I was mobilized for Iraqi Freedom on 19th March 2003. I was crosslevelled from the 88th RC to the 94th within days of being mobilized. I mobilized at Fort Bliss and ended up with B/325 MI BN (Interrogation Company). I was at Fort Dix for about 5 weeks. The 325th deployed to Camp Virginia, Kuwait and a week later we deployed to Camp Cropper at Baghord International Airport, Iraq. At BIAP, I initially supported screening and performed a handful of interrogations. I didn't feel comfortable with my interrogation experience and requested to be moved to operations. Once I moved to operations, I took ownership of the database for tracking of detainees. Up to that point, the MPs had maintained a detainee tracking database, but there had been nothing established or maintained for keeping track of the MI hold status of detainees at Camp Cropper. I also assisted with the daily reporting, was a liaison to the MPs, Magistrate's office, and any outside agency (i.e. IAD, OGA) would request information and I would coordinate with them for the sharing of any information we had on a specific detainee or group of detainees. I was at Cropper for about five months. I moved to Abu Ghraib sometime before 20 September as the Advance Party for 325th MI. When I first arrived, I didn't receive training, as no training plan yet existed. We were starting up some operations, merging with the 519th, based on directives from higher. As operations were established and the structure of MI operations at Abu Ghraib began to take shape, we were required to read, the established IROEs and were required to sign that we understood them. I signed them. The IROEs were reiterated time and time again. I was not present at every IC formation because I was part of the FAC and reported to through the FAC chain of command, which is the same echelon as the ICE, both reporting up to JIDC Operations. However, I was present at several JDC formations held in the ICE during my tenure there. Generally, these formations required everyone, military and civilians, full-time or TDY support to be present. Most of these formations were led by either the ICE NCOIC or by myself. I initially arrived with someone from 519th and worked with them, followed shortly thereafter. I arrived a few days later. He was not part of the 325th command. The 519th was already there and had been running operations for a specific mission: FEDEEYE SADDAM members. They had a system already in place when we arrived, but that system changed when the two units merged operationally. Our focus began to change rapidly and frequently. We were soon overwhelmed with detainees. I only went to the Hard Site a couple of times I do not recall who I went with. I didn't even know the assignment numbers to differentiate the JA or JB blocks. I was aware that a numbering system was in place, as for a very short period of time, I kept accountability of the isolation counts by detainee number. I never saw or was aware of any naked detainees. I knew that the detainees were jumpstarts. I am pretty proactive and won't hesitate to tell anyone, regardless of rank, if something is wrong. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, I began working with a gentleman who was a database professional to learn how the system operated. I also worked with someone from an administrative role managing the PERSTAT and other personnel reports. The last two to three months I worked in the Fusion Analytical Cell (FAC). I participated in one interrogating while at Abu Ghraib. I assisted with the interrogation of a female detainee. The female had moved from Cropper to Abu Ghraib, was pregnant, and had given birth while in detention. I was working with JAG to turn the baby over to her family or to an orphanage. I did conduct preliminary interrogations with the female detainee, but after we established the depth of her knowledgeably of MI interests, I handed her off to a Tiger Team and was then no longer involved with her case. The second instance in which I had direct contact with a detainee, I was present during a Knowledgeably Brief (KB), at some level on high had mandated that all detainees have a KB on file. Interrogators were spread far too thin and overwhelmed with the workload. As policy required that each interrogation/interview required at least 2 people present, I supported in one of the KBs when the team analyst was occupied on another task. The interrogation was conducted in the open tent in the Ganci camp, just outside of the detainee holding area. The detainee turned out to be the husband of the woman who was being sought after as a Black List #1 facilitator. As the facilitator was still being sought after and as BL#1 had not yet been apprehended, I communicated with the interrogation team leader the importance of prioritizing an interrogation for the detainee.
For the most part, I had limited contact with the Tiger Teams and had wanted to communicate with them more frequently in my role as a fusion analyst. I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainees, the use of dogs during interrogations, or the humiliation of detainees. The only time I knew dogs were present was during the shakedown of the Iraqi Police. I never actually saw dogs used other than for car searches—I had only heard that they were called in for the IP shakedown. A gun was found in an isolation cell and there had been a shoot out during this same incident. The only direct contact I had with OGA was in doing business with the agency analysts. I sat as an observer and note-taker on one interrogation with OGA at Camp Cropper. Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A: No.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

10 June 2004

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

1. (FOUO) On 9 and 10 June 2004, [Redacted] was telephonically interviewed at her office [Redacted] and residence in Wiesbaden, GM. She is assigned to A Company, 302nd MI BN in Wiesbaden. From approximately the first week of June 2003 to 21 September 2003, [Redacted] was deployed to Abu Ghraib. She served as the liaison officer between the CJTF7 C2X and the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) in Abu Ghraib. Her primary responsibility was to ensure C2X requirements were met and to maintain visibility (track) high value target interrogations. She reported to [Redacted] C2X who in turn reported to MG FAST, C2. Day-to-day she was supervised by [Redacted] and CW2 [Redacted] at the ICE where she was fully integrated into operations. During her time at Abu Ghraib, [Redacted] never observed or heard of detainee abuse. Other than on one occasion, described in the following paragraph, [Redacted] never observed detainees stripped or partially clothed. She heard that detainees were stripped as a standard operating procedure during interrogations. Operations in the ICE included two daily operational ("pass down") meetings, one at 0800 and the other "at the end of the day". These meetings were to assign and plan the interrogations for the upcoming shifts. They were generally led by either [Redacted] (night shift) or CW2 [Redacted] (0800) and/or [Redacted] for the ICE NCOIC (unidentified E-5) if they were unavailable. Assignments for interrogations/interrogation teams were made and the teams would get together to write out their interrogation plan (objectives, questions, techniques) have them reviewed, and approved. Generally the analyst assigned to a team only saw reports and developed questions and did not participate in interrogations. The TIGER TEAM concept of Interrogator/Analyst integration had not yet been employed at Abu Ghraib. Almost all interrogations during this period were conducted in open tents as the Hard Site was still under construction. [Redacted] never saw or heard of nudity as an interrogation (ego down) technique. She never saw stress positions employed. [Redacted] that the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) were well known and spelled out what was authorized very specifically. No "special" techniques were discussed, used, or employed. She never heard of or saw a request to higher for approval of an interrogation technique. On 21 September 2003, [Redacted] was reassigned to the C2X in the "Green Zone". She worked on the Detainee Release Board. She was responsible to conduct the background file review before a detainee was referred to the board. She would review the entire file (interrogation reports and arrest report but oftentimes not much more than the arrest report was in the file) to determine 1.) Why a detainee was incarcerated. 2.) What information he/she provided. 3.) Why he/she should be released. 4.) If not enough information was available recommend additional debriefing or interrogation.

2. While assigned to the ICE as the C2X liaison at Abu Ghraib, [Redacted] once participated in an interrogation in the Hard Site. When she and the interrogator arrived at

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the detainee's cell he was unclothed. She was asked to stand back by the MP while the detainee dressed and did so.

On 10 June the undersigned recontacted [redacted] to obtain further information on this incident. An investigative review of MP Logs at Abu Ghraib indicated on 16 September 2003 "MI directed a detainee be stripped nude in his cell". The interrogation report for this detainee indicated [redacted] was the analyst and [redacted] was the interrogator for an interrogation conducted 17 September. [redacted] recounted the following additional details. She did not remember the interrogators name. He was a "young, big, guy; a Specialist." This Specialist had just returned from R & R leave at Ft. Bragg. She could not recall the exact date but thought it was in late September. During the morning meeting she observed the interrogator working on his plan and she volunteered to work as his analyst. While not her normal duty, she saw this as an opportunity. During this time analysts were usually not sitting in on the interrogations and the hard site was not being used but on this day she was offered the opportunity to "sit in." The interrogator had already developed his plan and he briefed her quickly. The technique to be used was "love of family" as the detainee was elderly and the sole wage earner for his family. They requested (to the MPs) the detainee be brought out for interrogation. After waiting about 30 minutes near the open tents in Camp Vigilant (assuming the detainee was housed there) they asked what the delay was. The MPs (names unrecorded) re-checked and determined the detainee was housed in Tier 1A and they would have to go there. Upon arrival at the cell an MP (name unrecorded and described as 6 feet tall, medium build, strawberry-blond hair, mustache, from Nevada) asked [redacted] to move to the side as the detainee was naked. Both the interpreter (name unrecorded and described as older, short, possibly Pakistani whom she could identify in a photo) asked the detainee to put on his clothes which were in the cell. [redacted] asked the MP why the detainee was naked. He explained the detainee was extremely agitated and had been taking off his clothes as a protest. The detainee dressed and they took him to an empty cell at the other end of the hard site to conduct the interrogation. The detainee was very angry at first but calmed down as the interrogation proceeded. He was a plumber arrested on his way to work and apparently had been arrested without cause. (Note: A check of the interrogation report noted that this was the only interrogation of this detainee) [redacted] never thought to report the detainee was unclothed. It appeared to be the detainee's choice, he never complained of being forced to disrobe (even though excellent rapport was established by the end of the interrogation) and his clothes were in the cell. The interrogator completed the interrogation report and back-briefed the ICE Operations. [redacted] did not know if the interrogator documented or reported the nudity. It was not discussed at subsequent ICE operations meetings.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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DOD 000825
Oath

I,[redacted], do solemnly swear that the statement I am about to make is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45: The proponent agency is

LOCATION

BCCF, ABU GHURAYB, IRAQ

DATE

TIME

1730

FILE NUMBER

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

GRADE/STATUS

CW3

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

A Company, 203d Military Intelligence Battalion, APO AE 09342

I want to make the following statement under oath.

I served at the Baghdad Central Correction Facility (BCCF) at ABU GHURAYB, Iraq on or about 18 January, 2004. I am currently the Day Shift OIC for the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) at the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) and have been since my arrival. This sworn statement covers procedures dealing with hard copy packets of detainee files during that timeframe. The hard copy packets referred to as dossiers) are passed from the In-Processing Section to the Magistrate's office. These dossiers contain all the hard copy paperwork that involves the detainee: capture card, sworn statements, magistrate file, prior reporting, medical, in-processing sheet, all intelligence reporting, interrogator notes, and miscellaneous documents. However, the content varies from dossier to dossier and is reliant on what paperwork is generated for each detainee. The dossiers stay in the ICE for the duration of the intelligence exploitation of those detainees. The difference between the procedures prior to my arrival and now is fairly simple: accountability of the files. Prior to my arrival and during the first approximately two months of my time here, the dossiers were separated and filed by Section and the Section Sergeant was responsible for maintaining control of the paperwork. Since then, all of the dossiers are filed together and accounted for by ICE leadership. Rarely does a dossier physically leave the ICE. When it does, it is only for a short time. When intelligence exploitation of the detainee is completed, the Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB) process begins. The interrogator and Section Sergeant decide the detainee has no more intelligence value. They ensure the dossier is complete and attach a DAB Memorandum for Record in the BATS database. The dossier is then brought to me. I review the dossier and the MFR and pass the dossier to the Collection, Management, and Dissemination (CMD) shop for further review. Previous to May, 2004, I was taking out all the handwritten notes and the Interrogation Plans of the dossier before submitting the dossiers to CMD. Starting in May, 2004, I began leaving the Interrogation Plans in the dossier. After passing to CMD, the dossier will never come back to the ICE unless a requirement is found that has not been addressed. If the dossier does return, the requirement is addressed and the DAB process begins again. Processing exceptions to the counter-resistance policy differs between what happens now and what I was told was happening when I arrived. The process up the chain of command is the same with the interrogator providing an MFR to the Section Sergeant who reviews and passes it to the ICE OIC, then to the JAG officer for the MI Brigade who was responsible for the action. When I arrived at the JIDC, I was told that usually when an exception was approved by the CG, a confirmation would come down by either a verbal confirmation or an e-mail and then followed sometimes by an actual copy of the signed and approved MFR. When I came on board, there was never an instance of my instructing the interrogators to execute the exception without a signed copy of the MFR. I didn’t have to. We either had a copy or we continued exploitation without executing that approach strategy. I do not know what instances happened where exceptions were executed without a signed copy. This statement just verifies what I heard when I got here.

Do you have anything to add to this statement? N. NO

END OF STATEMENT

NOT USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ___ TAKEN AT ___ DATED ___ CONTINUED."

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND THE PAGE NUMBER AS "PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES" WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED. THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72

SUPERcedes DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 86, WHICH WILL BE USED.

AG0000739

DOD 00826
Nothing

follows
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] A/302nd MI BN

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned telephonically contacted [REDACTED] at the 302nd MI BN, Wiesbaden, GM, to clarify details taken in a 13 May 2004 sworn statement and 31 May telephonic interview with [REDACTED] concerning his knowledge of abuse at Abu Ghraib. [REDACTED] was identified by [REDACTED] as one of his acquaintances with whom he passed rumors of abuse.

[REDACTED] is an analyst assigned to A Company, 302nd MI BN, Weisbaden, GM. He was deployed to Abu Ghraib from Mid October 2003 to early February 2004. For his first month there he was assigned to an interrogation team. His Team Chief was [REDACTED] never observed or heard what he considered detainee abuse while at Abu Ghraib until after the USACID investigation "broke." After his first month he was reassigned to an ad-hoc guard force to escort detainees and ensure security and safety during interrogations. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were on the guard force and [REDACTED] was Sergeant of the Guard. [REDACTED] did not recall speaking about or purporting knowledge of detainee abuse. [REDACTED] did hear general rumors of abuse (source unrecalled) and discussions of "MPs smoking" detainees. He once heard a detainee was raped by fellow detainees. [REDACTED] would hold formations each Tuesday where he would discourage the spread of rumors. If [REDACTED] had claimed knowledge of abuse [REDACTED] would not likely have believed him.

2. [REDACTED] believed dogs could be used in interrogations when authorized by the Commanding General. He observed one interrogation where dogs were employed to "fear up" a detainee. It was an interrogation of a high value detainee captured with [REDACTED] The interrogation lasted nine hours. [REDACTED] was the analyst and [REDACTED] was an observer while a "blond guy" (NFI) conducted the interrogation. A female was the interpreter (NFI). The detainee was handcuffed to an I-bolt on the floor with a sandbag over his head for the majority of the interrogation. At one point dogs were brought outside the interrogation room door, the detainees hood was lifted, and the dogs were encouraged to bark. This interrogation was one of three (also captured with Hussein) occurring at the same time. Things were chaotic and "just about everyone was in the ICE" following the capture of these HVTs. [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were there but is not certain. Based on the perceived value of these detainees, everyone received approval (one day approval) to use "fear up" with the dogs. [REDACTED] could not recall anything else concerning this event or the approval process.

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3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a tour of the facilities and the Tiger Team Concept. Reporting but it was so fast, it took me a while to fully understand everything. We did receive the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and a handout on the IROEs which I signed. There was nothing new compared to what I had been taught at school. I do not remember receiving any information on the Geneva Convention. When I arrived, I didn’t know that COL Pappas was in charge of the entire site. I know that now. I believe that [Redacted] was the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center commander. [Redacted] was an analyst for the Force Protection team, he worked with me now and then, but he quickly left and began to work with the Former Regime Extremists team. I never witnessed any details above. I was really shocked when CID began their investigation. I have never heard or seen MP Guards use dogs. I did find out there were some photos but that was after the fact.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCCOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; 5 C.F.R. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Abu Ghraib, IZ

2. DATE (YYYY-MM-DD)
2004/06/09

3. TIME
1330

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
ILT/RA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq

9. WANTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On or about 20 January, 2004, I was in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center in Baghdad, Iraq. At that time, I was working with the CM&D Division as a part of the Joint Intelligence Collective Support Team (JICST). During this time, I was assigned to participate in an interrogation of a detainees

EXHIBIT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT _________ DATED _________"

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

END OF STATEMENT

AG000745

DOD 000832
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephonic Interview—

1. (FOUO) On 3 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview with [redacted] who was assigned to Abu Ghraib as the Signal Officer for the 320th MP BN. He acknowledged that he worked in the 320th and confirmed a statement that he maintained a copy of e-mail correspondence within the 320th. He kept this on a CD-ROM, secured in a safe, at his Reserve Unit Headquarters in Fort Dix, NJ. He did not recall anything in the e-mail traffic concerning abuses of detainees or specific allegations/incidents. He opined there were some e-mails pertaining to the challenges/difficulties during the transition period between the Military Police units at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] is scheduled for “drill” at his unit on 6 and 7 June 2004. He offered to review the e-mails and telephone if he discovers any correspondence related to detainee abuse or allegations of abuse. Otherwise he will copy the CD and FEDEX or Priority Mail the CD NLT 8 June 2004.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[Signature]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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I arrived at Abu Ghraib in July 04. We were the only ones there and I believe the 519th MI had a company that arrived around the same time we did. The 320th MP BN was in charge of base operations and we were under the 800th MP BDE. We had contact with MI Leadership on a daily basis because they attended our Battalion Staff meeting. All units at Abu Ghraib had a representative there. During the meetings we would discuss issues relating to detainees such as medical, biling (water, food, and clothing). We would discuss that MI personnel were not to take part in interrogations. Personnel who were in charge of MI soldiers were.

I provided a copy of the MP Rules of Engagement. The Hard Site was not open yet and neither was Camp Ganci. Except for one time, I never saw or was aware of any detainee physical abuse. The incident I am referring to occurred on 22 September. We had just had a mortar attack. The guard at the tower saw personnel moving outside the area. I sent in the QRF after the individuals. Two individuals were captured and brought in. It was procedure to have the 320th MI personnel bring this in. I drove to the Entry Control Point and MI drove right behind me. The individuals caught were a 320th MI personnel moved the detainees to the back of the vehicle. I came up to them and told them something. I didn’t hear him because I was on the radio with higher. When I finished I heard a lot of yelling going on. I went to where the yelling was occurring and asked the NCOIC what the problem was. I told the NCOIC to escort the detainees to the holding area and meet me back at the battalion TOC. By the time I arrived at the TOC, the NCOIC was already there with the soldiers. I asked them if anything had happened. I said no. I found out that the soldier was flown out of the unit that had just received mortar attacks and two soldiers from the mortars had been killed. I told him that you don’t send soldiers out who were that emotional. I told him to take some disciplinary action such as reprimand, counsel, or send him to be seen for combat stress. I do not remember the soldier’s name. CID took the case but deferred to the chain of command. I do not know what disciplinary actions were taken.

Three weeks after the incident, the 519th redeployed. I notified my battalion commander about the incident. I do not know any other incident. I never saw or had any knowledge of MI using dogs during the interrogations. The use of dogs had to be approved by the Unit Commander. Prior to the investigation beginning, I never saw or had any knowledge of any dogs or videos of MI personnel with detainees. The taking of photos was not authorized and we would take cameras away from individuals caught taking photos. This policy was put in place 60 days after the incident. Personnel caught would be punished and cameras confiscated. I never had any discussion with COL PAPPAS on detainee abuse occurring in the prison. One issue we were concerned about was the frequent mortar attacks. We did not have enough personnel to provide the adequate protection for the compound. We had a challenge trying to get all units at Abu Ghraib to cooperate and assist with force protection of the site. We didn’t have the ability to do that. We had too many other responsibilities with the detainees.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
A. No.
AFFIDAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR COMPELLING INFLUENCE.

(Witness Signature)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

AG0000749

DOD 000836
NOT TRUE
Page 2 of 3
08 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 08 May [redacted] stopped by for an interview appointment with MG Fay. [redacted] refused to make a statement due to the information that has already been released on him to the press.

MAJ, MI
Assistant Investigative Officer
I am the Commander of the 323rd Microwave Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), Fort Meade, Maryland, having assumed command on 17 Nov 01. The 323rd MI BN mobilized on 21 Jan 03. After spending almost eight weeks of preparation and training at the Northeast Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (NEARISC) at Fort Dix, New Jersey, we deployed and arrived in Kuwait on 28 Mar 03, and initially stayed at Camp Udairi, Kuwait. I crossed into Iraq on or about 15 May 03 and the battalion followed by companies over the next 30 days except for a Company which remained in Kuwait. We departed out of Baghdad by air on 12 Mar 04, and returned to Kuwait, where we remained until we redeployed to US on 31 Mar 04. While at the NEARISC at Fort Dix, the 323rd MI BN was being cross levied with approximately 70 personnel who arrived sporadically and in small numbers over several weeks. The 70 additional personnel integrated well and the battalion congealed into a cohesive unit. The 323rd was authorized 254 personnel, but we arrived in Theater with only 198 personnel, considerably under strength. While at Fort Dix, we awaited enough personnel to get to F-2 status, but we never made it, and we finally received a waiver for deployment. While at the NEARISC, the 323rd MI BN interrogators received approximately three to three and a half weeks of training provided by the ARISC personnel, which I personally observed. Interrogation training was first and foremost practice in the interrogation booth utilizing various approaches. Although I did not personally witness it, I believe the interrogators received classes in Geneva Convention requirements and interrogation Rules of Engagement. Records documenting the training may be on file at the NEARISC. The 323rd MI BN was also at the NEARISC processing and training for deployment at the same time. The 323rd and 325th trained simultaneously, but separately, and the NEARISC priority at the time was to support the training and deployment preparation of the two battalions. Although the 325th had arrived at Fort Dix later than the 323rd, both units deployed to Kuwait on the same day. We arrived in Kuwait on 28 Mar 03 and initially stayed at Camp Udairi, Kuwait. The 323rd was a Theater level collection and exploitation battalion that was war-planned to the 531st MI Brigade (BDE).

I am the Commander which supported Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait and Iraq. We spent approximately two months at Camp Udairi where we continued with some training and war preparation. At the time of our arrival in Kuwait, I had the 323rd organized with one headquarters company and three line units. A Company was the SIGINT and MASINT company with approximately 20 personnel. A Company was almost immediately cut to the 201st MI BN upon our arrival in Kuwait. B Company was the Counterintelligence company and had approximately 48 personnel. After the war began, B Company was cut to the 221st MI BN to screen the Iraqi Army (IAK) at Camp Ashraf north of Baghdad (approximately 26 Jun - 30 Aug 03). C Company was the Interrogation company, with analytical ability and a COMTECH platoon. Initially there was a 531st MI BN BN plan for the 323rd to support an "Intelligence Support Base", possibly at Camp Udairi, but it never came to fruition. After the war began, our mission was to relieve the 201st MI BN in place. The 202nd had ongoing interrogation operations at Camp Bucca and we assumed those operations. We were attached to the 202nd from the 141st MI BN, 531st MI BN BN, and the 531st MI Brigade (BDE) Operations (OPS), on operational control of BLA. We also assumed the mission of inter-rag, operations of black listed detainees in Baghdad. Because the 141st was attached to the 202nd at the time, we basically maintained these personnel when we assumed the 202nd mission. We also had essentially a "care taker" mission at BLA until the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) took over operations. And C Company was attached to support the ISG. Camp Cropper was primarily under the 325th MI BN and we had no real role there. On 25 Jun 03, the 323rd was attached to the 205th MI BN (COL PAPPAS, Commander). After interrogation operations at Camp Bucca began in approximately 20 Aug 03, an interrogator was moved from Bucca to Abu Ghurayb (AG), and was assigned the role of Operations Officer for the Joint Interrogation Detainee Center (JIDC). He only had about 12 soldiers that he worked with. I was residing at BLA at this time and I had wanted to bring the BLA to me. I wanted to bring the JIDC Operations Officer role to me. I was involved in discussions concerning the establishment or naming of the JIDC at AG. I do not recall exactly when I first visited AG, but I recall it was toward the end of Aug 03, and I can recall the specific reason, although it probably was to meet with the commanding officer and his soldiers. I did not want to disrupt the AG system and organization by immediately interjecting myself into the operations. 

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED
apparently felt confident and comfortable enough that had a handle on interrogation operations, and he concentrated his efforts on logistical and administrative matters. I viewed as the person on the ground who ran the interrogation operations. Through discussions with 205th MI BDE staff members (I cannot recall specific individuals or exact discussions), I had the impression that COL PAPPAS was under quite a lot of pressure at the time to produce quality, actionable intelligence from the interrogations at AG. I believe LTG SANCHEZ was not happy with the intelligence coming out of AG, felt AG was the best place where he could get actionable intelligence, and really wanted COL PAPPAS to focus his efforts and attention on AG. By about 15 Jul 03, I perceived that, as a result of the focus of LTG SANCHEZ on AG, COL PAPPAS emphasis was increasingly concentrated on AG as well. Between late Aug 03 and 15 Feb 04, I visited AG five or six times. Generally the reason was to visit my soldiers, but a tasking to stand up a Headquarters Service Company (HSC- Provisional) increased my involvement at AG. I received a SIPRNET message from (S-3, 205th MI Brigade) saying that I would need to stand up the HSC since it seemed I had more available personnel than anyone else. It was at that time that it was rumored that they were looking for a JDIC Chief and that my name was on the short list for selection. At this time, the JDIC was at least temporarily in charge of the AG JDIC and he was finally selected as the Chief, JDIC). My last visit to AG, about 15 Jan 04, was when I visited AG for seven days while I conducted an Article 15-6 investigation into an incident involving a South Carolina Air National Guard Rear Area Operations Center unrelated to the JDIC or AG interrogation operations. I selected to be the HSC Commander. He, like the other commanders of the 205th MI Brigade, were from the 141st MI BN, Utah National Guard, and it made sense to me, since 141st personnel were already effectively functioning in a staff and support function, that would then should assume the HSC Command. I can not recall the exact time this took place, but it was after had come on the scene at AG. My focus related to AG was logistic and administrative support. was responsible for interrogation operations (planning, DCO, 205th MI Brigade). During my visits to AG, I saw what appeared to be very competent, experienced professionals. Given the capabilities and experience of the MI leadership at AG, I believed they had a solid handle on operations. I did not look into interrogation operations because it was not my role. COL PAPPAS had been going back and forth between his Brigade HQ in Balad and AG. After he moved to AG permanently in the Oct-Nov 03 timeframe, I did not have any doubt that COL PAPPAS was in charge of AG. He was active, involved, and energetic about the mission. I never had any occasion to interview any CACI contract interrogators and I never observed any of them in action. had mentioned to me that he felt confident enough with what little concern he had was because he was not certain about the currency or how recent their experience was. I never had any conversations concerning specific interrogation techniques. While at Baghdad, I am confident that they understood very clearly that they were limited only to interrogation techniques and techniques specified in FM 34-52. I am not aware of any incidents beyond approved Army techniques as specified in FM 34-52, and no one ever talked about using approaches beyond established norms. I personally never witnessed any incidents of abuse or unauthorized treatment of detainees or unauthorized interrogation techniques. There was an incident that never told me about, that took place in Jul 03 . I saw a prisoner at Camp Bucca struck to the ground by an MP reported the incident to the MP Chain of Command and the MP was reportedly punished for.
the incident. This is the only such incident of which I am aware. I cannot recall seeing anyone taking photographs or video, and no one ever reported such activities to me (each of the prison facilities had signs clearly posted saying that photos of the prison were forbidden). Nor did I ever see or hear of any incidents involving military working dogs. I did mention to me once that a 205th soldier (not in my Command) had come forward about the MPs at AG drinking and partying; and one 205th soldier (also not in my Command) was involved with them. COL PAPPAS reportedly punished the soldier under UCMJ. He told me that he and the patrol were trying to keep MI soldiers away from the MPs because some of the MPs were perceived as “party animals” and potential problems after the drinking episode.

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT, FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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DOD 000842

AG0000755
From the end of Jul 03 to 21 Dec 03 I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AQ), Iraq as an interrogator with A Company, 519th MI Bn. All the interrogations I participated in or witnessed were conducted within the limitations of FM 34-52 and the established Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). The IROE were established to provide a clear, and adequately establish our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. Throughout my time at AG, the interrogations were creative in their techniques, but I never witnessed anything that was outside the IROE during an interrogation. Interrogation plans were required for any interrogation. The mission of my team was to identify and assist in theresolution of any issue concerning interrogations. We were not allowed to participate in the interrogation and a sheet was placed over the face of the interrogations to prevent anyone from seeing inside. During the interrogations, there was a little loud and there was a sound like something had hit the table. I confronted the OGA member and he told me it was his sidearm. During the discussion, I noticed he had a red sidearm, which was against the rule for the facility. I told him about the sidearm requirement and he checked the weapon with the MP’s. I reported the incident to the OGA. On 13 Dec 03, just after the capture of SADDAH HUSSEIN, my team was tasked to go to LSA CropperUnder the auspices of interrogating SADDAH HUSSEIN. During this time, I helped conduct a Vulnerability Assessment of the Cropper facility. The interrogation never occurred and the team eventually returned to AQ. Around this time, my team interrogated a high level detainee with suspected ties to Al Qaeda. After we got him to his cell in 14, we went through the documents found on him during his arrest. I believe COL PAPPAS and the IROE did not show anyone interest in the interrogation and I felt COL PAPPAS would approve any interrogation procedure I requested to facilitate the interrogation process. In my opinion, COL PAPPAS was more interested in getting intelligence information quickly than allowing the interrogator to choose the best approach. There was a lot of pressure to report intelligence information concerning this detainee. There was not a lot of intelligence reporting from the interrogation as it was more of an assessment. In Dec 03, I used an adjusted sleep schedule as an interrogation technique. Gage said he was approved by COL PAPPAS. I believe the adjusted sleep schedule is at the OA level for approval. When an adjusted sleep schedule is approved, the schedule is provided to the MP’s to follow. In Dec 03, I told me he was approached by an MP who told him that a guard dog had visited one of my team’s assigned detainees. I immediately went to the detainee’s cell. The detainee claimed the guard dog came into his cell and mangled his bedding. Upon further inspection of the cell, I noticed the bedding had been ripped apart. I did not request the use of the guard dog and do not know who authorized the guard dog to go into the cell. It took several hours to calm down the detainee and I incident was detrimental to my interrogation approach. In Dec 03, after the incident, I escorted the detainee back to his cell after an interrogation, we turned to leave and heard what could have been a person being struck.
9. STATEMENT  (Continued)

We talked to the MPs and reminded them they needed to stay professional and to not let emotions dictate their actions. The situation did not feel right and I reported the incident to [Redacted] in Dec 03, after the shooting incident involving a detainee with a pistol. I arrived at the scene approximately two to four hours after the incident occurred. I saw approximately 10 Iraqi Police detainees in the breezeway outside of 1A, and heard that approximately 40 Iraqi police officers had been stripped searched. [Redacted] was in charge, walked around the room and may have participated in the interrogations of some of the detainees. When I arrived at the location, I told her that the hallway needed to be cleared and a course of action needed to be established. "During my time at AG, I did not personally witness any detainee abuse. I am shocked at the pictures and have no knowledge of who approved the use of the guard dog depicted in picture "2/13". (The picture is of a guard dog, without a muzzle being held in front of [Redacted], who is bound and on his knees). [Redacted] was one of my assigned detainees. I interrogated him for four or five days before transferring him to [Redacted] upon my departure from AG. I departed AG on 21 Dec 03.

Q: Is there anything you would like to add to this statement?
A: No.

Affidavit

I, [Redacted], have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page [Redacted]. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or duress.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2nd day of June 2004 at Metropark, Springfield, VA

[Signature of Person Administering Oath]

Typed Name of Person Administering Oath

5 U.S.C. 303

Authority To Administer Oaths

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USAPA v1.00

AG0000757
i arrived in Abu Ghurayb, Iraq on or about 10 October 2003 and stayed there for about two weeks. I was a member of a five-person Mobile Training Team (MTT) sent from the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS).

(351B) lead the MTT made up of and myself. The MTT was prepared to train interrogators and analysts using material from the Program of Instruction (POI) of the 97E10 course, 97E30 course, the Department of Defense Strategic Debriefing Course (DSDC), and the Intelligence Support to Counter Terrorism (ISCT) course. My contribution to MTT was the 97E30 POI that I had prepared at the Military Intelligence NCO Academy at Fort Huachuca, AZ. All of the 97E30 POI was based primarily on FM 34-7-1 Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Operations (Dated September 2002), FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation (Dated September 1992), and DIAM 58-12 The DoD HUMINT Management System (Dated June 1997). We also had access to a memorandum that talked about approach strategies outside of the ones mentioned in FM 34-52 (like the use of military working dogs, sleep deprivation, etc). This memo was classified SECRET/Nofor and the MTT referred to it as the "SECDEF Memo." I observed 10-15 interrogation sessions while at Abu Ghurayb and gave feedback to the individual interrogator. I conducted several hours of the training in a classroom environment pertaining to topics like cultural, religious awareness, approach strategies, questioning techniques, behavior symptom analysis, terrorist organizations, interpreter use, etc. The audience that the MTT trained was made up of military and civilian interrogators and analysts who were working in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). The audience varied from day to day and from morning to afternoon as personnel in the JIDC were fully engaged in interrogation operations. The only thing out of the ordinary was the lack of booth space for interrogations to a degree where interrogators had to use the floor of a stairwell, the shower facility, or even the jail cells in the hardcells to conduct interrogations. I did not witness any detainees abuse or humiliation while I was present at Abu Ghurayb. I did not see any dogs present during any of the interrogations while I was at Abu Ghurayb. I saw two male detainees (who had just arrived to the prison facility) naked while they came out of the shower and the MPs issued them their orange overalls which they put on. The MPs then took them to their cells and interrogators started to screen them to assess their cooperation and knowledgeable. I did, however, hear there was Criminal Investigations Division (CID) investigations going on but no one told me any of the details nor did I inquire about it. At one point, while the MTT was still at Abu Ghurayb, the Intelligence Control Element (ICE) Officer in Charge (OIC) gathered all JIDC personnel in the ICE and asked everyone to read and sign a memorandum which was very similar to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-resistance Policy Memorandum For Record (MFR), effective 12 October 2003. Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT? A: NO.
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA

Timeline at a glance:
- 04 MAR 03—arrived in Camp Virginia, Kuwait
- Late MAR/early APR 03—jumped to LSA Bushmaster for several weeks
- APR thru SEP 03—located at LSA Anaconda (Balad, Iraq)
- SEP thru NOV 03—located at Camp Victory, Baghdad
- Thanksgiving (26 NOV 03?)—moved to FOB Abu Ghraib, Iraq
- 14 DEC 03 thru 5 or 6 JAN 04—went on R&R leave
- On/about 14 JAN 03—CID approached me re: abuse allegations/photos; notification/investigation began immediately
- Mid-FEB 04—returned to Kuwait for redeployment
- 24 FEB 04—redeployed to 1AD in Germany

I worked in the 1st Armored Division (1AD) Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), Wiesbaden, Germany, but was attached to the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade MTOE and deployed to Kuwait/Iraq in MAR 03.

Once I arrived in Kuwait, I immediately made contact with the V Corps OSJA, led by... At the beginning, my focus was on supporting the MI commanders with a wide variety of deployment legal issues, to include Targeting, ROE, LOW, Code of Conduct, Legal Assistance issues, Military Justice, etc. One of the main tasks that I performed at this time was ROE/LOW/Code of Conduct/Geneva Convention training for 205th MI personnel. I conducted more than 40 formal classes on ROE/LOW/etc. I also conducted "make-up" training classes for those officers/soldiers that missed the initial training. Company commanders and senior NCOs sometimes requested that I conduct refresher training, which I did on a frequent (but informal) basis. There were no interrogation operational issues in Kuwait.

In late MAR or early APR 03, I moved forward into Iraq with the 205th MI BDE. We moved forward soon after 3rd Infantry Division. Our first stop was at LSA BUSHMASTER. We were there for about two weeks and then we moved on to Balad, Iraq (LSA ANACONDA). The brigade had units in approximately 20 different locations. The Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) were almost everywhere throughout Iraq. I was on the road a great deal for the first several months, and visited many locations where the 205th MI had soldiers.

I would travel to the different locations for several reasons. First, I would go check to see whether the soldiers had any legal issues, concerns or questions and to make sure they knew where they could get in touch with me. Next, I would check on the communications to make sure commanders and soldiers had the means to communicate with me. Most places didn’t have good comms in the beginning. It took Abu Ghraib longer than most places to get comms up and running. Finally, I would speak with
commanders to see if they had any military justice issues (ART 15s, etc.), administrative law issues (15-6 investigations, Reports of Survey, etc.), claims (later centralized at V Corps JAG), and provided legal assistance (Wills, Power of Attorneys, etc.).

“Home base” for me was LSA ANACONDA (Balad, Iraq) until September 03. I moved to Camp Victory (Baghdad, Iraq) in early September.

The first time I became involved with the Interrogation Rules of Engagement was when MG MILLER came to visit. He brought a contingent of personnel with him who told me that it would be valuable for me (both now and in future operations) to sit in and participate in the discussions/staffing regarding the development of the interrogation operation policies. He asked whether I would be involved with the MP mission at Abu Ghraib. I told her “no” and that the 800th MP BDE had 4 of their own JAG attorneys. He told me to make myself available to the interrogators and in case they had legal questions or issues concerning interrogation policies or approaches. He also recommended that I “sit in” on interrogations as much as possible, which I did on subsequent visits (as well as when I moved to Abu Ghraib in late NOV 03). I never witnessed any interrogators conduct interrogations in a manner that violated applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

Personnel involved in the staffing of the IROEs from the legal perspective were:

was the V Corps/CTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate. was the POC on what was eventually to become a theater-wide interrogation approach and safeguards policy. The initial policy drafting process took more than one week to complete (early SEP 03). The initial interrogation policy utilized the Guantanamo Bay interrogation policy as a template, but was changed substantially to reflect the fact that Geneva Convention protections applied to detainees in Iraq. The original policy included approaches from FM 34-52 as well as input from the intelligence and MP communities.

would call me to check on the status of the IROEs from higher. She said that she needed IROES so that she could tell her soldiers “the rules” because there were numerous approaches that had been used in the past by various interrogators in different operations (not sure which operations she was referring to). I told that I would check on the status of the policy with CTF-7 JAG and that she should tell her soldiers to adhere to the accepted approaches in FM 34-52 until a signed, approved policy was in place.

The second week of SEP 03, I called and said “I've got good news and bad news.” The “good news” was that LTG Sanchez had signed the original interrogation policy. The “bad news” was that the policy would still have to be sent to CENTCOM, who could accept (or reject) it in whole or in part. I sent her the policy. was eager to put something “on paper” (other than FM 34-52) that she could provide to her soldiers. She drafted the “IROE slide” and sent it to me. told me that the slide she drafted had accepted FM 34-52 approaches on the left-hand side of the slide. She stated that the right-hand side of the slide contained some approaches that were not
in FM 34-52, and that these approaches were not to be utilized without the required approval from the CJTF-7 CG, if they would be allowed at all (since CENTCOM might eventually reject all or part of the policy). I took a copy of the slide to CJTF-7 OSJA for their thoughts/comments. The consensus was that the slide was “O.K.” as long as the slide remained restrictive (not permissive) in scope and provided minimum protections (CG approval for all the approaches on the right-hand side of the slide). Interrogators that followed the IROE slide instructions wouldn’t get in trouble because the CG would have to “sign off” on all restricted approaches (some of the approaches were later disallowed altogether). Also, I recommended that she include a sentence on the slide that the Geneva Conventions apply and that detainees should be treated humanely; she did include this language.

CENTCOM did not approve the first several IROE policies CJTF-7 had submitted. The final CENTCOM approved IROE was signed on 12 Oct 04. One of the reasons that it took a long time to get the IROEs established was because we were operating in uncharted waters. CJTF-7 OSJA attempted to look at all applicable legal authorities and precedents that were out there (Geneva Conventions/Protocols, Hague, international law, Army doctrine, established military protocols, case law, etc.). GTMO detainees were classified as unlawful combatants and weren’t protected by the Geneva Conventions, whereas CJTF-7 understood that the Geneva Convention applied to IRAQ. I do not know whether SOUTHCOM was consulted on the IROEs. I do know that the IROEs were coordinated with CENTCOM, but I wasn’t involved in those details. I helped type several of the modified versions of the policy.

One of the areas that CJTF-7 OSJA debated over and had legally intense discussions about was stress positions. In the original policy, stress positions could be used only with CG approval. I don’t recall ever seeing a request for an exception to policy regarding stress positions.

I kept COL PAPPAS updated on each proposed change to the interrogation policy that came out. COL PAPPAS commented to me that the 12 October policy was very close to FM 34-52 except for the “Safeguards.” I agreed with him. One of the changes implemented was changing the word “isolation” to “segregation.” Segregation is the word used in the Geneva Conventions and CENTCOM/CJTF-7 OSJA wanted the interrogation policy’s language, as well as intent, to be in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

The final interrogation policy stated that the segregation of any detainee beyond 30 days had to be approved by LTG SANCHEZ. If segregation was utilized, it was supposed to be written in the interrogation plan. I was not involved in the first few requests for an exception to policy to extend segregation beyond 30 days. I conducted the final legal sufficiency review on segregation extensions. He called me and told me that several of the requests for exception to policy did not have sufficient factual information to justify continued segregation of a detainee. Therefore, he asked me to review future requests to ensure that they were factually sufficient to allow me to make a decision regarding continued segregation. He also said it...
wouldn’t hurt to get another “set of eyes” on the requests, so I became part of the process of getting the requests reviewed.

The segregation extension requests would be written by the interrogator and reviewed by their section leader who would then pass it to [redacted] who would review the request and, if they felt it was sufficient, pass the request to me. I reviewed the request to ensure there were sufficient details and facts justifying the segregation extension request. If I found the extension request to be legally and factually sufficient, I would then pass it on to COL PAPPAS to review and either sign off or reject the request. The request would then go to [redacted] at Camp Victory, who would hand deliver them to MG FAST for review and approval/disapproval. If approved by MG FAST, they went up to CPA where [redacted] would conduct the final legal review. It would then go to LTG SANCHEZ for approval/disapproval.

LTG SANCHEZ didn’t rubber stamp requests, I believe he was looking at them very closely because he would sometimes reject requests, saying that if MI didn’t (or couldn’t) get the info from some of the detainees in a certain amount of time, they should let the detainee go (LTG SANCHEZ didn’t communicate this to me personally, I heard it either through JAG or MI channels when an extension request was denied).

The exception to policy process was a somewhat of a logistical nightmare, since signed originals were required to go from Abu Ghraib to Camp Victory, then to CPA to obtain the required signatures. However, this needed to be done to ensure that everyone was in line with the interrogation policy. Average “turn around time” took 10 days to two weeks, although 5-7 days wasn’t unusual. In order for someone to request an extension, they would normally begin the process approximately 10 days two weeks in advance because that is how long it took to physically move the document from place to place to get it reviewed, signed and approved (since we were in hostile territory). There were, however, several extension requests that we managed to get through the process in 1-2 days where detainees were near the “30 day window.” I saw approximately two requests where an extension beyond the original 30 day extension was being submitted. Fully executed extension approvals were returned to the JIDC. I advised [redacted] to maintain the signed copy of the request just in case there were any issues with a detainee in the future.

In reference to the use of dogs: I recall thinking that it was unusual during the initial drafting of the interrogation policy that the use of dogs was placed in the IROE because I don’t believe there were dogs at any of the Iraqi detention facilities at the time, but I believe it was inserted as a safeguard measure. The September 14 interrogation policy stated that the use of dogs during interrogations had to be approved by LTG SANCHEZ, even though the dogs had to be muzzled. I never told COL PAPPAS that the authority to approve the use of dogs had been delegated to his level.

I wasn’t the approval authority for any approaches used. Although I was given the authority to be the “No guy” with regard to application of approaches, I couldn’t be the
"Yes guy" to approve whether certain approaches could be used; approval authority for approaches falling outside the scope of the interrogation policy rested with the CG.

Some of the soldiers would ask me about some of the techniques they wanted to use and whether the proposed technique fell under an approved interrogation policy approach. I told them that we would always need to look at each circumstance on a case-by-case basis, since the facts surrounding a particular detainee could often determine whether an approach could be used (old/young man, female, health issues, etc.). I provided my analysis to CJTF-7 OSJA based on legal research of the Geneva Conventions, FM 34-52, ARs, interrogation policy, Federal Laws, etc., before giving the information to commanders for their assessment.

Several examples of issues that were addressed are: can we deprive detainees of food (no, not under any circumstances); can they use the good cop/bad cop technique (yes, provided there weren't any unusual factors that might preclude using this approach); can they change their meal times (yes or no, depending on the circumstances and as long as they weren't depriving detainees of food). Per CJTF-7, stress positions could not be used. Safety positions could be used if, for example, a detainee is physically confronting or fighting you, but must be discontinued once you get assistance or if the detainee calms down. Sleep management: anything less than 4 hours of sleep per night for the first 72 hours would have to be approved by higher.

I began visiting Abu Ghraib (weekly) in September. Upon introducing myself to the MP chain of command and NCOs/soldiers at Abu Ghraib, I told them that even though I wasn't their JAG, I would help them out if they had legal issues or if there was an emergency and they were unable to contact their attorneys. I did not discuss the IROEs with the MPs.

The only MP that took me up on my offer of assistance was [redacted]. When I first went to Abu Ghraib to tour the Hard Site in mid/late September, I saw a naked detainee. I approached [redacted] and asked him, “Hey, what the heck is going on here?,” or words to that effect. [redacted] told me the detainee had approached him and wanted to wash his uniform, but that there wasn't a replacement uniform to give the detainee. [redacted] then took me to the back side of the cell (outside) where the detainee had hung his jumpsuit to dry. I told him to get the detainee a blanket, which he did. [redacted] told me there was always a shortage of uniforms. I told him to go to his S-4 and that if the S-4 was not responsive, to tell me and that I would get involved. I left my contact info for [redacted]. He didn't call, but when I saw him again and asked him if he had any results and he said “no.” I called CJTF-7 OSJA [redacted] and he told me he would put a word out to CPA. I also told [redacted] about seeing the naked detainee and that we needed to make sure detainees had clothes. [redacted] told me it was hot (outside), but I think he was joking. I told [redacted] that if the ICRC came by and saw this they would have a problem because of our responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions. [redacted] said he understood and agreed; I believe he addressed the situation and corrected it. The next time I saw [redacted] he told me they had received 400 uniforms.
The MPs had four attorneys and the JAG at Abu Ghraib was [mask] who worked in the Magistrate Cell. When I arrived permanently at Thanksgiving, I saw a lack of standards with the MPs. There was no military courtesy or uniform standards. There were soldiers out of uniform and one particular individual had a T-shirt that said “F#—Bush.” I identified myself as an officer and made an on-the-spot correction by telling the individual he could not be wearing that and to change.

I moved to Abu Ghraib at COL PAPPAS’ request. In mid-November, COL PAPPAS asked me to go to the Dining Facility with him. He sat me down and told me that LTG SANCHEZ had decided to make him the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cdr for the prison. LTG SANCHEZ was concerned that there were too many perimeter security issues (mortars, rockets, RGPs, small arms, etc.) and that he wanted COL PAPPAS to fix it. COL PAPPAS decided to bring in the 165th MI BN to help with force protection. COL PAPPAS said that the MPs were going to run MP operations and MI was going to run the MI operations. COL PAPPAS took [mask] to Abu Ghraib to help him with the force protection and to install standards. COL PAPPAS told me he wanted me to be on-site at Abu Ghraib so that I could be readily available for any questions that might arise. I remember the first time COL PAPPAS and [mask] walked the outside perimeter—there were breaches in the perimeter walls. COL PAPPAS also brought in a Dining Facility, an Internet Café, and removed several local vendors that were conducting food/retail businesses at the prison.

Several MI soldiers were upset and approached me regarding their perception that the MP personnel were “getting away” with UCMJ and GOI violations, while MI personnel were being disciplined for the same misconduct. I notified [mask](MP) about this perception and reiterated that I could assist with military justice issues if needed. I thanked him and reminded him that they (MPs) were TACON to the 205th MI, not OPCON. I took his comment to mean that he had the situation under control and that I shouldn’t tell the MPs how to conduct their business, so I left it at that.

I tried to walk through all the detainee camps daily, but always went at least four times a week minimum. I never walked through after my shift (usually midnight at the latest). I also walked through 1A and 1B regularly because I often acted as a “tour guide” whenever high ranking military officers, foreign military officers, the General Council, and civilians came to visit. In January, we had visitors almost every day; visits generally lasted half a day.

There was a change to Detainee [mask] and I asked [mask] whether or not he had seen it. He said “no,” so I provided him with a copy. I told him to get his lawyer to come down and provide a class on the changes. I believe they did have a class. I believe this happened right before I left on R&R on 14 December 03.

Interrogators were familiar with the interrogation policy. The 519th received extra attention because they were conducting the more critical tasks. Upon arriving to Abu Ghraib, I gave a Train the Trainer Class on the RBOE and Geneva Convention to 519th.
Section leaders and provided them refresher training. I saw the section leaders discuss IROE strategy and approaches with soldiers during daily meetings. The interrogators were aware that I was observing interrogations at various times (behind the 2-way mirror). I always emphasized to classes that they must respect and protect the detainees and treat them humanely. I told soldiers that if they ever had any doubt, they should discuss whether an approach was permissible with me or their chain of command, etc. I also encouraged them to put themselves in the detainees place and ask whether they would want to be treated similarly if the tables were turned. I told them if they ever had any questions, they should see the IG, CID, chaplain, chain of command, me or any other JAG.

was in charge of the JIDC but he was not in COL PAPPAS' rating chain of command. I believe rated him, according to what told me. was in the prison (physically) all the time; the MPs liked him. He was present when a detainee obtained a weapon and shot an MP. The shooting incident occurred before I moved out to Abu Ghraib at Thanksgiving.

In reference to the ICRC: When the ICRC came for an October visit, called me at Camp Victory and said, "This is B.S. they just showed up unannounced and they want to go anywhere/everywhere." I told him, "Sir, They can go everywhere." He then said, "We have to see about this, they need to announce they are coming; they have to make sure we know they are coming." He also said he knew there was a prohibition against allowing the ICRC access to some of the detainees. I told him that he was referring to Article 143 of the Geneva Convention and that it was possible to temporarily deny access if imperative military necessity requires. I discussed this issue with CJTF-7 OSJA , who agreed, although they stated that it couldn't be a "blanket" prohibition and that the Article 143 exception was very narrow in scope and must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

The command invoked Article 143 regarding eight detainees during the December ICRC visit. The caveats to this decision (in order to meet the imperative military necessity standard) were: 1. It is only temporary. 2. Cannot apply as a general statement to an entire group. It cannot be a blanket request. 3. It has to be supported by factually sufficient reasons. 3. You must still give them access to their living area, since merely observing their living conditions won't compromise any intelligence objectives. I was on R&R leave during the December ICRC visit. The ICRC seemed pleased during their review of the December visit (in January 04) regarding the positive changes made since their October visit. In reference to the ICRC response to their first visit: I was not involved in replying. This is the memo that BG KARPINSKI signed.

I am aware of one allegation of sexual abuse. called me and informed me that three interrogators and an interpreter had conducted an unauthorized interrogation on two female detainees and asked one of them to take her shirt off. When I discussed this with COL PAPPAS, he was very upset. He took this matter very seriously and told me we were going to "nail" these guys (soldiers) if the allegations proved true. CID conducted an investigation, but it was inconclusive and we were unable to prove sexual
assault. Also, the involved soldiers denied any misconduct, and other detainees in the same holding area told CID that the females making the allegations were "nuts." The only thing we could prove was that the soldiers conducted an unauthorized interrogation without clearing it through proper channels. They were given ARTICLE 15s for the unauthorized interrogations. I do not know of any other incidents. I do not know about the incident relating to COL PAPPAS was always extremely careful to make sure he followed the UCMJ regulations.

I knew that detainees were placed in segregation. They were in cells alone to prevent them from speaking with other detainees. There might have been confusion with the word segregation and isolation. Segregation was authorized if you wanted to separate an individual from a group of detainees to prevent them from speaking to one another. Isolation was implemented as a means of discipline.

I never witnessed dogs being used during interrogations. I did see the dogs out in the yard near the Entry Control Point and walking around outside the concertina wire. No request for the use of dogs ever came through me. I never saw any requests with "want to be allowed use any approach necessary." In reference to women's underwear. I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee in women's underwear. Any interrogation plan with a combination of an approved technique and a technique requiring approval from higher had to be submitted in its entirety for approval.

About a week after I returned from R&R in January 04, (CID) came to me with the pictures of detainee abuse that had been turned in. He wanted my assistance as a prosecutor to determine how to proceed. I immediately called CTF-7 OSJA to notify them about the photographs. After assisting CID with the investigation for the first month, we felt that MPs and MI soldiers accused of abusing detainees were doing it (at least in part) for fun because of the witness statements, as well as the time, place and manner that the misconduct occurred.

The capturing units were bringing in detainees who were suspected of BA'ATH party or FEDAYEEN Membership. This was filling up Abu Ghraib. The magistrate cell identified good candidates for release in relation to theater policy and the Geneva Conventions. I would assist the magistrate cell with any questions relating to MI Holds who had been identified as candidates for release. If there was nothing on the capture tag, I would go to and ask about the status of the detainee. She would then provide details on that particular detainee. The Magistrate Cell would have the copies of the Medical file, MI Notes, CID report, and MP report. The 519th kept the interrogation plans.

Please let me know if you have additional questions regarding this matter.

Judge Advocate General's Corps
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

1. LOCATION
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

2. DATE
2004/04/27

3. TIME
1800

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
C2, CTTF-7, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
CTV

I was aware of a thumb drive which was turn in to me sometime in March. I was told one of the photos was of a dead body. I opened the file to find out if the photos were of a dead body or any M1 personnel. When I opened the photos, I saw photos of dead bodies. There were also some personal photos of females posing as normal soldiers. One of the females looked like a normal soldier but it was not. There were other photos of military personnel posing with detainees. I believed the photos to be of troops from the 82nd conducting their operations from the beginning and the end of detainee operations. There were no sexually explicit photos. There was one photo of a detainee on his knees with his back to me and military personnel were posing behind the detainee in front of a building that appeared to be what they had just raided. I didn't feel the photos were severe enough to take it to CID. I asked the JAG officer what I should do with the photos. He said since it did not involve M1 personnel, we should return the thumb drive to the owner. I gave the thumb drive to the MSG who worked with me and asked him to find out who it belonged to and return it to its rightful owner. They spoke to the owner and asked if the drive was hers and she said no. She identified one of the individuals as being an 82nd soldier. She knew that because she has worked with the 82nd before. I don't remember naked bodies, however, there was one dead body that his upper body exposed because it looked like the body had been blown up. I know our folks can not take pictures of detainees and I do not know the policy for other units. I do know that if he was a POW they could not take photos to degrade an individual.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to the statement?
A. No.

END OF STATEMENT

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CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 1 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 1 June 2004, the undersigned met with LTC, USA; Deputy Director, Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC), Baghdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), Iraq; and CW4, USA; Senior Interrogator, JIDC to obtain all logs concerning JIDC operations between 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004. Foust advised that no such logs or records currently existed within the JIDC. He recommended we contact the 391st Military Police Battalion, BCCF to obtain logs and records concerning detainee operations.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[Redacted]
Investigating Officer
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Directed Document Search

Pursuant to the telephone request on 16 June 2004 made by [Redacted] for MG Fay, Deputy G2, USA, I caused a thorough inspection to be made of all office, storage, and work areas in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) for documents pertaining to interrogation and debriefing operations from August 2003 to January 2004. The inspection was conducted from 16-17 June 2004 and did not reveal any additional documents beyond those documents previously made available to representatives of MG Fay's office.

[Redacted]
LTC, MI
JIDC Deputy Director
I arrived at Abu Ghraib as an Individual Augmentee from the 470th MI Group on or about 16 October 2003. I was assigned to the Detainee Assessment Board (DAB). My DAB Supervisor was [redacted]. When I first arrived, we didn’t receive any training for working in the DAB. We received the IROEs and I believe I signed them. The IROEs I would say were only vaguely understood due to the speed at which operations had to be conducted. Since the focus of the initial groups was on maintaining a steady stream of intelligence reports answering PIR’s, methodology took second stage to volume of output. The IROE’s were clarified three months later when we received updated IROEs which we signed again. We were shown the Geneva Conventions and told to adhere to them. They were on the wall along with the IROEs and other memoranda from various commanders within theater for the perusal of anyone who wished to review them. There was some controversy in relation to what the school taught and the environment we were in. The school was an environment where you would have some overwatch and where the ambience wherein interrogations are being conducted in a safe place with no additional stresses involved, but at Abu Ghraib, we were so busy there was no oversight on most of the interrogations being conducted as everyone was busy trying to hold up their part of the process. Most individuals arrived one day and were conducting operations the following day. Additionally, because of the stresses and due to the detainee’s cultural and religious upbringing, many of the things taught at the school were nearly useless or even irrelevant, which is why experienced or flexible interrogators were so absolutely necessary. Many of the interrogators should not have been conducting interrogations on their own. Most were young, inexperienced, and reservists who did not have the sufficient training nor the experience needed to achieve the necessary mindset of an interrogator in a combat zone. They did not know what to do so they reverted to screaming and throwing things, in other words, harsh approaches. After they didn’t get what they wanted, they could send the detainee to isolation for thirty days or more as long as they wrote the right memo. The focus was on intelligence, and the fast tempo dictated that oftentimes the individual interrogator or direct line supervisor had to be trusted to make the right judgment, but unfortunately not everyone was equipped to make the right decisions. The memos were being approved by COL PAPPAS or whatever individual had the authority at the time. No one was checking to ensure the recommendations were sound with any sort of regularity. At the beginning even a memo was not required as far as I knew but as I was not there during the first few weeks of the reorganization of Abu Ghraib into an interrogation facility, I cannot speak with any certainty. We were standing up the JDC being monitored daily, and the gate guards were being attacked. The DAE was not of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and there was no SOP in place on how to run one. We began developing one based on the GTMO concept, but the environment was different than GTMO. We were in a combat environment and the numbers of detainees requiring processing was higher so we had to make a lot of changes to the SOP. We were responsible for debriefing all detainees interrogated by the ICE. When a detainee arrived, he was screened and was either identified as being of intelligence value or not. Those with intelligence value were placed in CAMP VIGILANT. Eventually, CAMP VIGILANT became overcrowded some detainees having intelligence value were sent to one of the GANCi camps. A lot would go into isolation to prevent them from corruption of intelligence. I would say that the DAB identified about 85% to 90% of detainees were of either no intelligence value or were of value but innocent and therefore should not be held in captivity. We debriefed all the detainees considered to having some intelligence value to ensure intelligence was not getting lost and determined if detainees required to be held longer or recommend release of detainees. At the beginning, the initial group at Abu Ghraib became overwhelmed with the number of detainee being delivered by lower echelon units. The prison went from 200 one day to thousands during the following days. We did not have enough personnel to conduct the screenings and interrogations and determine the value of each detainee on a timely manner. When a detainee was able to answer a Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR), he would get interrogated numerous times and therefore, others would go without being interrogated for months. The DAB would identify those who had not been interrogated and question the JDC why it hadn’t been done. An interrogation would then be conducted but this didn’t always occur because of the dynamic of interrogators and due to their focus on detainees of intelligence value. This of course changed for the better after the JDC was more established and more direct oversight began to be conducted by higher echelon commanders. We would then get the detainee once the interrogator finished with the detainee. We would conduct a thorough debriefing of the detainee. The
In November, we also began to ask all detainees we debriefed if they had ever been mistreated while in the custody of the U.S. several individuals stated they had. One general stated that while at Abu Ghraib, some drunk MPs had gathered the him and five other generals from the General Population and taken them in to the Hard Site. They were tied up, blind folded and placed in a circle and were punched by the MPs. After the MPs were finished beating them, they were placed back into the General Population. I wrote this on my DAB report and reported it to my 66th MI. She told it was reported to a warrant officer (do not know his name. He is part of the unit who is part in now). He received a copy of the report and thanked us for reporting it. Another detainee stated he was stripped naked, made to stand on a box with his arms spread out and bag over his head while he was hit by his legs by the MPs. There were also two other instances where detainees reported being abused before they arrived to Abu Ghraib. One reported being electrocuted by an Egyptian interpreter who was working for a civilian agency. This had occurred four to five months prior to us speaking to him. Another detainee stated the capturing MPs threw him to the ground and pour dirt all over him. He said he was diabetic and was trying to tell the MPs and he went into diabetic shock. More prevalent than any abuse while in U.S. Custody were the reports that the detainee's had been abused by the Iraqi Police and the BADR Corp. I never witnessed any detainee abuse except when I saw a naked detainee walking in the Hard Site. But that is all I saw. I was pretty far away and could not tell who it was and do not know the circumstances. I do know that when criminals were placed in isolation they were often stripped. I was in the hard site at that time picking up a detainee to debrief. In reference to humiliation, I know that some interrogators would insult the detainee's religion and family. They did not physically abuse them, but humiliated them with words. The use of words was kind of questionable. We didn't know how far they could go with words. In reference to dogs, one of my friends, I do not remember who, said someone used the dog for an interrogation. That is all I know about dogs. We did not know what the MPs could do with the dogs or maybe the MPs did not know what we could do with the dogs, some things appeared to be in gray areas and often the individual interrogator or MP may have thought they had to make the decision themselves. In reference to OGA detainees, I am not sure I was some that were not processed and we could not talk to them. They (OGA) came and went as they pleased for the most part though some coordination was required. The operations section of the JIDC would know more as they were the POC for these agencies. I never saw or knew of any photos or videos of detainees until after the CID investigation began. A fellow DAB member said that a CACI employee pushed a detainee against the wall once. This was reported in the written report and reported up the chain. He spoke to him and told him that was not acceptable. We told him that he was going to become my partner. I was not pleased with his work. He made comments which were unnecessary. I did not allow the interpreter to translate the comments. He would insult their religion and would state that this was the time for them to show their loyalty to the U.S. I reported to my supervisor that I did not want to work with him. He left a few days later to go work as an escort. I wrote about the incidents on a memorandum that I believe was submitted by my supervisors. I believe that the CACI supervisor on the ground in Abu Ghraib, was very leery about doing anything to his guys. Another incident I was made aware of (I believe it may have been false) was a photo in file named [redacted] which was asked to humiliate male detainees by making comments as to their manhood by talking about the size of their genitals. My personal opinion is that of all the female linguists, she was the only one that would have agreed to something of that nature. I believe I heard this right before the CID investigation, but cannot say for sure. She was a bit more open than the other female linguists. I personally know of one female linguist and a male linguist that quit because they did not agree with the way interrogators spoke to detainees. My assumptions on the CACI personnel is that a lot of them were being hired on the basis of their experience in law enforcement and other such areas but that no true determination of their abilities as interrogators/screeners, etc. was done by the civilian company that hired them. Most of them were not properly trained on questioning and interrogation methodology but due to the fact that a lot of them were as much as twice as old as the interrogators leading Tiger Teams, they were not willing to listen. The focus on numbers (i.e. output) was so great that non-qualified individuals, both military and civilian, were allowed to have positions that gave them what seemed at times full powers over another person's life, namely detainees. Because these individuals (U.S. Personnel) were not screened or trained properly and not properly supervised, detainee's suffered incarceration and varied other discomforts, from mild to major, which were completely unnecessary in my estimation. Various reports were made of interrogators, linguists, and civilians treating the gray line between harsh interrogation and violation of the Geneva Conventions/TROE, but as far as was apparent no particular importance was placed upon them until the advent of the CID investigation. Some of the civilians thought that they were exempted from the rules of conduct which governed the soldiers and some of the interrogators seemed to feel the same. This, I believe, led to some of the misconduct that occurred, since the civilians didn't fear negative action and the soldiers could honestly say they were not personally involved in the actual misconduct. These statements are conjecture based upon my personal observations and conversations with other individuals and do not reflect any but my own opinions. I also think that U.S. personnel, especially civilian contractors, allowed them personal biases to color their reports, leading to detainee's being placed in isolation and being incarcerated for a longer period of time then if they had no wrongdoing was apparent. Often enough, the conclusion at the end of report which determined a detainee's future disposition (release/further incarceration), was more a matter of personal opinion than actual analysis of information given. People were afraid to take personal responsibility of recommending release of detainees, even when obviously innocent, and often this would lead to condemning statements such as "The victim was told the same story seven times but is lying because he should know such and such information and was therefore uncooperative. Recommend detainee be held in U.S. custody for the duration of the conflict."
Statements such as these were insufficient of themselves to commit detainee's to longer incarceration but couple that with supervisors fear of releasing anybody, and what came out was detainee's being held for months on nothing but an interrogator's personal opinion for which no substantiate information was given. The biggest issues that lead to the inefficiency in the collection process, I believe arose from the actions of lower echelon interrogation facilities and the capturing units themselves. The capturing units themselves were often not accompanied by appropriately trained individuals, namely members of THT or interrogators, able to make quick determinations of the value of a detainee and the appropriateness of detaining an innocent individual even if he did have information of intelligence value. Since the detainees were not properly screened on the spot and the capturing units were often not even qualified to conduct those types of operations, anyone who was in the area or looked out of place was detained regardless of culpability. When these individuals were taken to a brigade or division level facility, they were screened by civilians or military personnel who were not sufficiently or properly trained, or even sufficiently staffed, to render intelligent judgments as to the detainee's suitability to the information exploitation process. This resulted in the glutting of Abu Ghraib, a facility, which should have been housing only individuals necessary to the interrogation process, and not innocent individuals who should have never been taken from their homes, much less gone through two or three different interrogations facilities. Reports from lower echelon facilities were often not available and even when available, spotty at best. This led to a lot of duplication of effort at Abu Ghraib, which in turn meant an unnecessary delay in the detainee exploitation process. This was also true however of interrogators in Abu Ghraib, as stated above, who were also often not qualified or experienced enough for the job they were doing. The failure to ID those that could help us out in the communities instead of holding them in detention is a major cause, as far as I'm concerned, for the political instability/anti-U.S. sentiment existent in Iraq at the moment. I personal interviewed several individuals who were influential in their communities, military, religions, etc. but who had done nothing wrong or had previously voluntarily cooperated with U.S. agencies but were detained anyways. Some had letters from U.S. officials detailing the extent of...
their participation and a request to not arrest these particular individuals. These papers were ignored and the detainee’s held for months without any particular care paid to these documents. These detainees, who had the potential to be great friends to the U.S./Coalition efforts in Iraq, would have very little reason to stay their hand, and every reason to become implacable enemies of the U.S. once released. The detainee assessment branch functioned as a check and balances for the JIDO interrogators who were constantly being pressured to produce and thus had no real opportunity to check their work or pay attention to the detainee’s themselves. Individuals within the ICE attempted to do away with the DAB, stating that the interrogators themselves were qualified to make final decisions as to a detainee’s final disposition, but as evinced in the statements I made above and in the actual reports present in Abu Ghraib, oversight from a section not directly involved in the Interrogation Collection Element was necessary to avoid not only missing information of possible intelligence value, but also to prevent the needless incarcerations of innocent people who may have never even talked to an interrogator before their fate was decided upon. A comprehensive report was necessary to ensure that the proper disposition of detainee’s was being enacted and that interrogators did not recommend further incarceration of detainee’s who had done no wrong but had been unlucky enough to be present at the scene of a raid. Beyond that, I believe a system of checks and balances was sadly lacking at the lower echelon interrogation facilities, and someone should have been given the task of spot-checking every facility occasionally to ensure the proper implementation of the IROES as well as adherence to the Geneva Conventions. We received a training class by a linguist who taught us what type of words to use to humiliate the detainees. His name was [redacted] and was also requested by those interrogators who used more aggressive techniques. Although this does not necessarily entail any wrongdoing on his part or on the part of those interrogators who used him, the fact that the class occurred at all was indicative I believe of the notion that it was OK to humiliate detainees, to curse their mothers and daughters, to deride their religious practices, all unnecessary to a truly professional interrogator. I was shown some photos and was able to identify some of the military intelligence personnel. Photo #6 and #7 in file marked [redacted] were a photo of some detainees on the floor. Photo #23 shows an analyst in PT uniform and [redacted] is leaning against the wall to the left. Photo #11 in file marked [redacted] shows a female interrogator (name unknown) and a CACI interrogator who I believe was a member of a special interrogation team. Though this is probably of little relevancy, I would also like to comment that I was personally present at the general population camps in Abu Ghraib at one of the riots that occurred in November and which resulted in the deaths of some detainees (number unknown) and the injury of several. The riots were a constant threat to the MP’s during that time period due to the Muslim religious holiday of Ramadan. Many of the detainee’s, especially the innocent ones, with families, and who had been there a long time, felt like it was extremely unfair to them and were easy prey to the leaders amongst them who called for riots and such forms of violent expression. Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? A. No