standard Operating Procedures. On a larger scale, there is not clear boundary between which facilities will remain under the control of the Ministry of Interior (police) and which will transfer to the control of the Ministry of Justice. Standardization is not intended to result in centralized control of detainee and corrections operations or inhibit initiative, but merely to set and obtain reasonable standards throughout the theater.

Currently, due to the lack of Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities; though segregated in different cells/compounds. Camp Vigilant is within the same compound as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (an Iraqi-manned facility). At the High Value Detainee location, 30 EPWs are intermingled with the other security internees. These categories of offenders need to be separated as soon as facility construction and renovation projects permit, especially separating those facilities run by US personnel (for security internees) and those run by Iraqi personnel (for Iraqi criminals). The management of multiple disparate groups of detained persons in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. Absent specific mission constraints, intermingling these categories of detainees should be avoided.

There is virtually no trained professional correctional force. The CPA MOJ plan for hiring corrections experts to act in an oversight capacity and shadow training program for the leadership and management of the Iraqi Correctional System is sound and should be underway as soon as possible to begin building continuity in the system. Management expertise alone, however, will not enable a successful system. Staffing is a critical
element to the CPA/Iraqi Prison System. The training provided in support of CPA MOJ by the 800th MP Bde in an “academy” like setting provides a very basic course of instruction, but will require enhancements in areas of security, custody, control and unarmed self-defense, as well as Intermediate and Managerial level training.

Observations.

1. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Memorandum #2, Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, provides general program guidance and standards, tracking closely with the Practical Guidelines for the Establishment of Correctional Services within United Nations Peace Operations, and even provides more detailed instruction than the UN guidelines in a few areas, such as discipline, instruments of restraint, and treatment of prisoners awaiting trial. The memorandum provides sufficient guidance to develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for the Iraqi prison system, but cannot serve as a substitute for a detailed facility SOP.

2. Military Police supporting some Iraqi facilities have established policies and procedures based on CPA Memorandum Number #2. Several of the MP units benefited from assigned soldiers with experience in Federal or State correctional system. The facilities under the 310 MP Bn and the 381st MP Det (+) supporting the 101st ABN (AA) Div have translated their local policies and procedures into Arabic, and set a good initial template for smaller Detention Facilities and Police Jails. The SOPs for the larger regional correctional facilities will need to be more comprehensive, consistent with the complexity of running such facilities.

3. There is a lack of transportation assets for Iraqi operated facilities. Facility administrators either have one vehicle or no vehicle to transport prisoners to court, medical appointments or transfer to another facility (101st Abn (AA) Div did finance vans for their facilities). Some facilities without a vehicle must rely on the local police or Coalition military to assist in transporting detainees. The movement of detainees to facilities, court, or hospital is the responsibility of the confining power. Prior to Coalition presence, the Ministry of the Interior managed prisoner movement to and from their court appearances. The current CPA plan (est. US$3.1 Million) has the Ministry of Justice possessing dedicated assets embedded within the prison system for this activity. The continuing threat to Coalition Forces and ongoing operations has slowed the restoration of civil authority. Prisoners are by nature a high potential target requiring at present substantial force protection measures. A greater number of military assets are required for a small number of prisoners resulting in a backlog on the court docket. This slow pace of movement requires the use of additional military assets for longer periods of time. Greater efficiency and a reduction in required military assets can be achieved through better docket management, dedicated movement control and alternatives to traditional court appearances.
4. Currently the 800th MP Bde and other military police units have trained over 1,400 Iraqi correctional officers in basic confinement tasks, both in Baghdad and at remote locations. CPA MOJ has proposed a plan for a National Public Safety Training Academy and Regionalized In-Service Training Programs at an estimated cost of US$360,000. The proposal is for one National Academy and three regional training centers. CPA MOJ has one staff member dedicated to the training program, requiring almost exclusive dependence on military assets. Several Contract companies have expressed interest, or would likely express interest, in developing a more comprehensive tiered training Program of Instruction, and running the actual Iraqi correctional officer training programs. Though the current training program is sufficient for smaller short-term jails, it will not be sufficient to handle the numbers and skill-set required for larger and more complex regional prisons.

5. The current training program is a six-day program of instruction with a graduation rate of 120 each two week class. Applying an estimated average staffing ratio of 1:16 (1 cadre to 16 prisoners) and applying a 5.4 per 24-hour staff to position (accounting for leave, training and illness) algorithm, results in a system wide cadre requirement of approximately 8,090. If this figure is correct, under the 800th’s academy program, it will take 33 months at the current graduation rate to meet the system cadre requirements. The CPA MOJ planned academy will likely be more comprehensive requiring those past 800th MP Bde academy graduates to undergo follow-up training. CPA MOJ estimates the end-state in-service training requirement to encompass approximately 30,000 correctional employees.

6. The prison staff lacks resources to provide basic necessities to operate a prison. These basic necessities include cleaning supplies, hygiene items, medical supplies, food, and programs to reduce prisoner idleness or prepare them for release. Some facilities have had issues with contractors meeting their deadlines or statement of work.

7. Detainees are segregated into the following categories: Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Security Internees, High Value Detainees (HVD), and criminal detainees. The criminal detainee category is subdivided into: untried adult male, untried adult female, untried male juvenile, untried female juvenile, sentenced adult male, sentenced adult female, sentenced male juvenile, and sentenced female juvenile. There are facilities classified for males, females, and juveniles, but, except for HVD, some of the other categories are confined within the same facility. Violent criminals and non-violent criminal detainees are housed together with little or no structured risk assessment.

8. The lack of policy and standard operating procedures results in inconsistent application of basic security protocols. Visitation is a serious opportunity to introduce security and safety hazards. Contact and non-contact visitation varies from facility to facility. Some facilities have restricted visitation to non-contact
visitation because of contraband smuggled to prisoners. Visitation by female
guests is limited because of the shortage of female Iraqi correctional officers
available for searching female visitors. Visitors are searched prior to access, but
there are no criteria for who is authorized to visit. Presently, anyone can visit if
they possess identification.

9. There is a lack of policy or procedures for the control of accountability of keys,
tools, weapons, and contractor access. Soldiers were observed inside the
secure areas of detention and prison facilities with weapons. These soldiers
were in direct contact with detainees, which is an unacceptable risk inside a
confinement facility. A risk management-screening tool of individual workers
must control contractor access. Movement of contractors and visitors must be
controlled by a badging and/or escorting system.

10. A backlog exists of criminal detainees due to difficulties in court docket
management, transportation, and security issues and a general lack of records
availability. Iraqi criminal detainees compete with higher mission priorities for
transportation and force protection requirements for transportation to court. This
has resulted in a backlog of magistrate hearings and an inability to effectively
schedule trials. The courts have also been the targets of violence increasing the
difficulty for conducting trials and relieving the backlog.

11. The 800th MP (I/R) Bde units did not receive corrections specific training during
their mobilization period. Corrections training is only on the METL of two MP
(I/R) Confinement Battalions, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements
of the other at Camp Arifjan. MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days
of training in detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed self
defense, as well as training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell
moves, and correctional officer safety.

Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.

   a. Current commanders must develop a plan to remove all weapons from the
      interior and close proximity of all internment/correctional facilities. This must
      be accomplished to prevent unnecessary loss of life in the immediate future.

   b. Current commanders must continue to develop SOP’s that illustrate the basic
      requirements for visitation that identifies how detainees will be required to
      identify a list of immediate family members that they wish to receive visits
      from. This list should be verified, approved and made available to staff
      members at the facility entrance to facilitate the processing of visitors into the
      facility. Metal detectors should be placed at the entrances of the facilities to
      reduce the amount of contraband during visitation. All bags carried by visitors
      must be searched at the entrance. Only consumable food items that can be
consumed during the visit and other items authorized by the facility commander or designated representative may be brought into visitation. This will significantly reduce the amount of contraband trafficked during visitation.

c. Current commanders must develop a plan to account for keys to facility doors, vehicles, and restraint keys. This should include as a minimum a master key roster; secure key rings, procedures for access points and a list of keys never to be allowed inside the secure areas of a facility. All vehicles that are brought into the facility must be locked and the keys secured in a central location for accountability. This must be accomplished to prevent escape attempts.

d. Tools used by contractors were unsecured or unsupervised inside the secure areas of facilities. Accountability for facility tools and the type and number of tools used by contractors is required.


f. Utilize the experience of the existing MP units on the ground and the individual SOPs from the smaller supporting Iraqi facilities as well as the examples provided by the correctional assistance team as a guide to further develop the larger facility SOPs IAW AR 190-8 and local host national restrictions.

g. Continue to conduct training for the Iraqi correctional officers in basic confinement tasks, both in Baghdad and at remote locations.

h. Visit the operating budget for each of the facilities and identify emergency funds that will allow them to properly resource needed cleaning equipment to initiate necessary maintenance requirements to facilitate a more sanitary living environment for the detainees. Initiate a program for select detainees to conduct the required daily upkeep of the living, eating and latrine facilities they are housed in to reduce idleness and improve the sanitary conditions and maintenance of the facilities.

i. CPA MOJ must direct the court to go to the facilities to expedite the judicial process temporarily.

j. Initiate procedures for segregating Detainees into separate buildings if and where available, based on category of detainee, sex, untried or sentenced, and severity of offense.
k. Continue to maintain the excel spreadsheet developed by the 800th MP Bde, and distribute it to all sites that are not currently using this database. Review the Arabic excel database being utilized at the 400th MP Bn facilities, make any necessary corrections and distribute to all facilities. CPA needs to require uploads of the Arabic database to their office.

l. MI and Legal should make interest determinations. A vulnerability or threat assessments, on each SI should also be accomplished. Where no intelligence or interrogation interest is found and the individual is determined to be of no intelligence value and low threat (NOLOW), the NOLOW individual should be paroled on condition of no further anti-coalition activity. Those who continue to pose a threat or are of sufficient intelligence/interrogation value will continue to be detained until US/Coalition forces reclassify their status.

m. Request OIF 2 forces designated for I/R operations to receive the same Corrections program of instruction as those units deploying to GTMO.

2. Mid-Term.

   a. CPA with MOJ should purchase the necessary badge printers, card readers and additional hardware for the BATS or similar system, and positively identify contractors and workers as they enter the facilities. The system can also be used to bar personnel from the facilities. Annex E has a draft screening SOP, BATS Fielding Plan, and Badging Matrix that can be adapted for this theater.

   b. CPA with MOJ should further develop each facility SOP to delineate all procedures for visitation to include literature to be given to the families of the detainees explaining the rules of the facility during visitation to help expedite this process as well as significantly reduce the amount of contraband being trafficked during visitation.

   c. CPA and MOJ should work hand in hand with the current MP units within the facilities to develop an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that not only delineates where weapons are stored but how they will be employed during an emergency within the facility.

   d. CPA and MOJ should work hand in hand with the current MP units within the facilities to develop an effective key control plan that not only delineates where keys are stored but how they will be employed at each specific location (ie: (post orders).

   e. Continue to provide more detailed instructions in areas, such as discipline, instruments of restraint, and treatment of prisoners awaiting trial as well as those that are post trial.
f. Commanders publish and enforce these policies and procedures through the use of the NCO support channel to facilitate their efficiency and reduce the fostering of complacency.

g. With the assistance of the CPA allow the National Public Safety Training Academy and Regionalized In-Service Training Programs to transition more towards exclusively Iraqi run and continue to develop a more comprehensive tiered training Program of Instruction.

h. CPA and the MOJ must continue to further develop a more comprehensive tiered training Program of Instruction. This plan should include a method of increasing the graduation rate to meet the system cadre requirements. Allow the CPA and MOJ to plan a more comprehensive training program with input from the Iraqi Correctional Officers currently employed to help the Iraqi people feel that they are apart of the building of their future as well as what the follow-up training requirements should be. This plan should allow for a reduced estimated timeline for the end-state of the in-service training requirement to encompass more than the original 30,000 correctional employees.

i. The CPA along with the MOJ need to take responsibility for establishing standards and prioritizing work projects being conducted at all of the facilities.

j. CPA along with the MOJ must develop a plan to contract more vehicles to move the detainees where required with a combination of Iraqi Correctional Officers and US Army escorts.

k. Visit the operating budget for each of the facilities and identify emergency funds that will allow them to allocate funding for completion of existing construction of identified Regional Facilities for those sentenced detainees. Conduct a survey of current facility capacities to determine future facility housing requirements.

3. Long-Term.

a. CPA with MOJ should work together with the families of the detainees to identify any questions they may have regarding visitation this will facilitate a better relationship between the Iraqi Department of Corrections and the local community.

b. CPA and MOJ should work hand in hand with the current MP units within the facilities to develop a mechanism to conduct tests of the EAP to use as an assessment of the facilities capabilities to react appropriately during any disturbance within the facility.
c. CPA and MOJ should work hand in hand with the current MP units within the facilities to develop a mechanism to conduct vulnerability tests of the facility to use as an assessment of the staff's capabilities to react appropriately during any incident within the facility.

d. Conduct biannual assessments of the program in an attempt to acquire any updated practical correctional practices that will assist the system in continuing to maintain its goals.

e. Through the combined effort of the CPA and the MOJ they should continue to work conjointly to continue the further development of a more comprehensive and consistent method of running all of the facilities by having all SOPs translated into Arabic and added as a part of the In-Service portion of the correctional training program to assist in the transformation of control of each facility to the Iraqi Correctional System.

f. Conduct an annual assessment of the quality of training provided by the National Public Safety Training Academy and Regionalized In-Service Training Programs to identify any trends in application verses training that may be beneficial to future trainees.

g. Conduct an annual assessment of the quality of training programs to identify any trends in application verses training that may be beneficial to future trainees. And make the necessary adjustments to the training programs to ensure that not only the initial training is of quality but also the mid-level and upper level management training programs are consistent with the ever-changing Iraqi Correctional System.

h. CPA and MOJ must establish statements of work (written contracts) for the contractors, and effectively manage the work that is contracted.

i. The MOJ must develop a plan with the CPA that will allow for the hearings to be conducted at or near the correctional facilities to decrease transportation requirements and speed up the legal process. Furthermore, where possible, establish future court buildings adjacent to these facilities to decrease the transportation requirements. Establish a transportation section within the Iraqi, Department of Corrections with the sole purpose of transportation of detainees.

j. CPA along with the MOJ must develop a plan that will allocate funding for the construction of additional Regional Facilities to meet capacity requirements.
Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections System

General.

The Secretary of the Army is the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for administering the DoD EPW and CI program. The Army, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ASD-ISA), plans and develops policy for the operation of the program. This policy is captured in DoDD 2310.1 and AR 190-8. DoDD 2310-1 provides that persons captured or detained by the U.S. Military Services shall normally be handed over for safeguarding to U.S. Army Military Police, or to detainee collecting points or other holding facilities and installations operated by U.S. Army Military Police as soon as practical. AR 190-8 provides specific guidance on the administration and operation of both EPW and CI facilities, directing the establishment of Internment facilities in the communications zone of each theater of operations for the purpose of receiving, accounting for, administering, security, and logistically supporting EPWs. Though contingency plans may direct transfer of EPWs to CONUS.

United States Army Military Police Doctrine calls upon specialized MP units to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations. These units are almost exclusively Compo 2 and 3 units. Typically, a theater would be assigned one MP Brigade (I/R) to provide command, staff planning, and supervision of I/R operations performed by assigned and attached elements. The Brigade would establish I/R facilities in the COMMZ, and coordinate transfer of EPWs from the Corps Holding Areas to the I/R facilities. If the scope of responsibility (measured in number of subordinate MP (I/R) Battalions) exceeds its span of control, MP Brigade Liaison Detachments (BLD) can be assigned to extend the capability of the MP Brigade (I/R) to plan and supervise collection, internment, and evacuation operations of EPW's, Civilian Internees (CIs), Displaced Civilians (DCs), and US military prisoners. The BLDs can also act as a coordination link to allied and indigenous organizations to ensure that they are complying with the Geneva Conventions concerning EPWs and CIs; ensure that EPW operations in the theater follow US policies and directives, international agreements, and US policies implementing international law; and serve as an essential link with HN forces securing EPWs, CIs, and DCs, ensuring that policies consider the intent of the US to comply with international treaties pertaining to the care and handling EPWs, CIs, and DCs.

Subordinate to the MP (I/R) Brigade are MP (I/R) Battalions and MP Guard and Escort Guard Companies. The MP (I/R) Bn is the key unit of employment in I/R operations, providing command, staff planning, administration, and logistical support to operate an I/R facility for EPWs, CIs, or US military prisoners. Each HHC, MP (I/R) Bn has not only its principal staff elements, but four compound control and works projects teams, of approximately 15 military police each. These teams typical conduct inprocessing and "in-the-wire" operations. By doctrine, when attached with an MP Guard company, the Battalion is capable of securing 500 US military prisoners, 2,000 EPWs, 2,000 CIs, or 4,000 DCs in an I/R facility (the number doubles with the addition of a second MP Guard Company). MP Guard companies can also provide fixed-facility security.
The escort guard company provides supervision and security for evacuating and moving EPWs, CIs, DCs, US military prisoners, and other detained persons via vehicles, trains, planes, and road marches (but not by organic vehicles). Though few MP escort guard companies remain in the Army inventory, an MP Combat Support (CS) company can equally, if not more capably, perform the prisoner escort mission, due to its authorized vehicle, radio, and weapon array.

Except for two MP I/R (Confinement) Battalions currently conducting confinement of US military prisoners at Camp Arifjan and the other detention operations in Afghanistan, and a small number of specialized detachments, MP I/R units have 95B/31B military police soldiers, vice 95C/31E military police correctional specialist. HQDA has approved a new Force Design Update to address expanding operational requirements consistent with I/R operations. The FDU establishes one 95C/31E Internment/Resettlement company for each MP I/R BN, to enhance the capability of the MP I/R BN to handle high-risk detainees and support restoration of national prison systems, especially following a regime change. The new FDU is currently competing for resourcing in TAA-2011. The FDU also allows for the conversion of US correctional and confinement facilities to the new MTOE design, allowing rotational deployment of Active Component 95C/31E soldiers in support of contingency operations.

The 800th MP Bde currently has eight MP (I/R) Battalions, with both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Five Battalions conduct detention of security internees, one secures the MEK, and the remaining two support the reestablishment of the Iraqi prison system. Due to unit redeployment rules, the 800th will lose three Battalion HHCs in December, a fourth in January, and the remainder in March. The units that remain are generally under strength, as Reserve component units do not have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual soldiers that have reached 22 months of Federal active duty (i.e., activated prior to the soldier’s unit activation or cross-leveled from a unit that had previously been activated). But with the acceptance that all Reserve and National Guard units will spend 12-months “boots-on-the-ground” the 800th MP (I/R) Bde has a clear and logical plan to realign remaining Battalion and Company-sized units to meet its mission requirements (assuming proposed consolidation of the security internee facilities and anticipated progress in Iraqi manning of Iraqi prisons, detention centers, and jails).

Observations.

† The 800th Military Police Brigade (Internment/Resettlement) is currently a CFLCC asset TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct the internment and confinement operations in Iraq. All detention operations of EPWs and Security Internees are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO—not the COMMZ—at Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention site. The 800th MP (I/R) Bde is one of two MP (I/R) Brigades in the Army; the other having just completed a rotation to GTMO.
2. CFLCC has not requested an MP (I/R) Brigade for OIF 2, but has requested four MP (I/R) Battalions, four MP (Combat Support) Companies, four MP (Guard) Companies and two MP Detachments (I/R Brigade Liaison Detachment) to support internment and confinement operations in Iraq. The request was based on anticipated security internee operational requirements in March, coupled with an expectation of reduced manning to the Iraqi prison system.

3. The 800th MP Bde has experienced challenges adapting its organizational structure, training and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ, to its current mission-set and the characteristics of the Iraqi and third country national detainee population. Specifically, the 800th MP (I/R) Bde and its subordinate units are not well equipped to defend its I/R facilities (e.g., few crew-served weapons) or escort prisoners in a high threat environment (e.g., no M1114 HMMWVs, and few M1025/6 HMMWVs and organic cargo vehicles). Further, the doctrinal soldier to detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees.

4. The HVD site is not a typical detention facility, adding the challenge and complexity of detaining once-privileged political and military leaders, some in the status of EPWs and others as security internees. Many of the HVDs are in poor physical health, and more advanced in age than the typical detainee population, which could lead to complacency among the guards. The facility procedures in respect to the two classifications is unclear, as HVDs are now being provided the same treatment regardless of their individual status, as opposed to specific and separate treatment for EPWs. EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless those elements which are denied are due to specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude the direction of insurgency operations). Military necessity, though, grows more tenuous the greater the period of time between capture and length of detention. The current measures appear appropriate to the tactical situation.

5. The mission to secure the MEK Ashraf compound is unique, but well suited for an MP (I/R) Battalion. The complex interaction with the MEK leadership and varied US agencies addressing the MEK requires a battalion level headquarters, trained to support a community construct (i.e., the “R” in Internment/Resettlement). But the size of the compound (36 square kilometers), escort requirements for the MEK, and security of the ammunition bunkers is better performed by an MP Combat Support company, than a traditionally aligned MP Guard company. CPT Kelly Unbe’s (324th MP Bn) handle on the complex nature of the MEK situation was impressive, as was the apparent good relations of all the unit’s leadership with the MEK.
6. The initial classification of Iraqis as security internees requires more oversight and discipline. Though anecdotal in nature, numerous cases exist where Iraqis at most expressed displeasure or ill will with the U.S. personnel, and have been held for several months, waiting for their case to be reviewed. The current release decision process is not following DOD policy for the Global War on Terror or policy related to the DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program (DODD 2310.1). A more disciplined system would reduce the security internee population and inherent challenge of holding Iraqis that feel they have been unjustly detained.

7. AR 190-8 requires military police to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities. Military police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom has posited a template where military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Bde has not been asked to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews, nor participate in those interviews.

Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.
   a. Set the conditions for success of OIF 2 forces. As the 800th MP Bde structure contracts, identify those missions that require U.S. military police (e.g., HVD, “inside-the-wire” detention of Security Internees, MEK), only U.S. or Coalition Security Forces (e.g., force protection, facility defense, escort, etc.), and Iraqi personnel (i.e., criminal detainees). Array forces and program MP, security forces, and programs to train Iraqis against the respective missions.

   b. Consolidate all security internees at the Abu Ghurayb complex (Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci), except HVDs. Close Camp Bucca and TSP Whitford. The mission now, and in at least the mid-term period, will require one MP (I/R) Bn, with one MP Guard company, on MP Combat Support company, and two companies to perform exterior security and force protection. This unit could also provide monitoring support of the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. This COA does carry risk, as Camp Ganci and Vigilant are temporary “tent” internment facilities built on an EPW model. The less disciplined, more malicious, and often predatorial security internees will likely take advantage of the less stringent security measures inherent in this type of facility. A hardened medium or maximum security detention facility would greatly mitigate this risk.
c. Identify a new location for the HVD facility (recommendation for location classified), and continue to source one MP (I/R) Bn with an MP Combat Support Company. This unit should also provide monitoring support of the Baghdad Jails and support to the CPA MOJ Prisons Department.

d. Continue to source one MP (I/R) Bn to secure the MEK Ashraf compound and continue to augment the MP Guard Company with MP Combat Support platoons until the company is replace with an MP Combat Support Company.

e. Continue to support the establishment of Iraqi prisons in the MND South Central sector and 101st Abn (AA) Div AOs', till units depart in Apr '03.

f. Strongly recommend modification of the Abu Ghurayb Master Facilities Plan to refurbish the Southwest compound for the security internees (capacity 5,000 to 7,000 in individual and secure dorm-type rooms), the Northeast compound to assume the Camp Vigilant detention and screening mission (capacity 1600 in a maximum security setting). Convert the entire Southwest compound over to the MOJ CPA for use as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (capacity 2080 with hospital facility, inmate industries, and warehouses), and place soldier living and support facilities in the Northwest quadrant of the complex (see Diagram #1).

g. Align the release process for security internees with DoD policy. The process of screening security internees should include Intelligence findings, interrogation results and a current threat assessment. These analyses should be provided to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) for guidance on decisions for transfer, care and continued custody. Once decision authority is decided a regular review process and release protocols can be implemented. This required process adds to the importance of carefully determining which detainees are to be classified as security internees.

h. Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi-run Baghdad Correctional facility. Establish procedures that define the role of military police soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.

i. The 800th MP (I/R) Bde and other MP units should actively gather lessons learned, and forward those observations to the United States Military Police School (USAMPS).
Diagram 1. Abu Ghurayb Complex

2 Mid-Term.

a. Recommend that all Security Internee operations, except the MEK security mission, be consolidated under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2. This Brigade can also provide command and control of other MP Combat Support Battalions, performing other battlefield missions and stability and support operations.

b. Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement operations in support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7.
c. Assign to a MP Combat Support Brigade two MP (I/R) Battalion HHC, two MP Combat Support companies, one MP Guard company, and two general companies to provide security at the Abu Ghurayb complex.

d. Request that one of two MP Detachments (IR Brigade Liaison Detachment) be replaced with a MP Detachment (IR Camp Branch Liaison Team). The I/R Camp Branch Liaison Team includes MOS 95C/31E soldiers not included in the I/R Brigade Liaison Detachment. The special corrections skills of these soldiers will add technical expertise in confinement operations. Attached one MP Detachment Brigade Liaison Team to plan and coordinate the security internee mission and one Camp Branch Liaison Team to provide the subject matter expertise in confinement operations lacking in a Combat Support Military Police Brigade.

e. Augment Maneuver Headquarters (i.e., Division Provost Marshal staff) with a MP MAJ/CPT experienced in Corrections, an engineer CPT/LT, and two 95C/31E NCOs (SFC/SS) to provide subject matter expertise on the refurbishment and operation of Iraqi jails and prisons in their area of responsibility. This team would work closely with the CPA MOJ monitoring staffs. In all of the regions except for Baghdad, monitoring of Iraqi operations should be minimal, and should be accomplished by the Military Police providing general support to the maneuver commander in zone under the supervision of the augmented Division Provost Marshal staff.

f. Approved projects for the completion of renovations at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility must be completed in order to expand its maximum capacity and allow for the transfer of all criminal detainees from Camp Ganci into the Iraqi run facility. Because of the proximity of Camp Vigilant to the BCCF all of the security detainees currently being held must be moved prior to the opening of the wings currently being refurbished. In order to move those prisoners, who are for the most part being actively exploited by the JDIC, a new facility must be established within the Abu Gurayb compound, or at a minimum additional segregation capability be built into Camp Ganci.

g. Continue to source one MP (I/R) Bn with an MP Combat Support Company. This unit should also provide monitoring support of the Baghdad Jails and support to the CPA MOJ Prisons Department. Augment this mission with one squad of Active Component 95C/31E soldiers, similar to augmentation provided the Bagram Short Term Holding Facility.

h. Continue to source one MP (I/R) Bn to secure the MEK Ashraf compound and replace the MP Guard Company with MP Combat Support Company. Place the Battalion OPCON to the Maneuver unit responsible for the AO.
Request TRADOC/USAMPS hold a conference to review lessons learned in Internment operations from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Ensure the conference addresses interoperability with Intelligence gathering for the Global War on Terrorism and in support of Combat and Post-Hostilities Operations.

3. Long-Term. Ultimately all criminal detainees should be handed over to the Iraqi criminal system with monitoring and oversight performed by representatives from the CPA advisory staff. U.S. forces will solely be responsible for the internment of high value detainees and security internees until such a time as they have all been screened and released or other determination is made as to their status.
General.

In May 2003, five prison experts and an accountant from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, drafted Coalition Provisional Authority Order # 10, "Management of Detention and Prison Facilities," and the more expansive CPA Memorandum #2 (of the same Title), both published on 8 June 2002. The policy order places “full authority and control over all detention and prison facilities...[under] the Ministry of Justice.” Currently only the British financial specialist remains from the original team that conducted the initial assessment and support to CPA MOJ, while the six new staff members from the United States, Korea and Spain have less than 45-days experience in Iraq. CPA MOJ continues to pursue hiring actions to eventually field an organization of 110 international staff (primarily US prison experts) and 102 Iraqi staff.

The 800th MP (I/R) Bde currently supports the CPA MOJ Prisons Department with military staff augmentation (one Major, three Captains and several NCO's) and force protection during site surveys. On-site support and monitoring of all active MOJ and MOI prisons, detention centers, and jails is being conducted almost exclusively through the use of military assets. Until CPA MOJ brings on its additional personnel and is capable of functioning on its own, Coalition Military Police personnel and units will need to continue to support jail, detention center and prison operations, and the Iraqi Correctional Officer training program.

Unfortunately, military police generally lack the requisite institutional knowledge to effectively work issues related to National prison system policy and the operation of more complex long-term regional correctional facilities. Only a small number of officers in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment hold advanced degrees and measurable experience in corrections, and there are currently less than 1,000 95C/31E military police corrections specialists authorized to operate the six Army correctional and confinement facilities. The units supporting these six facilities are not currently organized for rotational deployment in support of contingency operations. On the other hand, according to the American Correctional Association, as many as 9,000 civilian correctional officers serve in the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard. The presence of civilian correctional officers in Reserve Military Police Units that deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was purely a matter of chance and coincidence (e.g., the 310th MP Bn has twelve civilian correctional officers).
Observations.

1. The current Interim Director and assigned colleagues of the CPA MOJ Prisons Department are proven experts in the Field of Corrections. Though only in the country for less than two months, they have aggressively attacked the issues inherent in rebuilding a National Prison system. Their efforts have only been inhibited by the small staff and security situation. Also, a natural tendency to want to address individual facility issues has slowed their assessment and construct of a National approach. The team continues its on-site assessments of the current facilities and proposed future sites for prisons, detention centers, and jails.

2. The staffing difficulties are impeding the system culture that the CPA MOJ Prisons Department is attempting to establish. There is much communication with military counterparts in the judicial system but it seems to be lacking between their Iraqi counterparts. There is little planning and operational communication between the CPA Prisons Department and the Iraqi prison leadership. Their separate locations make integrated planning difficult.

3. The weekly meeting is not as productive towards system development and transition planning as it could be. The large number of attendees, addressing primarily individual facility issues, tends to detract from the larger and more essential issues of reestablishing a National Prison System.

4. CPA and the 800th MP (I/R) Bde has only recently coordinated planning for redeployment of current units and the potential impact on the reestablishment of the Iraqi Correctional system. Though the 800th MP (I/R) Bde has a clear plan for managing the reduction of military forces against anticipate security internee and criminal detainee population, it is predicated on an expectation of increased Iraqi correctional officers on duty, more active CPA MOJ Prisons Department oversight, and the transfer of Iraqi correctional officer training to civilian correctional experts.

5. There appears to be a different expectation between CPA MOJ and the Coalition military of facility standards and conditions for transfer of Iraqi-run facilities from military joint operations, to military oversight, and then to actual transfer to CPA MOJ Prisons Department oversight. The differing perspectives and level of corrections experience will also manifest itself in the actual conduct of Iraqi facility support (e.g., CPA MOJ personnel were unimpressed with the procedures and facility condition of the ad-Diwaniyah jail, where military leadership would rate the facility as satisfactory for Iraqi assumption of responsibility with periodic military or CPA oversight. This two perspectives is natural, and only exemplifies the importance of transferring the mission to reestablish the Iraqi Prison system from military units to the CPA MOJ Prisons Department; fully staffed with civilian correctional experts for planning, training, and facility oversight.
6. At the current pace of academy graduation it will take 33 month to fill the anticipated staffing requirements based on a western staffing model. The local staffing model is more manpower intensive.

Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.

a. The success of the Iraqi prison system (IPS) is dependent upon integrated and strategic planning through several phases of transition from military to Coalition Provisional Authority, to a self-sufficient Iraqi system. There are several main themes essential to the effective strategic planning for these transformations. System capacity, personnel plans and requirements, Ministry of Justice Oversight and Administration and population control are among these central themes. Attention to each of the interactive parts of the justice system is required for eventual effective transfer of the prison operations to an independent system.

b. The courts must begin processing larger numbers of magistrate hearings. This process has been slowed due to competing transportation force protection priorities and the security requirements for the courts themselves. These initial hearings could be conducted at the prison sites. Transportation and security requirements are greatly reduced and attendant FP and security requirements can be better identified.

c. Full integration of Iraqi leadership in the planning and development of the corrections system and the other areas of the Justice System is essential to comprehensive strategic planning. The weekly meeting should consider refocusing their discussions on policy, budget, planning, benchmarking and quality checks related to those benchmarks. Attendance should include the only the stakeholders from the Prisons Department, Courts, Juvenile System Police, and their Iraqi counterparts. Weekly reports from the facility locations could be sent the day prior for discussion as part of a specific agenda. Educating the Iraqi system’s eventual leadership in areas of system management, operations, security, custody and control techniques is also necessary. There are several very good international corrections management-training locations available (for example, Kings College of England or the National Institute of Corrections). The system leadership should become involved in national and international corrections associations as a resource for information and future assistance. Planning and implementation must be an integrated process between the military units, CPA and the emerging Iraqi Prison System.
d. Facility supervisory transitions cannot be driven by when a facility is “certified ready,” but military necessity provides the first benchmark from which all other points of transition (training pace, facility renovation schedule and Iraqi prison personnel employment within the facilities) flow. There will be a natural tendency towards extended reliance on the military assets, however, planning must be accomplished on pace with the rotation rhythm of the military assets. To do otherwise creates potential for a lethargic dependency and gaps in coverage, both of which will slow the progress of the merging system. CPA MOJ Prisons Department and 800th MP Bde planners should meet weekly, following the general Prison meeting, to integrate transition plan away from the military presence to CPA and an independent self-sustaining system.

2. Mid-Term.

a. Replace the staff augmentation at CPA MOJ Prisons Department with a small Liaison Cell from the MP Combat Support Brigade responsible for the security internee mission.

b. CPA MOJ should conduct a staffing analysis, based upon the Iraqi cultural patterns. Once a required number of correctional officers is established, CPA should prioritize staff and efforts to recruit and train, similar to those actions being taken with the Iraqi police. This becomes critical as the reconstruction projects are completed at the larger regional correctional facilities.

c. Background checks are a critical aspect of the prison employment process. The potential for abuse, corruption and threat to public safety is such that extreme attention must be paid. Due to the high number of cadre required, the length of the vetting process and the comprehensive training it is recommended that the training program must increase it’s graduation pace (i.e., greater capacity, not a shorter course). The training academy program should soon move from dependency upon military assets to a robust CPA program or consideration of a contract training program through one of the many companies who specialize in corrections training in order to meet present and future needs.

3 Long-Term. We cannot overstate the importance of strategic planning in relation to anticipated criminal population trends and facility needs. The experience within the current CPA MOJ Prisons Department is clearly capable of accomplishing a prospectus of needs and a proposed strategic 10-30 year plan. The Iraqi Prison System leadership must be involved in the development process so that they may undertake the task independently upon the CPA’s transition of authority to the new Iraqi government. The CPA MOJ Prisons Department should assist the Iraqi Prisons System leadership to establish its own professional organization and relationships with other nations’ corrections associations (e.g., The American Correctional Association, International Corrections and Prisons Association, etc.).
**Detainee Medical Care, Health Management and Medical Operations Assessment**

**General.**

As part of the CJTF-7 Detention Operation Assistance Visit, the medical operations and detainee health management were evaluated with emphasis on health management medical care, sanitation and hygiene conditions. Early in the assessment several key issues surfaced regarding mission definition, command and control, manpower, and logistics which made the discrete evaluation of sanitation and hygiene and general health care operations difficult to quantify and report on specifically. Further, in keeping with the mission of enabling the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to transition to the end state of assuming the role of prison operations (to include health care operations) and assessing U.S. military managed prisons, the need for recommendations specific to each system and to joint operations became evident.

A review of available international guidance and CPA guidance provided the framework for the evaluation. Assessment tools incorporating this framework were developed and formed the basis for data collection. Physical inspections of the following locations were accomplished: Baghdad Central (Abu-Ghurayb), Camp Bucca (Umm Qasr), Badush Prison (Mosul), Tasferat (Baghdad), Mosul Regional Confinement Facility, Arbil Jail, and Dahuk Jail.

Additionally, interviews and discussions were held with key players to include the 80th MP Bde Surgeon (LTC Robinson), LTC Bowersox (Medical Advisor to the Ministry of Health specifically tasked to assist with prison medical operations), and LTC Shean Blaydon, Chief, Clinical Operations, CJTF-7 Surgeon’s Office, Liane Saunders, PhD, and the medical officers at each visited location. All available ICRC reports and responses were also reviewed looking for trends along with individual findings.

The separation of the Iraqi and U.S. military health care responsibilities is essential for the smooth operation of both systems. The goal of capacity building within the Iraqi correctional health care system and the differences within the systems require independent management and operations. As the Iraqi correctional health care system develops, the CPA can take on the oversight of all correctional health care and the assessment of the facility conditions for the Iraq Department of Corrections. The separation of these systems is dependent on the clear delineation of responsibility for each category of detainee. Mission confusion is significantly increased by co-locating Iraqi detainees and U.S. security detainees in the same compound. Iraqi and U.S. controlled detainees must be separated in order to support the primary mission of capacity building for Iraq and allowing U.S. military medical assets to focus on security detainees.
Observations.

1. No clear delineation of the responsibilities for health care exists for the various detainee categories. This results in confusion regarding the responsibilities between the U.S. military and CPA health care systems.

2. The Iraqi correctional medical system is in its initial phase of development and is not fully operational. This has resulted in the U.S. military providers covering many Iraqi responsibilities.

3. Health care providers have been operating in a high velocity change environment without a clearly communicated and established end-state. Expansion of mission responsibilities have challenged the health care delivery system. Despite the challenging environment of providing unit health care and a large detainee population, U.S. military health care providers are extremely dedicated and innovative. With further refinement of operational orders detainee health care will improve due to their focused efforts.

4. There currently exists expertise and oversight in both the CPA Ministry of Health (LTC Bowersox) and the CTJF-7 Surgeon’s office (LTC Blaydon and staff) to continue the effort of defining and meeting the mission of detainee health care for the immediate future.

5. There is a clear need for a published document regarding detainee categorization and health care directives. This document would clearly define each category of detainees and should further specify the medical care responsibilities by US military, coalition, or the CPA health care systems. Currently detainee populations at various locations are mixed or unclassified, resulting in US forces providing care for a greater population than its doctrinal capability. Additionally, detainees requiring level III health care of all categories are brought to the 28th Combat Support Hospital (CSH) through default due to the level of services provided, force protection issues, and poorly defined alternatives. The US military detainee medical mission would be reduced to clearly achievable capacity if the definitions and responsibilities were published and adhered to.

6. The early stages of the CPA, MOH, and detainee operations, to include health care operations, has not yet resulted in significant relief of responsibilities for health care to all classes of detainees for US military medical forces. Since the end of hostilities, the end of the previous conditions, and the movement towards a CPA and eventual Iraqi self-rule, the efforts at rebuilding an operational Iraqi prison system and establishing a military interment and re-settlement operation has been monumental and progressive.
7. Facility conditions and operations prior to transition must also be re-mediated resulting in a multitude of tasks of various priorities. Current physical lay-out conditions in many facilities are abysmal and do not lend towards the basic needs of a safe environment, adequate shelter, food, hygiene, and sanitation. Further, the MOH is charged with health care within the country along with the corrections element that requires an overall health care model adoption which may be culturally dissimilar to US standards.

8. Regarding corrections health care the MOH, has retained the services of several physicians, has begun an aggressive re-building process, and currently has the direction of one military medical advisor for assistance. In order to further assist the CPA and MOH a process action team should be hired to accomplish several goals for the organizations. This team ideally should involve limited military assets and should include prison health care experts in the areas of healthcare administration, scope of care, training, quality assurance, logistics and clinical operations. Once this team is assembled and operational, specific tasks and timelines should be established and reviewed periodically.

9. There is a need to stabilize the US military corrections operations resulting in a clearly defined detainee health care mission. With the continued transition of Iraq corrections to the complete control and management by the CPA, the provision of health care services provided to detainees by military forces will dramatically drop. All US and coalition health care providers observed are extremely dedicated to the missions of providing healthcare to all assigned unit soldiers and to all detainees within their area of responsibility. This dedication has lead to innovative approaches to providing healthcare to multitudes despite the constraints of personnel and equipment.

10. The availability medical expertise within the theater of operations within the CJTF-7 Surgeons office, CENTCOM Surgeon's office, the 800th Military Police Brigade and interim assistance within the MOH is exceptional. The CTJF-7 Surgeon and his staff in coordination with the CENTCOM Surgeon, are fully involved with the various issues concerning detainee health care operations. As an example, they recently participated and responded to the Inspector General evaluation of detainee operations as well as participated in discussion between the MOH, and Bureau of Prisons. These offices have purview over all US and coalition medical operations within the theater of operations and respond directly to the CTJF Commander. They are dealing with both the day-to-day operation issues as well as conducting mid and long-term planning for continued operations. The specifics of detainee health care, sanitation and hygiene are being addressed on a priority basis.
11. The 800th MP Brigade Surgeon is assigned, as are all the Brigade physician assets, on a 90-day rotation period. This rapid turnover of U.S. military physician personnel creates significant correctional health care management concerns and inefficiencies. Clear lines of supervision and coordination are critical to ensure the unique health issues faced in confinement by health care professionals are understood and addressed to mitigate risk, provide quality health care, and meet administrative and logistical requirements. While not all physician rotations can be extended, the position of Brigade Surgeon should be tasked as a one-year rotation obligation either to an IR or AD physician versant in preventive medicine and/or correctional medical operations for continuity and mission oversight. The Brigade Surgeon would be charged with overseeing Brigade operations as well as coordinating with the CTJF-7 and CENTCOM Surgeon's offices.

12. Additionally, there is a medical advisor (LTC Bowersox) within the MOH providing oversight, assistance, and coordination while the CPA develops its correctional health care system. Until the issues stated in the above observations can be accomplished this position should remain in effect and filled.

Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.
   a. Task key players to develop and distribute a standing operating procedure (SOP) as discussed above. Key players should include but not be limited to: the CTJF-7 PMO, JAG, Surgeon, 800th MP Bde Surgeon, CPA MOJ Prisons Department, and the Ministry of Health (MOH) prison health care medical advisor.

   b. Task the CTJF-7 Surgeon, 800th MP Brigade Surgeon and PMO (with JAG Review) to prepare and publish an agreed upon detainee health care policy. Then develop and publish an SOP for detainee health care operation in theater based on input from providers within each Battalion. This guide would be developed in coordination with the above document as the basis to delineate provider responsibilities and then should continue to address items such as detainee medical inprocessing, health care operations, infectious disease management, record keeping, logistics, special programs, health and sanitation requirements, patient transfer, security and control, and additional topics as needed.

   c. Retain the services of the military medical advisor to the MOH charged with overseeing the corrections health care system.

   d. Conduct a hiring action retaining the services of a process action team (PAT) as discussed above.
e. Hire a full time corrections health care consultant immediately to provide a correctional framework for the provision of health care, safety, and sanitation of the facilities. This individual would serve on the senior leadership team for the Department of Prisons.

f. Forward the health care policy to current and designated replacement units.

g. Rely on the CTJF-7 and CENTCOM Surgeons office to address and provide oversight for on-going detainee health care operations and the oversight within the US Military Corrections mission.

h. Prepare and submit 1 year tasking to fill the Brigade Surgeon's position, while continuing the military medical advisor support to the MOH.

2. Mid-Term.

a. Publish and distribute all new Policies and SOPs to all affected parties and re-evaluate the application and adherence to medical practices.

b. Provide continued in-service training to all newly assigned and/or rotating medical personnel on the provisions, rules and responsibilities stated.

c. Charge the PAT with conducting a needs assessment, prioritize projects in each category, move to action completion within established timelines. Keep historical documents and records of all actions.

d. Contract with local Iraqi hospitals within a reasonable distance from Iraqi prisons, in order to provide specialized and tertiary care to established regions.

e. Complete and incorporate the regional corrections hospitals in Baghdad Central, and Mosul, Dahuk and Basrah Regional Confinement Facilities.

f. Review and refine the operations order as needed.

3 Long-term.

a. Review and report on current state of health care operations to the CPA, US military, and coalition forces corrections authorities and medical commands. Examples of assessment tools are available through the American Correctional Association and the Commission on Correctional Health Care. Copies of these assessment tools will be provided to the CPA and the CJTF-7 Surgeon.
b. Baghdad Central Corrections hospital should be expanded to provide all level III health care services and function as the hub for health care within the Baghdad region. This would support the regional management of resources by consolidating efforts. Additionally, this facility should be used as the logistical support, medical equipment, and supply transfer point.

c. Annual review and report of program progression to the Ministry of Justice Department of Prisons and the Ministry of Health

POC.

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Detention Facilities that meet required Health, Hygiene, and Sanitation standards

General

Significant variance in the health, hygiene and sanitation conditions were observed in the detention facilities throughout Iraq. Major progress in all these areas has been made according to the most recent reports by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Most facilities have adequate water supplies, sewage management and appropriate food services to comply with the United Nations guidelines. Those facilities with deficiencies in these basic services are aggressively pursuing options to meet basic health standards.

The highest priority for facility safety is adequate standing operating procedures and equipment to minimize loss of life during emergency operations (fires, explosions, riots, etc.). Fire suppression plans and equipment were non-existent in some facilities and no facility had written guidance on how to evacuate detainees under life threatening conditions. With primitive, over used electrical systems and open flame cooking in housing areas, the threat of fires is exceptionally high.

Inadequate logistical support for facility operations is the root of most deficiencies observed in the areas of health, hygiene and facility sanitation. The Iraqi medical system is diligently working to provide appropriate logistical support (equipment, medications, and vehicles) to perform its mission. However, present shortfalls are taxing the U.S. military system into providing the services and locking overall responsibility for health care with the U.S. The military units lack adequate vehicles and medics to appropriately manage detainee operations. The administrative and logistical demands of a confinement facility are significant and require increased staffing and equipment support.

Observations.

1. Institutional programs (work, recreation, education, spiritual services and mental health services) are critical components of a smoothly run confinement facility. Idleness in prison breeds resentment and disciplinary problems that fester into major resistance. The health, hygiene and sanitation conditions of all the detention facilities would be enhanced with detainee programs. Housekeeping and laundry details for detainee work programs would have major affect on the overall sanitation conditions. Detainee idleness aggravates mental illness and must be addressed as a basic health care SOP and equipment for emergency operations (fires, explosions, and riots) are grossly inadequate and present immediate threat to life concerns.

2. Present shortfalls in logistical support (equipment, medications, vehicles) for the Iraqi medical system are taxing the U.S. military system into providing services and locking the overall responsibility for detainee care with the U.S.
3. U.S. military medical units lack adequate personnel and vehicles to appropriately manage the detainee mission.

4. Iraqi medical personnel are specialists and lack the range of skill sets necessary to adequately serve the detainee population. Military health care providers are continuing to assume coverage for Iraqi doctors during non-duty hours, rather than the Iraqis assuming 24/7 responsibility for care.

5. Baghdad Central is not appropriately staffed and equipped to manage chronically ill and special needs detainees. The facility lacks hospital beds, diagnostic equipment and custodial personnel to perform paraprofessional duties.

6. The Baghdad Central facility has major sanitation problems within Camp Ganci. The area is littered with trash, has pools of water standing around latrines and the bottles of water carried by detainees for water consumption are filthy. The tents lack floors and are inadequate to provide protection from the elements and form potential hostile fire. The area is not conducive to the long term management of detainees and offers minimal options for improved sanitation.

7. The contacting of the food service provides culturally appropriate meals, but does not allow for special diets for medical needs.

8. The renovations of the criminal prison in Baghdad Central will provide adequate living space, lighting, weather and hostile fire protection for the detainees.

9. The tents for Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci are inadequate for the climate and present major safety concerns due to hostile fire.

10. Initial issue clothing is being provided in most facilities, but the lack of laundry facilities and the harsh climate are resulting in the garments quickly becoming filthy.

11. Adequate cleaning supplies (brooms soap, disinfectant) were non-existent in many facilities.

12. Idleness is a serious problem facing all the detention facilities. Long term idleness will generate discontent and aggravate the conditions for the mentally ill detainees.

13. The mentally ill were receiving no treatment and the field of mental health was not addressed by the Iraqi medical system. Mental illness is a grossly neglected area for the health care of Iraqi detainees.
Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.

   a. Obtaining adequate supplies of functional fire extinguishers and fire suppression systems is a top safety issue for all facilities. Evacuation plans and emergency operations drills need to be developed immediately.

   b. The CPA needs to significantly increase logistical support to the Iraqi correctional health care facilities to make them operational. This is an immediate, high priority recommendation.

   c. U.S. medical units supporting detainee facilities require additional paraprofessionals to maximize the efficiency of the few professional staff. Additional vehicle support (ambulances) are needed to ensure access and continuity of care for detainees.

   d. The hospital at Baghdad Central must be equipped immediately to manage the chronically ill and special needs detainees. This will require hospital beds, diagnostic equipment, and training for paraprofessionals in how to provide appropriate custodial care.

   e. Camp Ganci and Camp Vigilant need to be upgraded to provide adequate shelters from the weather and hostile fire. Construct floors and increase the height of the sandbags to protect the detainees from hostile fire.

   f. Laundry facilities to support the washing of clothes are an immediate need.

   g. Brooms should be purchased and dispersed throughout the prison system. Although bleach is generally not brought into a correctional facility, it may be the best option to support the sanitation of these facilities.

2. Mid-Term.

   a. Incorporate emergency operations planning onto the design of all prison renovations and new facility designs. Adequate fire suppression systems must be considered a high priority.

   b. Develop institutional programs to overcome detainee idleness. Recreation, spiritual services and counseling programs should be available to all detainees. Work details should start with institutional support (housekeeping and laundry services) and gradually increase to include vocational and educational programs.
c. Suicide awareness and intervention programs should be incorporated into the daily operations.

d. Separate special needs detainees (elderly, children, females, and mentally ill detainees) from the general population and develop services for these detainees.

e. Camp Ganci and Camp Vigilant require hardened facilities and sites to ensure appropriate sanitation.

f. Medical personnel need to ensure detainees are provided appropriate meals to meet their medical needs. This may require a contract modification or internal food preparation center.

g. A correctional health care certification program should be implemented to ensure a corrections perspective in the practice of detainee health care.

h. Further collaboration and coordination between regional correctional health care administrators should be initiated. Lessons learned, practice guidelines and best practices should be shared and explored through these contacts.

3. Long-Term

a. Vocational and educational training programs should be initiated to assist detainees gain marketable skills and their transition back into society.

b. A laundry facility at Baghdad Central should be considered for employment of detainees. With regionalization of the prison system, additional facilities should be considered in the northern and southern regions.

c. Mental health services must be incorporated into the correctional health care model to appropriately manage the mentally ill detainees. These services will significantly reduce acting out by the mentally ill in prison and reduce recidivism rates.

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General.

CPA Memorandum Number 3, Criminal Procedures, reiterates the goal of transitioning the Iraqi Criminal Justice system from a “dependency” on military support as quickly as possible. When Coalition Forces completed the ground war phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 24 million Iraqi people had no functioning criminal justice system. Courthouses had been destroyed and/or looted. Looting was not limited to removal of furniture but the dismantling and removal of lights and fixtures, air-conditioning systems, drywall, and even pipes and ductwork in some cases. Judges and Prosecutors had to be screened and re-appointed/re-hired and the Courts purged of Baath Party members and other corrupt individuals and practices. Involvement of Military Police and Judge Advocates, as well as many other Coalition Forces experts has been extensive.

Significant resources have been devoted to restoring the Iraqi Criminal Justice System. The task was monumental and unprecedented. A few examples underscore the significance of the work done by Coalition Forces and the efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority: the abolition of Special Security courts which served as a means by which Saddam Hussein could purge his political opponents or naysayers under the guise of a “Court” process, a total review of Iraqi Criminal Law and Procedural law with an emphasis on conformance with International standards, creation of a Judicial Review Committee to insure that Judges and Prosecutors were of the highest integrity, creation of a Council of Judges, selection of a Minister of Justice, and re-opening of the Iraqi Judicial College.

Release protocols play a significant role in population control and ultimately establishing facility, staffing requirements. As a general rule, establishing a Central Booking Facility (as in Mosul) and ensuring a timely operation of the Investigative Courts decreases pre-trial criminal detainee populations. Another option is for magistrate hearings to be held at the facility en mass. From this process some will be determined eligible for release and others, who are remanded for trial, can be docketed. A review and enhancement of security at the court locations and knowledge of how many trials are anticipated will enable better military force protection planning. This will allow the docket to move more efficiently, aiding detainee population control.

Observations.

1. While the majority of Iraqi courts are at least substantially operational, there is no plan or time line for withdrawal of JAG assistance and replacement with CPA personnel or civilian contractors. Their efforts, as well as the efforts of the MP support personnel, have been extraordinary. At the same time, the resources of CPA have been extremely limited or almost non-existent in some areas. It is critical that definitive planning with dates be discussed between CPA and Coalition Forces and a time-line and action plan be developed.
2. Due to operational limitations, facility limitations and Force Protection issues, there are Criminal Detainees collocated with other types of detainees, including Security Internees. However, the Geneva Convention does not allow this. Criminal Detainees are defined as all persons detained by Coalition Forces (including Iraqi police) solely in relation to allegations of criminal acts and who are not security internees. Generally, Criminal Detainees are Iraqi citizens (or non-coalition forces) charged with or being investigated for criminal acts against other Iraqi citizens (or non-Coalition forces). Almost all of these Criminal Detainees are awaiting trial in the Iraqi Court system.

3. Significant efforts have been made to improve the Juvenile Court process but there is much work to do. The current detention Juvenile facility in Mosul is poor, but a good plan is in place to build a new detention facility. The Juvenile facility in Baghdad is inadequate for numerous reasons but is being moved to a building that is near the Baghdad police station and is being refurbished. There are juveniles (under age 18) being held in Juvenile facilities that have “security holds” or Security Internee status. Some are alleged to have committed serious crimes against Coalition Forces. They are being held in the same facility as other juveniles charged with theft or other less serious crimes. Some may pose a security risk in the facility. Some pose no danger. The review process being used to review the status of the juveniles held as Security Internees is substantially the same as those for adults. The process is cumbersome and slow and labor intensive. Resource and manpower limitations have made it very difficult to get these cases reviewed and to release those individuals that pose very little or no danger. The efforts of COL Ted Cox should not go unmentioned. With due concern for not adequately recognizing the efforts of many others, he has almost single handedly lifted the Baghdad Juvenile Court, Detention Facility and process from the rubble. COL Cox and Major Dean Raab are currently working diligently to expedite the process in which cases involving juveniles detained for alleged offenses against Coalition Forces are quickly reviewed to determine whether the juvenile should continue to be held.

4. There exists no Iraqi method by which to investigate allegations of improper conduct and corruption by Judges and Prosecutors. Coalition Forces have established Judicial Review Panels and have been working extremely hard and successfully in screening former judges and re-establishing the operating judiciary. In addition, they have been monitoring the workflow and work product of judges and making on the spot corrections, and in some cases, disqualifying judges from service. Discussions have been ongoing among JAG personnel, and others assisting the courts, about the creation of an Internal Affairs Department or Anti-Corruption Agency. Indeed the 101st Airborne Division has already developed a concept plan for such a process but it has not been implemented.
5. There is a disconnect between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance with respect to the payment for services performed by MOJ personnel, including prison guards and juvenile detention guards, as well as the payment for construction and remodeling of facilities and purchasing of supplies and equipment. While the CPA/MOJ now has a Coalition Forces Finance Officer assigned, rather than having the time to assess and implement systems, there is concern that too much time is spent on a scavenger hunt trying to determine why payment has not been made or why payment was made when the job was not done. The problem is becoming even more critical as employees, particularly prison guards, are complaining about not being paid in a timely manner. This seems to be an on-going problem that is permeating all facets of the efforts to restore the Iraqi Criminal Justice System and the Iraqi prison system. If not corrected, this situation is likely to deteriorate and could result in partial or massive walkout of Iraqi prison guards, court staff, and others. This would result in a massive re-introduction of a significant number of Military Police personnel and others to keep the system operating.

6. There is no standard docket management system in Iraq. While there exists the Iraqi Criminal Code and Procedural Code, each courthouse operates a little different than the other. The court system in the Mosul area is operating at a near pre-Coalition time. The court system in Baghdad is not as autonomous from Coalition assistance as is Mosul. Generally, JAG personnel are assisting and coordinating with the identification of criminal detainees who need to come before the Investigative courts, transportation of same, docket scheduling and monitoring of the actual court process. This is a quasi-shepherding process. Coalition Forces are not operating the Courts but we are assisting. In Mosul, elements of the 101st have developed a plan to computerize the court docket system. These efforts, primarily the work of LTC John Bell and others members of the 101st, could serve as a model for use throughout Iraq. They should be carefully documented and shared with CPA representatives.

7. While JAG personnel have been critical in getting the Court system operating, there is no plan to transition from JAG personnel serving as LNO’s to civilian contractors/experts and no time line in place. Current and anticipated missions needs and planning dictates that a plan be implemented to phase out JAG involvement in the court system so that those assets can be used in other venues. In addition, as the environment becomes more secure and the courts more operational, persons with extensive experience with civilian court operations, supervision, docketing management and assistance will become more critical if the Iraqi Criminal Justice System (and civil Justice System) is to be successful after Coalition Forces and the CPA depart. There are U.S. and International Resources available to assist the courts, prosecutors and others.
8. While the efforts of the JAG liaison teams in re-establishing the Iraqi Court system have been exceptional, they have not had the time, or the resources to adequately share the fruit of their efforts with other teams. Consequently there is not very much coordination and copying of best practices and lessons learned. There are insufficient personnel at the Ministry of Justice to monitor these activities and to coordinate between the various JAG liaison teams. This situation is compounded by the fact that JAG personnel will begin to rotate out of country very soon.

9. It is particularly important to note some of the efforts of members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, the 800th MP Brigade, and other units, too numerous to mention, in the re-opening and improvement of the Iraqi Court system:

- In the Mosul area, there are 31 Courts up and running, including one juvenile court
- The 101st ABN (AA) Div has established a Court-Appointed Attorney Program (CAAP) in the North. This innovative program was the effort of CPT Jerome J. Teresinski and others
- A Judicial Education program for sitting Judges has also been launched by the 101st and CJTF7 in Mosul and by LNO's in Baghdad. Establish a standardized filing system, file contents, file tracking system, and file security system
- Prosecutor advocacy skill training, Victim & Witness coordination, and other initiatives have been implemented
- LTC Bell and the Office of the SJA, 101st ABN (AA) Div, have established a prototype Central Booking Facility and Investigative Arraignment Court

Recommendations.

1 Near-Term.

a. Solve the disconnect between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance by implementing an immediate change to the CPA orders/directives and operating procedure to require two signatures on any checks or two signatures on any directives for payment for physical improvements. One of the signatories should be the authorized representative of the Ministry of Finance of and the other signatory should be a representative of the Ministry of Justice. This would enable the Ministry of Justice to insure that the work had been done satisfactory before payment is made. As the process now exists, payment is made by an entity that has no direct interest in the outcome, quality or status of the work being performed.

b. Separate all Criminal Detainees from all other detainees, i.e., High Value Detainees, Security Internees, EPW's. Criminal pre-trial detainees and post-trial prisoners must also be separated.
c. Review all juvenile detainee files and insure that those classified as/or being treated as security internees/detainees are separated from other juvenile detainees. Establish a fast track review system to determine which can be released and which must be detained. Coordination needs to be made with a CJTF legal representative and MI representative and the Juvenile Detention representative to establish a fast track review system, perhaps at the facility. Consideration should be given to establishing a fixed review time of at least weekly to review the files so that those juveniles that can be released are released. It is suggested that they be held for no more than 30 days, and if their case is not adequately reviewed and a proper determination made, then release authority should revert to that person who currently has the authority to release any other juvenile that is being detained. Due to personnel and resource limitations, this is a problematic area that is not being addressed adequately at the present time.

d. CPA should hire a Juvenile Probation/Programs consultant/expert to assist in the development of a model juvenile probation program, placement program, placement options, treatment options and other related services and training therein.

e. Establish a time line for transition from the use of JAG liaisons and personnel to monitor and assist the Iraqi Court system to CPA/civilian experts monitoring. This would release JAG assets for other missions and would assist SJA’s in focusing on military law and operations.

f. Ensure that there is someone/some specific entity tasked with collection/capture of the efforts of each of the individual JAG Court assistance cells so as to be able to preserve, sort and use the expertise, forms and experience and to not re-invent the wheel over and over again.

g. CPA should immediately insure that the Courts and Courthouses meet minimal security requirements to insure that the courts, courthouses and personnel are protected. The Courthouses are busy and a symbol of Iraqi freedom from oppression, and, consequently at considerable risk. Iraqi Judges and court employees are very concerned about their personal security.

h. Identify and hire an individual to establish an Anti-Corruption/Internal Affairs Department within the Ministry of Justice. While there will be trepidation on the part of the Minister of Justice, such action is necessary to restore and preserve the Iraqi people’s confidence in the Justice system. It should be stressed to the Minister of Justice that such departments and procedures exist in all public agencies in the United States and is a critical factor in maintaining the integrity of the public offices and officers.
Establish a dialogue/relationship with the National Judicial College, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the International Association of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, and other public organizations which specialize in Judicial Education, Judicial Administration and Operations with a goal toward contracting with experts/consultants on a 60 to 90 day presence in Iraq, if this increases the number of qualified persons willing to come to Iraq, to assist in court integration and docket control management issues, on a local and Iraqi wide level. Various Public Defender Agencies and Prosecuting Attorney entities and Court Administration Resource Centers should also be tapped for assistance.

CPA should hire a Court Administrator to serve the Ministry of Justice in four primary areas: Court Administration, Technology Implementation, Docket Management, Courts and Courthouse Security. Court Administration would focus on Judicial and Court personnel support and administration assistance. Technology Implementation would concentrate primarily on the development and use of technology and bringing same into each courtroom, courthouse and the linking of courts and courthouses with other regions. Docket Management would be responsible for insuring that the courts are moving forward as quickly as possible with effective docket management systems as well as serve as the central collection point and identifier of best docket management being contemplated and/or used in various locations for broader implementation, and ultimately computerization. Courts and Courthouse Security would be responsible for coordinating and insuring adequate security in the Courts and Courthouses. Over the course of time, this function could be absorbed by one of the existing Iraqi departments of the Ministry of Justice or recognized as an independent department.

Identify those Criminal Detainees awaiting appearance before Investigative Courts/Judges wherein there exist transportation resource problems, (i.e., distance, security, vehicles and determine in what situations we can transport the Judges to the detainees instead of transporting the detainees to the Courts). It is easier to move a small group of persons who are not an escape risk than those who are. This should not be a widely implemented procedure and Iraqi Judges would have to be supportive but it presents one possible solution to the delay between apprehension and appearance before the Investigative Court. There has been some attempt to do this with some success. Again, the efforts of the 101st in the Mosul area with the Central Booking Facility concept should be carefully studied for greater application. Judges could go to those detained or the magistrate hearings are held en masse. Either way, better use of resources will result in an immediate reduction in both force protection requirements and greater security to the judges and court personnel and the prisoner. Once a docket is established and operating on a regular basis, transportation and force protection can be more efficiently planned.
2. Mid-Term.

a. Develop a Court Administration Department within the Ministry of Justice, with sufficient assets to serve as a liaison between the courts and the Ministry of Justice with respect to all court administration.

b. Issue an order amending the operation of the Ministry of Finance that would require that once the budget for the Ministry of Justice is approved that such money be transferred to the Ministry of Justice and placed in its operating budget for payment of its operations on an as needed basis. The Ministry of Finance would retain its oversight and monitoring powers and the Ministry of Finance could impose periodic reporting requirements and perform auditing functions. As an alternative, the approved operating budget could be released to the Ministry of Justice on a quarterly basis.

c. Establish a Technology Task Force composed of the Court Administrator or his representative, a representative or representatives from the Iraqi Judges, from among the Iraqi Prosecutors, from the Juvenile Division, from the Bureau of Prisons, and any other interested stakeholders to determine the short term and long term technology needs of the courts and their interface with the jails and prisons and to move the Iraqi Criminal Courts from typewriters and carbon copies to computers and docket management systems. The danger of delaying this process will result in different courts being at different stages with different resources and systems. There is no problem with development being at different stages, given a gatekeeper.

d. Plan for which CPA positions or Coalition Force assignments can be co-staffed by Iraqi’s and/or shadowed by Iraqi’s and/or transferred to Iraqi’s and a timeline for such (“Position Model Plan”).

e. Establish educational requirements for all Juvenile Detention Facilities and secure appropriate educational services.

f. Consider amending Iraqi Juvenile law to allow for the transfer or waiver of juveniles accused of serious offenses into the adult criminal court. Once established this could serve as an alternative disposition to trying Iraqi juveniles for committing serious crimes against coalition forces in a Commission forum.

g. Establish an Adult Probation Services Division within the Prison Department with a liaison with the Courts.

h. Consider revising the current “bond”/”bail” procedures in order to facilitate the release of Criminal Detainees awaiting appearance before the Investigative Courts or awaiting trial when their risk of flight is minimal and they pose no real threat to the community. This would decrease the detainee population.
3. Long-term.

a. Implement the Position Model Plan and place Iraqi’s in key CPA positions identified above as either co-partners or shadows and transition or set the dates for transition of CPA positions to the Iraqi government.

b. Review Iraqi Criminal Law and Procedure with Iraqi participation and amend where needed.

c. Evaluate the new Iraqi Constitution (once ratified) and be prepared to modify CPA orders, directives and policies and procedures.

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Detainee Legal Processing

General

Procedures have been implemented for the legal processing of detainees since the inception of hostilities. These methods have undergone revision over time and now are centered on the identification and processing of Security Internees (including High Value Detainees) as well as Criminal Detainees. While the EPW mission remains significant, there is very little legal processing of EPW's as they are in a hold status until a determination is made to either release them or prosecute them before military commissions.

Security Internees are defined as those persons who are detained by Coalition Forces when necessary for imperative reasons of security. In accordance with Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, persons held as Security Internees are afforded the right of appeal of the decision to intern them. The decision to intern a person shall then be reviewed not later than six months from the date of the induction into the internment facility.

CJTF-7 has developed and implemented procedures designed to insure that all persons detained are treated in accordance with all applicable laws and that there is timely processing. FRAGO 749 sets forth the requirements and details concerning the capturing, detaining, and processing of detainees. Additional guidance has been provided to commanders to facilitate consistent processing of those persons identified as a Security Internee.

Observations:

1. The Fourth Infantry Division has supplemented the guidance from CJTF7 and added a Detainee Disposition Worksheet and a Detainee Inquiry Response Form. Use of the Detainee Disposition Worksheet seems to more clearly identify the capturing unit, thus making subsequent communication easier. In addition, the form, to the extent the recommendations can be obtained in the field, documents the staff recommendation as to whether the person should be released after processing, held or turned over to the Iraqi police. It also provides an opportunity for the capturing unit to concur or non concur where release may be later contemplated and further states the 4th ID’s recommendation to the CJTF-7 Review Board. The Detainee Inquiry Response Form is used by 4th ID to respond to inquiries from families of those persons captured by the 4th ID.

2. At present there are approximately 3400 Security Internees in custody. As many as 4300 have been interned and approximately 900 have been released. The future trend will likely continue, although it is driven by a number of factors (e.g., number of missions by Coalition Forces, frequency and accuracy of new intelligence information and the activity of any anti-Coalition forces).
3. While the Geneva Convention requires a 72-hour review, it should be noted that the CPA has concurred with CJTF-7's determination that the 72-hour review requirement starts when the detainee reaches the central collection point in Baghdad. CJTF-7 has established a 14-day grace period in which persons detained and initially identified as a Security Internee should be brought to the central collection point. This was done to accommodate the transportation and security issues that Coalition Forces operating far from Baghdad were experiencing.

4. The 72-hour review is being conducted by JAG officers. In fact, regardless of whether the capturing unit has had JAG assets to conduct the 72 hour review, CJTF-7's JAG Detention Cell team is conducting in some cases a second 72 hour review. The CJTF-7 Detention cell mission is headed by Major Dean Raab. He has done an outstanding job staying on top of this unique mission.

5. Persons determined to be Criminal Detainees are referred to the Iraqi Criminal process.

6. Individuals determined to be Security Internees at the 72-Hour Review are interned under Article 78 of the Geneva Convention. They may appeal the decision to a Review and Appeal Board. Thereafter, if the appeal is denied, or in the event no appeal is made, the detainee's case must be reviewed by an Article 78 Board within six months. No six-month review boards have been required thus far but they will begin to occur in November.

7. The number of detainees being processed has been so overwhelming that the CJTF-7 SJA has taken the initiative. The SJA has developed and implemented an interim step between the 72 Hour Review and the Review and Appeal Board (if an appeal is taken) and the 72 Hour Review and the six month review requirement in an effort to more quickly screen those cases that might warrant release by the Review and Appeal Board earlier than would otherwise occur under the normal required process. The SJA's initiative has proven to be very helpful in managing the numbers of detainees.

8. While the Review and Appeal Board, currently composed of BG Fast, BG Karpinski and COL Warren retains release authority for all Security Internees, the creation of the Review Panel has effectively served to speed up the review process and identify those persons worthy of release while not compromising the integrity of the process. With respect to the Geneva Convention requirements, the Review Panel affords the Security Internee additional opportunities for release and therefore, additional due process and consideration. The Review Panel consists of one MP officer, one MI officer and a Judge Advocate. The Review Panel screens for the Review and Appeal Board, both the six month review requirement and the appeal requirement. The Review Panel can meet more frequently than the Review and Appeal Board and has been invaluable.
9. With the steady flow of detainees coming into the system and the impending requirement to hold 6 month reviews of Security Detainee/Internee status beginning in November, it is unlikely that the current process will be able to accommodate the numbers of cases that will need to be reviewed in the future since there will be the requirement to hold 6 month reviews and handle appeals. Recognizing this, CJTF-7 has identified the need for additional personnel, both JAG and MI assets. On 25 August 2003, the CJTF-7 SJA submitted his memorandum justifying Reserve Component Augmentee Support. A similar request has been made by the MI community.

10. In addition, as recently as 2 October 2003, the CJTF-7 SJA, again recognizing the upcoming increased demand for Security Internee case reviews, has requested and obtained approval for the creation of a separate Appellate Review Panel to review all appeals by Security Internees and a Six Month Review Panel to focus solely on the six month review cases.

11. In this manner, the Review and Appeal Board will hear only those cases that have been reviewed by a subordinate panel and recommended for release by that panel.

12. In an effort to give finality to the process of internment and to provide a definitive legal response to attacks on Coalition Forces a request has been made by Lieutenant General Sanchez to CENTCOM for assistance in the establishment of military commissions to try persons in Iraq accused of crimes against the Coalition Forces.

13. The CJTF-7 SJA has also made plans for the disposition of cases involving HVD's, regardless of their classification as either Security Internees or EPW's. Options include prosecution by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq and/or Military Commissions, depending on the allegations against the detainee (Operation Wolverine).

14. CJTF-7 has established a Criminal Review Board to review serious criminal cases involving an Iraqi victim so that a JAG legal review can be done and in those cases where a “reasonable prosecutability” threshold cannot be met, release can be ordered. In the alternative the detainees can be held as a Security Internee if the Board finds that the individual is a security threat.

15. Due to resource limitations and competing mission requirements, there have been some instances when a person ordered released has not been released in a timely manner, i.e., not within 24-48 hours, when ordered released. In some instances, the person has been inadvertently moved to another facility but not released. There has even been a delay in the receipt of some juvenile release orders. This situation is compounded by the fact that these juvenile detainees are housed with ordinary juvenile delinquents.
Recommendations.

1. Near-term.

a. CJTF-7 review the 14 day period allowed from initial detention to the "72 hour" review to determine whether that period should be shortened in light of the lessening of hostile action and the greater availability of transportation assets. While this has apparently not been the focus of any ICRC personnel, it may be that they have not understood the delay in the 72 hour review. Regardless of whether the period is shortened or not it is recommended that the number of days between initial detention and the 72 hour review be more closely monitored so that habitually offending units can be identified and corrective action taken and documentation be kept evidencing same to respond to any ICRC inquiries or complaints.

b. Consideration be given to adopting the 4th ID’s Detainee Disposition Form Worksheet and Detainee Inquiry Response Form. It compliments the Apprehension form and helps to capture the command’s recommendation as to the ultimate disposition of the Internee.

c. Due to anticipated rotation of units, consideration is given to refresher training on compliance with FRAG order 749 and accurate completion of required documentation.

d. Immediate review and approval of COL Warren’s request for Reserve Component Judge Advocates and support personnel by the U.S. Army Reserve Command and OTJAG. Consideration be given to the mobilization period be not less than 90 days and not more than 179 days to facilitate continuity of the mission and to increase the likelihood of filling the requirements with willing Judge Advocate’s dedicated to the mission.

e. Review the process of record keeping and communication/coordination between the intelligence community, military police community and JAG to insure that the necessary information is being communicated in the appropriate forum/method to the appropriate people in a timely manner so as to expedite release when ordered, to insure files are kept current and that all required dates are being met. Standardize the files, file keeping and tracking practices and document them.

f. Review the current procedures to safeguard information contained in the Detainee files.
2. Mid-Term.

a. Once the additional Reserve Component support is approved, identify and equip a separate location for the operation of the Detainee Processing Cell with adequate support. Consideration should be made as to whether the Detainee Processing Cell should be located at Camp Victory or at a location nearer to where the detainees are being held. Additional consideration should be given as how the Cell is going to be organized and to whom it should report.

b. Develop standards and processes for preparation of the case file for the six month review board that would take into consideration the following items:

1) contact(s) by MI representatives since the last review;
2) amount of useful information/Intel obtained from the Security Detainee;
3) cooperation and conduct of the Security Detainee;
4) input from the capturing unit;
5) a present risk assessment using a standardized checklist designed for same;
6) a health assessment;
7) family contacts, if any;
8) MI/intelligence personnel input as to whether or not subsequent interrogation is anticipated; and an
9) interview by a behavioral scientist or therapist.

These are but a few suggestions that could be utilized in preparation of the case for presentation before the board, but at a minimum the process must comply with DoD 2310.1 and involve USD (ISA). A checklist would be beneficial. Consideration of the GWOT model would be appropriate also.

c. Implement the two-review panel system, as is being done by COL Warren.

d. Establishment of Military Commissions to try persons in Iraq accused of crimes against United States Forces. This includes staffing of sufficient personnel to prosecute and defend as well as the identification of Presiding Judges and other commission support personnel.

e. Convene Military Commissions in Iraq and try Iraqi’s accused of crimes against United States Forces.
3. Long-term.

a. Consider reconfiguring the Review and Appeals Board to be composed of three other senior members of the command or three senior members of another command, or three members of the U.S. Army Trial Judiciary.

b. Convene Military Commissions in Iraq and try Iraqi’s accused of crimes against United States Forces.

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Detainee Databases and Records (including integration with law enforcement and court databases)

General.

The 800th MP BDE is using two main databases to track detainees. The National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) is being used to track EPWs and Security Internees. The Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) is used to establish a biometric record (digital fingerprint, eye scan and facial photo) to track all detainees that enter a US Forces managed detainee locations (EPW, High Value Detainee (HVD), Security Internees (SI) and Iraqi Criminal Detainees).

The National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) is the Department of Army approved EPW tracking system. Its use within CJTF-7 appears to be fairly well managed. Information is routinely gathered at each camp on EPWs and security internees and passed from the 800th MP BDE to CFLCC, thru CENTCOM to the National Detainee Reporting Center at HQDA. The operation of the NDRS appears to be occurring with only minor problems related to the application of Internment Serial Numbers (ISNs) for new detainees.

The Biometric Automated Toolset (BATs) System is a good system to reliably track detainees, especially in the CENTCOM AOR, where central tracking individuals by governmental means is limited at best. Despite what name an individual is registered under, the biometrics collected on the individual assures positive identification in the future. BATs is designed as a centrally managed database with feeder inputs by the in-processing facilities at the detainee camps. The database is designed to compare new inputs and can be programmed to alert the administrator when an individual is entered in the database more than once (multiple arrests, etc). In addition, BATs is designed to be assessable via web-based applications in order to facilitate external organizations to query the database for analysis.

Effective prison management relies heavily on the ability to accurately account for and manage information on prisoner designation, movement, and incidents. In the US few systems for the collection of data are interoperable between prisons systems let alone between other law enforcement agencies. The Iraqi prison system and the entire justice system have a unique opportunity to establish from the beginning a fully integrated and interoperable system of data collection and information management. The courts, police and the prisons departments all have the immediate need, with most using carbon paper as a duplication and paper management technique. There are several off the shelf programs that would enhance the data management of the Iraqi system. A contract for developing a comprehensive justice system would be an even better answer. The BATS system is an excellent system that with some enhancement to include docket management and police blotter and reporting could fit the need and set the Iraqi system apart from many other countries in their criminal justice information management.
It is anticipated that this population will continue to grow during continued Coalition presence. There is not an efficient release process in place. Those among the SI population who are later classified, as Criminal/Enemy Combatants are to be treated IAW DOD policy. That is, treatment, not status of EPW's. They receive the protections of the Geneva Convention absent those exclusions deemed appropriate for safe, secure and humane custody and which are in the interests of the US and Coalition forces. Only those SI's who are ultimately determined to be EPW, CI, or an Enemy Combatant (EC) after the MI, Legal, and threat analysis are to be entered into the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) as well as the BATS.

Observations.

1. NDRS appears to be operating with only minor problems. The area that needs more attention is training and the enforcing the policy of who is entered into NDRS. EPWs certainly should be tracked with NDRS. Currently Security Internees are entered into NDRS. Only after a clear determination is made that a Civilian Internee is going to classified as a Security Internee should an ISN be issued and the individual entered into the NDRS. Careful consideration must be given to which categories are entered since the NDRS database is reported to the International Red Cross, giving the Red Cross and International Community the impression that individuals who committed crimes against Coalition Forces privileges and classification as a legal EPW inappropriately.

2. Currently there is no effective central system administration of BATs. Data terminals are not located at all detainee camps and the BATS terminals that are distributed are not connected to the central server. As a result, some detainees are not being tracked at all, and most detainees are only being tracked at individual detainee camps. The data gathered is not being made available in a central location for analysis. Currently not all the detainee camps have connectivity via the SIPRNET. As a result, for effective data sharing, courier runs need to be established to the CJTF-7 C2 in order to update the BATs server with new detainee information. The C2 has established an action officer to control system administration. His actions should include establishing SOPs, TTPs and their monitoring to ensure data inputs are done properly and timely.

3. Currently not all detainee facilities have reliable data connectivity. The SIPRNET has been established as the network over which BATS will operate. However, that decision appears to have been made due to SIPRNET being the most reliable network available. As the telecommunications infrastructure matures in Iraq, consideration should be given to moving the BATS from SIPRNET (after the data has been properly vetted) to another less restrictive network (possibly CENTRIXS) as telecommunications becomes more commercialized.
4. Not all detainee facilities have a BATs terminal. As a backup method of tracking detainees, all sites also are managing an Excel spreadsheet of detainees. Consequently, a biometric record is not being established on all detainees. BATS terminals at all locations are essential to properly tracking all detainees that enter the system as well as providing for more comprehensive analysis.

5. Accountability for detainees is maintained by using the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS), the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) System or an Excel spreadsheet for a facility or collection point without NDRS or BATs. There exists no tracking system for the courts, detention facilities or prisons.

Recommendations.

1. Near-Term.
   a. Reinforce NDRS guidelines regarding who is entered into the NDRS and enforce reporting standards.
   b. Establish an SOP and TTPs for the proper operation and data sharing of BATS. Training should accompany the SOP and TTPs to ensure personnel are aware of the requirements that are established.
   c. Establish courier runs to update the central server database from those sites that do not have SIPRNET connectivity. Courier runs that occur either daily or every other day should be sufficient.
   d. Invest in BATs terminals for all sites. In addition, an equipment replacement/maintenance program should be implemented to resource the replacement of terminals that break due to the extreme environment they are operating in.
   e. Implement a mobile BATs team to visit all sites that do not have a BATs terminal and start registering all detainees. Schedule regular visits to ensure detainee population is current.
   f. Recommend that individuals are entered into BATs upon their first entry into US control, regardless of whether it is a jail or prison.

2. Mid-Term.
   a. Continue to carefully monitor the detainee categories that are entered into NDRS.
b. Establish connectivity to all detainee camps through tactical means or commercialization of the telecommunications infrastructure.

c. Continue to invest in the maintenance of the equipment. The extreme environment will ensure that equipment meantime between failure (MTBF) is considerably shorter than manufacturer expectations.

d. Close coordination should begin with CPA to ensure BATs system/program requirements for data sharing and data merge are known by CPA in order for them to establish requirements as they procure the future commercially available detainee tracking system that the Iraqi government will own and operate. This action is required to simplify importing of data being collected into BATs into the future CPA procured detainee tracking system.

e. The BATs database (after proper vetting) should be made available to the CPA MOJ as the control of the detainee facilities is handed off from US/Coalition Forces to Iraqi government. Close coordination should continue ongoing to ensure the CPA is aware of the data being collected and the system/program requirements for data sharing and data merge.

3. Long-Term.

a. Department of the Army should consider implementing Biometrics in NDRS for positive EPW identification.

b. CPA should commercialize the connectivity between the detainee facilities and the central server.

c. Advertise the detainee database to ensure multiple organizations are aware and have the capability to effective use the database for analysis. Care should be taken by the system administrator to ensure different users with different requirements/permitted access are given the proper access rights to prevent the improper disclosure of sensitive information.

d. Continue to use BATs for the criminal system until CPA/IRAQ decides which system they will implement.
Conclusion

The objective of the assessment was to observe detention and prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve operations and transition the fledgling Iraqi prison system from military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi government. The assessment focused on detainee and corrections systems management (including detainee movement, segregation, accountability, and command and control), detainee medical care and health management, detainee legal processing, court integration and legal processing, detainee databases and records management, integration of military detention and corrections operations with CPA, and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run system. The assessment revealed a wide variance of prison, detention center and jail operations. The al-Hillah and Mosul prisons are operating very efficiently under Iraqi control with oversight by Coalition soldiers. City jails generally reflect less stringent adherence to International standards of confinement, but in many cases are being operated satisfactorily by Iraqi personnel with Coalition oversight (e.g., the al-Maqual prison in Basrah under the 3 RMP (UK) and facilities in the 101st ABN (AA) Div AO). Conversely, the Baghdad facilities need additional security and construction upgrades, improved sanitation, and are dependant on augmentation and continuous direction by Military Police, while some cities do not have functioning jails (e.g., an-Nasariyah, al-Amarah), and the team was unable to observe city jails in the 4th ID/82nd ABN Div AOs.

The team recommends that the primary effort of the Military Forces and the CPA MOJ be focused on the goal of building sufficient capacity (bed space) and a fully functioning Iraqi prison system with large regional correctional facilities, while not letting the less acceptable city jails divert the primacy of effort. We applaud CPA MOJ efforts to recruit enough subject matter experts to ensure that appropriate prison construction is initiated, ensure that Iraqi correctional officer training academies are staffed and providing appropriate instruction, and provide mentors for Iraqi Correctional leaders so they are capable of operating their facilities without US or Coalition military support or supervision. Due to cultural differences and local realities, the answer is not for the Iraqi officials to replicate the U.S. system, but mold their Department using a set of reasonable International standards and realistic expectations.

Recommend that CJTF-7 and CPA MOJ review the recommendations, adopt specific solutions which would be useful, and request assistance from the corrections team or International community if assistance is needed. Some of the recommendations will require few resources, others will require major policy changes and resources that can only be implemented over several years. But the long-term recommendations will only be accomplished if a strategic plan is developed and followed. The current team in the CPA MOJ Prisons Department has demonstrated a desire to work with CJTF-7 on developing and implementing solutions to the challenges in the Iraqi corrections system. Recommend that DoD/CJTF-7 provide political support for CPA MOJ to enable them to better address the many challenges ahead for the Iraqi Corrections System.
### Annex A-Facility Summaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Physical Plant</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Health, Safety, and Sanitation</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bucca Camp</td>
<td>Tent and wire within a perimeter fence</td>
<td>EPW, Criminal Detainees and Security Internees are housed in the same perimeter fence, but they are in separate compounds. The Segregation Facility does not have a SOP. Units do not have adequate communication equipment to properly operate the facility.</td>
<td>An effective plumbing system and waste water removal system was built at the facility. Units did not have adequate medical staff to meet demands at facility capacity.</td>
<td>A wide variety of less than lethal force was available and effectively utilized at the facility. Other weapons were not used within the facility. Triple strand concertina wire for perimeter fencing failed to prevent escapes from the facility. S Sally ports are not effectively utilized to control access to the facility.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th ID Collection Point</td>
<td>Building and Tent design, exterior wall on three sides</td>
<td>Well developed and employed SOPs; well established transfer system between Brigade and Division Collection Point</td>
<td>Tents have wooden floors and internees have mat large internee population, clean and well maintained.</td>
<td>Excellent ORF procedures; unit has tazer as part of non-lethal package. Weapons maintained outside facility.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 ABN (AA) Div Collection Point</td>
<td>Wooden structure and wire within perimeter fence, new facility under construction</td>
<td>Solid operational procedures; small internee population</td>
<td>Clean and well maintained.</td>
<td>Insufficient Lighting; one weapon kept inside wire (Admin Tent) in lock box.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 AD DIF Collection Point</td>
<td>Good hard stand and wire perimeter, too small for long term operations.</td>
<td>Currently being utilized as a Division Collection Facility for Security Internees. The facility is operated by a Division MP Platoon who has received no additional training for operating a High Risk Detainee site.</td>
<td>The facility is very clean and well maintained. There is no plumbing in the facility, requiring the detainees to be escorted for showering/washing.</td>
<td>The facility has functioning sally port, two rows of wire, and a tower for security. The guards' weapons are maintained inside the facility in the control room, and the detainees' confiscated weapons and weapons are maintained inside the facility in an evidence room.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Central (Abu Ghurayb) Prison</td>
<td>Block and tier design both single and multiple cell, Compound and designation, No Iraqi/OPA SOP for the facility, facility perimeter walls.</td>
<td>Populations are not fully segregated by and multiple cell. Compound and designation, No Iraqi/OPA SOP for the facility, facility perimeter walls.</td>
<td>Clean and well maintained. No Personal protective equipment or policy for Cadre to conduct forced cell movement</td>
<td>Doors and gates unlocked during the day. No wire on roof top or sally port for entry/exit. No key/tool control identified. Contractors have unrestricted access to inmates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul (MRCI) Prison</td>
<td>Three compounds, one operational, two waiting funding, Block buildings with a ten meter perimeter wall.</td>
<td>SOPs have recently been printed and are being utilized. Facilities have largely final approval, developed by civilian correctional officials: excellent key control, camera system; well trained Iraqi guards.</td>
<td>The facility was exceptionally maintained and sanitary. Each cell was a bed available for each detainee. The facility has a temporary medical facility; running water, and sewage treatment plant.</td>
<td>The facility has a single entrance gate with surveillance camera; weapons are not permitted inside the facility, but are used in the towers and rooftops for overwatch.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary:**
- **Facility Type:**
  - Tent and wire within a perimeter fence
  - Building and Tent design, exterior wall on three sides
  - Wooden structure and wire within perimeter fence, new facility under construction
  - Good hard stand and wire perimeter, too small for long term operations
  - Block and tier design both single and multiple cell
  - Three compounds, one operational, two waiting funding

- **Physical Plant Operations:**
  - EPWs, Criminal Detainees and Security Internees are housed in the same perimeter fence, but they are in separate compounds. The Segregation Facility does not have a SOP. Units do not have adequate communication equipment to properly operate the facility.
  - Well developed and employed SOPs; well established transfer system between Brigade and Division Collection Point

- **Health, Safety, and Sanitation:**
  - An effective plumbing system and waste water removal system was built at the facility. Units did not have adequate medical staff to meet demands at facility capacity.
  - Tents have wooden floors and internees have mat large internee population, clean and well maintained.
  - Clean and well maintained.
  - The facility is very clean and well maintained. There is no plumbing in the facility, requiring the detainees to be escorted for showering/washing.

- **Security:**
  - A wide variety of less than lethal force was available and effectively utilized at the facility. Other weapons were not used within the facility. Triple strand concertina wire for perimeter fencing failed to prevent escapes from the facility. Sally ports are not effectively utilized to control access to the facility.
  - Excellent ORF procedures; unit has tazer as part of non-lethal package. Weapons maintained outside facility.
  - Insufficient Lighting; one weapon kept inside wire (Admin Tent) in lock box.
  - The facility has functioning sally port, two rows of wire, and a tower for security. The guards' weapons are maintained inside the facility in the control room, and the detainees' confiscated weapons and weapons are maintained inside the facility in an evidence room.
  - Doors and gates unlocked during the day. No wire on roof top or sally port for entry/exit. No key/tool control identified. Contractors have unrestricted access to inmates.

**Note:**
- **Facilities:**
  - **Bucca Camp**
  - **4th ID Collection Point**
  - **101 ABN (AA) Div Collection Point**
  - **15 AD DIF Collection Point**
  - **Baghdad Central (Abu Ghurayb) Prison**
  - **Mosul (MRCI) Prison**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al Hillah</td>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>Block buildings with 3D cell blocks and perimeter walls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraqi (MOJ) operated facility with oversight from the 310th MP Bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SOPs are in place and the Iraqi guards are trained and familiar with the facility.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The facility has exposed wiring and lighting.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Requires US$21 million to complete construction.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Towers around the facility provide good protection.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facility has two operational sally ports.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>There is single strand razor wire around the perimeter, but needs replacing in some areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The facility has an adequate biogas system, and key control program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>One story block buildings with perimeter walls being converted into prison facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Operational. The FEST has submitted a plan for this facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>Detention Center</td>
<td>New Construction, single 2-story building with perimeter wall and separate admin building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daquku</td>
<td>Jail A</td>
<td>Programmed for destruction to build civic center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thorough operational, preparing to move detainees to Prison B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor sanitation, very old facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daquku</td>
<td>Jail B</td>
<td>Block buildings with perimeter walls divided into three compounds; one compound operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability of the detainees is well maintained within the facility.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prison B is being refurbished in preparation for Prison A closing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The cells and latrines were inadequate and not properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainees slept on floor not in the cell blocks.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ventilation and no firefighting equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Key control is maintained.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The facility has a single entrance gate, but does not have a sally port.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons are not patented inside the facility, but are utilized in the towers for overwatch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guards did maintain key control within the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The facility has a proper sally port entrance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons are authorized inside the facility, but not in the cell blocks.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim fencing inside the facility is inadequate and has exposed ends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Key control is maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The cell blocks had poor sanitation due to the population and not well maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The latrines were unsanitary and not properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Key control is maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facility does not have a sally port entrance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons are authorized inside the facility, but not in the cell blocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The cell blocks are small and likely to close.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The facility does not have shower facilities on site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unreliable electrical system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High rise apartments posing a force protection issue for U.S. forces at the facility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex A-Facility Summaries**
### Annex A-Facility Summaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Control of Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surnenay</td>
<td>Jail</td>
<td>Currently being utilized as a Brigade Collection Facility for Security detainees. The facility currently has no SOPs, and is operated by 3CT, 1AD. All three buildings have adequate showers for detainees, two of the buildings have latrines; however none of the cells have plumbing inside the cells.</td>
<td>No control of weapons within the facility. Weapons were taken into the cells with the detainees. A large cash of weapons is maintained in the facility in an evidence room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadamiyah</td>
<td>Detention Center</td>
<td>Two building, 2 floor structure with perimeter wall, recently refurbished. Equipment too close to the wire not high enough to prevent escape. Detainees are allowed out in groups, although they are prohibited from communicating there remains risk whenever multiple detainees of this caliber are in proximity to each other.</td>
<td>New construction adding crash gates and seating potential escapees routes; detainees will have to leave cells to use latrines/shower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalal</td>
<td>Detention Center</td>
<td>Block buildings with perimeter walls. Accountability of the detainees is well maintained within the facility. The facility houses both pre and post-trial confinement, and mental health patients; excellent Iraqi leadership, prison stayed operational after Oct 02 release dates.</td>
<td>The facility has a single entrance gate, but does not have a sally port. Weapons were permitted inside the facility administrative areas, but not inside the cellblocks. Guards did maintain key control within the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an Najaf</td>
<td>Jail</td>
<td>Block buildings with eight cellblocks and perimeter walls. Facility has four additional cellblocks under construction, and the space to expand to 2000+ capacity. Iraqi (MOI) operated facility with oversight from the 310th MP Bn. SOPs are in place and the Iraqi guards are trained and familiar with them. The facility houses pretrial, male/juvenile/female offenders.</td>
<td>The facility is kept clean and organized. Food contractor provides three meals per day. Each cell has a swamp cooler to keep cells cool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad Diwaniyah</td>
<td>Jail</td>
<td>Block buildings with perimeter walls. Two C-Huts are being built to increase capacity. Iraqi (MOI) operated facility with oversight from the 310th MP Bn. SOPs are in place and the Iraqi guards are trained and familiar with them. They have good accountability of the detainees utilizing the BATS system.</td>
<td>The facility has towers with oversight of the facility. Facility has two operational sally ports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Value</td>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>Single cell design, functional, but not optimal due to location and overall facility design. Bermwall and Wire perimeter. The facility has had no serious incidents relating to cadre or detainee to date. There is a lack of theft concerns because of the age of the detainees population.</td>
<td>The facility has an adequate badge system, and key control program. Weapons are maintained in the facility's control room. Movement within the facility is controlled, but there is a shortage of restraints.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detainees should never be underestimated. There are potential gaps in the perimeter security. Equipment too close to the wire is not high enough to prevent escape. Detainees are allowed out in groups, although they are prohibited from communicating there remains risk whenever multiple detainees of this caliber are in proximity to each other.
Annex B Audit Instruments

Though the primary purpose of the site surveys was to identify trends and national level requirements, the team provided onsite guidance and assistance to units performing detention operations and assistance to the Iraqi Correctional Officers, to include a two-day train-the-trainer session for 800th MP (I/R) Bde NCOs from it’s assigned Battalions. The team also left examples of SOPs used at the United States Disciplinary Barracks with the 320th MP (I/R) 3n at Abu Ghurayb, and have included SOPs, Training Plans and Emergency Action Plan resources in this report. Though detailed observations, whether written or provided verbally, were given onsite or forwarded to respective unit and facility commanders, there is merit in conducting subsequent surveys. Attached is the audit instruments used by this assistance team, but more detailed guidance and standards are available from the American Correctional Association (ACA). We would caution, though, to the strict application of U.S. standards (even U.S. facilities fall short of many published standards), and only offer the ACA standards as general guidelines. The baseline remains 1) Accountability, 2) Humane treatment, 3) Safe, Sanitary and Secure Facilities, and 4) Proper Segregation.

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Annex B Audit Instruments

Appendix 1 (Legal Data)

Legal Data Collection Tool
Questionnaire for On-Site Visits

Date of visit_________________ Facility/place visited________________________

Name of person completing checklist______________________________

Name of translator/interpreter________________________________________

Information for this checklist was obtained from the following person(s). Include title and telephone number, fax? and email?

The questions are designed for a YES or NO response, unless otherwise obvious. Please write a “Y” or “N”. In some cases a short answer is necessary. It is not necessary that every question is asked or all information obtained.

Is the facility/place run by U.S. Military----Coalition Provisional Authority----Iraq? (Circle one)

What is the primary mission of the prison/facility?

What is the secondary mission?

Initial Detention:
List all of the means by which a person is detained at the facility. In other words, are they brought by Court Order and/or U.S. Forces and/or Iraqi authorities?

What is the process?

Is documentation submitted with each person left to be detained? _____
If so, what documentation?
Who created the documentation?
Please obtain a copy (copies) of such documentation.
Is this documentation reviewed by someone at the prison/facility for completeness/correction/appropriateness? _____
What is the standard being used for detention?
Annex B Audit Instruments

Is documentation completed by the prison/facility when a person being detained first arrives? _____
Who created this documentation?
Please obtain a copy (copies) of such documentation.

Is someone responsible for reviewing the paperwork submitted with the person being detained at the time they are being first placed in the prison/facility? _____
If so, who?
Does this person have the authority to refuse to accept the person being detained? _____
If so, under what circumstances?

Is the person being detained advised of the basis for their confinement? _____
Are they advised of what will happen to them next? (i.e., court appearance, how long they will be held, rights to counsel, whatever is applicable) _____

Is the person being detained given an individual identifier? _____
If yes, what are the identifiers being used?

How are they tracked?

Is the person being detained given any initial briefing or otherwise advised of the rules of conduct for the prison/facility?

Is there an initial assessment of the person being detained to determine their physical and mental condition? _____
Security risk? _____ Special needs? _____
If so, is there an initial assessment form or guideline? _____
If so, please obtain a copy of it.

Documentation:
Is a master file or central documentation kept on each person being detained? _____
If YES, please provide a copy of any sample documentation that is being used. Ask where the documentation came from that is being used.
Is there standardized information kept in each file? _____
If so, please list the standard information.

Is one particular person or one particular office or section responsible for maintaining the file? _____
If so, who or what maintains the files and where are the maintained?
Annex B Audit Instruments

Classifications of Detainees:
Are persons being detained classified? _____
If so, how many different classifications are used?
What are the different classifications?

Are pre-trial persons held apart from post-trial persons? _____
Are the different classifications of persons detained kept in the same place/cells or are they segregated? (Circle one)
Are men and woman kept segregated? _____
Are pregnant women separated from the other population?
Are juveniles identified and separated or moved to another facility?

What is the current population of each classification on the date of the visit?
What is the current population of pre-trial? Of post-trial?
How confident are they that this number is correct?
Very confident—Confident—Not very confident—- (circle one)
Is this number verified by someone or by some method? _____
How is that number verified?

Are there standards/criteria for classification? _____
Obtain copies of any documentation describing the process or SOP?
Who makes the classification determination?
Is the determination reviewed? _____
How quickly? Who?
Is the determination reviewed periodically? _____
If so, how often?

Regardless of classification, does everyone detained appear in court at some point? _____
Which classification of those detained, if any appear in court for a hearing?

Does someone at the prison/facility determine who and when the person detained goes to court or does someone from the court make the determination? (Circle one)

Is someone responsible for insuring a person detained appears in court when scheduled? _____
Who?
Is someone responsible for transporting a detained person to court? _____
Who?
Annex B Audit Instruments

Are there any SOP’s describing the legal rights of the persons being detained in the prison/facility? 
If so, please obtain a copy.

Are the persons being detained advised of their legal rights, orally or in writing, when they are detained? If so how? Please obtain a copy of any written advisement. If an oral advisement is given, please make note of what is told to the detainee.

Counsel:
Can lawyers meet in the prisons/facilities with their clients? 
If so, are these meetings conducted in private between the lawyer and the client? 
Are there any written policies relating to an attorney visiting his client in the prison/facility? 
If so, please obtain copies of such policies. If lawyers are permitted to consult with their clients, are there certain classifications of persons detained that are not permitted to consult with an attorney? 
If so, which classifications?

Internal Discipline:
Are prisoners/persons detained punished for disciplinary breaches afforded due process of law? 
Who administers/imposes such punishment? What is the burden of proof required for such determination? What is the due process? If there is a SOP or other written guidance on the rights and/or the process by which a detainee is punished for a violation of the prison/facility rules? 
If so, please obtain a copy of it.

Does the prison/facility have written behavioral or conduct rules for those persons detained? 
If so, please obtain a copy of it.

If a person being detained is punished for violation of the prison rules, is the determination and punishment imposed reviewed by some authority? 
If so, by whom? How quickly after the initial determination?

Detention and Correction systems management:
Does the prison/facility utilize any computer based management system? 
If so describe it.
Annex B Audit Instruments

Does the prison/facility have any case management system? ____
If so, describe it or obtain copies of the SOP.

How often does the prison/facility transport prisoners to court for hearings?
Daily---weekly---upon request---other (specify: ______________) (circle one)

Can the prison/facility transport a person to court upon request by the court? ____

How does the prison/facility communicate with the Court?
By phone-----by mail-----by courier-----by fax----- (other please specify: __________)
Circle one

Has the Administrator/chief executive officer of the prison/facility been trained primarily by
the CPA------U.S. Military------Iraqis------Other (please circle all that apply)
What training has this person received within the last twelve months?

Is the Administrator/chief executive officer aware of the International Standards that apply
to this facility? ______
Do they believe they are in compliance with such standards? ______
If not, where are they lacking?

Is the Administrator/chief executive officer satisfied with the level of training that they and
their staff have received? ______
If not, what additional training do they believe is most necessary?

Has the Administrator/chief executive officer and/or their staff received any specialized
training in the legal rights of those being detained? ____
If so, when and by whom?

If not, is this training the Administrator would like to see provided to they and their staff?

Ask the Administrator to please rank the following types of training that is the most needed
at this particular facility? (1 being the most needed and 6 being the least needed)
____Training in the legal rights of persons being detained
____Training in the classification of persons being detained
____Training in how to keep accurate records and files on persons being detained
____Training on maintaining good order and discipline in the prison/facility.
____Training on appropriate methods and processes to punish those persons being
detained for violations of prison/facility rules.
____Training in improving the coordination and communication between the prison and
the Courts.
Annex B Audit Instruments

Regardless of the priority stated above, is there any area stated above that you do not need training in? ____
If so, please list.

Is there adequate food in the facility? ____
How many meals are served per day? ____
Are there enough beds in the facility? ____
Is there adequate medical care in the facility? ____
Is there a Doctor either in the facility or on call 24 hours a day? ____
Are mental health/counseling services available in the facility? ____
If so, please describe.

Are family members and friends allowed to visit any person being held in the facility? ____
If only certain classifications of persons being detained are entitled to have visitors, which classifications are allowed visitors?

Is there a protocol or SOP for family members and friends of persons being detained? ____
If so please obtain a copy.

Are their periodic reviews of every prisoner’s status, to include the following: last court date; next court date; out date (if applicable); and behavior/conduct? ____
If so, how are those reviews documented?

Who is the Legal Advisor/Who provides Legal Advice for this particular prison/facility? (need name, office, telephone number and fax number, and email if available)
### Annex B Audit Instruments

#### Appendix 2 (Health and Safety of a Correctional Facility)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Framework for the Assessment of the Health and Safety of a Correctional Facility**

**A. Detainee Space**

1. Adequate living space, lighting, weather and noise containment
2. Separation of special populations (children, females, physically and mentally ill)

**B. Water Management (availability and reliability)**

1. Potable water for drinking and basic hygiene
2. System for fire suppression

**C. Sewage and Trash Removal**

1. Septic system capable of sustaining basic sanitation
2. Daily trash removal and cleaning of the facility
3. Ready access to toilets and hand washing

**D. Food Service**

1. Kitchen sanitation procedures
2. Food handler procedures for basic sanitation management
3. Food handling/storage in detainee living areas

**E. Ventilation**

1. Adequate airflow to minimize stagnant air pockets
2. Ability to mitigate extreme temperatures

**F. Personal Hygiene**

1. Hand washing facilities readily available
2. Shower facilities in adequate numbers to support routine showers
3. Laundry facilities
4. Adequate clothing and bedding to permit frequent rotation

**G. Housekeeping**

1. Adequate cleaning material and equipment
### Annex B Audit Instruments

2. Assess frequency of cleaning within the facility  
   (how dirty is the facility and is there evidence of vermin and insect infestation).

### H. Programs

1. Work – institutional work to maintain the facility
2. Recreation – space and activities to deal with boredom
3. Education – essential for facilities with children
4. Spiritual services – religious programs
5. Counseling programs – psychological services for the severely mentally ill, including suicide prevention and intervention.

### I. Emergency Plans

1. Disaster Management Procedures – riot control, hostage procedures, weather situations
2. Fire procedures and drills
3. Medical emergencies – mass casualty, hunger strikes, etc.
### Annex B Audit Instruments

**Appendix 3 (IRAQ Corrections Training Academy Data Collection Tool)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRAQ Corrections Training Academy Data Collection Tool</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Basic Corrections Training Course is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 Weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 yr 18 months (other) in Duration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the school provide the following as part of its Correctional Training Program?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction &amp; Overview of the Iraqi Corrections System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Standards and Norms Impacting on Prison Work &amp; Inmates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Corrections Policy &amp; Procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Cultural Awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmate Discipline Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmates and the Prison Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence in Prison</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Correctional Treatment Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Survival</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision of Inmates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmate Search Procedures (Frisk/Strip)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell and Common Area Search Procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug Awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Prevention/Intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist &amp; Communicate with Inmates (IPC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Aid &amp; CPR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Precautions for Blood Born Diseases</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Protection Techniques (USD)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Key &amp; Tool Control Procedures</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inmate Accountability Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report Writing</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress Management</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Cell Moves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Firearms Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint Procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Procedures &amp; Transportation of Inmates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Procedures within a Correctional Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Actions for Fire/Escapes &amp; Disorders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitation Procedures</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeding Procedures within a Correctional Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-processing/Intake Procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellblock Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Housing Unit (SHU) Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Academy Provide a Performance Evaluation Exercise as a Course Completion Requirement?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does School have Advanced Correctional Training Courses?</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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B-10
### Annex B Audit Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the Academy Provide Annual Refresher Training?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Academy have an Instructor Certification Process?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does School have Viable POI/CMP?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Training Adequately Provide Students with the Basic Knowledge to Perform the Job?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**
Annex B Audit Instruments

Appendix 4 (Prison Security Management Data Collection Tool)

1. Access Control
   a. Sallyport
   b. Pedestrian
   c. Vehicle
   d. Searches
   e. Posted Rules/Contraband
   f. Weapons Control

2. Perimeter Security
   a. Barrier (Fence/Wall)
   b. Tower/mobile patrols
   c. Lighting

3. Control Center
   a. Communication (Internal/Outside Agencies)
   b. Two types of communications
   c. Duress System
   d. Emergency Plans
   e. Movement control
   f. Policies/SOPs/Post Orders

4. Accountability
   a. Inmate (Master Alpha Roster)
      - Headcounts
      - Bedcounts
   b. Staff (How many inside facility at any given time)
      - Badge system/Restricted entry
   c. Tool Control
   d. Key and Lock control
   e. Sharps Control
      - Needle /Syringe
      - Cooking Utensils
   f. Mail

5. Inmate Movement
   a. Escorted
   b. Unescorted
   c. Mass
   d. Supervised
Annex B Audit Instruments

6. Prisoner Programs/Management
   a. Grievance System
   b. Discipline System
   c. Educational Programs
   d. Recreational Programs
   e. Food Service
   f. Sanitation
   g. Medical

7. Classification/Custody (Segregated by: )
   a. Criminal
   b. High Risk Detainees
   c. MEK
   d. Pre-trial
   e. Administrative Segregation (Protective custody, mentally ill, medical, leaders)

8. Visitation
   a. Contact/Non-contact
   b. Legal
   c. Family
   d. Government Official
Annex B Audit Instruments

Appendix 5 (IRAQ Corrections Medical Operations Data Collection Tool)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IRAQ Corrections Medical Operations Data Collection Tool</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The current medical oversight is being provided by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialty : (MD, PA, civilian, other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned unit or agency:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are health assessments performed on in-processing detainees?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are records kept of all initial and follow on medical assessments/treatments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there standing operating procedures for dealing with infectious diseases which address protection issues for both staff and prisoners?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Care Operations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there procedures that address detainees medical needs for daily, chronic, specialized and/or emergency care?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are records kept of all detainee patient visits?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are detainees with mental health issues identified and managed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are “special needs” (i.e. mentally ill, suicidal patients) detainees identified and managed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are detainees that require specialized or hospital care managed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are unique medical needs of women, nursing mothers, infants, and children addressed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceuticals: How are medications managed (i.e. accountability, distribution, and storage)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are healthcare operations assessed and reviewed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are dental services available to detainees?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical/legal issues:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a policy for the use of medical restraints?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a policy for the forced use of mood altering medications?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a policy for the management of suicidal detainees?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are detainees given the right to care and the right to refuse care?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Education and Preventive Medicine:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are detainees trained on the prevention of communicable diseases?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are staff educated on the management of special needs detainees (i.e. mentally ill, infectious detainees, lactating women and other special populations)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

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Appendix 1 (Correctional Officer Safety).............................................................................D-2
Appendix 2 (React to a Physical Attack using Unarmed Self-Defense Techniques)..........D-10
Appendix 3 (Restrain a Detainee)........................................................................................D-41
Appendix 4 (Forced Cell Moves)..........................................................................................D-52
### SECTION I. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

**COURSE NUMBER(S)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task(s) Taught or Supported</th>
<th>TASK NUMBER</th>
<th>TASK TITLE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The academic hours required to teach this lesson are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Hours</th>
<th>TEST HRS/MOI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7/CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3/TP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL HOURS</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Lesson Number</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Lesson No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Testing,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(to include test review)</td>
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</table>

Prerequisite Lesson(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LESSON NUMBER</th>
<th>LESSON TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign Restrictions

Security Clearance/Access

Unclassified.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

| References
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Student Study Assignments | None. |

| Instructor Requirements | One primary instructor. |

| Additional Support Personnel Requirements | None |

| Equipment Required |  |

| Materials Required | STUDENT MATERIALS: pen/pencil and notebook. |

| Classroom, Training Area, and Range Requirements | One 40-person classroom. |

| Ammunition Requirements | None. |

| Instructional Guidance | Before presenting this lesson, instructors must thoroughly prepare by studying this lesson and identified reference material. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proponent Lesson Plan Approvals</th>
<th><strong>NAME</strong></th>
<th><strong>RANK</strong></th>
<th><strong>POSITION</strong></th>
<th><strong>DATE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward J. Baldwin Jr.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Corrections SME</td>
<td>Oct 03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

SECTION II.

INTRODUCTION

Method of instruction: CO
Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.1
Media: Slides.

NOTE:
Show Slide #1 (Safety in Internment Facilities).

NOTE:
PRIOR TO CLASS OBTAIN AND DISPLAY NUMEROUS EQUIPMENT ITEMS FOR ASSISTING IN IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY HAZARDS (I.E., BROOM, MP W/BUCKET, BUFFER, ETC.).

Motivator
You will soon be supervising detainees and as their supervisor you are responsible for their safety. A lot of the incidents or accidents discussed in this class may seem minor or that common sense could have prevented the accident. No matter how minor, people were still hurt or property was damaged. As for common sense some of the same accidents are still happening.

NOTE:
Inform students of the following terminal learning objective requirements.

NOTE:
Show Slide #2 (Action, Conditions, Standards).

Terminal Learning Objective
At the completion of this lesson you will:

| ACTION: | Discuss the potential safety hazards in an Internment facility and discuss the appropriate actions in conducting your duties in a safe manner. |
| CONDITION: | In a classroom environment, given a conference presentation. |
| STANDARD: | Recognize all potential safety hazards and perform duties in a safe manner in an Internment environment. |

Safety Requirements
None.

Risk Assessment Level
Low.

Environmental Considerations
None. It is the responsibility of all soldiers and DA civilians to protect the environment from damage.

Evaluation
None.

Instructional Lead-in
Safety in an Internment facility relates to most of the classes you will receive but closely relates to supervise work activities within a confinement facility.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

SECTION III.

Note:

Enabling Learning Objective A

ANNEX 0 Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

PRESENTATION

Inform the students of the Enabling Learning Objective requirements.

| ACTION: | Identify safety hazards to detainees and staff in a confinement environment. |
| CONDITION: | Given a conference presentation in a classroom environment. |
| STANDARD: | Recognize safety hazards to detainees and staff in a correctional environment. |

NOTE: Show Slide #3 (Accident).

Learning Step/Activity 1.

Method of instruction: CO Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.1 hour(s).
Media: Slides
References:
Security Classification: None

Something that occurs unexpectedly or unintentionally and results in damage and (or) injury is classified as an accident.

1. Safety is a concern for all supervisors. The immediate supervisor, the person that is supervising the detainees, more than likely is the one that will be held accountable if there is an incident.

NOTE: SHOW EQUIPMENT ITEMS AND HAVE STUDENTS DISCUSS THE SAFETY HAZARDS FOR EACH ITEM. USE PERSONAL EXPERIENCES.

NOTE: Show Slides #4 and #5 (Institutional Safety).

2. We will discuss the situations listed.
   a. Locating safety hazards.
   b. Establishing safety standards.
   c. Training detainees to follow safety standards.
   d. Fire and accident prevention.

NOTE: Instructor will discuss some of the most common accidents that occur within a confinement facility.

3. As a corrections staff member you will have some responsibilities on the supervision of detainees and safety standards.
   a. Setting the example by always following good safety practices.
   b. Being constantly alert to potential safety hazards.
   c. Making sure that safety equipment is issued and that the tools are in
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

proper working condition before letting the detainees use them.

d. Instructing the detainee on proper safety measures and ensuring
the safe working habits of all the detainees.

Inform the students of the Enabling Learning Objective requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION:</th>
<th>Identify ways to perform corrections staff member duties in a safe manner.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONDITION:</td>
<td>Given a conference presentations in a classroom environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARD:</td>
<td>Recognize ways to perform your duties safely in an internment environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Learning Step/Activity 1.

Method of instruction: CO/TP. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction 0.3/0.3
Media: slides.
References:
Security Classification: None

NOTE: Show Slides #6 and #7 (Officer Safety).

SECTION V. We will discuss the situations listed.

SECTION V. Safety rules to be observed when escorting detainees.

SECTION V. Safety practices when approaching cell doors and when walking underneath the tiers.

SECTION V. Always look up.

SECTION V. Watch the detainee’s hands.

SECTION V. Use the windows to see the reflection like a mirror.

c. Safety rules pertaining to cell searches.

SECTION V. Proper procedure for breaking up an altercation between detainees and the proper action to take if suddenly confronted by an armed detainee.

NOTE: SHOW JOB AIDS: I.E., WHISTLE, RUBBER GLOVES, MIRROR, FLASHLIGHT, AND RADIO.

2. We will discuss the job aids available to correctional personnel, the equipment that is designed to make our job safer, such as the body alarm, radio, mirror, rubber gloves, flashlight, etc.

NOTE: What are your questions concerning safety in a confinement/correctional facilities.

NOTE: Show Slides #8 and #9 (Pre-attack Cues).

SECTION V. We will discuss and identify PRE-ATTACK CUES, to help you be aware and look for the warning signs of detainees as
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

they prepare to attack.

a. BLADING -- this is shifting one foot in back of the other, so the detainee can move toward you more easily.

b. CLENCHING THE FISTS -- to prepare the detainee for attack by lubricating the finger joints, and to keep themselves under control.

c. SHIFTING THE SHOULDERS BACK -- to give you a message that he means business, as well as providing a certain amount of protection for himself, or as preparation before STRIKING YOU.

d. TARGET GLANCE -- looking for a weapon to attack with or an area on your body to strike.

e. CONSPICUOUSLY LOOKING UP -- the detainee may be trying to distract you by looking in a certain direction, prior to a surprise attack, or checking out his post-attack escape route.

f. THOUSAND-YEAR STARE -- the detainee may try to depersonalize you, by looking straight through you. (A good example of this can be seen in the movie "The Silence of the Lambs" when Anthony Hopkins looks at Jody Foster as if she wasn’t even there.)

g. FACIAL WIPE -- hiding or avertion the face. (Sometimes people who are on the verge of losing control of themselves perform a facial wipe, by which they attempt to hide the level of anxiety they’re experiencing by physically moving their hands over their faces. This may show up as removing a hat, slicking back the hair, or something equally inconspicuous.)

h. ROCKING ON THE BALLS OF THE FEET -- as the detainee gets more upset, these movements act as a means of diffusing their overload of adrenaline and anxiety.

i. LOWERING THE BODY SLIGHTLY -- causing the head to lower, just before moving into the attack.

j. GROWLING -- at the climax of their fear or anger, some humans even growl before they attack.

k. FACIAL COLORING -- changing from flushed to pale. (The body is moving blood from the extremities to the internal organs, to protect them in case of injury.

l. BOISTEROUS PROFANITY -- detainees will speak loud and yell words or profanity to demoralize you in an attempt to intimidate you, prior to attack.

m. WAVING ARMS AND HANDS -- detainees will wave their arms and hands rapidly as they speak, in an attempt to distract you prior to attack.

NOTE: BE AWARE OF AND LOOK FOR THESE BEHAVIORS AND CUES, AS THEY ARE CLEAR SIGNS OF DANGER. BEING ABLE TO OBSERVE AND DETECT THESE CUES AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS WILL MAKE THE DETERMINATION WHETHER OR NOT YOU WILL SAFELY ACCOMPLISH YOUR DUTIES.
NOTE: Show Slide #10 (React to Danger).

NOTE: THERE ARE THREE GENERAL STEPS TO TAKE WHEN CONFRONTED BY A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION THAT MAY FEEL UNSAFE.

SECTION V. STOP (WHAT YOU ARE DOING).
SECTION V. THINK (OBSERVE THE SITUATION, AND ASSESS THE DANGER).
SECTION V. REACT (TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION).

NOTE: Show Slide #11 (Time and Distance).

QUESTION: WHAT IS REACTION TIME?
ANSWER: THE AVERAGE AMOUNT OF TIME YOUR BODY WILL REACT TO A GIVEN SITUATION.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE AVERAGE REACTION TIME IF YOU WERE ATTACKED BY A DETAINEE THAT IS APPROXIMATELY FIVE FEET AWAY FROM YOU?
ANSWER: LESS THAN .1/4 second.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE AVERAGE REACTION TIME IF YOU WERE ATTACKED BY A DETAINEE THAT IS APPROXIMATELY TEN FEET AWAY FROM YOU?
ANSWER: LESS THAN .1/2 a second.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE AVERAGE REACTION TIME IF YOU WERE ATTACKED BY A DETAINEE THAT IS APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FEET AWAY FROM YOU?
ANSWER: LESS THAN 1 and ¼ SECONDS.

NOTE: Whenever you are encountering a potentially dangerous detainee that makes an attempt to attack ALWAYS remember that he will always act faster than you think he will and you will always react slower than you think you will.

SECTION IV.

SUMMARY

Method of instruction: CO
Instructor to student ratio is 1:60
Time of instruction: 0.1 hour(s).
Media: None.

Determine if students have learned the material presented by –

Check on Learning

SECTION V. Soliciting student questions and explanations.

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SECTION V. Asking questions and getting answers from the students.

c. Providing immediate feedback in context to the material presented and correcting student misunderstandings.

Review/Summarize Lesson

1. RETAIN ATTENTION: As a correctional staff member you will be responsible for the detainees safety and other corrections staff member safety as well as your own.

2. SUMMARY: Supervising detainees includes enforcing safety standards, recognizing safety hazards and ensuring that safety equipment is being properly used. While performing your duties you will have to stay alert to ensure you perform your duties in a safe manner.

3. CLOSING STATEMENT: You, as the detainees immediate supervisor will be the person in the position to ensure the detainees follow established safety standards. The way you handle this responsibility could reduce or increase the amount of accidents in the facility.

Transition to Next Lesson

SECTION V. STUDENT EVALUATION

Testing Requirements

None

Feedback Requirement

SECTION V. Schedule and provide immediate feedback in context to the material presented; correct student misunderstandings.

SECTION V. Provide remedial training as needed.
### React to a Physical Attack using Unarmed Self-Defense Techniques

#### Administrative Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Courses Including This Lesson</th>
<th>Course Number</th>
<th>Version</th>
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<td>191-381-1370 (*)</td>
<td>React to a Physical Attack using Unarmed Self-Defense Techniques</td>
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#### Academic Hours

The academic hours required to teach this lesson are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resident Hours/Methods</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conference / Discussion</td>
<td>0.6 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>5.0 hrs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practical Exercise</td>
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| Test | 1.6 hrs |
| Test Review | 0 hrs |

Total Hours: 12 Hrs

#### Test Lesson Number

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#### Prerequisite Lesson(s)

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<td></td>
<td>Apply Priorities of Force</td>
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#### Clearance Access

Security Level: Unclassified
Requirements: There are no clearance or access requirements for the lesson.

#### Foreign Disclosure Restrictions

FD5. This product/publication has been reviewed by the product developers in coordination with the (installation/activity name) foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from all requesting foreign countries without restrictions.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

### References

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
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<tr>
<td>STP 19-95C1-4-SMTG</td>
<td>Soldier's Manual for MOS 95C, Corrections Staff member, Skill Level 1.</td>
<td>30 Sep 2003</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 190-14</td>
<td>Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties</td>
<td>12 Mar 1993</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 190-47</td>
<td>Army Corrections System</td>
<td>15 Aug 1996</td>
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### Student Study Assignments

None

### Instructor Requirements

1 Primary and 4 assistants per 60 students

### Additional Support

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Stu Qty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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### Personnel Requirements

None

### Equipment Required for Instruction

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<td></td>
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<td>1:12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strike Pad (Foam)</td>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>1:12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1:12</td>
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* Before Id indicates a TADSS

### Materials Required

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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Materials:</th>
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</thead>
</table>

### Classroom, Training Area, and Range Requirements

Gym or other suitable training area.

### Ammunition Requirements

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<th>Stu Ratio</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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### Instructional

NOTE: Before presenting this lesson, instructors must thoroughly prepare
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

by studying this lesson and identified reference material. All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward J. Baldwin Jr.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Corrections SME</td>
<td>25 Oct 03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION II.

INTRODUCTION

Method of Instruction: Conference / Discussion
Instructor to Student Ratio is: 1:60
Time of Instruction: 10 mins
Media: Large Group Instruction

The concepts relating to self-defense have a long history and originated from the far east. Some of the self-defense tactics include jujitsu, judo, tae kwon do, aikido, etc.

A majority of the techniques taught in this lesson are derived from Aikido, which was founded in Japan in 1925 as an adaptation of jujitsu. Japanese warriors primarily used Aikido for a method self defense. Pressure points, throwing, and joint locking (holds) are its principle techniques.

An 80-year-old man named Moriki Ushiba who was a master in many different styles of martial arts initially designed aikido. He developed these defensive techniques because as he got older he found that when he would hit or kick an opponent he would feel pain as well. He designed Aikido as a means of using the attacker's strength and energy against them just by redirecting their energy. This program was designed for old people, woman and children, so if they can perform these techniques then everyone here today should have no problem executing these techniques.

You must be aware of your surroundings while working within an Internment facility because whenever men or women are housed in a tightly controlled environment, tensions and stress levels increase. As a result there may be times as a staff member that you may find yourself being required to use force to defend yourself. When force is used to quell a disturbance or to defend ourselves we must use the minimum amount of force all times. Knowing that the propensity for exists we must be alert for and potential violent attack, as well as being aware of our avenues of possible escape.

NOTE: Inform the students of the following Terminal Learning Objective requirements.

At the completion of this lesson, you (the student) will:

Action: React to a physical attack using unarmed self-defense techniques.
| Condition: | Given a situation that requires you to use physical force against an aggressive assailant who is attacking you in an Internment facility and all lower levels of force have been ineffective. |
| Standard: | React to a physical attack by selecting the appropriate unarmed self-defense technique and perform all the necessary steps to defend yourself against a physical attack as demonstrated by successfully completing the performance evaluation. |

### Safety Requirements

There will be a lot of hands on training during this program of instruction. This is a controlled environment and the following safety precautions must be enforced by all instructors and students during this lesson:

1. All participants will only practice those techniques explained by the primary instructor. ALL students MUST relax and be flexible during each technique applied to reduce injury to limbs and joints.

2. There will be no horseplay or other types of disturbances during the class.

3. Instruct students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say "CODE BLUE" this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defender's commands. On the command of "STOP", or "CODE RED" or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

### SECTION V

All watches, rings, glasses and necklaces etc... must be removed prior to the beginning of class and stored in a safe location away from the training area.

5. All participants must warm up major muscle groups prior to training to help prevent muscular injuries.

6. Additional instructors will be tasked to assist the Primary Instructor to help control and supervise the training as well as assist and critique students as necessary.

7. All techniques will be conducted step by step the first time using a talk through demonstration method of instruction a minimum of two times prior to allowing students an opportunity to conduct any practical exercises.

8. The techniques taught in this lesson will NEVER be conducted by any student at combat speed during this lesson.
SECTION III. PRESENTATION

Learning Step / Activity 1. Introduction of Natural Weapons of the Body.

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of Instruction: 10 mins
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.
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The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

• NATURAL WEAPONS OF THE BODY

We all have areas of our body that we may employ as natural weapon when defending ourselves, the following is a list of these areas.

• Finger.
• Knuckles.
• Edge of hand.
• Heel of hand.
• Head.
• Knee.
• Shin.
• Heel.
• Finger poke.
• Grab.
• Elbow.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

SECTION V. Learning Step / Activity 2. Perform Proper Stances/Falls.

Method of instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of instruction: 30 mins
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.
Interview-stance.

(1) This stance allows complete relaxation yet at the same time allows you a quicker reaction time.

SECTION V. The upper body is erect and centered over the hips. The weight is distributed evenly between the left and right foot. The weak foot to the rear approximate shoulder width apart at a forty-five degree angle. The hands are placed around waist level in front of the body in a non-aggressive manner.

Defensive-stance.

(1) This is a preferred stance for defending yourself, because you are not braced, but are in a relaxed comfortable, balanced position from which you may be able to effectively defend yourself.

(2) The upper body is erect and centered over the hips. The head should be carried vertically with the point of the chin toward the attacker. The knees should be slightly bent and weight evenly distributed. The rear elbow is held down and in front of the ribs. The open palm of the lead hand faces the attacker and is positioned in front between the shoulders.

NOTE: After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

c. Movement Techniques

(1) Step and Drag Step –

(a) Forward – From the Defensive Stance, step forward with your lead foot and drag your rear foot returning to a comfortable defensive stance.

(b) Backwards – From the defensive stance, step backwards with your rear foot first then drag your lead foot returning to a comfortable defensive stance.

(c) Left and Right movements – Depending on which direction you are moving in the foot closest to that direction moves first then dragging the trail foot returning to a comfortable defensive stance.

SECTION V. Falling Techniques

(a) Back fall – cross your arms in front of your chest, squat to a crouch position, role onto your buttocks and back keeping your chin tucked in, and slap the mat with both hands palms down.

(b) Side fall – is a rolling fall. Roll 45-degrees over your shoulder striking the mat and rolling to one side of your body, arm will extend out and slapping the mat palms down.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

SECTION V. Learning Step / Activity 3. Apply Pressure Points.

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
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Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of instruction: 1 hr
Media: Large Group Instruction

NOTE: Inform students that nothing is 100%; meaning that not every technique will cause the same reaction to every attacker and being able to identify more than one pressure point of the body will aid the defender in applying more than one technique if confronted by an attacker.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

APPLY PRESSURE POINTS:

By applying pressure to certain areas of an attacker’s body, you may be able to disarm him, escape or control the attack. Vital areas (Pressure Points) are those areas that are vulnerable to pressure applied by the hand, foot, or knee and may cause pain. Pressure points are sensitive to various types of applications, whether by hand, finger, knee, foot, or any available defensive tool. Proper application of pressure to a vulnerable area will either impede or incapacitate a violent attacker. You be aware that people have different tolerances for pain and some pressure points may not be as effective. When applying one technique and it does not appear to give you desired effect immediately move to another pressure point. These techniques can also be used when conducting force cell moves.

Pressure points include:

1. **Infra-orbital nerve (nose)** – Secure the head by reaching around with weak hand and grasping the chin. Ensure to keep your fingers away from the mouth. The head should be secured into the pocket of the around armpit area. With your strong hand (knife hand) apply pressure to nose by pushing in then up. Once assailant complies release the pressure not the hold.
(2) **Mandibular angle nerve (ear)** – Secure the head by reaching around with weak hand and grasping the chin. Ensure to keep your fingers away from the mouth. The head should be secured into the pocket of the around armpit area. Hyper extend the head to the opposite side where pressure is going to be applied. Slide your thumb downward from the top of the ear to bottom. You will feel a pocket towards the bottom of the ear, this is where you will push your thumb inward towards the opposite ear. Once assailant complies release the pressure not the hold.

(3) **Hypoglossal nerve (under jaw)** – with your grasping hand you should apply pressure under the jaw by pushing in and up.

(4) **Suprascapular (traps)** – With a knife hand strike make contact with the muscle area on top of the trapezoids.

(5) **Brachial stun** – impact should be made with a ridge hand or forearm across the brachial nerve on the side of the neck.

(6) **Clavicle nerve** – impact should be made by applying pressure in a downward motion along the clavicle/collar bone.

(7) **Jugular notch nerve** – Place your index finger directly into the Jugular notch and apply pressure in a downward motion.

(8) **Radial nerve (Forearm)** – With a knife hand strike apply pressure or impact directly on top of the forearm.

(9) **Median nerve (Forearm)** – With a knife hand strike apply pressure or impact directly under the forearm.

(10) **Parainal nerve (leg)** – impact should be made with the knee just above the back of the knee to the outs ide of the leg (thigh muscle area)

**NOTE:** Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

**SECTION V**

**Learning Step / Activity 4. Create and Maintain Distance.**

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<th>Demonstration</th>
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<td>Large Group Instruction</td>
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**INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.
During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION.

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defender’s commands. On the command of “STOP”, “CODE RED”, or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

ONE-HAND CHECK:

(1) One-hand check – While informing the individual to stop you will forcefully extend your lead hand, hands open, lower portion of palm forward at the assailant at the same time he/she is making an attack.

(2) Use the palm of your lead hand, direct the strike to the brachial plexus tie-in and immediately re-track turn towards your nearest avenue of escape. (This should disturb your attacker’s rhythm, thus giving you ample time to vacate the area.)

(3) Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

TWO-HANDED CHECK:

(1) Two-handed check – this technique is applied in the same manner as the one-hand check with the following exceptions: use both palms and direct the strike to both sides of the brachial plexus tie-in.

(2) Once contact is made with the attacker look for your nearest avenue of escape. (This should disturb your attacker’s rhythm, thus giving you ample time to vacate the area).

(3) Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

THREE-POINT CHECK:

(1) Three-point check – If a situation arises where time and space does not permit you to escape from a rushing attacker, use the wall behind you as a support and simultaneously lift the lead knee and direct strikes (palms) to the brachial plexus tie-in.

(2) Once contact is made with the attacker, look for your nearest avenue of escape. (This should disturb your attacker’s rhythm, thus giving you ample time to vacate the area).
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(3) Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

TWO or MORE ASSAILANTS:

(1) Two or more assailants- Never attempt to run or move between assailants. Assess the situation look for the nearest avenue of escape, and move toward the outer most portion of the attackers.

(2) You will always attempt to keep one attacker between you and the rest or push that attacker into the rest of the attackers while you use your avenue of escape. (This should disturb your attacker’s rhythm, thus giving you ample time to vacate the area).

(3) Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

Learning Step / Activity 5. Defend Against Lapel Grabs.

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of Instruction: 2hrs
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned through out the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration. Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

INSTRUCTOR NOTE: Prior to employing any technique the students must understand the FIVE phases of AIKIDO. Furthermore, everyone must understand the importance of employing all five phases every
time someone attempts to harm him or her and if they employ the techniques properly they will be able to successfully defend themselves.

FIRST PHASE: “Mind Direction” This is a distraction technique you must employ to temporarily redirect your attacker's mind for a split second from the area or point on your attacker's body that you intend on grabbing. (Simply slapping your attacker's face lightly or kicking your attacker in the shin lightly may accomplish this).

INSTRUCTOR NOTE: Bring a student to the front of the class and have him place his arm straight out to the side. Demonstrate the distraction technique by initially attempting to push his hand straight down while exerting a lot of energy and not being able to move the hand down. Once you have the students attention attempt to push it down once again but also use your free hand and move it towards the students groin illustrating the use of distracting his attention for a split second and the hand that was pushing the students hand down will be able to effectively accomplish this task (reinforcing your teaching of the distracting technique.

SECOND PHASE: “Energy Direction” This is a technique you must employ to temporarily redirect your attacker's strength and energy. This is accomplished in conjunction with first phase, by slight moving your attacker's energy in the opposite direction (2-4 inches) for a split second causing him to exert more energy in the opposite direction in which you intend to move in order to effectively employ any given technique. (an example of this is when your attacker is pulling your arm in a direction and your entire body moves that way over exaggerating your movement this will cause him to push the opposite direction with more energy than you, allowing you to employ your defensive technique more effectively with little or no force on your part).

THIRD PHASE: “Proper Grip and Technique” This is utilized simultaneously with phase 1 & 2 and is where you must employ your intended defensive technique properly. These techniques will be explained as we advance through the lesson).

FOURTH PHASE: “Pain Compliance” This is where you must effectively apply a technique in a manner that causes the attacker to no longer present a threat to you. This is accomplished by applying only enough pressure to a specific area of the body (i.e: wrist/foot or pressure point) to keep the attacker on the threshold of pain, care must be given to ensure that you do not keep steady pressure on any area for too long or the attacker will become oblivious to the pain and resist your technique and attack you more aggressively.

FIFTH PHASE: “Proper Release” This is where you must effectively position your attacker in a manner that he will not be able to re-attack you upon your release of him. This is accomplished by utilizing the fourth phase in conjunction with your communication skills to direct him into a compliant position facing away from your escape route, allowing you to release him and subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilizing your body alarm, radio or whistle, seeking assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: When applying wrist hold techniques, proper grip is of utmost importance. If you have a proper grip, your attacker will not be able to get out of the hold easily thus defeating his efforts and placing you in a safe controlling position. Using the wrist holds enables you to assist the attacker to the ground giving you the ability to gain even more time and space as well as to create and maintain distance. Be aware that it only takes 2 to 5 lbs. Of pressure to break the wrist, 6 to 8 for the elbow, 8 to 10 for the shoulder, and this can be accomplished with two fingers if a person resists the hold. When an attacker grabs you and you apply one of the wrist holds properly you will not break your attacker's joints. The attacker will fracture his own joints if he resists the hold. Again always ensure to give orders to the attacker, so that he knows what you want him to do i.e. “STOP”, “GET DOWN ON THE FLOOR” etc...

Inform the students: An attacker will grab you in one of three ways. We will discuss these three as Palms Up, Palms Down and Palms Facing In.

The first lapel grab we will discuss and demonstrate will be if an attacker grabs you with his Palms Up.
NOTE: The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

Palms Up defense using "Wrist Hold #1":

Role Playing (Attacker): Reach and grab the shirt of the defender with both hands Palms Up.

Defender: Utilizing the first phase (Mind Direction) kick the shin of your attacker, while simultaneously employing the second phase (Energy Direction) leaning and pulling your upper body slightly to the rear 2-4 inches. This will distract the attacker and cause him to respond by pulling you forward. As you are employing phase 1 & 2 simultaneously utilize the third phase (Proper Grip) by grabbing the left hand of your attacker in the following manor using the "Wrist Hold #1" defensive technique.

**Wrist hold #1. (Proper Technique)**

Reach and grab the meaty part of the little finger of the attackers left hand with your left hand and simultaneously grab the meaty part of his right thumb with your right hand and place your thumbs together on the center of the back of the attackers hand just below the knuckles.

Bend the attackers wrist straight back to his elbow, causing him to drop to his knees.

With both of your hands twist the attackers left hand to the right causing him to lie on his back.

While maintaining control of the attackers hand with both of your hands ensure that you maintain your balance (the general rule of thumb is that your feet are always wider than your knees and your knees are always wider than your shoulders).

Next, hyper extend his left arm and slide your left hand down the attackers arm and grasp his arm just before the elbow.

Simultaneously twist the attackers left hand to the right with your right hand and pull his arm to the left with your left hand, while walking around his head (using the step-drag-step) technique learned previously in this lesson causing him to lie flat on his stomach.

**NOTE:** Do not cross your feet while walking around the attackers head or you will be pulled off balance.

Once the attacker is flat on his stomach, slide your left hand back up to the attackers hand and re-grab his hand using wrist hold #1 as you did in step a above.

Execute the fourth phase (Pain Compliance) by slightly bending the attackers hand straight back to his elbow while keeping his arm straight and moving it along his torso towards his head. While applying pain compliance verbally direct your attacker to look away from you place his free hand under his groin and cross his legs.

**NOTE:** (CAUTION) Only apply enough pressure to the attacker until he is compliant to your commands, but do NOT release your grip until you are ready to move away from him. Remain cognizant that it only takes 2 to 5 lbs of pressure to break the wrist, 6 to 8 lbs of pressure to break the elbow and 8 to 10 lbs of pressure for the shoulder to break. The attacker will fracture his own joints if he resists the hold. Again always ensure to give verbal instructions to the attacker, so that he knows what you want him to do.

The fifth phase (Proper Release) can now be executed by you releasing his left hand subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilizing your body alarm, radio or whistle, seeking assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.
NOTE: Following the demonstration of this technique at least two times have students pair off into lines with half facing the front and the other half facing the rear of the training area so that you can begin the step by step method of instruction. Inform the students that those that are facing the front of the class will be the defender first and once each step is explained and practiced the students will change rolls and you will repeat the steps.

NOTE: Direct the students to “simulate” grabbing one another when (role playing) as the attacker, by placing their left hand, fingers extended and joined palm facing their own face directly in front of their face. This will facilitate proper grip as well as prevent unnecessary injury to wrists.

To help the students be able to practice the technique on themselves direct the students to perform the following: Place your left hand in the center of your chest, palm up, and bend your fingers upward, so that your pinky finger is against the breastbone. With your right hand grasp the meaty part of your thumb with your fingers. Place your right thumb tip between the index finger and middle finger below the knuckles. Bend the wrist straight back to the elbow until they feel pressure. This is the proper grip and technique.

The second lapel grab we will discuss and demonstrate will be if an attacker grabs you with his Palms Down.

NOTE: The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

Palms down defense using “Wrist Hold #2”:

Role Playing (Attacker): Reach and grab the shirt of the defender with both hands Palms Down.

Defender: Utilizing the first phase (Mind Direction) lift your right hand and slap the left side of the attacker's face, while simultaneously employing the second phase (Energy Direction) leaning and pulling your upper body slightly to your left 2-4 inches. This will distract the attacker and cause him to respond by pulling you to the right. As you are employing phase 1 & 2 simultaneously utilize the third phase (Proper Grip) by grabbing the top of your attacker's right hand (meaty part of the little finger) in the following manor using the “Wrist Hold #2” defensive technique.

Wrist hold #2. (Proper Technique)

Reach and grab the meaty part of the little finger of the attackers right hand with your right hand, while placing your right thumb in the webbing of his forefinger and thumb.

With your right hand quickly twist the attackers right hand to your right in a clockwise circular fashion.

Simultaneously reach up with your left hand and place the webbing of your forefinger and thumb just above the attackers right elbow and continue to twist your attackers hand to the right causing your attacker to bend at the waist.

You will utilize both phase 4 & 5 in this next step. With both of your hands continue to twist the attackers right hand in a clockwise circular motion to the right as he is moving to your right, you must step back to your right with your right foot (maintaining your balance) and quickly release your attacker causing him to hit the floor.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilizing your body alarm, radio or whistle, seeking assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.
NOTE: (CAUTION) Only apply enough pressure to the attacker until he is compliant to your commands, but do NOT release your grip until you are ready to move away from him. Remain cognizant that it only takes 2 to 5 lbs of pressure to break the wrist, 6 to 8 lbs of pressure to break the elbow and 8 to 10 lbs of pressure for the shoulder to break. The attacker will fracture his own joints if he resists the hold. Again always ensure to give verbal instructions to the attacker, so that he knows what you want him to do.

NOTE: Following the demonstration of this technique at least two times have students pair off into lines with half facing the front and the other half facing the rear of the training area so that you can begin the step by step method of instruction. Inform the students that those that are facing the front of the class will be the defender first and once each step is explained and practiced the students will change rolls and you will repeat the steps.

NOTE: Direct the students to “simulate” grabbing one another when (role playing) as the attacker, by placing their right hand, fingers extended and joined palm facing their down towards the defender. This will facilitate proper grip as well as prevent unnecessary injury to wrists.

To help the students be able to practice the technique on themselves direct the students to perform the following: Place your left hand across the center of your chest, palm down, your fingers are extended, joined and parallel to the ground. With your right hand reach across the top of your left hand and grasp the meaty part of your little finger with your fingers. Place your right thumb tip in the webbing of the forefinger and thumb. Twist and bend the left wrist outward until you feel pressure. This is the proper grip and technique.

The third lapel grab we will discuss and demonstrate will be if an attacker grabs you with his Palms Facing In.

NOTE: The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

Palms Up defense using “Wrist Hold #3”:

Role Playing (Attacker): Reach and grab the shirt of the defender with both hands Palms Facing In.

Defender: Utilizing the first phase (Mind Direction) kick the shin of your attacker, while simultaneously employing the second phase (Energy Direction) leaning and pulling your upper body slightly to your left 2-4 inches. This will distract the attacker and cause him to respond by pulling you to your right. As you are employing phase 1 & 2 simultaneously utilize the third phase (Proper Grip) by grabbing the left hand of your attacker in the following manner using the “Wrist Hold #3” defensive technique.

Wrist hold #3. (Proper Technique)

Reach and grab the meaty part of the thumb of the attackers left hand with your right hand and place your thumb on the back of the attackers hand just below the knuckles of the ring finger and little finger while simultaneously placing the palm of your left hand on top of your right thumb (keeping your thumb in place) causing your attacker to bend backward and to his left at the waist.

You will utilize both phase 4 & 5 in this next step. With both of your hands continue to quickly twist the attackers left wrist to your right and forward bending his wrist back to his elbow and outward over his shoulder at an approx angle of 45 degrees, you must step backward slightly to your right with your right foot (maintaining your balance) and quickly release your attacker causing him to hit the floor.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilizing your body alarm, radio or whistle, seeking assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.
NOTE: (CAUTION) Only apply enough pressure to the attacker until he is compliant to your commands, but do NOT release your grip until you are ready to move away from him. Remain cognizant that it only takes 2 to 5 lbs of pressure to break the wrist, 6 to 8 lbs of pressure to break the elbow and 8 to 10 lbs of pressure for the shoulder to break. The attacker will fracture his own joints if he resists the hold. Again always ensure to give verbal instructions to the attacker, so that he knows what you want him to do.

NOTE: Following the demonstration of this technique at least two times have students pair off into lines with half facing the front and the other half facing the rear of the training area so that you can begin the step by step method of instruction. Inform the students that those that are facing the front of the class will be the defender first and once each step is explained and practiced the students will change rolls and you will repeat the steps.

NOTE: Direct the students to “simulate” grabbing one another when (role playing) as the attacker, by placing their left hand, fingers extended and joined palm facing their own face directly in front of their face. This will facilitate proper grip as well as prevent unnecessary injury to wrists.

To help the students be able to practice the technique on themselves direct the students to perform the following: Place your left hand in the center of your chest, palm up, keeping your fingers extended and joined and place your pinky finger is against your breastbone. With your right hand grasp the meaty part of your thumb with your fingers. Place your right thumb tip between the ring finger and little finger on the back of your left hand below the knuckles. Turn your wrist outward away from your body until you feel pressure. This is the proper grip and technique.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

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INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.
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Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

WRIST GRABS.

(1) Attacker grabs you by one of your wrists with one of his hands. (Weak Thumb Principle)
   (a) Spread your fingers on the hand of the wrist that is grabbed.
   (b) Twist that hand and pull against the opening of the attackers forefinger and thumb.
   (c) Attacker will release his grip.
   (d) Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

(2) Attacker grabs you by one of your wrists with two of his hands. (Weak Thumb Principle)
   (a) Spread your fingers on the hand of which wrist is grabbed.
   (b) Twist that hand and pull against the opening of the attackers forefingers and thumbs.
   (c) If he does not release his grip, use your free hand to grab your other hand and pull against the opening of the attackers forefingers and thumbs.
   (d) Attacker will release his grip.
   (e) Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

Attacker grabs one of your wrists across your body and none of the above works.

The attacker is facing you and reaches across your body to grab your right wrist with his right hand.
   (b) You must slightly pull your right arm to the right approx 2-4 inches to redirect his energy causing your attacker to pull your right arm to his right.
   (c) Continue to move your right arm to his right using his energy until the palm of your right hand is parallel to the ground above his wrist, then immediately rotate your right hand in a clockwise circular motion to the right in order to grasp the back of the attackers right wrist. Immediately cover the top of the attackers fingers on his right hand with your left hand palm down. With both of your hands apply pressure against the attacker’s wrist in a downward fashion. At this point, you will cause the attacker to drop to his knees. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: These techniques can be utilized whether either the left or right hand is grabbed across the body.

Attacker grabs one of your wrists using the opposite hand and none of the above works.

The attacker is facing you and grabs your right wrist with his left hand.
   (d) First, you must slightly pull your right arm to your left approx 2-4 inches to redirect his energy causing your attacker to pull your right arm to his left.
   (c) Continue to move your right arm to his left using his energy until the palm of your right hand is parallel to the ground above his wrist, then immediately rotate your right hand in a counterclockwise circular motion to the right in order to grasp the back of the attackers left wrist. Immediately cover the top of the attackers fingers on his left hand with your left hand palm down.

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(e) With both of your hands apply pressure against the attacker’s wrist in a downward fashion.
(f) At this point, you will cause the attacker to drop to his knees. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: These techniques can be utilized whether either the left or right hand is grabbed.

Attacker grabs both of your wrists simultaneously.

The attacker is facing you and grabs both your right and left wrists simultaneously. First, you must simultaneously slightly pull both your right and left arms outward to the side approx 2-4 inches to redirect his energy causing your attacker to pull your arms inward. Continue to move your right arm to his left using his energy until the palm of your right hand is parallel to the ground facing upward under his right wrist. Immediately grab the meaty part of the thumb of his right hand your right hand and pull downward to his right in a counterclockwise circular motion. As he lets go of his grip, immediately cover the top your right thumb with your left hand palm down. Apply pressure against the attacker’s wrist in a downward fashion.

At this point, you will cause the attacker to fall backward rapidly. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

7. Learning Step / Activity 7. Defend against a Bear Hug, Head Lock, Choke Hold, and Full Nelson

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of Instruction: 2hrs
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the
defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

**Bear Hug Defense:**

**Attempted Bear Hug from the Front (Pinning the Arms)**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from your front around your torso you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

(if your arms are pinned) make a fist with your strong hand placing it on your chest with the knuckles facing outward, you must slide your hand up or down your chest until it is directly in front of your attacker’s sternum. As he applies pressure to you he will feel pain to his sternum causing him to release his grip on you.

Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

**Attempted Bear Hug from the Front (Not Pinning the Arms)**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from your front around your torso you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

(if your arms are not pinned) with your strong hand use one of your natural weapons of your body the edge of your hand and apply one of the pressure points as learned earlier in this lesson by applying pressure to the (Infra-orbital nerve).

As you apply pressure to his nose area he will feel pain causing him to release his grip on you. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

**Attempted Bear Hug from the Rear (Pinning the Arms)**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from the rear around your torso you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

(if your arms are pinned) lower your center of gravity by spreading your feet as wide as you can and step to your strong side maintaining your balance.
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Make a fist with your weak hand and reach back as hard and as fast as you can to strike your attacker in the groin area. As he will feel pain to his groin he will release his grip on you.

Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

**Attempted Bear Hug from the Rear (Not Pinning the Arms)**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from the rear around your torso you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

(if your arms are not pinned) lower your center of gravity by spreading your feet as wide as you can and step to your strong side maintaining your balance.

Make a fist with your strong hand and strike the back of the attackers hand with your knuckles until he releases one of his fingers.

As he releases a finger, you must grab the free finger with your hand that is on that side and rotate it outward causing his hand to become inverted. This pain will cause him to release his grip on you.

Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

**Head Lock Defense:**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from your front around your head you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

Immediately turn your head inward towards your attackers stomach, reducing injury from your attacker punching your face.

With your hand that is to the rear of your attacker reach up his back to his throat and apply one of the pressure points learned previously in this lesson either (Hypoglossal nerve under the jaw or Mandibular angle nerve under the ear).

While applying pressure to one of these areas simultaneously utilize the hand that is to the front by reaching under the attackers leg and pinch a tiny area near the femoral nerve. This technique will cause your attacker extreme pain and he will release his grip on you.

Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

**Choke Defense from the Front:**
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As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from your front around your neck you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

Immediately bring your strong hand up, over and under your attacker's wrists close to your throat.

Bring your weak hand against your strong hand and apply pressure against your attacker's wrists twisting to your strong side.

This technique will cause your attacker to release his grip on you utilizing the weak thumb principle as learned previous in this lesson. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

Choke Defense from the Rear:

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from the rear around your neck you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

Upon the attacker bringing his arm around your throat immediately lower your center of gravity by spreading your feet as wide as you can and step to either your strong or weak side maintaining your balance while simultaneously tucking your chin into his elbow.

Reach up with both of your hands and grab your attacker's elbow and pull down.

Pull your attacker's elbow to either your weak or strong side (depending on which side his elbow is) (if he grabs you with his right arm you will step back with your left foot and vise versa) and step back with either your weak or strong foot throwing your attacker to the ground over your hip.

NOTE: Do NOT attempt to throw your attacker over your shoulder or you will cause yourself unnecessary pain and suffering.

This technique will cause your attacker to release his grip on you subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle, to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

Full Nelson Defense (Prevention):

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from the rear in an attempt to place you in a full nelson you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.
Being aware of your surroundings will assist greatly in prevention from being placed in a full nelson. As soon as you feel anyone touching your mid section from the rear lock your arms and clinch them together pinning anyone that may be attempting to do you harm.

Immediately lower your center of gravity by spreading your feet as wide as you can and step to your strong side maintaining your balance.

With either your strong or weak hand grab a free finger of your attacker and rotate it outward causing his hand to become inverted. This pain will cause him to release his grip on you. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

Full Nelson Defense:

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that has his arms out in a threatening manner with the intent to grab you from the rear in an attempt to place you in a full nelson you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

Upon being placed in a full nelson immediately lower your center of gravity by spreading your feet as wide as you can and step to your strong side maintaining your balance, simultaneously, use the knuckles of your fists to strike the back of the hands of your attacker causing him to release a finger.

As he releases a finger, you must grab the free finger with the hand that is on that side and rotate it outward causing his hand to become inverted. This pain will cause him to release his grip on you. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

Learning Step / Activity 8. Defend against a Knife Attack

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of Instruction: 2 hrs
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.
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All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

NOTE: When confronted by an attacker with any potentially sharp object or stabbing weapon you must be mentally prepared to defend yourself and not go into shock if you get cut during the physical altercation. Most of the time the act of getting cut causes people to go into shock and die, so we must tell ourselves the following every time we are confronted with a sharp object or stabbing weapon: “I am going to get cut but I am not going to die” this will help us be more effective when utilizing the following defensive techniques.

Knife Attack with the Attacker (Standing) with a knife in front of your Face or Throat

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a knife or potentially sharp stabbing weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker places the knife close to your face/throat area, raise your hands slowly as if you are surrendering.

Keep your hands close to your body and when you get your hands parallel to the height of his wrist, (with both of your hands palms open) simultaneously strike the inside of his wrist and the center of the back of his hand as hard as you can.

This will cause the attackers hand to open up and drop the knife, subsequently allowing you to grab the back of his hand and employ wrist hold # 3 as described previously in this lesson to disarm your attacker. Subsequently, create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

b. Knife Attack Thrusting down to your Chest

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a knife or potentially sharp stabbing weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

As soon as the attacker attempts to slash or stab you in a downward manner you must redirect his energy by pivoting on the ball of your outside foot (opening an avenue of approach of the attacker) simultaneously, reaching up with both hands in a circular motion touching the forearm of the attacker redirecting his blow in towards him.

Keep your hands close together in a circular fashion when you make contact with him causing the attacker stab himself with the knife.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle, to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

c. Knife Attack Straight Thrust to Stomach

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a knife or potentially sharp stabbing weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to stab you in a thrusting straight forward manner you must redirect his energy by pivoting on the ball of your outside foot (opening an avenue of approach of the attacker) simultaneously, reaching across the top of his hand and grab the back of his hand and employ wrist hold # 3 as described previously in this lesson to disarm your attacker.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

d. Knife Attack Thrusting upward to your Abdomen.

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a knife or potentially sharp stabbing weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to stab you in an upward manner at your abdomen you must redirect his energy by pivoting on the ball of your outside foot (opening an avenue of approach of the attacker) simultaneously, using your outside forearm to strike the attackers elbow area redirecting the weapon away from your body.

Next, step forward with your outside leg and utilize your inside forearm to strike the attackers Brachial nerve in a stunning manner.

This will cause your attacker to hit the ground rapidly subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

Knife Attack Slashing side to side at your Stomach
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a knife or potentially sharp stabbing weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to slash you in a side-to-side manner at your abdomen you must do the unexpected and move forward as he is swinging his arm side-to-side and assumes a natural pause on his upswing.

Care must be taken to time your forward movement to allow you an opportunity to secure his slashing arm against his stomach with your weak arm simultaneously, using your forearm to strike the attackers Brachial nerve in a stunning manner.

This will cause your attacker to hit the ground rapidly subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle, to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

Learning Step / Activity 9. **Defend against a Punch to the Face**

- Method of Instruction: Demonstration
- Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
- Time of Instruction: 30 mins
- Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

**CAUTION-Caution- Caution- Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution**

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL...
students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

**Straight Punch Defense:**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker with his hands in the form of a fist you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to punch you with a straight punch to the jaw, you must redirect his energy by pivoting on the ball of your outside foot (opening an avenue of approach of the attacker) simultaneously, reaching up with both hands touching both the elbow and wrist of the attacker in the following manner.

Simultaneously using open hands push forward with your outside hand while pulling towards yourself with your inside hand making contact with the attackers elbow with the outside hand and the inside of the wrist with the inside hand.

When your hands make contact with his arm and hand you will redirect his energy causing him to move by you and to the floor this will subsequently, allow you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

**b. Roundhouse Punch Defense:**

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker with his hands in the form of a fist you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to punch you with a roundhouse punch to the side of your head, you must do the unexpected by moving closer to him to redirect his energy by pivoting on the ball of your inside foot (opening an avenue of approach of the attacker) simultaneously, reaching up with your weak hand blocking the inside of his wrist while simultaneously moving the forearm of your other hand up to the side of his neck to initiate a Brachial stun.

You must simultaneously step inside of the attacker with your strong foot.

Next, pivot on the ball of your strong foot and step backward with your weak foot in a counterclockwise circular fashion.

As the attackers momentum is moving forward you will redirect his energy and throw him to the ground.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.
NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

Learning Step / Activity 10. Defend against a Kick

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of Instruction: 30 mins
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION-CAUTION

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

a. Kick to the Groin Defense

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker that will potentially kick you, you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to kick you in a upward manner at your groin area you must redirect his energy by pivoting on the ball of your outside foot (opening an avenue of approach of the attacker) simultaneously, using your outside forearm to strike the under side of the attackers leg redirecting the kick away from your body.

This will cause your attacker to hit the ground rapidly subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.
NOTE: Conduct a check on learning and summarize the learning activity.

Learning Step / Activity 11. Defend against Club Attack

Method of Instruction: Demonstration
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:12
Time of Instruction: 30 mins
Media: Large Group Instruction

INSTRUCTOR NOTES: The primary instructor will ensure all assistant instructors are positioned throughout the training area to ensure students can see each demonstration.

Predesignated assistant instructors will demonstrate each technique, as the primary instructor explains them.

During demonstrations one predesignated assistant instructor will role-play as an attacker, while the other demonstrates each technique.

The following techniques will be conducted initially by the instructors at a moderate pace in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of each technique before it is demonstrated step-by-step using the demonstration method of instruction.

All instructors must conduct rehearsals prior to presenting this lesson in front of students to ensure each step is mastered and can be demonstrated effectively.

After each step has been demonstrated, have the students perform these steps. Assist and critique students as necessary.

CAUTION-CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION- CAUTION

Remind students when they feel pain or discomfort while (role playing) as the attacker during ANY technique to pat themselves or pat the ground with a free hand, or say “CODE BLUE” this will inform the student applying the technique to release the pressure in that area. However, the student applying the technique may continue to execute the technique slowly until the (role playing) attacker complies with the defenders commands. On the command of “STOP”, or “CODE RED” or at the sound of a whistle ALL students applying any technique will release the hold on the attacker and stop the technique being applied in order to minimize injury to one another.

Club Attack down at your head

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a club or other club type weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to swing at you in a downward manner you must do the unexpected by moving forward under his arms and place your strong foot between his feet.

Next, pivot on the ball of your strong foot and step backward with your weak foot in a counterclockwise circular fashion while simultaneously reaching up and grabbing the club with both of your hands.
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As the attackers momentum is moving forward you will redirect his energy and throw him over your strong hip to the ground disarming him.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle, to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: Do NOT attempt to throw your attacker over your shoulder or you will cause yourself unnecessary pain and suffering.

Club Attack Slashing side to side at your Stomach

As a defender you must assume a good natural interview-stance. Upon being approached by an attacker carrying a club or other club type weapon you must immediately assume a defensive stance as explained previously in this lesson.

Your reaction will be unexpected by your attacker and a last minute response by standing your ground.

As soon as the attacker attempts to swing at you in a side to side manner you must do the unexpected by moving forward to inside his chest area as he is on the up swing and place your strong foot between his feet.

Next you must pivot on the ball of your strong foot and step backward with your weak foot in a circular fashion while simultaneously reaching up and grabbing the club with both of your hands.

As the attackers momentum is moving forward you will redirect his energy and throw him over your strong hip to the ground disarming him.

Subsequently, allowing you to create and maintain distance using any of the previous techniques. Allowing you the opportunity to utilize your body alarm, radio or whistle to seek assistance as you are using your avenue of escape.

NOTE: Do NOT attempt to throw your attacker over your shoulder or you will cause yourself unnecessary pain and suffering.

SECTION IV. SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method of Instruction:</th>
<th>Conference / Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructor to Student Ratio is:</td>
<td>1:60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of Instruction:</td>
<td>20 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media:</td>
<td>Large Group Instruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Check on Learning

Determine if the students have learned the material presented by soliciting student questions and explanations. Ask the students questions and correct misunderstandings.

Review / Summarize Lesson

SECTION V. STUDENT EVALUATION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Testing Requirements</strong></th>
<th>NOTE: Describe how the student must demonstrate accomplishment of the TLO. Refer student to the Student Evaluation Plan.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feedback Requirements</strong></td>
<td>NOTE: Feedback is essential to effective learning. Schedule and provide feedback on the evaluation and any information to help answer students' questions about the test. Provide remedial training as needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## React to a Physical Attack using Unarmed Self-Defense Techniques

### PERFORMANCE EXAM

The following is a competency-based performance evaluation. All students must be able to effectively execute each task to standard.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Demonstrate the Interview-stance &amp; Defensive-stance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Explain what the 5-Phases Are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. M_________________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. E_______________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. P_______________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. P_______________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. P_______________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Demonstrate the Proper Wrist Hold # 1 Technique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Demonstrate the Proper Wrist Hold # 2 Technique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Demonstrate the Proper Wrist Hold # 3 Technique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against Double Wrist Grab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Bear Hug from the Front Pinning your Arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Bear Hug from the Front Not Pinning your Arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Bear Hug from the Rear Pinning your Arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Bear Hug from the Rear Not Pinning your Arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Head Lock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Choke Hold from the Front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Choke Hold from the Rear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against Full Nelson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Club Attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Straight Punch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Round House Punch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Defend yourself against a Kick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Slashing Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Slashing Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Slashing side to side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Straight Jab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

Appendix 3

Restrain a Detainee

SECTION 1. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Oct 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION I. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Courses Including This Lesson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURSE NUMBER(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task(s) Taught or Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced Task(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK NUMBER</td>
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</table>

The academic hours required to teach this lesson are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Hours</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRS/MI</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5/CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.5/DM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0PE1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL HOURS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Lesson Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours Lesson No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(State if there are none.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prerequisite Lesson(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESSON NUMBER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Restrictions</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D-41
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

Clearance/Access

References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Student Study Assignments

Instructor Requirements

One primary and six assistant instructors.

Additional Support Personnel Requirements

None

Equipment Required

Twenty ratchet style handcuffs w/key, and twenty leg restraints w/key.

Materials Required

INSTRUCTOR MATERIALS: None.

Classroom, Training Area, and Range Requirements

One 40-person classroom.

Ammunition Requirements

None.

Instructional Guidance

Before presenting this lesson, instructors must thoroughly prepare by studying this lesson and identified reference material.

Proponent Lesson Plan Approvals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward J. Baldwin Jr.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Corrections SME</td>
<td>Oct 03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION II. INTRODUCTION
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

Method of instruction CO
Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction 0.1 hour(s)
Media: None.

**Motivator**

The installation commander may delegate his authority to use individual restraining devices such as hand restraints and leg restraints within the internment facility or hospital prison ward. Authority for these devices and the specific circumstances under which they may be used will be covered in your local SOP.

**NOTE:**

Inform students of the following terminal learning objective requirements.

**Terminal Learning Objective**

At the completion of this lesson you will:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>Restrain a Detainee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONDITION:</td>
<td>In a classroom environment given a situation with a Detainee (role played) who requires a restraint device, a set of hand restraints, a set of leg restraints and access to the facility SOP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARD:</td>
<td>You must do all the steps in sequence to correctly select and apply the appropriate restraining device while observing all safety procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Safety Requirements**

None.

**Risk Assessment Level**

Low.

**Environmental Considerations**

None. It is the responsibility of all soldiers and DA civilians to protect the environment from damage.

**Evaluation**

This material is tested in a Performance Evaluation Exam where you will be required to apply the devices without error.

**Instructional Lead-in**

In controlling or moving an unruly Detainee, sufficient custodial personnel should be used to overcome the individual's resistance without the necessity of strong-arm tactics associated with man-to-man confrontation. In those instances where a male Detainee refuses to comply with haircuts and shave standards, or a female Detainee fails to comply with hair length or style standards, the Detainee may be restrained and reasonable force used as necessary to administer an appropriate haircut or shave.

**SECTION III. PRESENTATION**

**Note:**

Inform the students of the Enabling Learning Objective requirements.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

Enabling Learning Objective A

| ACTION: | Apply hand/leg restraints using the front, rear, or seated method. |
| CONDITION: | Given hand/leg restraints with key and a Detainee (role played). |
| STANDARD: | Correctly apply hand/leg restraints in sequence. |

Learning Step/Activity 1.

Method of instruction: CO/DM Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.1/0.1 hour(s).
Media: None.
References:
Security Classification:

4. Hand restraints are the most often used type of restraining device. Always remember that they are temporary and the individual handcuffed is not completely helpless.

COMMENT: ALWAYS CHECK THE HAND RESTRAINTS AND LEG RESTRAINTS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE OPERABLE. DO THIS BY CLOSING THE CUFFS. DOUBLE LOCK THEM BY PUSHING IN THE DOUBLE-LOCKING DEVICE WITH THE TOP OF THE KEY, SQUEEZE EACH CUFF TO ENSURE THE DOUBLE LOCK IS ENGAGED. THEN UNLOCK THE CUFFS.

COMMENT: WHEN IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO RESTRAIN UNRULY DETAINEEs, REQUEST MEDICAL PERSONNEL, IF AVAILABLE, TO CHECK THE DETAINEE. IT IS NOT NECESSARY, HOWEVER, FOR MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO CHECK DETAINEEs WHO ARE WEARING HAND RESTRAINTS AND LEG RESTRAINTS FOR ESCORT PURPOSES.

5. Apply the hand restraints with Detainee's arms in front of him/her.

   a. Stand to the front of the Detainee. If the Detainee is uncooperative, be sure that at least one other correctional staff member is present when applying or removing hand restraints.

   b. Direct the Detainee to extend both arms to the front, elbows extended and locked, palms facing each other.

   c. With your right hand, grasp the hand restraint by the chain, so that the keyholes are facing out towards you and the double locks are oriented to the up position.

   d. With your left hand grasp the Detainees right hand using the handshake method. With your right hand, apply hand restraint to the Detainees right wrist so the double lock is up and the keyhole is facing you.

   e. Tighten cuffs being careful not to cut off circulation (check tightness by inserting fingertip between the Detainee's wrist and restraints).

   f. With your left hand, firmly grip the chain in order to maintain control of the hand restraint.

   g. Grasp the Detainee's left hand, using the handshake method, with your right hand. Using your free hand, apply the hand restraint to the left wrist of the Detainee so that the double lock is up and the keyhole is facing you.
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h. Being careful not to cut off the Detainee’s circulation, tighten the hand restraints. Check the tightness by inserting one fingertip between the Detainee’s wrists and the restraints.

i. Double-lock both hand restraints by using the tip of the hand restraint key.

j. Check double-lock by squeezing the hand restraints.

COMMENT: AN EXTRA PRECAUTION. IF THE DETAINEE IS UNCOOPERATIVE, REMOVE THE BELT. PASS THE BELT THROUGH THE HAND RESTRAINT CHAIN, REPLACE THE BELT WITH BUCKLE TO REAR OF DETAINEE.

NOTE: INSTRUCTOR DEMONSTRATES APPLYING THE HAND RESTRAINTS TO A DEMONSTRATOR WITH HIS ARMS IN FRONT OF HIM.

Learning Step/Activity 2.

Method of instruction: CO/DM. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.1/0.1 hour(s).
Media: None.
References:
Security Clearance: None

6. Apply hand restraints to a Detainee with their hands placed behind them.

a. Stand to the rear of the Detainee.

b. Direct him to place his left hand behind his back with the palm facing out.

c. Using the handshake method, grasp the Detainee’s left hand with your left hand. Apply the hand restraint with your right hand so that the double lock is up and the keyhole is facing you.

d. While maintaining control of the hand restraints with your left hand, pass the connecting chain under the Detainee’s belt. Make sure the belt buckle remains in the front.

e. Direct the Detainee to place his right hand behind his back with the palm facing out.

f. Grasp his right hand with your right, using the handshake method. With your left hand, apply the hand restraints with the double lock up and the keyhole facing you.

g. Tighten the hand restraint. Check each hand restraint by inserting your fingertip between the Detainee’s wrist and the hand restraint to be sure it is not too tight.

h. Double lock both hand restraints.

i. Check the double lock by squeezing the hand restraints.

NOTE: INSTRUCTOR DEMONSTRATES APPLYING THE HAND RESTRAINTS TO A DEMONSTRATOR WITH HIS ARMS BEHIND HIM.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

Learning Step/Activity 3.
Method of instruction: PE1. Instructor to student ratio is 1:6.
Time of instruction: 0.2 hour(s).
Media: None.
References:
Security Classification: None

NOTE: Conduct Practical Exercise on Apply Hand Restraints.

Learning Step/Activity 4.
Method of instruction: CO/DM. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.1/0.1 hour(s).
Media: None.
References:
Security Classification: None

7. Apply leg restraints to a Detainee.

NOTE: HAND RESTRAINTS WILL ALWAYS BE PLACED ON A DETAINEE PRIOR TO APPLYING LEG RESTRAINTS.

COMMENT: IF DETAINEE IS UNCOOPERATIVE, PLACE HIM FACE DOWN ON THE FLOOR TO APPLY LEG RESTRAINTS. HAVE AT LEAST ONE OTHER CORRECTIONS STAFF MEMBER OR MILITARY POLICE PRESENT. USE MINIMUM FORCE TO IMMOBILIZE DETAINEE.

a. Stand behind the Detainee and direct the Detainee to stand with his feet spread approximately shoulder width apart. If the Detainee will not cooperate, place the Detainee face down on the floor to apply the leg restraints. Have at least one other corrections person or an MP present. Use minimum force to overcome the Detainee.

b. Crouch behind the Detainee, but be sure to keep your balance.

c. Grasp one of the Detainee's ankles.

d. Place the leg restraint above the ankle so that the keyhole is up and the double lock is facing you.

e. Tighten the leg restraint without cutting off the Detainee's circulation. (It may be necessary to turn down the boot tops to make room for the leg restraints.)

f. Grasp the chain between the leg restraints to keep control of the Detainee.

g. Apply and tighten the other leg restraint in the same way.

h. Check to be sure the leg restraints are not too tight. Then, double lock them.

i. Check the double lock by squeezing the restraints.

NOTE: INSTRUCTOR DEMONSTRATES APPLY THE LEG RESTRAINTS TO A DEMONSTRATOR.
NOTE: Conduct Practical Exercise on Apply Leg Restraints.

Determine if students have learned the material presented by --

a. Soliciting student questions and explanations.

b. Asking questions and getting answers from the students.

c. Providing immediate feedback in context to the material presented and correcting student misunderstandings.

RETAINT ATTENTION: When your supervisor directs you to get some type of restraining device, do you know how to check it to make sure it works properly? Do you know how to apply the different devices? If you don't, you will have bigger problems with the Detainee. It will be too late to learn how when it comes time to apply them in a real life situation.

SUMMARY: We have seen, discussed, and conducted practical exercises on applying restraining devices. We've covered the method of applying the devices. Also discussed was the amount of caution used when applying these devices.

CLOSING STATEMENT: Remember, a restraining device is nothing more than a job aid in getting a Detainee to carry out your will. Just like any other job aid, it is most effective when applied properly. But job aids can also become dangerous, if used improperly. While working as a corrections staff member, you could be called upon at any time to apply or assist in applying restraining devices.

STUDENT EVALUATION

Describe how the student must demonstrate accomplishment of the TLO.

1. Performance examination:

   a. Schedule and provide immediate feedback in context to the material presented; correct student misunderstandings.

   b. Provide remedial training as needed.
RESTRAIN A DETAINEE PERFORMANCE EXAMINATION GRADE SHEET

PURPOSE: This examination evaluates your ability to properly apply restraining devices to a Detainee.

ACTION: Apply hand and leg restraints.

CONDITIONS: Given a set of hand restraints and leg restraints with a key, a cooperative Detainee, and a situation requiring you to apply restraints.

STANDARDS: You must correctly complete all performance measures for applying hand restraints to the front, apply leg restraints and apply hand restraints to the rear in sequence within 10 minutes.

---

(Print Student Rank/Name L, F, MI)

(Instructor Signature)

DATE

START TIME STOP TIME

CIRCLE ONE

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<td>APPLY HAND RESTRAINTS TO THE REAR.</td>
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Completed exam within 10 minutes.

Remarks:

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INSTRUCTOR NOTES:

GIVE A SAFETY BRIEFING TO ALL PERSONNEL PRIOR TO CONDUCTING THE EXAM.

USE PASS/FAIL EVALUATION CHECKLIST TO GRADE STUDENT PERFORMANCE.

CIRCLE GO OR NO-GO ON THE RESTRAIN A DETAINEE PERFORMANCE EXAMINATION GRADE SHEET AND WRITE REMARKS IF APPLICABLE.

IF A STUDENT FAILS TO ACHIEVE A STEP DURING THE EVALUATION MAKE A NOTE AND UPON COMPLETION OF THE EVALUATION INFORM THE STUDENT OF THE NOGO SHORTCOMING. CIRCLE THE F (Fail) AND NOTE THE SHORTCOMING IN THE REMARKS SECTION OF THE EVALUATION CHECKLIST.

IF A STUDENT RECEIVED A 1X NOGO, COUNSEL HIM/HER ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NOGO AND CONDUCT RETRAINING ON THE STEP OR STEPS THE STUDENT MISSED, ALLOW THEM TIME TO REHEARSE THOSE STEPS AND RETEST THEM ONLY ON THE STEP OR STEPS THAT WERE MISSED.

IF A STUDENT RECEIVES A 2ND X GO INDICATE IT ON THE RESTRAIN A DETAINEE PERFORMANCE EXAMINATION GRADE SHEET, MAKE A NOTE IN THE REMARKS SECTION AND CONTACT THE SENIOR INSTRUCTOR.
RESTRAIN A DETAINEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1. APPLY HAND RESTRAINTS TO A DETAINEE WITH HIS ARMS IN FRONT.
   a. Checked hand restraints to make sure they worked properly.
   b. Stood in front of the Detainee and directed the Detainee to extend both arms to the front locking the elbows with the palms facing each other.
   c. With the left hand, grasped the Detainee’s right hand. Used the right hand and applied the hand restraint on the Detainee so that the double lock was up and the keyhole was facing him.
   d. Moved his left hand to the chain and grasped the Detainee’s left hand with his right hand. Used his left hand to apply the hand restraint so that the double lock was up and the keyhole was facing him.
   e. Checked each hand restraint by inserting the tip of his finger between the Detainee’s wrist and the hand restraint to make sure it was not too tight.
   f. Double locked both hand restraints, and checked the double locks by squeezing the hand restraints.

2. APPLY LEG RESTRAINTS TO A DETAINEE.
   1. Checked leg restraints to make sure they worked properly.
   2. Stood behind the Detainee and directed the Detainee to stand with his feet shoulder width apart.
      (Crouched behind the Detainee while maintaining his/her balance.)
   3. Grasped one of the Detainee’s ankles, maintained control of the leg restraints.
   4. Applied the leg restraint above the ankle so that the keyhole was up and the double lock was facing him.
      (It may be necessary to turn down the boot tops to apply the leg restraints.)
   5. Tightened the leg restraint without cutting off the Detainee’s circulation.
   6. Grasped the chain between the leg restraints and applied the other leg restraint in the same manner as the first one.
   7. Checked each leg restraint by inserting the tip of his finger between the Detainee’s leg and the leg restraint to make sure it was not to tight.
   8. Double locked both leg restraints, and checked the double locks by squeezing the leg restraints.
RESTRAN A DETAINEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Continued)

3. APPLY HAND RESTRAINTS TO A DETAINEE WITH HIS HANDS BEHIND HIM.

   a. Checked hand restraints to make sure they worked properly.

   b. Stood behind the Detainee and directed the Detainee to place his left hand behind his back with the palm facing out.

   c. Used the handshake method, grasp the Detainee’s left hand with his left hand. Applied the hand restraint with his right hand so that the double lock was up and the keyhole was facing him.

   d. Maintained control of the hand restraints with his left hand.

   e. Directed the Detainee to place his right hand behind his back with the palm facing out.

   f. Grasped the Detainee’s right hand with his right hand. With his left hand, applied the hand restraint with the double lock up and the keyhole facing him.

   g. Checked each hand restraint by inserting the tip of his finger between the Detainee’s wrist and the hand restraint to make sure it was not too tight.

   h. Double locked both hand restraints, and checked the double locks by squeezing the hand restraints.
# Forced Cell Moves

## SECTION 1. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

### Oct 2003

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### TASK NUMBER | TASK TITLE
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#### Academic Hours

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### Foreign Restrictions

### Security

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Clearance / Access

References

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Student Study Assignments

None.

Instructor Requirements

One primary instructor.

Additional Support Personnel Requirements

None.

Equipment Required

Materials Required

Classroom, Training Area, and Range Requirements

One 60-person classroom.

Ammunition Requirements

None.

Instructional Guidance

Before presenting this lesson, instructors must thoroughly prepare by studying this lesson and identified reference material.

Proponent Lesson Plan Approvals

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<td>SFC</td>
<td>Corrections SME</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Method of instruction: CO
Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.1 hour(s).
Media: None.

NOTE: Show Slide #1 (Forced Cell Moves).

Motivator

Whenever an unruly detainee is housed in a tightly controlled environment such as close confinement, the potential for a disorder is very high. The sooner the disorder is quelled, the likelihood of personnel and/or property loss is minimized. This is accomplished by the expeditious use of a properly trained Forced Cell Move Team.

NOTE: Inform students of the following terminal learning objective requirements.

NOTE: Show Slide #2 (TLO)

At the completion of this lesson you will:

| ACTION | Identify appropriate actions to take when conducting a forced cell move. |
| CONDITION | In a classroom environment given a conference, identify procedures used to forcibly move uncooperative detainees from a cell. |
| STANDARD | Identify steps to take when forcibly moving and uncooperative detainee. |

Safety Requirements

None.

Risk Assessment Level

Low.

Environmental Considerations

None. It is the responsibility of all soldiers and DA civilians to protect the environment from damage.

Evaluation

None.

Instructional Lead-in

There are times when it is necessary to subdue an unruly detainee. There are a number of things to consider during this procedure to ensure that the minimum amount of force is used at all times, the team is properly trained and supervised. Most importantly, personnel use minimum amount of force necessary to subdue the unruly detainee.

SECTION III. PRESENTATION
Learning Step/Activity 1.

Method of instruction: CO. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 0.4 hour(s).
Media: None.
References: None
Security Classification: None

NOTE: Show Slide #3 (Purpose for a Forced Cell Move).

1. Purpose for a Forced Cell Move.

   a. Detainee refuses to move from one cell into another as ordered.
   b. Detainee refuses to surrender any item ordered to by staff member.
   c. Refusals to take shower within the allotted time period required by the facility SOP.
   d. Refusal to receive haircut IAW local SOP.
   e. Refusing to receive prescribed medication by qualified medical personnel, i.e., mental health patients.
   f. Detainees refuse orders to return to their assigned cells.
   g. Detainees become a physical threat to themselves or others.
   h. Detainee is barricaded inside a cell, window, or room.
   i. The detainee cannot be approached without risk of serious physical injury to the detainee or others, or the approach would result in a major disturbance or serious property damage.

NOTE: Show Slide #4 (Forced Cell Move Team Composition).


   a. As a Corrections Officer you will become familiar with the operations of a Forced Cell Move Team.

   b. It is important to have a working knowledge of the duties of each member of a Forced Cell Move Team and the ability of team members to work as one using the minimum amount of force necessary to subdue, restrain, and move an unruly detainee.

   c. Remember we are not moving the detainee as punishment, we are moving the detainee for his/her safety, and we are helping the detainee.

   d. All of the following equipment must be worn properly at all times by each member of the Forced Cell Move Team.

      (1) Helmet with face shield.
      (2) Groin protector.
      (3) Flak vest.
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(4) Elbow pads.
(5) Gloves.
(6) Leg/shin protectors.

e. A Forced Cell Move Team is comprised of five members each with a specific task, supported by a Military Police Investigator, a duty Medic, and an Officer in Charge of the team.

NOTE: In order for each member of a Forced Cell Move Team to ensure minimum force is used all members should receive a class in self-defense to include but not limited to Pressure Point Control Techniques (PPCT). Prior to training for Forced Cell Moves.

NOTE: Show Slide # 5 (Responsibilities of Each Member).

3. Responsibilities.

a. The following is a list of responsibilities belonging to each member of the Forced Cell Move Team, and support personnel.

(1) Number one person - Locate the detainee prior to entering the cell and inform the rest of the team of what is seen inside the cell. Pinning the detainee upon entering the cell and securing the detainee's head during all movements, using the minimum amount of force necessary. This is to ensure the detainee's head is not injured, or causes injury to any member of the team.

(2) Number two person - Responsible for controlling the detainee's strong arm using the minimum amount of force necessary. He/she will carry the hand restraints with key or flexi-cuffs, and secure the detainees arms to the rear with the restraints.

(3) Number three person - Responsible for controlling the detainee's weak arm, using the minimum amount of force necessary and assisting the number two person applying the wrist restraints.

(4) Number four person - Responsible for controlling the detainee's right leg, using the minimum amount of force necessary and assisting the number five person in securing the detainee's legs with leg restraints or flexi-cuffs. The number four person will carry the leg restraints with a key or flexi-cuffs.

(5) Number five person - Is the Team Leader, responsible for giving all commands. Responsible for controlling the detainee's left leg and ensuring that the rest of the team uses the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the move. Also responsible that all extra equipment that may be used during the move is available for the team (i.e., extra hand restraints, leg restraints, soap and sponge). The team leader directs the opening and closing of the cell.

(6) Duty Investigator - Responsible for filming the briefing of Forced Cell Move Team, all movements of the Forced Cell Move Team, and the actual Forced Cell Move. Ensuring that a use of force statement is completed upon the completion of the Forced Cell Move and receives statements from all persons involved.

(7) Duty Medic - Responsible for all medical attention needed by the detainee and cadre.
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(8) Officer in Charge (OIC) - Has overall responsibility for the operation. The OIC will determine whether a Forced Cell Move is needed and if so will conduct the briefing of the incident that resulted in the requirement for the use of force and what the team will be instructed to accomplish which will be read aloud in front of the Forced Cell Move Team and be videotaped by the investigator. The OIC will give all commands to the detainee, and will also conduct a debrief with the Forced Cell Move Team upon completion of the mission. The OIC is overall responsible that the Forced Cell Move Team uses the minimum amount of force necessary to complete the mission.

NOTE: ISSUE HANDOUT #1 (BRIEFING EXAMPLE).

NOTE: Show Slide #6 (Team Member Briefing).

b. Briefing.

(1) Each member of the Forced Cell Move Team, to include the duty medic, will be given a briefing by the OIC. This briefing will be filmed by Investigations. Each member of the team will step in front of the camera and state the following:

(2) My name and rank is _____; I am the number one person. My mission is to pin the detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary.

(3) My name and rank is _____; I am the number two person. My mission is to secure the detainee’s right arm and apply the wrist restraints to the detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary. I will carry the wrist restraints (the number two person will hold the restraints up to the camera).

(4) My name and rank is _____; I am the number three person. My mission is to secure the detainee’s left arm and assist the number two person with applying the wrist restraints to the detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary.

(5) My name and rank is _____; I am the number four person. My mission is to secure the detainee’s right leg and apply the leg restraints to the detainee’s legs using minimum amount of force necessary. I will carry the leg restraints (the number four person will hold the restraints up to the camera).

(6) My name and rank is _____; I am the number five person. My mission is to secure the detainee’s left leg and assist the number four person in applying the leg restraints to the detainee’s legs using the minimum amount of force necessary. I am the team leader for this mission, I am also responsible for ensuring that the team uses the minimum amount of force necessary at all times.

(7) My name and rank is _____; I am the duty medic. I will treat any and all medical emergencies during the move.

(8) Each member of the team after stating their mission will then execute an about face allowing the camera to see the number on the back of their helmet and flak vest, take one step forward and execute another about face.

NOTE: THE NUMBERS ASSIST IN IDENTIFYING ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED FOR THEIR SAFETY.

NOTE: IF FORCE IS USED: EACH MEMBER OF THE TEAM WILL REPORT TO
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INVESTIGATIONS UPON COMPLETION OF THE MISSION AND WILL COMPLETE THE APPROPRIATE PAPERWORK.

NOTE: Show Slide #7 (Team Action During the Move).

4. TEAM ACTION DURING THE MOVE.

a. The following is a list of actions that the team will take upon initiating the move.

1) The OIC will move to the front of the detainee's cell and order the detainee to comply with previous instructions. Upon receiving no reply or a negative response from the detainee, the OIC will command the Forced Cell Move Team to move the detainee as per the situation would dictate.

2) The Investigator will carry a video camera and be positioned where the entire event can be recorded.

3) The on-duty medic will be carrying an a:d bag and be positioned where he/she can observe the entire situation. The medic will render medical assistance to anyone that may require it during the mission.

NOTE: WHEN ORDERED, THE TEAM WILL MARCH IN A COLUMN TO THE FRONT OF THE DETAINEE'S CELL DOOR, REMAIN IN A COLUMN DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE CELL PREPARED TO ENTER AND RESTRAIN THE DETAINEE.

4) The number one person carrying a 3-foot protective shield, will stop in front of the cell, once in front of the cell, will be the "eyes and ears of the team."

(a) The number one person will observe the entire cell, check for anything that may cause harm to the team or the detainee. The number one person will inform the rest of the team by looking over their right shoulder and announcing the exact location of the detainee, if the detainee is holding anything, if a barricade has been erected, if the floor is wet or if the light is on or off, etc.

NOTE: IN ORDER FOR THE NUMBER ONE PERSON TO KNOW THAT THE TEAM HAS HEARD AND UNDERSTOOD HIM EACH MEMBER OF THE TEAM STARTING WITH THE NUMBER FIVE PERSON WILL GRAB THE RIGHT SHOULDER OF THE MEMBER IN FRONT OF HIM UNTIL THE NUMBER ONE PERSON IS SIGNALED. IF THERE IS NO RESPONSE THE NUMBER ONE PERSON WILL REPEAT THE INFORMATION.

(b) Once the number one person determines that the detainee does not have any weapons and can see the detainee's hands, the number one person will drop the shield and prepare to move into the cell once it begins to open by bending at the knees and at the waist, with hands about chest high in front of them.

(c) If the number one person cannot see the detainee's hands and/or the detainee is known to have a weapon, or any other situation that may cause undue injury to the team or detainee, the number one person may carry a pinning shield into the cell, after (OC) spray has been used. (See use of OC spray.)

(d) Upon entering the cell the number one person's mission is to pin the detainee, attempting to guide the detainee to the bunk and secure the
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detainee’s head to prevent any injury to the detainee or the team.

(5) **The number two person** will stand directly behind the number one person outside of the cell, with both hands on the waist of the number one person, preparing to push the number one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

(a) Once inside the cell, the number two person will secure the detainee’s right arm and apply the wrist restraints to the detainee’s wrists behind the detainee’s back, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

(b) Once the number two person has the wrist restraints secured on the detainee the number two person will announce to the team, "HANDS SECURE" and will be positioned where the number two person can carry the detainee at the direction of the team leader. If there is no response the number one person will repeat the information.

(6) **The number three person** will stand directly behind the number two person outside of the cell, with both hands on the waist of the number two person preparing to push the number two and number one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

(a) Once inside the cell, the number three person will secure the detainee’s left arm and assist the number two person in applying the wrist restraints on the detainee’s wrists behind the detainee’s back, using minimum amount of force necessary.

(b) Once the hands are secure the number three person will be positioned where the number three person can carry the detainee, at the direction of the team leader.

(7) **The number four person** will stand directly behind the number three person outside the cell, with both hands on the number three person’s waist preparing to push the number three, two, and one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

(a) Once inside the cell, the number four person will secure the detainee’s right leg and apply the leg restraints on the detainee, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

(b) Once the leg restraints are secured the number four person will announce to the team, "LEGS SECURE" and be positioned where the number four person will be able to carry the detainee, at the direction of the team leader.

(8) **The number five person** will stand directly behind the number four person outside of the cell, with both hands on the waist of the number four person preparing to push the number four, three, two, and one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

(a) Prior to the cell door being opened, the team leader will ensure that the team is prepared to enter the cell and signal to the OIC to have the cell door opened, using a prearranged signal.

(b) Once inside the cell the number five person will secure the detainee’s left leg and assist the number four person in applying the leg restraints to the detainee’s legs, using the minimum amount of force necessary.
(c) Once the legs are secure the number five person will be positioned where the number five person can carry the detainee.

(d) When the hands and legs are secure, the team leader will survey the area and visually check all members of the team to ensure that they are ready to move the detainee out of the cell.

NOTE: ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM WILL REMAIN SILENT DURING THE MOVE UNLESS NOTIFYING THE TEAM OF INSTRUCTIONS OR ANSWERING THE TEAM LEADER. NONVERBAL PREARRANGED HAND SIGNALS SHOULD BE USED TO RELAY ANYTHING THAT MAY AGITATE THE DETAINEE.

(e) Once the Team Leader has checked the team, team leader will command "PREPARE TO LIFT" "TEAM LIFT". At this time the team will simultaneously lift and carry the detainee to the doorway of the cell.

(f) Prior to exiting the cell the team may have to turn the detainee to the side. To do this the team leader will command "PREPARE TO TURN" AND "TEAM TURN". At this time the team will turn the detainee's body so that the detainee's face is facing the bunk, (This may psychologically ease the detainee, if the detainee can see a soft area the detainee may relax), the team will proceed outside the cell with the detainee.

NOTE: Show Slide #8 (Once Outside the Cell).

(g) Once outside the cell the team leader will command the team, "PREPARE TO LOWER" "TEAM LOWER". At this time the team will (simultaneously slowly lower the detainee to the floor. The medic will check the detainee for any injuries.

(9) Once outside the cell if the team is not in the correct position, the team leader will direct adjusting movements. After the medic examines the detainee, the team leader will direct the team to lift and move the detainee to the predesignated cell.

NOTE: ONCE OUTSIDE THE CELL THE TEAM LEADER WILL INSTRUCT THE NUMBER TWO AND FOUR PERSON TO READJUST THE RESTRAINTS AS NECESSARY AND DOUBLE LOCK THE RESTRAINTS TO PREVENT INJURY TO THE DETAINEE DURING FURTHER MOVEMENT, AS APPLICABLE.

NOTE: Show Slide #9 (Before Entering the Cell).

(10) Before entering the cell, turn the detainee's body so that the detainee's face is facing the bunk, if necessary.

NOTE: Show Slide #10 (Place the Detainee in Predesignated Cell).

(11) Place the detainee in the predesignated cell as follows:

(a) Face down on the bunk, with the detainee's head furthest away from the cell door.

NOTE: Show Slide #11 (Remove the Restraints).

(12) Remove the restraints in the following manner (if predetermined prior to initiating the move), these instructions would be given during
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the briefing.

(a) The number two person will remove the wrist restraints and announce to the team, "HANDS UNSECURE". Then secure the restraints on their person readily available for use, as applicable.

(b) The number four person will remove the leg restraints and announce to the team, "LEGS UNSECURE". Then secure the restraints on their person readily available for use, as applicable.

(13) The number one person will secure the detainee's head to prevent injury to the detainee or any member of the team, using minimum amount of force necessary.

(14) The number three person will assist the number two person by holding the detainee's hands behind the detainee's back using PPCT, or appropriate wrist holds.

(15) The number four person will assist the number five person by crossing the detainee's legs and folding them against the detainee's body and applying pressure to keep them secure, using minimum amount of force necessary.

NOTE: Show Slide #12 (Exiting the Cell).

(16) The team will exit the cell in the following manner:

(a) Each team member, at the direction of the team leader, will exit the cell opposite from the way that they came in, beginning with the number five person. As they exit each team member will stand in the ready position outside the cell prepared to reenter if necessary.

NOTE: THE READY POSITION IS CROUCHED WITH HANDS AT CHEST LEVEL EYES ON THE OTHER MEMBERS STILL IN THE CELL.

(b) When exiting each team member will sound off with "five out", "four out", "three out", the number two and number one person will temporarily continue to restrain the detainee on the bunk.

(c) The number two person will be positioned on top of the detainee's legs. The number one person will be positioned across the detainee's back and secure the detainee's hands behind his back using PPCT.

(d) When ready, the number one person (using a prearranged non-verbal signal), will signal the number two person when prepared to exit, the number two person will signal the number one person in return.

(e) The number one person will then signal the number three person that they are preparing to exit the cell. The number three person will then reach in and grab the number two person, the number two person will grab the number one person and they will exit the cell simultaneously.

(f) While they are moving out of the cell the OIC will notify the staff member cage via the radio or other prearranged signal and have the cell secured.

(g) Once the entire team is outside of the cell the team leader will command the team to depart the area.
NOTE: IF WHILE THE CELL DOOR IS CLOSING, THE DETAINEE MAKES AN EFFORT TO CHARGE THE GATE IN ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE THE CELL, OR ASSAULT ONE OF THE TEAM MEMBERS, THE TEAM WILL REENTER AND RESECURE THE DETAINEE IN RESTRAINTS, IAW LOCAL SOP, REPEATING THE ABOVE LISTED PROCEDURE.

NOTE: IF THE DETAINEE IS KNOWN TO HAVE HIV OR AIDS SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS MUST BE USED TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO: USE OF OC SPRAY, ALL TEAM MEMBERS MOPP LEVEL 4, AND/OR WET WEATHER GEAR AND SURGICAL MASK, IAW LOCAL SOP.

Learning Step/Activity 2.

Method of instruction: CO. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 1 hour(s).
Media: None.
References: Security Classification: None

NOTE: Show Slide #13 (Shower Procedures).

1. SHOWER PROCEDURES

   a. If directed to administer a shower to a detainee, use the following procedure:

      (1) Remove the detainee from the cell using the above procedures and place the detainee on the tier. The medic will conduct an examination of the detainee.

      (2) Upon completion of the examination, the number two person under the direction of the team leader, will remove the detainee’s shirt in the following manner:

           (a) First carefully move the detainee’s shirt down the arms until meeting the wrist restraints.

           (b) Then apply a second set of restraints above the shirt, ensuring that the hand restraints are double locked, or the flexi-cuffs are not cutting off the blood circulation (which ever is used).

           (c) Remove the first set of restraints and the shirt.

   NOTE: THE TEAM LEADER MUST ENSURE THAT THERE ARE EXTRA SETS OF THE HAND RESTRAINTS AND LEG RESTRAINTS OR OTHER RESTRAINTS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO EXECUTING THIS MOVE.

      (3) After the shirt has been removed, the number four person will remove the detainee’s pants in the following manner:

           (a) Unbutton and slide the pants and shorts down adjacent to the leg restraints.

           (b) Apply a second set of restraints above the pants ensuring that the leg restraints are double locked, or the flexi-cuffs don’t cut off blood circulation.
(c) Then remove the first set of restraints, the pants and shorts.

(4) At the direction of the team leader, the team will lift and carry the detainee to the shower and administer a shower:

(5) Once inside the shower the team will stand the detainee up so that the detainee is facing towards the doorway of the shower.

(a) Each team member will secure a limb, except for the number one person.

(b) The number one person will wash the detainee with soap and a sponge.

NOTE: (THE TEAM LEADER MUST ENSURE THAT THE PROPER EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO EXECUTING THE MOVE.)

(c) Once the detainee's front side has been washed, the team will turn the detainee around and wash the back side in the same manner:

(d) Once the detainee has been washed, the number one person under the direction of the team leader will dry the detainee. The number one person may also attempt to dry the floor area as best as possible, so that all personnel involved in the move can maneuver out of the cell without injury.

(e) After carrying the detainee out of the shower, the team will place the detainee on the tier floor. The medic will once again check the detainee for any injuries.

(f) Once this is accomplished, the team leader will direct the team to move the detainee into a predesignated cell, following the procedures discussed earlier in this lesson.

NOTE: IAW LOCAL SOP THE TEAM MAY BE WEARING WET WEATHER GEAR TO INCLUDE RUBBER BOOTS TO PROVIDE MORE PROTECTION AND A BETTER GRIP ON THE WET FLOOR.

Learning Step/Activity 3.

Method of instruction: CO. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: 1 hour(s).
Media: None.
References: None
Security Classification: None

NOTE: Show Slide #14 (Use of Oleoresin Capsicum Spray)

1. USE OF OLEORESIN CAPSICUM (OC) SPRAY.

   a. Authorization to use OC Pepper Spray will be under the following conditions:

      (1) If the detainee is known to have a weapon, is barricaded inside
the cell, or has smeared a slippery substance to himself/herself or the cell.

(2) The detainee cannot be approached without risk of serious physical injury to the detainee or others, or the approach would result in a major disturbance or serious property damage.

(3) A medical doctor should be consulted prior to the use of OC Pepper Spray, unless the commander determines that circumstances are such that immediate use is necessary. Whenever possible, the detainee’s medical file should first be reviewed by a doctor to determine whether the detainee has any diseases or conditions, including, but not limited to, asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, tuberculosis, obstructive pulmonary disease, angina pectoris, cardiac pulmonary, or congestive heart failure, which would be dangerously affected if the OC Pepper spray was used.

(4) The OIC of the Forced Cell Move Team will instruct the detainee to surrender the weapon, or to dismantle the barricade, and prepare to be placed in restraining devices.

(5) If the detainee refuses to comply, the OIC will order the team to move in front of the detainee’s cell. Once in front of the cell the number two person will spray the detainee in the following manner.

NOTE: CAUTION: (ALL FORCED CELL MOVE TEAM MEMBERS WILL RECEIVE TRAINING IN THE USE OF (OC) PEPPER SPRAY, PRIOR TO AN ACTUAL APPLICATION IN A FORCED CELL MOVE).

(a) The OIC will communicate with the detainee in an attempt to distract the detainee from the team, allowing the number two person (only at the direction and authorization of the Installation commander) the opportunity to assume a good position and spray the detainee with the OC spray.

(b) The number two person will hold the (OC) spray dispenser in the strong hand, extended out and away from the body in front of the shield, aiming at the detainee’s eyes, nose and mouth.

(c) Press the actuator with the thumb, using two one-second bursts, spray the detainee’s face. (This may need to be repeated as necessary to achieve a positive affect.)

(6) The team will wait a minimum of six seconds (IAW local SOP) after the detainee has been sprayed to avoid secondary vapor effects prior to entering the cell. The OIC will notify the staff member cage and have the cell opened, at which time the team will secure the detainee as instructed earlier in this lesson.

NOTE: THE TEAM MUST BE ALERT FOR ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES OF THE DETAINEE AFTER BEING SPRAYED WITH OC PEPPER:

1. EYES CLOSE IMMEDIATELY.
2. BREATHING BECOMES DIFFICULT.
3. LOSS OF BALANCE.
4. MUSCLE DYSFUNCTION.
5. DETAINEE FALLS TO THE FLOOR.

6. NO REACTION, DETAINEE JUST STANDS STILL.

7. DETAINEE BECOMES AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT, AGITATED, WANTING TO FIGHT THE TEAM.

NOTE: ONCE THE DETAINEE HAS BEEN SPRAYED THE OIC SHOULD GIVE THE DETAINEE INSTRUCTIONS TO LAY ON THE FLOOR, AND TO NOT RESIST. THE OIC SHOULD TRY TO REASSURE THE DETAINEE THAT COOPERATION IS NECESSARY. THIS WILL POSITIVELY EFFECT THE MINIMAL AMOUNT OF FORCE USED.

NOTE: CAUTION - THE TEAM AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL MAY NEED TO BE WEARING THEIR PROTECTIVE MASKS DURING THE SPRAYING PROCESS, TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE RESIDUAL SPRAY, THAT MAY INCAPACITATE ANY MEMBER OF THE FORCED CELL MOVE TEAM. EACH FACILITY SHOULD CONDUCT TESTS OF THE SPRAY DURING TRAINING IN ORDER TO HAVE A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF HOW THE SPRAY MAY EFFECT ANYONE OUTSIDE OF THE CELL AS WELL AS ONCE THE TEAM ENTERS THE CELL. (WILL THE TEAM UPON ENTERING THE CELL BE EFFECTED AND WHAT ARE THOSE EFFECTS?) CELL CONFIGURATION AND SPACE IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR WHEN CONSIDERING USING OC SPRAY IAW LOCAL SOP.

(7) Once the detainee has been placed on the tier, the medic will check and decontaminate the detainee:

NOTE: THE PROTOCOL FOR THE PARTICULAR COMMERCIAL OC PEPPER SPRAY MUST BE FOLLOWED BY THE INDIVIDUAL FACILITY PERSONNEL TO ACHIEVE CLEANSING AND DECONTAMINATION OF THE DETAINEE AFTER THE OC PEPPER SPRAY HAS BEEN APPLIED.

(a) The medic will splash water on the detainee's face to dilute the pepper on the skin, and flush the eyes with water to decontaminate the eyes.

(b) Once the detainee is decontaminated, the team will place the detainee into the predesignated cell. (AS DIRECTED BY THE OIC) They will remove the hand and leg restraints as explained earlier in the lesson.

(8) After the detainee has been placed into the cell, correctional personnel will monitor the detainee for a minimum of one hour. If the detainee shows signs of respiratory problems or loses consciousness the medic will be summoned.

NOTE: NEVER LEAVE A DETAINEE UNSUPERVISED AFTER BEING SPRAYED AND DECONTAMINATED. BE ALERT FOR ANY OUT OF THE ORDINARY RECOVERY SYMPTOMS AND ENSURE MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE SUMMONED IF ANY OF THE ABOVE SYMPTOMS OCCUR.

Learning Step/Activity 4.

Method of instruction: CO. Instructor to student ratio is 1:60.
Time of instruction: .1 hour(s).
Media: None.
References:
NOTE: Show Slide #15 (Placing Detainee on Stretcher).

1. PROCEDURES FOR PLACING A DETAINEE ON A STRETCHER FOR TRANSPORTATION

   a. Use the following procedures to place an unruly detainee that has been secured in hand and leg restraints onto a stretcher for transportation.

   NOTE: THIS WILL BE ONLY FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME.

   (1) Remove the detainee from the cell and place the detainee on the floor. Allow the medic to check the detainee for injuries. Place the detainee on a stretcher as follows:

      (a) At the direction of the team leader, the team will slowly lower the detainee face down onto the stretcher.

      (b) Once on the stretcher, the number one person will secure the detainee's head by turning it to the side, to ensure no injuries are sustained to the detainee or any member of the team.

      (c) The number two person, at the direction of the team leader, will secure the detainee's upper torso to the stretcher with velcro or leather restraining straps, or by using reinforced duct tape.

      NOTE: CAUTION - BE CAREFUL NOT TO TAPE THE SKIN OF THE DETAINEE IF POSSIBLE.

      (d) The number four person, at the direction of the team leader, will secure the detainee's legs to the stretcher with velcro or leather restraining straps, or by using reinforced duct tape.

   (2) When removing the restraining straps or tape and moving the detainee into a predesignated cell, the procedures will be in reverse order as when the detainee was placed onto the stretcher.
ANNEX D Corrections Train-the-Trainer Training Program

SECTION IV.

SUMMARY

Method of instruction: CO
Instructor to student ratio is 1:20
Time of instruction: 0.1.
Media: Slides.

Check on Learning

Determine if students have learned the material presented by --

a. Soliciting student questions and explanations.

b. Asking questions and getting answers from the students.

c. Providing immediate feedback in context to the material presented and correcting student misunderstandings.

NOTE: Show Slide #19 (Summary).

Review/Summarize Lesson

During this block of instruction, you have been taught forced cell moves, forced shower procedures, use of (OC) spray procedures, procedures for placing a detainee on a stretcher for transportation, applying leather restraints, placing the straitjacket on a detainee, the proper structure of the team, and each team member’s responsibilities during a move.

CLOSING STATEMENT. Forced Cell Moves are both mentally and physically stressful. Teamwork is a vital aspect of a successful operation. Continuous practice enables a team to work and move safely and efficiently in the most difficult conditions. A Forced Cell Move should not be taken lightly and all members must always use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission.

SECTION V.

STUDENT EVALUATION

Describe how the student must demonstrate accomplishment of the TLO.

None

Note: Refer student to the Student Evaluation Plan.

Feedback Requirement

a. Schedule and provide immediate feedback in context to the material presented; correct student misunderstandings.
b. Provide remedial training as needed.
RESTRAIN A DETAINEE AND PLACE ON STRETCHER FOR TRANSPORT.

INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDENT

Given a situation with a person role-playing as an unruly detainee, restraining devices, and a stretcher. You must do all the necessary steps to correctly secure and place the detainee on a stretcher using minimum amount of force necessary.

THE STUDENT

1. Upon being briefed by the OIC step forward in front of the camera and state your mission.

   a. The number one person will say: "My name and rank is ___; I am the number one person. My mission is to pin the detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary."

   b. The number two person will say: "My name and rank is ___; I am the number two person. My mission is to secure the detainee's strong arm and apply the wrist restraints to the detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary. I will carry the leg restraints."

   c. The number three person will say: "My name and rank is ___; I am the number three person. My mission is to secure the detainee's weak arm and assist the number two person with applying the wrist restraints to the detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary."

   d. The number four person will say: "My name and rank is ___; I am the number four person. My mission is to secure the detainee's right leg and apply the leg restraints to the detainee's legs using minimum amount of force necessary. I will carry the leg restraints."

   e. The number five person will say: "My name and rank is ___; I am the number five person. My mission is to secure the detainee's left leg and assist the number four person in applying the leg restraints to the detainee's legs using minimum amount of force necessary. I am the team leader for this mission. I am also responsible for ensuring that the team uses the minimum amount of force necessary at all times."

Each member of the team will then execute an about face allowing the camera to see the number on the back of their helmet and flak vest, take one step forward and execute another about face.

2. When ordered to move to the front of the detainee's cell the team will:

   a. The number one person carrying a 3-foot protective shield, will stop in front of the cell, once in front of the cell, will be the "eyes and ears of the team."

   b. The number one person will observe the entire cell, check for anything that may cause harm to the team or the detainee. The number one person will inform the rest of the team by announcing the exact location of the detainee, if the detainee is holding anything, if a barricade has been erected, if the floor is wet or if the light is on or off, etc.

   c. Once the number one person determines that the detainee does not have any weapons and can see the detainee's hands, the number one person will drop the shield and prepare to move into the cell once it begins to open by bending at the knees and at the waist, and holding their hands about chest high in front of them.

   d. If the number one person cannot see the detainee's hand and or the detainee is known to have a weapon, the number one person will carry a pinning shield into the cell, after (OC) spray has been used.
e. The number two person will stand directly behind the number one person outside of the cell, with both hands on the waist of the number one person, preparing to push the number one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

f. The number three person will stand directly behind the number two person outside the cell, with both hands on the waist of the number two person preparing to push the number two and number one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

g. The number four person will stand directly behind the number three person outside the cell, with both hands on the number three person’s waist preparing to push the number three, two, and number one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

h. The number five person will stand directly behind the number four person outside of the cell, with both hands on the waist of the number four person preparing to push the number four, three, two, and one person into the cell upon the cell door opening.

3. Team’s Action upon entering the Cell:

a. The number one person will pin the detainee, attempting to guide the detainee to the bunk and secure the detainee’s head to prevent any injury to the detainee or the team.

b. The number two person will secure the detainee’s strong arm and apply the wrist restraints to the detainee's wrists behind the detainee's back, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

c. Once the number two person has the wrist restraints secured on the detainee the number two person will announce to the team, "HANDS SECURE" and will be positioned where the number two person can carry the detainee at the direction of the team leader. If there is no response the number one person will repeat the information.

d. The number three person will secure the detainee’s weak arm and assist the number two person in applying the wrist restraints on the detainee's wrists behind the detainee's back, using minimum amount of force necessary.

e. Once the hands are secure the number three person will be positioned where the number three person can carry the detainee, at the direction of the team leader.

f. The number four person will secure the detainee’s right leg and apply the leg restraints on the detainee, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

g. Once the leg restraints are secured the number four person will announce to the team, "LEGS SECURE" and be positioned where the number four person will be able to carry the detainee, at the direction of the team leader.

h. The number five person will secure the detainee's left leg and assist the number four person in applying the leg restraints to the detainee's legs, using the minimum amount of force necessary.

i. Once the legs are secure the number five person will be positioned where the number five person can carry the detainee.

j. When the hands and legs are secure, the team leader will survey the area and visually check all members of the team to ensure that they are ready to move the detainee out of the cell.

k. The team leader commands:

(1) "Prepare to lift, team lift."

(2) "Prepare to turn, team turn."
4. Placing the detainee on the stretcher:
   
a. At the direction of the team leader the team will slowly lower the detainee face down onto the stretcher.

b. Once on the stretcher, the number one person will secure the detainee’s head by turning it to the side, to ensure no injuries are sustained to the detainee or any member of the team.

c. The number two person, at the direction of the team leader, will secure the detainee’s upper torso to the stretcher with Velcro or leather restraining straps, or by using reinforced duct tape.

d. The number four person, at the direction of the team leader, will secure the detainee’s legs to the stretcher with Velcro or leather restraining straps, or by using reinforced duct tape.

5. Place the detainee back in the cell or predesignated cell:
   
a. When removing the restraining straps or tape and moving the detainee into a predesignated cell, the procedures will be in reverse order as when the detainee was placed onto the stretcher.

b. The detainee will be placed face down on the bunk, with the detainee’s head furthest away from the cell door.
   
   (1) The restraints will be removed in the following manner (if predetermined prior to initiating the move), these instructions would be given during the briefing.

   (2) The number two person will remove the wrist restraints and announce to the team, "HANDS UNSECURE". Then secure the restraints on their person readily available for use, as applicable.

   (3) The number four person will remove the leg restraints and announce to the team, "LEGS UNSECURE". Then secure the restraints on their person readily available for use, as applicable.

   (4) The number one person will secure the detainee’s head to prevent injury to the detainee or any member of the team, using minimum amount of force necessary.

   (5) The number three person will assist the number two person by holding the detainee’s hands behind the detainee’s back using PPCT.

   (6) The number four person will assist the number five person by crossing the detainee’s legs and folding them against the detainee’s body and applying pressure to keep them secure, using minimum amount of force necessary.

6. The team will exit the cell in the following manner:
   
a. Each team member, at the direction of the team leader, will exit the cell opposite from the way that they came in, beginning with the number five person. As they exit each team member will stand in the ready position outside the cell prepared to reenter if necessary.

b. When exiting each team member will sound off with "five out", "four out", "three out", the number two and number one person will temporarily continue to restrain the detainee on the bunk.

c. The number two person will be positioned on top of the detainee’s legs. The number one person will be positioned across the detainee’s head while securing the detainee’s hands behind his back.
d. When ready, the number one person (using a prearranged non-verbal signal), will signal the number two person when prepared to exit, the number two person will signal the number one person in return.

e. The number one person will then signal the number three person that they are preparing to exit the cell. The number three person will then grab the number two person, the number two person will grab the number one person and they will exit the cell simultaneously. The OIC will have the cell door closed as the number one person clears the cell doors.

f. Once the entire team is outside of the cell the team leader will command the team to depart the area.

USE OF PEPPER SPRAY ON AN UNRULY DETAINEE

INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDENT

Given a situation with a person role playing as an unruly detainee that is involved in one of the following circumstances:

1. The detainee has a weapon.
2. The detainee is barricaded inside the cell.
3. The detainee is nude with a slippery substance on his body, the cell walls and floor.
4. The detainee cannot be approached without risk of serious physical injury to the detainee or others.
5. Approaching the detainee may result in a major disturbance or serious property damage.

You are given restraints and (OC) Pepper Spray, you must properly spray and secure in restraints the unruly detainee. Move the detainee out of the cell or area, ensure decontamination is accomplished and place the detainee in a predesignated cell, using minimum amount of force necessary.

The OIC orders the team to the detainee’s cell:

a. Once in front of the cell the number two person (only at the direction and authorization of the Installation commander) will spray the detainee in the following manner:

(1) Hold the (OC) spray dispenser in the strong hand, extended out and away from the body in front of the number one person, aiming at the detainee’s eyes, nose and mouth.

(2) Press the actuator with the thumb, using two one-second bursts, spray the detainee’s face. (This may need to be repeated as necessary to achieve a positive affect.)

(3) The team will wait a minimum of six seconds (IAW local SOP) after the detainee has been sprayed to observe the detainee for one or more of the following responses:

(a) Eyes closed, difficulty breathing, loss of balance, muscle dysfunction, and falls to the ground.

(b) No reaction, detainee just stands in place.

(c) The detainee becomes aggressive, more violent, agitated and wants to engage in physical contact with the team.
(4) While observing the detainee's reaction this also gives the team time to wait and avoid any secondary vapor effects from the spray prior to entering the cell.

(5) The OIC will ensure that the cell door is opened and the team enters and secures the detainee in restraints and moves the detainee out onto the tier for the medic to decontaminate him. (Apply a second set of restraints if applicable.)

(6) After Decontamination: The team moves the detainee back into the cell and removes the restraints if ordered, then exits the cell, as discussed earlier in this lesson.
TEAM BRIEFING STATEMENTS

Upon being briefed by the OIC each team member will step forward in front of the camera and state their mission.

The number one person will say:

"I am (ie: SGT Jones) ; I am the number one person. My mission is to pin the Detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary."

The number two person will say:

"I am (ie: SGT Jones) ; I am the number two person. My mission is to secure the Detainee’s Right arm and apply the wrist restraints to the Detainee’s wrists using the minimum amount of force necessary. I will carry the wrist restraints."

The number three person will say:

"I am (ie: SGT Jones) ; I am the number three person. My mission is to secure the Detainee’s Left arm and assist the number two person with applying the wrist restraints to the Detainee using the minimum amount of force necessary."

The number four person will say:

"I am (ie: SGT Jones) ; I am the number four person. My mission is to secure the Detainee’s Right leg and apply the leg restraints to the Detainee’s legs using minimum amount of force necessary. I will carry the leg restraints."

The number five person will say:

"I am (ie: SGT Jones) ; I am the number five person. My mission is to secure the Detainee’s Left leg and assist the number four person in applying the leg restraints to the Detainee’s legs using the minimum amount of force necessary. I am the team leader for this mission, I am also responsible for ensuring that the team uses the minimum amount of force necessary at all times."
FOR THE COMMANDER:

Official:          JOHN DOE
                  COL (P), GS
                  CHIEF OF STAFF

JOHN SMITH
COL, GS
AcofCS, G2

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Summary. This SOP outlines procedures for screening local national employees to ensure the force protection posture is maintained throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Applicability. This SOP applies to the force protection team assigned to Karshi-Khanabad Airbase or attached to support OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

Management Control. Supplementation of the regulation is prohibited without prior approval from 19th ABN Corps, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, APO AE 09xxx.

Interim Changes. Interim changes to this circular are not official unless they are approved by the J2X office and authenticated by the J2X, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

Suggested Changes. The proponent of this circular is the J2X, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. Users may send suggestions to improve this regulation on DA Form 2028:10: Commander, 19th ABN Corps, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, ATTN: J2, APO AE 09xxx.
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program.

1. References. The following is a list of references used for the development of this SOP:
   c. Counterintelligence Team 1-1/Tactical HUMINT Team 2-1 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for deployment.

2. General. United States Armed Forces deployment to global theaters of crisis requires a very large support apparatus. The US government recognizes this need and awards contracts to various civilian companies in order to meet the daily mission and personnel demand for such a large force. The civilian contractors hire non-US citizens and local national civilians or Locally Employed Persons (LEPs) to meet their contract obligations with the US government. Base Operations among other duties and responsibilities is principally responsible for the overall security and safety of the facility and for ensuring a high-state of force protection for the units and personnel assigned to do operations at the Bagram Air Base.

   a. Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) conduct security-screening interviews to minimize chances of high-risk local nationals being hired by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) contractors in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). LEP Security Screening is a high priority mission designed to enhance security and the force protection posture of OEF units. The program focuses on employees hired by US employers such as Brown & Root Service Corporation (BRSC), Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Stratex, Titan/BTG Systems Interpreting, World Wide Language Resources Incorporated (WWLR), etc.
b. OEF J2 has identified the LEP Security Screening Program as an essential element in the overall force protection plan for the base. The intent of this program is threefold in that it serves to:

(1) Identify LEPs who represent a real or potential threat to their safety and security of OEF soldiers, civilians;

(2) Collect perishable force protection information; and

(3) Identify security shortfalls or weaknesses witnessed by local nationals that would otherwise go unreported.

4. Background.

a. A screening team consists of 97 series or 35 series (Counter Intelligence) screeners and a Category II Interpreter. A 31 series (Military Police) may be used in lieu of the above specialties as long as there is a military intelligence component assigned to assist in the overall operation. In cases where employees are sufficiently fluent in English, in that they are able to comprehend and answer the questions, the screening team interpreter may not be necessary.

b. The Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS), Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) awarded a contract to the US Corporation WWLR, to provide OEF with competent: English/Russian, English/Uzbek, English/Dari and English/Pashtu speakers. Proficiency in the local language is necessary to assist US forces in the performance of their mission in regional deployment. BRSC also hires interpreters for use in communications with their local national employees performing various missions throughout OEF. There are three categories of interpreters:

(1) Category I: Local civilians hired for their ability to speak English, and who reside near the units they support. These interpreters are screened by the THT prior to being hired and are not granted security clearances.

(2) Category II: US citizens hired for their ability to speak the local theater language. These interpreters reside with the units they support, are screened by INSCOM Counterintelligence Agents prior to being hired by the language contractor, and are granted a SECRET security clearance to support mission requirements pending National Agency Checks (NAC) and Entrance National Agency Checks (ETNAC).

(3) Category III: US citizens hired for their ability to speak the local theater language. These interpreters reside within the units they support, are screened by INSCOM Counterintelligence Agents prior to being hired by the language contractor, and are granted a TOP SECRET security clearance to support mission requirements pending National Agency Checks (NAC) and Entrance National Agency Checks (ETNAC).

c. BRSC is a US corporation contracted by the DCMC to provide multiple services to US forces deployed to overseas locations. BRSC provides basic life support services.
ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

including construction, maintenance, and quality of life items. They typically employ the largest number of LEPs and usually have the highest turnover of personnel. Their turnover is usually due to the following reasons: security violations, employee conduct, stealing or possessing items prohibited by BRSC policies, health, and job dissatisfaction.

d. AAFES and WWLR Category I interpreters represent the smallest percentage of LEPs employed by OEF. Although these companies employ the smallest percentage of LEPs, their salaries are typically significantly higher than those paid by BRSC.

5. Responsibilities.

a. S-2 (Base Operations):

(1) Has overall responsibility for ensuring that all foreign personnel are screened prior to entering the base camp.

(2) Tasks HUMINT elements to support the LEP screening process.

(3) Ensures the HUMINT Analysis Requirements Cell (HARC) provides analytical products and support to the LEP screening cell.

   (a) Searches the personalities database.

   (b) Updates to HUMINT requirements.

b. MI Company Commander/Operational Management Team (OMT):

(1) Provide HUMINT support to LEP screening cell.

(2) Ensure THTs are conducting LEP screening missions in accordance with the LEP SOP.

(3) Identify LEPs for detention if they match personalities on the high value target list.

c. THT: The THT is responsible for managing, coordinating, and directing screening efforts at Bagram Air Base. The THT will maintain a current and historical database on LEPs employed throughout the base. It also assists in the management and development of various components and data associated with the Biometrics identification and badging system.

(1) Officer in Charge:

   (a) Establish, maintain, and distribute an SOP for LEP security screening operations at Bagram Air Base with the approval of Base Operations Commander.
ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

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(b) Manage and direct LEP screening missions of all LEPs at Bagram Air Base. This includes adding Persons Under US Control (PUC) that are detained at the Bagram Collection Point.

(c) Identify potential SAEDA cases through LEP screening, and request that counterintelligence agents from military intelligence assets conduct initial investigations.

(d) Ensure appropriate force protection reports (FPIR, Spot Report, Initial SAEDA, etc.) are submitted within established timelines and procedures.

(e) Review completed screenings to ensure all pertinent information is being obtained. Provide guidance as necessary to screeners.

(f) Review all screening sheets for potential intelligence value and leads for further exploitation.

(g) Establish the database for LEP and PUC security screenings and make this database available for HUMINT analysis.

(h) Maintain functional file system that includes a hardcopy and photo of all LEP and PUC screenings conducted.

(2) Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge

(a) Coordinate with contractors and BRSC to schedule LEP screenings and re-screenings. Arrange screening dates so that they occur prior to the expiration date shown on the badge.

(b) Maintain LEP Security Screening database of all current and past LEPs. Ensure records of terminated personnel are updated, to include specific reasons for dismissal.

(c) Produce and distribute a memorandum of completed screenings that includes the date, name, and company of the LEP screened, within one week of the screening. A copy of the memorandum will be provided to the local Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) and LEP employer. A THT office copy of the memorandum will also be maintained. Refer to Annex G for a sample of this memo.

(d) Conduct liaison with the US employers, i.e., AAFES, WWLR, BRSC, etc., and other Contracted Designated Representative Liaison personnel to receive monthly roster updates of current employees, new hires, and terminations. Include explanation. Refer to Annex H for BRSC termination codes.

(3) THT Members:

(a) Conduct LEP Security Screening and report results IAW this SOP.
(b) Perform pre-employment screening on all LEPs. LEPs in Class I should be given a higher security screening priority than LEPs in Classes II or III due to unescorted base access and the threats associated with it. If security screening duties exceed the capacity of the THT to effectively process and screen LEPs in a timely manner, the THT should screen Class I first, and Classes II and III in descending order of priority. (Refer to paragraph 6 for an explanation of the three different classes of employees.)

(c) Re-screen LEPs every six to eight months. A two month “grace period” is built into the re-screening timeframe to allow flexibility of schedules and the perceived “necessity” to re-screen individuals in sensitive positions.

(d) Conduct OPSEC and SAEDA briefings as part of each LEP screening and re-screening to include instructions on how to report significant information.

(e) Conduct informal conversations with LEPs by walking around the various work areas initiating conversations. Address security concerns and ensure they know how to report significant information.

(f) Conduct liaison with contractors to ensure passage of information.

(g) Maintain “a complete” roster of all LEPs and dates of screening as they occur. This is to ensure screenings are not duplicated within designated timeframes.

(h) Use only the approved Microsoft Access or Biometrics database, as appropriate, to record information obtained from screenings. Follow examples and procedures set forth in Annexes A-F. Update database within 48 hours of the screening.

(i) Query database information to support initial screening of LEPs.

(j) Conduct records checks in support of OEF upon receipt of request.

(k) Back-up database on compact disc and alternate computer daily.

6. LEP Employment Categories. All LEPs and Category I Interpreters/Linguists fall into one of three Security Screening Classes. Screening Class is determined by amount of interaction between LEP and base personnel, location of the LEP’s job, and LEP’s need of an escort while on base. The description of each screening class is as follows:

a. CLASS I: Personnel with unescorted access to the base at some time during the day or personnel in charge of subordinate LEPs. The following are examples of employees in this class (not inclusive): Category I Interpreters/Linguists, AAFES Personnel, Security Guards, and TAs / TGS / TFS:

   (1) Trusted Agents (TAs): Trusted Agents are utilized in positions where the threat is low enough to justify a person other than an armed soldier escorting LEPs around base.
(2) Trusted Gophers (TGs): Trusted Gophers are utilized as couriers that carry goods, or papers requiring a signature, from one site to another. They do not escort LEPs.

(3) Trusted Foremen (TFs): Trusted Foremen are utilized at a specific work area and remain at the work area in charge of LEPs until relocated by a TA. They do not escort LEPs.

b. CLASS II: Personnel that require an escort to move around outside the work area. The personnel have partial unsupervised access to their work area and contact with OEF soldiers is likely. The following are examples of employees in this class (not inclusive):

- General Laborers
- Cleaning Personnel
- Laundry Workers
- Dining Facility
- Drivers

- Class I Area
- Fuel Point
- Water Point
- Air Field
- Clerks

c. CLASS III: Personnel who work in cordoned off areas. Escorts are required for personnel to move around outside of the work area. Interaction with OEF soldiers is unlikely. The following are examples of employees in this class (not inclusive): BRSC facilities, AAFES warehouse personnel, etc.

7. LEP Security Screening Process

a. Phase I – Preparation:

(1) Determine which individuals need to be screened based on the guidance set forth in paragraph 6 (LEP Employment Categories) above. Prior to screening, must ensure individuals are medically cleared. Medical clearance is based upon test results verified by trained medical personnel and the nature/location of the individual’s position.

(2) Perform database search of personnel to be screened for any evidence of prior convictions, infractions, or other information that would make them a security threat to OEF. Other sources of information include: Lists of banned employees from US contractors, CPO, Provost Marshal, and US Embassy.

(3) Coordinate with US contractors and/or BRSC for time, date, and location of LEP security screening. Ensure names and passports of LEPs to be screened are obtained.

(4) Coordinate for Category II or Category III interpreters, if required, through WWLR or Titan/BTG Systems Interpreting.

(5) Coordinate for transportation as required for security screening.
(6) Coordinate for private rooms as necessary to complete the screening process.

(7) Ensure the screening room has a minimum of a table and three chairs available.

(8) Ensure a digital camera, blank screening sheets (Annex B), screening questions (Annexes C-E), prescreening information, as necessary, and extra paper and pens are available. The extra paper may necessary if SAEDA information is developed.

b. Phase II – LEP Security Screening Interview:

(1) In-process each LEP by taking role-call and by taking a digital photograph of them. Inform LEP that no conversations are allowed in the waiting room before or after the screening interview. Monitor LEP while seated in the waiting room to ensure they do not engage in conversation.

(2) Escort LEP into the screening room, explain why they are there, and establish rapport.

(3) Ensure that the screener:

(a) Assists interpreter in obtaining biographical information on the LEP for use in completing the LEP Screening Sheet (Annex B). The screener will make certain all data questions are answered and historical time periods are annotated.

(b) Attempts to determine additional information by focusing on force protection topics. Annexes C-E can be used to ask force protection questions. These annexes are not inclusive and are intended to serve as an example to assist the screener in formulating questions of their own based upon their Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) and regional mission objectives.

(4) Thank the LEP for his/her cooperation, if applicable.

(5) Ensure LEP is aware of how to report information in the future and the importance of reporting.

(6) Use back of the data-screening sheet to describe how the interview went. Write down enough information so that the reader can form an opinion of LEP honesty and cooperation, etc.

c. Phase III – Reporting Results:

(1) Use the following indicators gained through a complete screening to recommend that a local national be terminated or not be hired:

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(a) The LEP has a criminal background, associates with, or is directly involved with persons engaged in organized crime or black-marketing activities.

(b) The LEP appears to represent a threat to the safety and security of OEF soldiers and civilians due to mental instability.

(c) The LEP appeared deceptive in response to questions concerning contact with intelligence collectors of extremist and terrorist organizations.

(d) The LEP was previously fired by an OEF contractor for security reasons.

(e) The LEP refuses to answer questions and is uncooperative.

(f) The LEP has opinions and views so extreme in nature that they pose a real or potential threat to OEF soldiers and civilians.

(g) The LEP uses narcotics or other illegal drugs.

(h) The LEP has strong ties to any other governmental organization that has been identified as a threat to OEF.

(2) Report information obtained in proper format, i.e., SAEDA, DIIR, SIR, etc.

(3) Provide contractors and CPD a memorandum for record listing the LEPs that were screened. Refer to Annex E.

8. POC is the undersigned or the current OIC/NCOIC of the THT at 318-231-4312.

BILL SMITHE
COL, USA
Commanding

APPENDIXES:
Appendix A - LEP Database Instructions
Appendix B - LEP Screening Sheet
Appendix C - LEP Screening Question Guidance for New Hire
Appendix D - LEP Screening Question Guidance for Rehire
Appendix E - LEP Screening Question Guidance for Foreign Nationals
Appendix F - Assessment Write-up Example
Appendix G - Memo of Completed Screenings
Appendix H - BRSC Termination Codes
ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

DISTRIBUTION:

CJTF180 BDOC
Task Force Dragon BDOC
AAFES
BRSC
CPO
WWLR
STRATEX
ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP
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Appendix A – LEP Database Instructions

1. Access to the Local National Hire Database is restricted to Tactical HUMINT Teams. U.S. Contractors and Operation Enduring Freedom personnel may request information available in the database by altering Annex F to meet their needs. Release of information from the database to the requester must be approved by the local THT, and the Base Ops Commander.

2. Input data into the LEP Database using the following instructions: *(Note. All entries will be entered in all Capitals.)*

   a. DATE OF SCREENING – DD/MMM/YY.

   b. SCREENER – Input first and last name of screener.

   c. PASSPORT NUMBER.

   d. COUNTRY PASSPORT ISSUED IN – Spell Out.

   e. LAST NAME.

   f. FIRST NAME.

   g. OTHER NAMES – Such as a nickname or alias.

   h. PHOTO –
      
      (1) Photo size should be setup as follows in the Access database: Width-3.12; Height-2.37; Left-2.87; Top-1.54 but, adjust field to fit as necessary.

      (2) Photo should be taken with the following picture/camera settings: Resolution-300; 24-bit depth; Width-640; Height-480; File Type JPEG (JPG).

   i. GENDER – Use pull down menu on field by pressing arrow key next to field block.

   j. HAIR COLOR – Use pull down menu on field by pressing arrow key next to field block.

   k. EYE COLOR – Use pull down menu on field by pressing arrow key next to field block.

   l. HEIGHT – Inches only (i.e. 66).

   m. WEIGHT – Pounds only (i.e. 120).
n. DATE OF BIRTH – DD/MMM/YY.

o. PLACE OF BIRTH – City, Country. Spell Out.

p. LANGUAGES – Spell Out.

q. ETHNICITY – Spell out.

r. RELIGION – Use pull down menu on field by pressing arrow key next to field block.

s. EDUCATION – Years completed or highest level attained. (8 YEARS, PRIMARY, SECONDARY, TECHNICAL, TRADE, etc.).

t. COLLEGE MAJOR – Institution and dates of study. Focus of study.

u. BASECAMP – Self-explanatory (i.e. BAF),

v. EMPLOYER/CONTRACTOR – Use pull down menu on field by pressing arrow key next to field block.

w. EXACT WORK PLACE – Where employee performs job (DFAC, GYM, FUEL POINT, etc.).

x. POSITION – Current Position (CLEANER, INTERPRETOR, GENERAL LABOR, etc.).

y. DATE OF HIRE – DD/MMM/YY.

z. DATE OF RELEASE OR DATE BARRED FROM BASE – DD/MMM/YY.

aa. CURRENT and PREVIOUS RESIDENCES (from 1990 to present). DATES – Express as MMM/YY - MMM/YY or YYYY - PRESENT.

bb. ADDRESS – Street Address.

c. CITY – Self-explanatory.

dd. COUNTRY – Complete name of country.

e. PHONE NUMBER – Employee’s phone.

ff. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT (from 1980 to present). DATES – Express as MMM/YY - MMM/YY or YYYY - PRESENT.
ANNEX E- Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

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gg. FIRM – Name of person or firm for whom employee worked.

hh. POSITION AT FIRM – Title of employees job.

ii. ADDRESS AND COUNTRY OF FIRM – Self-explanatory.

jj. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION – List all international organizations. All Capitals.

kk. MILITARY EXPERIENCE – (YES/NO)

ll. UNIT/BRANCH OF SERVICE – Spell Out.

mm. RANK – Spell Out.

nn. SERVICE DATES – Express as MMM/YY - MMM/YY.

oo. STATIONED WHERE – Spell Out.

pp. DUTIES / TRAINING – Spell Out.

qq. VEHICLE MAKE / MODEL – Spell Out.

rr. VEHICLE YEAR / COLOR – Spell Out.

ss. VEHICLE LICENSE PLATE NUMBER – Spell Out.

tt. MARITAL STATUS – Use pull down menu on field by pressing arrow key next to field block.

uu. SPOUSE – Name of spouse; Capitalize first letter, Maiden name, Residence, Profession, Age.

vv. CHILDREN – Full name, Residence, Profession / Year in School, Age.

ww. FATHER – Full name, Residence, Profession, Age.

xx. MOTHER – Full name, Maiden name, Residence, Profession, Age.

yy. BROTHER / SISTER – Full name, Maiden name (if applicable), Residence, Profession, Age.

zz. REMARKS – Used to input additional information obtained during the interview that would not fit into current fields on the database.
LOCALLY EMPLOYED PERSON SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE

Screener ___________________________ Date of Screening _______________________
(First and Last Name)

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Tazkara #__________________________ Registry #__________________________ Book #________ Page #________

Passport #__________________________ Country of Issue____________________ Exp. Date________________

Last Name__________________________ First Name__________________________ AKA________________

Gender ____________________________ Hair Color__________________________ Eye Color________________

Ht./Wt. ______________ (Inches/Pounds) Date of Birth ______________________ Age __________________

Nationality________________________ Ethnicity__________________________ Religion________________

Education __________________________ (Years Completed, Degree/Major if applicable)

Birthplace __________________________ Language(s)______________________
(village/city, province and country)

EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION

Basecamp________ Contractor________ Work Location________ Position________

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CURRENT AND PREVIOUS RESIDENCES

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Current Phone Number__________________________
## ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

### OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

## MILITARY EXPERIENCE

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## FAMILY DATA

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## FOREIGN TRAVEL

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OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

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ANNEX E - Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP
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FOREIGN CONTACTS – GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Reason</th>
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CI Comments_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

I hereby swear or affirm that everything I have communicated during this interview is true. I also realize that any deception on my part will result in the termination of my job.

با امضا کردن این ورقه من قسم مخورم که معلومات که در این ملاقات من داشتم حقوقی دارد و ضموم متعلق هستم که اگر کدام چیزی غیر از حقوق باشد اجازه دخول در بس را از دست خواهم داد.

X________________________________________
ANNEX E- Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Appendix C - LEP Screening Question Guidance for New Hire

NEW HIRE

Below are key words and corresponding questions that should be addressed during screenings. Tailor your use of this question guide to the locality. Keep in mind how the employee’s baseline response behavior will be affected by questions asked, motivation to lie, and cultural differences. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive because of the situational diversity of the force protection mission. The key words are listed so a quick glance at them can help confirm all topics have been covered. AF—Afghanistan; UZ—Uzbekistan

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INTRODUCTION: (Suggestion for the Introduction: “The reason why you are here today is because our job is to preserve the peace. Since you are very familiar with the areas in which you live, shop and work, you may be aware of information that will help ensure the safety of everyone. We believe our presence here is helping your country and providing people like yourself with employment. We need you to help us by being truthful in response to the questions you will be asked. You will be asked to sign a statement regarding your honesty. If you have any questions, please ask them at this time.”

“The interpreter for today’s interview is an American citizen. All information you give will be guarded and your name will not be released as the source of information.”)

JOB RELATED: How did you first find out about this job? (Initial screening)

Were you forced to pay a fee to get a job here?

Do you know of anyone who is forcing people to pay a fee to get a job here?

AF—For Commanders—Do you receive fees or charge anybody to work here?

EMPLOYEE FINANCE:

How are your current finances, do you owe anyone money?

CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT:

Have you ever been fired from a job? When? Why?

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Have you, your family or friends ever been in trouble with the law or arrested? When? Why?

What countries have you traveled to? When? Why?

What organizations do you belong to?

OPINION:

How do you feel about the US presence here?

How do you feel about the establishment of the base camp?

How do you feel about the Afghan government?

OTHERS’ OPINION:

How do others feel about the US presence here?

How do others feel about the establishment of the base camp?

THREATS:

What threats are there to U.S. and Coalition Forces in this or other areas?

Have there been any strangers in your town/village?

GROUPS:

Do you know about any groups or individuals that are members of or support any terrorist or extremist groups in your local area?

Do you know about any terrorist or extremist activity in your area or elsewhere?

COLLECTION:

Has anyone ever approached you seeking information about your job on base, access to the base, base personnel, missions, etc.?

Has anyone offered you money or favors in exchange for information on this base camp?

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ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

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Have you seen anybody taking pictures or making notes about the base or the activities here?

BLACKMARKET: Do you know of anyone selling U.S./Coalition property downtown/in the bazaar such as supplies or equipment?

UNSAFE AREAS: Would it be safe for Americans to walk around in your city/village at night time?

Where would it be unsafe for them to go? Why?

FALSE ID: Do you know anyone that can make a false ID/Tazkara Card?

Has anyone asked to copy your ID/Tazkara Card?

Has anyone lost their ID/access badge recently?

WEAPONS: Do you know anyone that has large quantities of weapons?

Where are the caches of weapons, explosives and ammunition?

SECURITY: Do see any place around the base that you feel security is easy to bypass or is not sufficient?

Do you know of anyone stealing from the base/work place?

ILLEGAL DRUGS: Do you know of any soldiers or civilians using or selling illegal narcotics?

Have you ever used or sold illegal drugs?

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
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CATCH ALL: Is there anything that we haven’t discussed that you feel is important we talk about?

WRAP-UP: Do you have any questions for us?
Below are key words and corresponding questions that should be addressed during screenings. Tailor your use of this question guide to the locality. Keep in mind how the employee’s baseline response behavior will be affected by questions asked, motivation to lie, and cultural differences. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive because of the situational diversity of the force protection mission. The key words are listed so a quick glance at them can help confirm all topics have been covered. AF—Afghanistan; UZ—Uzbekistan

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

INTRODUCTION:

(Suggestion for the Introduction: “The reason why you are here today is because our job is to preserve the peace. Since you are very familiar with the areas in which you live, shop and work, you may be aware of information that will help ensure the safety of everyone. We believe our presence here is helping your country and providing people like yourself with employment. We need you to help us by being truthful in response to the questions you will be asked. You will be asked to sign a statement regarding your honesty. If you have any questions, please ask them at this time.”

“The interpreter for today’s interview is an American citizen. All information you give will be guarded and your name will not be released as the source of information.”

JOB RELATED: Do you feel that your employer has fair hiring practices?

Were you forced to pay a fee to get a job here?

Do you know of anyone who is forcing people to pay a fee to get a job here?

AF--For Commanders—Do you receive fees or charge anybody to work here?

EMPLOYEE FINANCE:

How are your current finances, do you owe anyone money?

Is your employer paying you the amount that you agreed to work for?
When payday arrives are you being paid on time?

CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT: Have you, your family or friends ever been in trouble with the law or arrested? When? Why?

What countries have you traveled to? When? Why?

What organizations do you belong to?

OPINION: How do you feel about the US presence here?

How do you feel about the establishment of the base camp?

How do you feel about the Afghan government?

OTHERS' OPINION: How do others feel about the US presence here?

How do others feel about the establishment of the base camp?

THREATS: What threats are there to U.S. and Coalition Forces in this or other areas?

Have there been any strangers in your town/village?

GROUPS: Do you know about any groups or individuals that are members of or support any terrorist or extremist groups in your local area?

Do you know about any terrorist or extremist activity in your area or elsewhere?

COLLECTION: Has anyone ever approached you seeking information about your job on base, access to the base, base personnel, missions, etc.?
Has anyone offered you money or favors in exchange for information on this base camp?

Have you seen anybody taking pictures or making notes about the base or the activities here?

BLACKMARKET: Do you know of anyone selling U.S./Coalition property downtown/in the bazaar such as supplies or equipment?

UNSAFE AREAS: Would it be safe for Americans to walk around in your city/village at night time?

Where would it be unsafe for them to go? Why?

FALSE ID: Do you know anyone that can make a false ID/Tazkara Card?

Has anyone asked to copy your ID/Tazkara Card?

Has anyone lost their ID/access badge recently?

WEAPONS: Do you know anyone that has large quantities of weapons?

Where are the caches of weapons, explosives and ammunition?

SECURITY: Do see any place around the base that you feel security is easy to bypass or is not sufficient?

Do you know of anyone stealing from the base/work place?

Have you over heard any of your coworkers speaking about stealing anything from the work place?
ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

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ILLEGAL DRUGS: Do you know of any soldiers or civilians using or selling illegal narcotics?

Have you ever used or sold illegal drugs?

JOB SATISFACTION:

Are you being fairly treated with respect by your coworkers?

Are you being fairly treated with respect by your supervisor?

Are you having any problems with your job?

CATCH ALL: Is there anything that we haven’t discussed that you feel is important we talk about?

WRAP-UP: Do you have any questions for us?

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ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP
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Appendix E – LEP Screening Question Guidance for Foreign Nationals
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Below are key words and corresponding questions that should be addressed during screenings. Tailor your use of this question guide to the locality. Keep in mind how the employee’s baseline response behavior will be affected by questions asked, motivation to lie, and cultural differences. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive because of the situational diversity of the force protection mission. The key words are listed so a quick glance at them can help confirm all topics have been covered. AF—Afghanistan; UZ—Uzbekistan

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

INTRODUCTION: (Suggestion for the Introduction: “The reason why you are here today is because our job is to preserve the peace. Since you are very familiar with the areas in which you live, shop and work, you may be aware of information that will help ensure the safety of everyone. We believe our presence here is helping your country and providing people like yourself with employment. We need you to help us by being truthful in response to the questions you will be asked. You will be asked to sign a statement regarding your honesty. If you have any questions, please ask them at this time.”

“The interpreter for today’s interview is an American citizen. All information you give will be guarded and your name will not be released as the source of information.”

JOB RELATED: How did you first find out about this job? (Initial screening)

Do you feel that your employer has fair hiring practices?

Do you know of anyone who is forcing people to pay a fee to get a job here?

EMPLOYEE FINANCE:

How are your current finances, do you owe anyone money?

CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT:

Have you ever been fired from a job? When? Why?

Have you, your family or friends ever been in trouble with the law or arrested? When? Why?
ANNEX E - Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

What countries have you traveled to? When? Why?
What organizations do you belong to?

OPINION: How do you feel about the US presence here?

How do you feel about the establishment of the base camp?

How do you feel about your government, and its involvement?

How do you feel about the US presence in your country?

OTHERS’ OPINION: How do others feel about the US presence here?

How do others feel about the establishment of the base camp?

THREATS: What threats are there to U.S. and Coalition Forces in this or other areas?

COLLECTION: Has anyone ever approached you seeking information about your job on base, access to the base, base personnel, missions, etc.?

Has anyone offered you money or favors in exchange for information on this base camp?

Have you seen anybody taking pictures or making notes about the base or the activities here?

BLACKMARKET: Do you know of anyone selling U.S./Coalition property downtown/in the bazaar such as supplies or equipment?

FALSE ID: Has anyone lost their ID/access badge recently?
ANNEX E-Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

SECURITY: Do see anyplace around the base that you feel security is easy to bypass or is not sufficient?
Do you know of anyone stealing from the base/work place?

Have you over heard any of your coworkers speaking about stealing anything from the work place?

ILLEGAL DRUGS: Do you know of any soldiers or civilians using or selling illegal narcotics?

Have you ever used or sold illegal drugs?

JOB SATISFACTION:
Are you being fairly treated with respect by your coworkers?
Are you being fairly treated with respect by your supervisor?

Are you having any problems with your job?

CATCH ALL: Is there anything that we haven't discussed that you feel is important we talk about?

WRAP-UP: Do you have any questions for us?
MEMORANDUM FOR S2 BASEOPS, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, 09354

SUBJECT: Assessment Write-up

1. The screening cell obtained information during an interview conducted on \textit{DATE}, which could impact on operations or security of the base.

2. Describe what relevant information was obtained during the interview. If it is a security issue, and the individual should be restricted from getting a badge or a current badge should be recovered, provide the name and other information as needed to identify the LEP.

3. The POC for this action is \textit{NAME OF SCREENER} AT 318-231-4312.

\textbf{Note: Information that may be relevant.}

(1) Threats to the base or coalition forces.

(2) Knowledge of personnel gathering intelligence about the base.

(3) Knowledge of persons making false ID cards.

(4) Knowledge of weaknesses in security at the base.

(5) Contacts with personnel who are opposed to the Afghan government, US, or other coalition forces.

(6) Comments about the LEP or other personnel having to pay a fee to get a job, pay a fee to maintain employment, contractors taking money out of their pay, or taking their tip money.
MEMORANDUM FOR S2 BASEOPS, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, 09354

SUBJECT: LOCAL NATIONAL SCREENING

1. The following personnel have successfully completed screening for the week of 15 September 2003 thru 21 September 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAST Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Tazkara/PP#</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>CMXXXXX</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>CMXXXXX</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>CMXXXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>CMXXXXX</td>
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</table>

2. The following personnel are not recommended for employment at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. Information obtained during the screening make them a potential risk to security at the base or to coalition forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAST Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Tazkara/PP#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. XXXXXXXX</td>
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<td>2. XXXXXXXX</td>
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<td>3. XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>CMXXXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>CMXXXXX</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. Point of contact is the undersigned at DSN: 318-231-4312.

Note: This will be completed weekly and turned in to S2, BASEOPS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>JUSTIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>JOB COMPLETE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>REDUCTION IN FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>DECEASED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09*</td>
<td>FAILURE TO WORK DURING POSSIBLE LABOR DISPUTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21*</td>
<td>HEALTH REASON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22*</td>
<td>EMPLOYEE DISABILITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>FAMILY REASONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>DEPENDENT CARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>TRANSPORATION PROBLEMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>MOVING AWAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>PERSONAL REASONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>WORK ELSEWHERE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH SUPERVISOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>RETURN TO SCHOOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH COMPANY POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH ANOTHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH LOCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH PAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>DISSATISFACTION WITH TYPE OF WORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>FAILURE TO REPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>JOB ABANDONMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>FIGHTING ON THE JOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74*</td>
<td>INSUBORDINATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>WALKED OFF THE JOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>SLEEPING ON THE JOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79*</td>
<td>DISOBEYED SAFETY REGULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80*</td>
<td>DISOBEYED INSTRUCTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82*</td>
<td>ATTENDANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85*</td>
<td>REFUSED JOB ASSIGNMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>UNSATISFACTORY JOB PERFORMANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>MISREPRESENTATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90*</td>
<td>VIOLATION OF ALCOHOL POLICY</td>
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<tr>
<td>91*</td>
<td>VIOLATION OF POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92*</td>
<td>SECURITY RELATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93*</td>
<td>VIOLATION OF DRUG POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98*</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* REQUIRES EXPLANATION
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
FOR THE FIELDING OF THE BIOMETRICS AUTOMATED TOOL
AT BAGRAM AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: Biometrics Automated Tool Fielding Plan

1. Background.

   a. Base Operations is responsible for providing command and control, administration, and logistical support to the units and personnel assigned to the Bagram Air Base. One of its other responsibilities is to develop and execute force protection plans that ensure the overall safety and security of the base. Contracts are awarded to civilian companies to meet the daily mission and personnel demands of the base. The civilian contractors hire foreign (non-US) and local national civilians, called Locally Employed Persons (LEP), to meet their contractual obligations.

   b. The Screening Cell conducts security screening interviews to minimize high-risk local nationals and foreigners from being hired that would jeopardize the security and safety of the base. LEP Security Screening is a high priority mission designed to enhance security and the force protection posture of US and Coalition forces at Bagram. The program focuses on Host Nation Nationals (HNN) and Third Country National (TCN) employees hired by US employers such as Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Stratex, Titan/PTG Systems Interpreting, World Wide Language Resources Incorporated (WWLR), etc.

   c. Information from the security screening process is forwarded to the Provost Marshall Office (PMO) and the S2 for review. The Base Commander is the final authority in determining whether to grant access privileges to the LEP. KBR issues the badges to the LEPs once they have been authorized access onto the base. Persons posing a risk to the security and safety of the facility are denied access and are not issued a badge.

   d. There are three primary security screening classes. Screening Class is determined by the amount of interaction between LEP and base personnel, location of the LEP’s job site, and the LEP’s need for an escort while on base.

      (1) Class I – Personnel with unescorted access to the base at some time during the day or personnel in charge of subordinate LEPs.

      (2) Class II – Personnel who require an escort to move around outside the work area. These persons have partial unsupervised access to the work area. Contact with OEF soldiers is likely.
(3) Class III – Personnel who work in cordoned-off areas. Escorts are required to move around outside the work area. Interaction with OEF soldiers is unlikely.

e. The current badging process presents a potential risk to the force protection of the base:

(1) Manually prepared badges can be easily duplicated and falsified. This allows unscreened local nationals to gain unauthorized access onto the base.

(2) Persons who have been terminated by their employer or who have quit their job voluntarily can also gain access if they continue to possess a badge that has not expired.

(3) Off post badges can be sold, traded, or stolen allowing a person to exchange the unauthorized off-post badge for an on-post badge in order to gain entry onto the base.

(4) Persons who are terminated from their job or fired from post could easily reapply for a new badge using a different alias name and a falsified zakara number. They could then be approved for a badge and granted access privileges to the base.

f. Correctly verifying and matching a LEP’s badge with their identity is extremely problematic due to the present system’s level of sophistication. With the large numbers of LEPs accessing the base daily, it is virtually impossible to detect and control the number and identity of persons entering the base.

g. Procurement of the Biometrics Automated Tool (BAT) hardware and software will provide Base Operations with a more comprehensive and effective way of managing and tracking the LEPs who have been screened for access onto the base. BAT will also provide a more reliable means of verifying the actual identities of LEPs against their badges as they enter and exit the base.

h. BAT enables users of the system to accurately verify authorized badge holders by matching scanned biological data collected from the LEP with information stored in the database about that individual. Through this system of checks, military personnel will be able to quickly identify, flag, and deny access to any person who has not been entered into the BAT database or who has previously been denied access.

2. Purpose. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishes a plan to effectively field BAT at the Bagram Air Base as part of it’s overall force protection plan. The MOU accomplishes this by identifying:

a. End state objectives

b. System hardware and software

c. Network requirements and configuration
ANNEX E - Locally Employed Person (LEP) Security Screening Program SOP

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

3. End State Objectives. During a meeting held on 22 September 2003, the following end state objectives were identified:

BAT will function as a stand-alone system operating as a fully integrated, comprehensive network within the C1OA. The database will be populated with all local nationals and foreign employees and employers working at the Bagram Air Base and Kabul. Other persons may be added to the system as it evolves based on military necessity. One database will be established that will include critical biological and counter-intelligence information about each LEP, collected during the security screening process. System access is restricted to key military and civilian personnel who contribute to base force protection and the security screening and badging process of the LEPs. BAT will enable system users to track and maintain situational awareness of the LEPs on a 24/7 basis in order to observe and enforce our own times and assist with overall base security. When fully fielded and operational, Base Operations will be capable of contracting the operations and management of the system to the private sector with limited government oversight.

4. BAT System Hardware

a. The table below depicts the major hardware components that are being procured with the BAT system. The table shows the recommended assignment of this equipment to the respective parties.
b. Listed below is a short description of what each peripheral piece of BAT hardware does:

(1) Panasonic Toughbook Laptop - This item is the Central Processing Unit (CPU). It is a highly durable, portable computer. Each computer can function as independent system or be networked with other computers as part of a bigger system. Peripheral hardware, as described below, may be added to expand the capability of each individual computer. BAT data may be stored on the computer or obtained through a server. Distribution: All Users.

(2) U.are.U Fingerprint Reader - This item is used for enrollment and identification at the screening points and authentication of badges at entry control points. This piece of equipment is inexpensive and lightweight. Distribution: All Users.

(3) CrossMatch Fingerprint Reader - This item is used to collect flat 10-print fingerprint records which are FBI and Interpol compatible. Having 10-print records on the LEPs will benefit you in the event of a criminal or other investigation. Distribution: Screening Cell, KBR, and PMO (Future – BCP).

(4) PIER Iris Reader - This item is used for enrolling and identification purposes at the LEP screening point. This device also operates "stand-alone" and can be uploaded with thousands of iris templates from BAT. It provides a mobile, portable biometric identification capability so that you can read irises to positively identify individuals on the spot, away from your access control points. It also stores alert information if the person is on alert. Distribution: Screening Cell, KBR, PMO, and All ECP Locations, except ECP-1A (Badge-Barcode Check Only).

(5) Fargo Badge Printer - This item is used to create state-of-the-art digitized badges for the BAT. Distribution: Screening Cell and KBR.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
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(6) Topaz Signature Pad - This item is used to apply signatures, i.e., card holder and authorizing agents, etc., to the badges. It also can be used to apply signatures to Adobe Fillable Forms, so that any DoD, DA, or other fillable forms added to their dossiers can be signed. Distribution: Screening Cell and KBR.

(7) Symbol Barcode Reader - This item is an omni-directional mountable barcode reader that can read badge numbers into BAT. When BAT is in "QuickMode" at entry control points, persons entering will scan their badges using the barcode reader and place their finger on the fingerprint reader. BAT will authenticate them in the system. Personnel manning the control point can see immediately if persons are on alert, have invalid, expired or revoked badges, or fail the biometric match. Distribution: All Users.

(8) Canon Digital Cameras - This item is integrated into BAT for taking face, photo and full-body photographs. BAT activates the camera, shows the "live" video stream for quality checks and aligning the subject, and snaps and imports the photos directly into the application. The BAT system performs face recognition as well, so the MPs or CI folks can submit photos against the BAT server to look for face candidates. Distribution: Screening Cell and KBR.

(9) USB Hub - allows you to hang more than 2 USB peripherals off of the system. Distribution: Same as Paragraph 4b(4).


a. Operation. The purpose of a network is to interconnect two or more computers or computer systems so that they can communicate.

(1) Wired networks require physical land-line wiring, usually standard Category 5 (Cat 5), Category 6 (Cat 6), or Category 6 (Cat 6). Lengths of wired networks are limited due to the constraints of sending data for long distances over wires. Typical maximum distance for a non-amplified or unassisted wire-based network is approximately 100m between network nodes. Amplifiers or other devices can be emplaced along the network lines to extend the distances, but the use of these requires physically locating the devices along the route and further requires power for these devices. Because the signal is on a land-line and the network system can be constantly self-monitored, most breaches are detectable.

(2) Radio wireless networks require essentially line-of-sight locations between transmission points. Although there are few obstructions on base, the performance is best when this line-of-sight is literal between the transmitting units, sometimes necessitating the use of towers to elevate the antennae. Depending on the radio frequency and power used for transmission, low-speed transmissions can be more than 20 miles between network nodes. Amplifiers or other devices can be emplaced along the network path to extend the distance, but the use of these requires physically locating the devices along the route and further requires power for these devices. Because the signal is a radio broadcast, breaches can not necessarily be detected. Software is available for free off of
the Internet. This software allows undetected, passive reception of radio broadcast network signals.

(3) Free Space Optical (FSO) wireless networks require line-of-sight locations between transmission points. Although there are few obstructions on base, operational performance requires literal line-of-sight between the transmitting units, sometimes necessitating the use of towers to elevate the transmission units. Depending on the transmission frequency and power output of the laser diodes, transmissions can be more than 6 miles between network nodes. Additional relay units can be emplaced along the network path to extend the distance, but the use of these requires physically locating the devices along the route and further requires power for these devices. Because the signal is laser broadcast, breaches are detectable.

b. System Security/Safeguards. Network security has two parts. First is signal security, where the actual data can be compromised in transmission. Second is physical security, where the actual data can be compromised by access to a physical device that stores or uses the data.

(1) Signal security.

(a) Signal security can be monitored on wired networks by maintaining physical security of the wired infrastructure, preventing unauthorized nodes from connecting, and preventing signal detection units from scanning the signals passively through the wired system.

(b) Signal security can be monitored on wireless radio networks by not allowing unauthorized traffic from entering the system. Monitoring unauthorized scanning of a radio wireless network is essentially impossible. A primary form of wireless radio network security is encryption, either standards-based encryption (Wireless Equivalency Protocol, or WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). Additionally, at additional cost, additional network traffic overhead, and additional complexity, Virtual Private Networking or additional levels of encryption can be used in addition to the standard network. Software is available for free off of the Internet. This software allows undetected, passive reception of radio broadcast network signals. Some software scans for signals and others still attack and decode WEP encryption. Higher-power transmissions and non-directional antennae make security breaches easier for the outsider.

(c) Signal security can be monitored on FSO networks by detecting breaches in the reception of the partner unit’s signal. Since FSO is an optical transmission, the only way to detect the transmission is to physically intercept it, which would cause the system to detect a breach. Additionally, since the devices are literally line-of-sight, any physical obstructions should be readily visible.
(2) Physical security. Physical Security is a concern in all cases of networking. Regardless of password access to files, encryption of files, or encryption of transmission, a compromised physical security site negates all other forms of security on a network.

(a) Screening Cell has such weak physical security that in order to maintain the integrity of the Screening Cell functions, a secure room must be made to house the server that operates the network and stores the informational database. Other proposed nodes are expected to maintain 24-hour manning, and would not necessarily require a secured room for the equipment (although all networks should maintain physical security).

(b) The entire Screening Cell facility should be hardened against casual breaches, including secure windows, doors, and locks. If an alarm system is used, this would improve security by a measured margin.

c. Recommended Network/Equipment. Based upon the current information available, the most practical equipment for the deployment of a secure wireless network for the screening cell biometrics system is the FSO Network:

(1) Ten (10) Free Space Optics wireless optical network transmission units.

(2) Two (2) 12-port switches.

(3) Ten (10) 700VA Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS).

(4) One (1) antenna mast comprised of four (4) 10' sections.

d. Possible Vendors. Preferred vendors and manufacturers should be utilized to streamline implementation and ensure product specification.

(1) fSONA Free Space Optical network transmission units, as sold by Alcatel.

(2) 3Com 12-port switches.

(3) APC UPS.

(4) Rohn 25G antenna mast sections.

e. Cost Estimate. Estimated cost for all items, not including any shipping charges and based entirely on previous experience, is approximately $110,000. Actual contract cost and specifics from Alcatel are pending.

f. Delivery Time. Estimated largest delay is three weeks time based on availability and shipping of antenna mast sections.

7. Screening Process. The Screening Cell OIC will be responsible for adapting the current SOP to meet the needs and specifications of BAT.
a. Base Operations is responsible for overall base security.

(1) S3 and Force Protection Officer are responsible for developing base force protection plan that assures integration with BAT.

(2) S2 is charged with ensuring that a system is in place to properly screen and badge all local nationals and foreign citizens prior to gaining access onto the base. S2 will be responsible for developing badging access categories and templates for BAT.

(3) Screening Cell manages, coordinates, and directs security screening efforts for the Bagram Air Base and Kabul.

b. Human Intelligence Team (HUMINT) support the Screening Cell. Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) screeners will conduct security screening interviews to minimize high-risk local nationals and foreigners from being hired. Screeners:

(1) Conduct pre-employment screenings on all LEPs at the time of initial hire.

(2) Rescreen LEPs every six to eight months following their initial hire. (A two month "grace period" is built into the re-screening timeframe to allow flexibility of schedules and the perceived "necessity" to re-screen individuals in sensitive positions.)

(3) Use a different interview format for each type of screening, i.e., initial local national, initial foreigner, re-screen, etc.

c. Screening Cell OIC will make any adjustments or modifications to the interview formats to make them compatible with BAT.

d. Screening Cell will maintain a current and historical database on all LEPs who have been screened. It will integrate the current database into BAT IAW paragraph 10a (1)-(5).

e. Screeners will enter information obtained during the screening process IAW established BAT database standards.

f. Screening Cell will ensure information collected from the security screening interviews is reviewed for accuracy. Information will then be checked against the existing database to verify previous entries/records, identify inconsistencies, and make modifications/changes to data. Any new information or records will then be added into database as appropriate.

8. Badging Process. S2 is responsible for establishing a SOP for issuing badges utilizing the BAT.
Badges should bear a watermark or hologram to prohibit counterfeiting and unauthorized duplication. Badges should not display an expiration date. Screeners will determine whether to reissue a new badge at the time of re-screening by making a visual inspection of LEP against the photo on their badge.

9. **Base Access Plan Interface**. **S3 and Force Protection Officer is responsible for establishing a SOP for Base Access Control utilizing the BAT.**

10. Data Management/Access

   a. Screening Cell is responsible for the overall transfer, update, and management of the database during and after BAT fielding. The vendor (Northrop Grumman IT) is expected to work with the Screening Cell in the conversion/transfer of data, and in the initial setup of the BAT system. The Screening Cell OIC will be responsible for:

      1. Identifying any unmet data needs in consultation with the S-2 that would add value to current LEP screening process.

      2. Identifying any irrelevant or redundant data in consultation with the S2 that should be purged from the database.

      3. Developing standards for the entry of data into the database to ensure consistency in how data is entered and facilitate the generation of queries and reports.

      4. Identifying reports, tables, and queries that would be useful.

      5. Loading current databases utilized by the KBR Badging Office and the Screening Cell into the BAT.

   b. Access to the BAT database will be limited on a need-to-know basis. Read-only and write privileges will be as follows:

      1. Screening Cell will have complete access to the database to ensure all the data is entered in a uniform and consistent manner.

      2. Screening Cell will function as the primary clearinghouse for all changes and updates to the database to ensure they are submitted through a single source to prevent contamination of the database.

      3. KBR will have read and write access privileges to the administrative portion of the database, and will be responsible for maintaining that portion.

      4. The S2, PMO, JDS/CI, and ECPs will have read-only access to the entire database.
(5) Requests to update database by those parties/persons without write privileges to the database will be submitted in writing to the Screening Cell OIC.

(6) The Screening Cell OIC will be responsible for developing a form to allow parties to submit changes and updates to the database.

11. Staging/Implementation Plan. Implementation of the BAT system will consist of three phases in order to bring the system into full operation.

a. Phase I. This phase will consist of receiving the equipment, training on the BAT system, establishing the network, and data transfer from existing databases to the BAT system.

(1) The PBO will issue equipment to the using units IAW the table in paragraph 4 of this MOU. Priority for fielding the equipment will be to the Screening Cell and BRS Badging Office, next the ECPs, and last the PMO, S2 and JDS/CI Team. All equipment over the current requirements will be issued to the Screening Cell OIC for accountability. BRS will ensure they have adequate supply of new badges for the BAT system IAW the S2’s plan for badges.

(2) Training on the system will begin as soon as possible after the fielding of the equipment. Priority for training on the equipment will be to the Screening Cell and BRS Badging Office, next the ECPs, and last the PMO, S2 and JDS/CI Team. Initially, the vendor will provide training to the end-users of BAT. Following this, Relief in Place (RIP) training will be the responsibility of the unit that is being relieved or replaced by another unit to perform its BAT duties and functions.

(3) A stand-alone network will be established at the Screening Cell building, and ECP 1. This network will be completely hard wired within the building and directly connected to stations at ECP1. Recommend using Optical Network to connect other remote sites as outlined in paragraph 5. In the interim, the database will be backed up on disk or zip drive, provided to the S2 or his/her designee and updated that night or the following morning at the remote sites. ECPs will have the priority on the database updates.

(4) The Screening Cell OIC will work with the personnel from Northrop Grumman IT to transfer the existing data into the BAT.

b. Phase II. This phase consists of issuing the new badges. Phase IIA will include a trial badging system for commanders, delegates, new hires, and rehires with expired badges. Phase IIB will include complete transition from the old badging system to the new badging system. This phase is dependant on the S2 completing the Badging SOP and determining types of badges required.

(1) Phase IIA will begin as soon as the Screening Cell and BRS Badging Office complete their training phase. The commanders and delegates will receive their badges
first during the trial period of the BAT. Any new hires or rehires with expired badges will receive the new badges also during this period. This period will continue until the BAT system is fully operational at ECP 1 and 5, and the screening, database entry, and badging are operational, and the operators are comfortable with the system.

(2) Phase II B begins once the BAT is operational at ECP 1 and 5, and the database is manageable. All new hires and rehires that expire in the next two months will go through the new process using the BAT system to receive their new badge. Rehires with an expiration date beyond the two month window will receive a new badge, but will require a new screening at their 6 month expiration date. Phase II B will end when all LEPs have the new ID card, and ECP 1 and 5 are using the BAT as the only means of gaining access to the base for LEPs.

c. Phase III. This phase consists of full implementation of the BAT system and preparation to turn over the Screening Cell Operation and Database Management to a private contractor.

(1) All remote sites will be established during this phase of the implementation, to include: ECP 3, S 2, PMO, and DS /CI Team room at screening cell building.

(2) The optical network will be up and operational for all sites.

(3) An approximate two-month period of operating the entire system to identify glitches in the system, troubleshoot them, and prepare to transfer authority of the BAT system to a civilian contractor. This phase will end when the system is contracted out and a civilian contractor is operating the system with oversight from the government.

12. Privatization Plan

a. The goal of BAT pursuant to the end-state objectives noted in paragraph 4 of this MOU is to eventually contract many of the current functions of the Screening Cell to KBR or another competent, qualified contractor.

b. Privatization of the Screening Cell functions would not be practical or prudent to occur until such time that BAT is fully implemented at Phase III as identified in paragraph 11c (1)-(3).

(1) S3 will be responsible for developing a statement of work in consultation with the S2 and Screening Cell OIC. Statement of work will address the following:

(a) Contractor manpower requirements.

(b) Overhead and incidental costs.

(c) BAT hardware and software to be provided by government.
(d) Level and type of government oversight necessary to support contractor.

(e) Services and deliverables to be provided by contractor.

(f) Maintenance plan and responsibilities.

(2) Contracting will announce request for bids/quotes for the operation of BAT.

(3) Contracts will be reviewed, and contractor will be awarded the contract.

(3) Execution of contract and statement of work.
Host Nation National (HNN) & Third Country National (TCN)
Badging & Security Screening Application Process

BRSC
- Take digital photo of HCN applicant
- Verify and make copy of Tazkara / Passport
- Complete initial information on HCN Badge Application
- Schedule medical screening
- Conduct PPD and Hep test
- Await results from PPD and Hep tests (about 2 days). If negative, schedule for initial security screening

Screening Cell
- Review and verify Tazkara / Passport
- Conduct initial security screening / interview
- Obtain and record pertinent biographical and counterintelligence information from interview
- Identify potential SAEDA case and request CI investigation
- Request CI agent review as needed
- Review HCN Badge Application
- Recommend approval / disapproval

PMO
- Review HCN Badge Application
- Recommend approval / disapproval

S2
- Review HCN Badge Application
- Recommend approval / disapproval

DCO
- Review HCN Badge Application
- (Escorted / Vendor) Approve / disapprove
- (Red & Blue)

CDR
- Review HCN Badge Application
- (Unescorted Vehicle) Approve / disapprove
- (Green & Yellow)
- Review and update records
- Forward application

Update database as needed

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
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Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

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F-1
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 1 (Lone Disorderly)

Respond to a Lone Disorderly Detainee.

1. MP observing unruly behavior of Detainee orders him to stop the behavior.

2. The order to stop is repeated two additional times if needed.

3. If behavior continues, (Sound the Alarm by blowing three short blast of the whistle) order Detainees not involved to move to the left or the right side of the cell away from the disorder and face away from the incident, and notifies SOG and OIC or NCOIC.

4. SOG notifies all MP (via Operations RTO) on shift of a minor emergency and its location.

5. One additional MP from unaffected cellblocks will rapidly respond to the incident, while the other MP’s secure the cellblocks and maintain control of those Detainees not involved in the situation. (MP’s in unaffected areas must be alert to any changes in Detainee behavior, note any unusual conduct and report it to the SOG). Upon Arrival to the effected area the senior responding NCO determines level of force required to quell the disturbance and takes appropriate action IAW the theater ROE and all applicable references. If necessary coordinates with SOG or NCOIC.

6. If necessary, SOG notifies NCOIC QRF to report to OIC or NCOIC.

7. OIC or NCOIC will order Detainee to stop the behavior and lay face down in the center of the cell facing away from the entrance.

8. If Detainee continues to disregard order, OIC or NCOIC will notify the QRF to initiate the Cell Extraction team procedures to prepare to enter the cell IAW Annex c appendix 8 of this SOP.

9. Operations will notify command IAW Wake up criteria during non-duty hours.

10. O/O after completion of the incident MP observing unruly behavior of Detainees completes Observation Reports.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 2 (Minor Disorder)

Respond to a Minor Disorder.

1. MP observing the unruly behavior of Detainee orders them to stop the behavior.
2. The order to stop is repeated two additional times if needed.
3. If behavior continues, (Sound the Alarm by blowing three short blast of the whistle) order Detainees not involved to move to the left or the right side of the cell away from the disorder and face away from the incident, and notifies SOG and OIC/NCOIC.
4. SOG notifies all MP (via Operations RTO) on shift of a minor emergency and its location.
5. One additional MP from unaffected cellblocks will rapidly respond to the incident, while the other MP’s secure the cellblocks and maintain control of those Detainees not involved in the situation. (MP’s in unaffected areas must be alert to any changes in Detainee behavior, note any unusual conduct and report it to the SOG). Upon Arrival to the effected area the senior responding NCO determines level of force required to quell the disturbance and takes appropriate action IAW the theater ROE and all applicable references. If necessary coordinates with SOG/NCOIC.
6. If necessary, SOG notifies NCOIC QRF to report to OIC/NCOIC.
7. OIC/NCOIC will order Detainees to stop the behavior and lay face down in the center of the cell.
8. OIC/NCOIC will order Detainees, one at a time to stand and move to the front of the cell to have restraints applied, QRF/Escorts will apply restraints and escort to ISO.
9. If Detainees continue to disregard order, OIC/NCOIC will secure the cell by posting QRF as augmentation while waiting for additional response force IAW Major Disorder.
10. Operations will notify command IAW Wake up criteria during non-duty hours.
11. O/O after completion of the incident MP observing unruly behavior of Detainees completes Observation Reports.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 3 (Major Disorder, Mass Riot, Hostage)

Respond to a Major Disorder, Mass Riot, or Hostage.

1. MP observing the unruly behavior of Detainees orders them to stop the unruly behavior.

2. The order to stop is repeated two additional times if needed.

3. If behavior continues, (Sound the Alarm by blowing three short blast of the whistle) order Detainees not involved to move to the left or the right side of the cell away from the disorder and face away from the incident, and notifies SOG and OIC/NCOIC.

4. SOG notifies all MP (via Operations RTO) on shift of a major emergency and its location.

5. One additional MP from unaffected cellblocks will rapidly respond to the incident, while the other MP's secure the cellblocks and maintain control of those Detainees not involved in the situation. (MP's in unaffected areas must be alert to any changes in Detainee behavior, note any unusual conduct and report it to the SOG). Upon Arrival to the effected area the senior responding NCC determines level of force required to quell the disturbance and IAW the theater ROE and all applicable references coordinates with SOG/NCOIC/OIC.

6. OIC/NCOIC determines level of force required to quell the disturbance. If necessary, coordinates with Confinement OIC and Facility Commander.

7. SOG notifies NCOIC QRF to report to OIC/NCOIC.

8. OIC/NCOIC will determine if a larger force is to be alerted.

9. Operations will notify command IAW Wake up criteria during non-duty hours.


11. O/O after the incident the MP observing unruly behavior of Detainees completes Observation Reports.

12. OIC/NCOIC will isolate the disturbance awaiting support and guidance from the Confinement OIC or Facility Commander.

13. Alerted personnel will rendezvous at the Entrance Point near the QRF area and wait for further instructions.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 4 (Fire)

Respond to a Fire.

1. MP observing the fire calls “Fire!, Fire!, Fire!”, and the location of the fire.

2. Soldiers initiate fire-fighting procedures.
   a. Use available extinguishers if safe to do so.
   b. Use available fire buckets and water resources if safe to do so.

3. MPs will relay notifying SOG and OIC/NCOIC.

4. SOG notifies QRF to post in the Recreation Towers in preparation for Facility evacuation.

5. SOG notifies Operations of situation and location of fire.


7. If a particular cell/compound is in immediate danger from the fire, escorts will evacuate that cell and moves Detainees to the Recreation Area. All Detainees will be restrained prior to movement with hand and leg irons unless risk of loss of life is imminent. If not restrained prior to movement, all Detainees will be restrained while in the recreation yard.

8. Escorts conduct headcount once assembled on recreation yard and report count to SOG.

9. After the fire is extinguished, escorts will return Detainees to appropriate cell. Recreation towers will remain manned until headcount is cleared.

10. SOG/OIC initiates headcount.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 5 (Escape)

Respond to an Escape.

1. Escape Detected By Eyewitness.
   
   a. MP observing escape attempt alerts all personnel with three blasts on their whistle and yell halt at a minimum of three times. MP will secure escape route and remaining Detainees if needed.
   
   b. MPs hearing the whistle will notify SOG of the direction and location.
   
   c. SOG notifies escorts, QRF, and Roving Patrol of the location of the whistle.
   
   d. SOG notifies Operations of situation and location of escape.
   
   e. Floor Guards lock down all cells and compounds.
   
   f. Main Gate/Sally Port secures main entrance to facility and only allows on-duty personnel to enter.
   
   g. Escorts secure any perimeter breaches.
   
   h. Operations notifies R & U, if needed to repair affected areas. R & U will have concertina wire staged for such emergencies.
   
   i. SOG and MP conduct headcount and identify all missing Detainees.
   
   j. Operations notifies PMO and CJTF-7 of escape and provides Escape Notification Card with Detainee photo, name, and description.

2. Escape Detected By Headcount.
   
   a. MP observing headcount discrepancy immediately recounts the headcount.
   
   b. If a discrepancy remains, the MP notifies SOG.
   
   c. SOG conducts a headcount and identifies all missing Detainees.
   
   d. If the headcount is still incorrect, the SOG notifies OIC/NCOIC.
   
   e. OIC/NCOIC conducts a headcount and identifies all missing Detainees.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

f. If a discrepancy remains, the OIC/NCOIC will initiate a lockdown and notifies QRF.

g. Floor Guards lock down all cells and compounds.

h. OIC/NCOIC notifies Operations of situation.

i. Operations notifies QRF/Roving Patrol to search exterior areas of facility.

j. Operations notifies R & U, if needed to repair affected areas.

k. Operations notifies PMO and CJTF-7 of escape and provides Escape Notification Card with Detainee photo, name, and description.

l. Escorts secure any perimeter breaches.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 6 (Bomb Threat)

Respond to a Bomb Threat.

1. A runner will be used to ensure that all soldiers are aware that they must turn off all radios.

2. Soldiers do not touch a suspected bomb.

3. SOG notifies QRF to post in the Recreation Towers in preparation for Facility evacuation.

4. SOG notifies Operations of situation and location of bomb if known.

5. Operations notifies EOD, PMO and CJTF-7 of route to facility and marked route to bomb.

6. If a particular cell/compound is in immediate danger from the bomb threat, Escorts evacuate that cell and moves Detainees to predesignated locations in the Recreation Area. (Which must be searched for any secondary IED's prior to placing anyone in that area) All Detainees will be restrained prior to movement with hand and leg irons or flexicuffs unless there is imminent risk of loss of life. If not restrained prior to movement, all Detainees will be restrained while in the recreation yard. (Note: when bunkers have been installed inside the perimeter fence, Detainees will be escorted to predesignated bunkers.)

7. Escorts conduct headcount once assembled on recreation yard and report count to SOG.

8. After the bomb threat is cleared, escorts will return Detainees to appropriate cell. Recreation towers will remain manned until headcount is cleared.

9. SOG/OIC will direct all headcounts.
Inspect a Cell.

1. MP and QRF assemble for entry.

2. Over watch posts in sufficient number to cover down on all cells, including cells to be inspected.

3. Interpreter announces cell inspection using PA system.

4. Instruction is given to Detainees to prepare and position themselves for cell inspection, including removal of any Detainee in any cellblock.

5. Security team enters a cellblock, followed by the inspection team. OIC/NCOIC will remain outside of the cells to provide command and control.

6. Security team stands watch over Detainees to ensure safety of the inspection team.

7. Inspection team proceeds with search of cell and personal belongings of each Detainee:
   a. Search personal belongings on the opposite side that the Detainees are positioned.
   b. Take care to not damage or show disrespect to Quran and any personal belongings.
   c. After search of personal belongings, perform pat down search of each Detainee by having them stand facing away from the guard performing the search with his feet spread approx shoulder width apart and arms out to the sides parallel to the ground palms facing upward.
   d. Secure any contraband and its owner. Record contraband items with the SOG or the OIC/NCOIC.

8. After completion of the search, the inspection team, followed by the security team will exit the cellblock, ensuring that they are prepared to reenter if needed.

9. Steps are repeated as necessary in other cells.

10. Cells are re-secured and returned to operational condition at the completion of all inspections.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 8 (Cell Extraction)

General Population Cell Extraction.

1. MP and QRF assemble for entry. QRF will wear the following equipment:
   a. Flak Vest
   b. Shin/Knee guards
   c. Elbow pads
   d. Helmet w/Face Shield
   e. Shield (Protective or Pinning)
   f. Gloves (Leather)
   g. Set of leg and hand restraints, (Flexi-cuffs preferred)

2. Instruction is given to Detainee to prepare and position themselves for cell inspection, including removal of any Detainee in any cell/area. Detainees will be positioned so that they are prone facing back of the cell with their hands behind their back.

3. Instruction is given to Detainees in the target cell to move away from the Detainee to be removed and stay at the rear of the cell facing away from the entrance.

4. Extraction teams move onto the tier and position themselves directly in front of the cell door in preparation to enter the cell.

5. Security team enters a cell, followed by the extraction team as applicable.

6. Security team stands watch over non-combatant Detainees to ensure safety of the extraction team.

7. Extraction team enters the cell and restrains the Detainee with appropriate restraints (using ONLY the minimum amount of force).

8. The extraction team removes the Detainee from the cell, and searches the Detainee.

9. The Detainee is medically evaluated/treated as needed by the on-duty medic.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

10. The Detainee is placed into a predestinated cell and the cell is re-secured and returned to operational condition.
Headcounts.

1. Headcounts are performed to maintain accountability of Detainees. To facilitate this task, headcounts will be made at scheduled and unscheduled times throughout the day.

   a. Scheduled Headcounts. The following procedures apply for conducting scheduled headcounts:

      (1) SOG directs floor guards to conduct headcounts on main floor three times per shift and another at shift change. SOG directs a three-point check for headcount consisting of the face, badge, and wristband.

      (2) ISO cell guards perform cell check/headcount every 15 minutes.

      (3) After headcounts are completed, stations will –

         (a) Annotate in the log book the number assigned/number present and status of not present by Detainee Number.

         (b) Report the location if not present such as (transport of Detainees to appointment etc.) as “Not Present” during headcount until transfer of custody of the Detainee is confirmed by Operations.

   b. Unscheduled Headcounts. The following procedures apply for conducting unscheduled headcounts. Unscheduled headcounts will be performed whenever a situation arises requiring a headcount at that moment, including, but not limited to, power outages, major disorder, etc, or by the direction of Operations, Confinement OIC, and Team OIC.

   c. Sleeping Headcounts. SOG directs a sleeping headcount of the main floor at 2100Z, once more before midnight and at a minimum of once between midnight and reveille. Sleeping headcount is completed by a floor guard visually verifying each Detainee by seeing skin and that they are breathing.
Annex F EXAMPLE MP Battalion SOP Emergency Action Plan

Appendix 10 (Restraints)

Restraints.

1. Responsibilities. OIC/NCOIC/SOG ensures all Guard Personnel are familiar with the Facility SOP on Restraints.

2. Procedures.

   a. OIC/NCOIC/SOG will ensure that all new arrivals are placed in restraints when signed over to the Facility S-3 Ops section.

   b. New Detainee arrivals will be held in the holding room, where any form of restraints that they arrived with will be removed.

   c. OIC/NCOIC will ensure that new Detainee arrivals have goggles and earmuffs placed on them before original leg and hand restraints are removed and our facility leg and hand irons are placed on the new Detainee.

   d. Hand irons will be placed on the Detainee with the double lock up and the keyhole facing out. The cuffs will be loose to where a finger can fit snugly between the Detainee’s wrist and the hand irons when they are double locked.

   e. Leg restraints will be placed on new Detainees from the rear with the keyhole up and the double lock to the rear. Leg irons will be loose to where a finger can fit snugly between the Detainee’s leg and the leg iron.

3. When moving a Detainee within the facility, Detainees will be restrained as outlined above except when a Detainee is moved to an IR room, when the double lock on the leg irons will be used for Detainee safety.

4. When a Detainee is escorted to the latrine/shower the hand irons will always be used and upon arrival at the latrine/shower they will be removed (leg Irons then hand Irons) after arrival to the latrine/shower but will be replaced after use of the latrine/shower prior to returning him to the cell.
References

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- AR 190-8, Subj: Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Oct 97
- AR 190-47, Subj: Army Corrections System, 15 Aug 96
- FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 Aug 01
- Standards for Administration of Correctional Agencies, 2nd ed, American Correctional Association, Apr 93
- Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, 4th ed, American Correctional Association, Jan 03
- Standards for Small Jail Facilities, American Correctional Association, Jan 89
- Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities, American Correctional Association
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug 49
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug 49
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- Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for Prisons in a Free Society, Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice, 15 Jun 03
- Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 May 77
- Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14 Dec 90
- Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9 Dec 88
- United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14 Dec 90
- Practical Guidelines for the Establishment of Correctional Services within United Nations Peace Operations, International Corrections and Prisons Association for the Advancement of Professional Corrections (ICPA), 19 Apr 02 (Draft).
- The Treatment of Foreign Prisoners, Gary Hill (American Correctional Association International Committee), Sep 02
- A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management: Handbook for Prison Staff, Andrew Coyle (International Center for Prison Studies)
OFFICE OF THE
PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

CJTF-7 DETENTION OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE VISIT

6 Nov 03

MG Donald J. Ryder
Provost Marshal General

OFFICE OF THE
PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

Agenda

- Mission
- Background
- Methodology
- Observations/Recommendations (9 Subject Areas)
- Conclusion
Team Mission

- Cdr, CJTF-7 requests a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations in Iraq...assist in resolving the management and administration of detainee operations.
  - The team must be prepared to make specific recommendations and identify the resources required to ensure that detainees are held and processed in accordance with the requirements imposed by U.S. and international law.
  - The focus of the team will be to identify problems, propose solutions and recommend the resources necessary to implement the solutions. A report that merely documents problems will not be helpful.
- Restated Mission: We view our team in an assistance role, as part of the CJTF-7 Team. A key aspect of the mission is to make recommendations on how to bridge from current operations to an Iraqi-run prison system that is synched with CPA plans, and adequately address general detention operations and management, legal/judicial systems, medical support and information systems management.

Background

- Oct 02, Saddam Hussein releases 100K inmates
- Antiquated/fragmented Prison infrastructure systematically disassembled and heavily looted during hostilities
- Jun 03, Publication of “Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for Prisons in a Free Society”
- Jun 03, CPA issues Order #10 and Memorandum #2: Management of Detention and Prison Facilities
- Jun 03 TOA, the 800th MP (I/R) Bde expands mission to include Security Internees, HVD, Criminal Detainees, and MEK
- Since Jun 03, CPA Ministry of Justice Prisons Department personnel departure inhibits progress
- 15 Sep 03, new CPA MOJ Prisons Department director arrives
- Impact of CPA turn-over mitigated by initiative of 800th MP (I/R) Bde and other Military Police Units in Theater
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Methodology

- Team Tasks (CJTF-7 Memo, dtd 11 Aug 03)
- Team Composition (PMG and 13 SME's in Corrections, MP I/R Doctrine and Employment, Legal, Medical & Automation)
- Command, Principal Staff and Soldier Interviews
- Site Surveys (32 Facilities)
- Focus:
  - U.S. Security Internee Operations; OIF 2 requirements
  - Coalition Support to CPA MOJ Prisons Department for Criminal Detainee/Iraqi Prisons; OIF 1 synchronization and transition plan
- Assistance packages and train-the-trainer program
Observations (12):
- CPA MOJ Prisons Department are proven experts in corrections, but under-manned, resulting in over-reliance on Coalition MP support
- 800th MP (I/R) Bde has used elements of several assigned MP (I/R) Bns and two Brigade LNO Dets to assist CPA MOJ
- Long-term vision or projected end-state for facilities, staff levels, or anticipated prison population is unclear
- Conflicting perceptions Abu Ghurayb Prison complex end-state

Recommendations (14):
- Enable CPA and Iraqi prison leadership; encourage rapid hiring of CPA MOJ Prisoners Department staff; solicit International assistance
- Encourage joint CPA/CJTF-7 centralized planning with decentralized execution; take advantage of current military structure till OIF 2
- Consolidate security internees at Abu Ghurayb (w/ separate HVD site); consolidate Iraqi Prison operations at large Regional Facilities
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Detainee Management (including movement, segregation and accountability)

- Observations (10):
  - CPA Memorandum #2, provides sufficient guidance to develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for the Iraqi prison system
  - Memo #2 cannot serve as a substitute for a detailed facility SOP; CPA MOJ is working on a more comprehensive facility operational guide
  - No military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices
  - Soldiers with previous military/civilian corrections experience employed more effective & appropriate procedures, knowing what “right” looked like

- Recommendations (33):
  - Remove all weapons from the interior and proximity of facilities; apply greater discipline to key/tool accountability; conduct USD/ROE training
  - Augment transition to OIF 2 forces with Active Component 95C/31E NCOs (MSG, 3 SFCs) at Abu Ghurayb and one squad at the HVD facility
  - Encourage CPA MOJ to rapidly hire expert trainers and mentors, or contract out Iraqi correctional officer training program

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Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections System

- Observations (7):
  - US Army MP doctrine calls upon specialized Theater-level MP units to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in the COMMZ
  - 800th MP (I/R) Bde has experienced challenges adapting its structure, training and equipment resources to its current mission-set
  - CFLCC has not requested a replacement MP (I/R) Bde for OIF 2
  - HQDA has approved a new Force Design Update to address new paradigm in I/R operations and expanding operational requirements.

- Recommendations (19):
  - Specifically identify those missions that require U.S. military police, vice general Coalition security forces or Iraqi police or correctional officers
  - Assign two MP (I/R) Bns to a MP Combat Support Bde to conduct security internment mission at Abu Ghurayb and HVD site; augment staff
  - OPCON one MP (I/R) Bn to BCT securing MEK Compound
  - Augment Division PMs with Corrections Experts (MP CPT, 2 95C NCOs)
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*Task Organization*

1st MP I/R Bn: Cp Ganci/Cp Vigilant, support Baghdad Central Correctional Facility
2nd MP I/R Bn: HVD Site, support CPA MOJ and Baghdad Jails
3rd MP I/R Bn: DS to 41D replacement for MEK mission and Jails

Brigade/Confinement Liaison Dets: One focuses on US Security internees and the second supports CPA MOJ and Iraqi Prisons

CS MP Bns: Missions assigned by Brigade Cdr IAW CJTF-7 OPORD

Augmentation to Div PM's in AO's w/o I/R Battalions: 1 MP Captain w/ Corrections experience, 1 Eng LT, and 2 95C Corrections NCOs

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*Integration of Military Detention & Corrections Operations with CPA; adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run system*

- **Observations (6):**
  - CPA MOJ efforts inhibited by a small staff, turn-over, security concerns, and a natural tendency to address individual facility issues
  - MPs generally lack experience/institutional knowledge to effectively work National prison system policy
  - Few MP officers and only 95C/31Es have experience in the operation of more complex long-term regional correctional facilities

- **Recommendations (8):**
  - Clearly separate security internee (Coalition Military mission) and criminal detention (CPA MOJ mission w/ military support) operations
  - Wean Iraqi Prison System from direct MP joint ops and supervision of prisons; CJTF-7 PM IAW CPA MOJ define transfer conditions
  - Fully integrate Iraqi leadership in planning and development of the corrections system; accelerate hiring of CPA/Iraqi/international staff
Detainee Medical Care, Health Management and Medical Operations Assessment

- Observations (12):
  - U.S. military providers cover many Iraqi responsibilities; delineation of responsibilities for health care is unclear between detainee categories
  - U.S. military medical units lack adequate personnel/vehicles to appropriately manage the detainee mission
  - Rapid turnover of U.S. military physician personnel creates additional concerns for appropriate correctional health care management

- Recommendations (17):
  - Contract with local Iraqi hospitals throughout the country for specialized and tertiary care of criminal detainees
  - Establish Regional corrections hospitals at the proposed facilities at Dahuk, Mosul and Basrah
  - Baghdad Central hospital should be expanded to provide all level III health care services, and medical logistical support

Detention Facilities that meet required Health, Hygiene, and Sanitation Standards

- Observations (13):
  - Significant variance in the health, hygiene and sanitation conditions in various facilities; ICRC reports major progress in all these areas
  - Most facilities have adequate water supplies, sewage management and appropriate food services to comply with United Nations guidelines
  - Present shortfalls in logistical support (equipment, medications, vehicles) for the Iraqi medical system are taxing the U.S. military system

- Recommendations (18):
  - Continue renovation projects of facility latrines/showers; use detainee labor to maintain sanitation standards
  - CPA MOH must increase logistical support to the Iraqi correctional health care facilities
  - The Baghdad Central Correctional Facility should be equipped to manage the chronically ill and special needs detainees
OFFICE OF THE
PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
Court Integration and Docket Management for Criminal Detainees

• Observations (9):
  – Docket management and release protocols play a significant role in population control and ultimately facility & staffing requirements
  – Mosul Central Booking Facility with onsite court facilities, coupled with timely investigative Courts a solid model for large urban areas

• Recommendations (22):
  – Hire a Court Administrator for the duties of Court Administration, Technology, Docket Management and Courthouse Security
  – Establish a Central Booking Facility at Russafa complex in Baghdad; explore opportunities for other such facilities across Iraq
  – Establish a relationship with the National Judicial College, and other public organizations of Judicial Education & Administration

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Detainee Legal Processing

• Observations (15):
  – Criminal Detainees are referred to the Iraqi Criminal process
  – Security Internees are interned under Article 78 of the Geneva Conventions
  – 4th ID has added a Review Panel of one MP officer, one MI officer and a Judge Advocate for release decisions
  – At present there are approx 3400 Security Internees in custody; as many as 4300 have been interned; and approximately 900 released

• Recommendations (13):
  – Review release policy IAW DoDD 2310.1; vet policy thru USD (ISA)
  – Adopt 4th ID Detainee Disposition Worksheet and a Detainee Inquiry Response Form across the AO
  – Prepare for Military Commissions to try persons in Iraq accused of crimes against US Forces
Detainee Databases and Records (including integration w/ law enforcement/court databases)

- Observations (5):
  - Security internee information recorded in NDRS and BATS
  - Not all have reliable data (NIPR/SIPR) or phone connectivity to connect BATS terminals to the central server, no central system administrator
  - Though there are several US State integrated prison systems, none are effectively integrated with law enforcement agencies and courts
  - CPA MOJ contracting for database system for Iraqi prison system

- Recommendations (15):
  - Establish connectivity to all detainee camps through tactical means, commercialization of the telecommunications infrastructure, or courier
  - Develop a mobile BATS team to complete fielding BATS terminals and register all detainees; appoint a system administrator
  - CPA contract Northrop Grumman to evaluate whether the BATS system can be enhanced to include docket management/police reporting

Conclusion

- Consolidation.
  - Achieve greater efficiencies with a consolidation at Abu Ghurayb; separate facility for HVDs
  - CPA MOJ expand Iraqi Regional Correctional Facilities

- Separation. Establish distinctly separate facilities for Security Internees (US run) and Iraqi Criminals (Iraqi run)

- Standardization.
  - Provide standard guidance and training on detention operations and procedures for security internee facilities
  - CPA MOJ/ MOI provide guidance on Iraqi prisons, Detention Centers, and Jails

- Enable CPA MOJ. (provide force protection/escort)
  - Continue staff augmentation through OIF 1
  - Establish decentralized Liaison in OIF 2
  - Encourage contracting of Iraqi training and International participation

- Enable Decentralized Execution/Initiative. Minimize bureaucracy (especially MOF) and support unit initiatives (101st ABN (AA) Div)
Back-up Slides

TEAM TASKS
(Slide 1 of 2)

- Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation and accountability
- Detainee databases and records, including integration with law enforcement and court databases
- Interrogation prioritization and management (separate team)
- Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene and sanitation standards
- Detention and Corrections systems management
TEAM TASKS
(Slide 2 of 2)

- Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees
- Detainee medical care and health management
- Detainee legal processing
- Integration of military detention and corrections operations with CPA, and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run system (i.e., "Bridging Mechanism")
- Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system

TEAM MEMBERS
(slide 1 of 3)

Team Chief: MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General

Team Members:
COL Andraschko, MP, Director, Command & General Staff School; former Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Commander, 704th MP BN & Ft Lewis Regional Correctional Facility, and Staff Officer at the USDB; MA degree in Criminal Justice (Corrections)
COL David, JA, Military Judge (CT JAG Rep); Mobilized Reservist, Indiana State Circuit Court Judge; Juris Doctor degree
LTC Grande, MP, Deputy Commandant, USDB; former Commander of Ft Knox Regional Correctional Facility and Mannheim Confinement Facility; MA in Criminal Justice (Corrections); American Correctional Association (ACA) Certified Correctional Executive and Auditor
LTC Inch, MP, Corrections & Internment Branch Chief (OPMG); former Battalion Commander, 705th MP Bn (USDB) and Commander, Ft Ord Area Confinement Facility; OIC for Somali Police and Prison program (UNOSOM II); MA degree in Geography (Middle East)
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Team Members
(slide 2 of 3)

LTC Schmitt, MS (Social Worker), Health Care Administrator, USDB (10 Years experience at USDB); Masters of Social Work degree, National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) Certified Correctional Health Care Professional, ACA Certified Correctional Manager and Auditor

Mr Shannon, EPW/Detainee Program Manager (OPMG), former ACA Deputy Director of Standards and Accreditation and Executive Director California Correctional Association; US Air Force Reserves Counter-intelligence Officer; MA degree in Public Administration (Corrections)

MAJ Albert, SP (Physician Assistant, OTSG Rep), Special Projects Officer (Department Health Education & Training, AMEDDSCS); specializes in Preventive Medicine and Occupational Health; 17 years as a PA to include health care at USDB, Ft Lewis RCF and Ft Hood Installation Detention Facility; Masters in Public Health degree

MAJ Creed, MP, XO 327th MP Bn (currently at Bagram, Afghanistan); 15 years experience in Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations, to include 6 years in a Training Support Battalion and command of an MP Escort Guard Company during Desert Storm

MAJ Curry, MP, Concepts Developer (USAMPS); 12 years experience in I/R operations, to include recent work on MP I/R force design and employment; MA degree in Management

MAJ Farris, SG, Action Officer, Strategic Architecture Branch (USCENTCOM, J6); formerly advised Kuwaiti MOD on communications and computer systems; Undergraduate degree in Police Management and MA in Business Management; will remain in country as USCENTCOM J6 LNO

CPT Harbison, MP, I/R Operations Officer, CFLCC PMO since Dec '02; former LNO to CPA and ICRC before TOA; MA in Criminal Justice (Corrections) with follow-on assignment to the USDB

MSG Jones, 31E (Correctional Specialist), Guard Commander, USDB; 24 years of Corrections experience to include NCOIC of the Special Housing Unit and eight years at USDB

SFC Baldwin, 31E, Senior Corrections Technical Advisor (USAMPS); 22 years corrections experience, to include 7 years at USDB and two tours to GTMO; MA degree in Public Administration and Security Management